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Introduction 
My aim in undertaking this thesis was to discover, as 
accurately as possible, what occurs in and between countries 
when foreign investments are made in mineral development. 
In this regard, two areas were identified as requiring 
attention. 1) The nature of the transactions which constitute 
the process of foreign investment on the physical level. What 
is involved here are movements across national boundaries of 
objects, money and instruments of credit, information 
(interpreted in its widest sense to include technologies, 
skills and ideas), and individuals. 2) The nature of the 
relationships which are created between foreign investors and 
governments (or other relevant political identities) in 
countries where foreign investments are made. These areas 
can be dealt with separately for purposes of analysis, but 
they are closely interrelated in practice. The nature of 
physical transactions (or perceptions of the same) play a 
crucial role in determining the character of host country-
foreign investor relations, and the policies and attitudes 
adopted by host country authorities exercise an important 
influence, in turn, on the physical effects of foreign 
investments. 
There is of course little agreement as to what are the 
effects, beneficial or otherwise, of foreign investment. This 
lack of agreement is not entirely a result of differences in 
political outlook (though such differences are sometimes 
important). It results to some extent from a scarcity of 'hard' 
factual information. The literature abounds with checklists of 
Xll 
perceived 'costs' and 'benefits',^ but studies which present 
empirical data concerning particular cases of foreign 
investment are much less plentiful. The paucity of such works 
is partly due to the difficulty of obtaining relevant 
information, but it also reflects a failure to undertake 
detailed studies of individual companies and/or projects. 
Where possible, studies of this type have been attempted in 
the thesis. 
Uncertainty as regards the effects of foreign investments 
also reflects the existence of two methodological problems 
associated with study of the subject. The first involves the 
difficulty of attaching significance to particular impacts in 
individual countries. It is unlikely that a particular effect 
will have the same significance in countries with different 
economic, social and political characteristics. What criteria 
should be applied in assessing the significance of a certain 
impact in any given situation? The second problem arises from 
the difficulty of distinguishing between the impact of foreign-
financed mineral development and mineral development per se. 
Such a distinction is required if a causal relationship is to 
be established between events in the host country and the 
specifically foreign nature of the mining investment which has 
occurred. 
Neither of these problems is susceptible to easy solution, 
but it is important to state explicitly what position is 
See, for example. Industrial Policy Group, The Case For 
Direct Investment, (London, January 1970); S.J. Rosen and 
W.S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, CCambridge, 
Mass., 1974), p. 104; Z. Mikdashi, The International Politics 
of Natural Resources (Cornell University Press, London, 1976), 
p. 42-3. 
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adopted in relation to both before embarking on a study of 
this kind, as the position taken can have an important 
bearing on the manner in which empirical data is interpreted. 
This is done in the first part of Chapter One. 
Part II of that Chapter outlines the kinds of effects 
which are considered in analysing the impact of foreign mining 
projects. It seeks to provide a broader perspective against 
which the analysis of individual projects can be conducted, 
by discussing the economic and other issues raised by foreign 
mining investment. One such issue involves the possible 
effects of foreign investors on political processes in the 
host country. As mentioned already, a close interrelationship 
exists between the policies pursued by host country authorities 
and the outcome of foreign investments, and this provides the 
background to the development of host country-foreign investor 
relations. Part III of Chapter One reviews some existing 
literature regarding the nature of those relations, and 
suggests some alternative perspectives. The various viewpoints 
discussed will be reconsidered in the Conclusion in the light 
of the case study material. 
II 
A case study approach was adopted in order to permit 
detailed empirical studies of specific projects and of 
policies pursued by individual host country governments. The 
scope of the thesis was set to include countries characterised 
by varying economic, social, political and historical 
circumstances. The intention is both to examine the manner in 
which these circumstances affect the foreign investment process, 
and to discover what the interaction between the two reveals 
XIV 
about the nature of that process. The actual choice of case 
study countries was influenced by the scope they allowed for 
original research, and by the ease of access they offered to 
research material (particularly by the feasibility of 
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conducting field work). The countries chosen were Australia, 
Ireland, Papua New Guinea and Zambia. 
Each case study will outline the manner in which foreign 
mining investment has occurred, discuss the mineral policies 
of the government concerned, analyse the economic and other 
effects of foreign mining projects, and attempt to assess the 
appropriateness of host government policies and the nature of 
host government-foreign investor relationships. In the studies 
of Ireland, Papua New Guinea and Zambia, a narrative approach 
will be adopted; developments relating to individual projects 
and/or companies will be outlined, and the analysis conducted 
at appropriate stages of the narrative. It is possible to 
adopt this approach because each of these countries is host 
to only two or three major companies mining one or two 
commodities, and consequently detailed studies of individual 
projects can be combined with an analysis of the broad national 
and international issues arising from the position of the 
mining industry as a whole within each country. This 
possibility is excluded in Australia because of the wide range 
of minerals produced and the large number of corporations 
involved. An examination of a few companies or projects in one 
or two sectors would be unlikely to provide a basis on which to 
2 
Thus a South T^erican country was not included because 
considerable research has already been conducted on foreign 
mining investment in the region, reducing the scope for original 
work, and because financial constraints rendered field work 
impossible. 
XV 
deal with national issues, while constraints of time and 
space made a comprehensive approach impossible. Thus in the 
Australian case, government policies and the assumptions on 
which they were based will first be outlined, and the validity 
of those assumptions and the appropriateness of policies 
subsequently examined in the light of an analysis of the 
economic and other effects of foreign mining investment as a 
whole. 
Ill 
Before outlining its subject matter in more detail, it 
may be useful to clarify what the thesis does not attempt to 
do. First, it does not attempt an exact calculation of every 
impact of foreign mining investment with the aim of arriving 
at a single figure which would stand for all economic and other 
costs and benefits. While it is important to gauge the various 
effects of foreign investment as accurately as possible, I do 
not believe it is feasible to arrive at such a figure.^ 
Certain costs or benefits cannot be quantified, the significance 
of a particular impact can vary from case to case, and assess-
ment of certain effects require value judgements which only 
policy-makers in the host country are qualified to make. In 
any case, such a figure would reveal little about the economic 
and political processes which led to a particular outcome. 
Rather the aim of the thesis is to identify the various effects 
of foreign-financed mineral development, assess their significance 
from the host country's point of view, and isolate the factors 
which determine the scale and direction of those effects. Such 
Some of the difficulties involved in attempting to do so are 
discussed by R. Vernon, Storm over the Multinationals: The Real 
Issues, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 
pp. 159-60. 
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an approach can yield useful information regarding the 
character of foreign mining investment, the kinds of policies 
which are likely to maximise its benefits and minimise its 
costs to the host country, and the nature of the foreign 
investor-host country relationship. 
Second, my main concern is with what occurs when a 
foreign mining investment is made, not with what motivated 
that investment. Corporate motivation may of course have an 
important bearing on the outcome of an investment, and the 
issue is not ignored, but neither is it a focus of attention. 
However, one general point should be made regarding the motives 
of the companies encountered in this study. With few exceptions, 
they were not concerned to secure captive sources of raw 
4 
materials for consumption in their home countries. Rather 
their aim was to apply their capital profitably in developing 
minerals for sale in markets outside their home countries.^ 
As will become apparent, this fact had important implications 
for the host countries . 
Third, the thesis is not concerned with the nature of 
international trade in minerals, or with what this implies for 
the relationship between mineral exporting and mineral consuming 
countries. This issue is enormously important for both the host 
country and the foreign investor, as in most cases the value 
accorded minerals in international trade determines the size 
^ The exceptions involved European aluminium companies and 
British lead/zinc producers operating in Australia. 
^ Canadian companies developed Irish minerals for sale in Europe; 
American and South American companies developed Zambian copper 
for sale in Europe and Japan; British and American companies 
developed Australian and Papua New Guinea minerals for sale in 
Japan and Europe. 
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of the surplus available for distribution between the two. 
However, the focus of the thesis is on the manner in which 
that distribution occurs, rather than on the factors which 
determine its perimeters. 
Chapter One 
THE FRAx^lEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
This chapter outlines the framework of analysis used 
in the thesis. First, some methodological questions raised 
by a study of this type are examined. Second, the kinds of 
effects considered in analysing the impact of foreign mining 
investments are discussed in general terms, and economic and 
other issues arising from them are considered. Finally, a 
number of theories regarding the nature of host country-
foreign investor relations are discussed. 
Two principal methodological problems were encountered. 
The first, especially relevant in a comparative study, arises 
from the difficulty of assessing the significance of particular 
impacts in individual countries. For example, provision of 
employment in areas of Ireland suffering from economic and 
social decline may obviously have implications quite different 
to creation of employment on a similar scale in remote and 
sparsely populated areas of Australia. In other words, 
describing the physical impacts of foreign investment does not 
automatically allow weight and significance to be attached to 
those impacts, that is to assign them as 'costs' or 'benefits' 
of various magnitudes. 
Two alternative approaches could be adopted in dealing 
with this problem. The first would involve a calculation of 
the extent to which various impacts have aided or obstructed 
host country governments in pursuit of their policy aims. 
For instance, generation of foreign exchange by a foreign 
mining operation would be assigned as a 'benefit' where the 
government was concerned to maximise foreign currency inflow, 
with the significance of the benefit being determined by the 
size of its contribution in relation to total perceived needs. 
Likewise if utilisation of foreign investment diminished the 
possibility that a government's desire to have minerals 
processed locally would be satisfied, this impact could be 
assigned as a 'cost', whose magnitude would depend on the 
scale of economic opportunities believed to have been lost. 
A second approach v;ould be to inquire whether foreign mining 
investment had contributed to a more efficient utilisation 
of resources (by mobilising idle resources or by attracting 
resources from alternative, less productive uses), or whether 
it had the opposite effect. This approach could lead to quite, 
different conclusions from the first. For example, it might 
transpire that mineral processing would represent a relatively 
inefficient use of resources, and the failure of foreign 
companies to invest in processing would consequently not be 
regarded unfavourably. 
This second approach is essentially that of the 
economist, who attempts to establish optimum patterns of 
resource allocation, and assesses particular economic activities 
by gauging the extent to v;hich they contribute to or detract 
from achievement of the optimum. The political orientation 
of the thesis, and my own training, would indicate that it 
would be more appropriate (and more prudent) to adopt the 
first approach, but to do so would create a major difficulty. 
It would involve acceptance of government policies as given, 
excluding any critical element from the analysis. This would 
be undesirable for at least two reasons. 
First, it would diminish the practical value of the 
study, which would merely consist of a catalogue of policies, 
a catalogue of impacts, and a comparison between the two. 
No conclusions could be reached regarding the appropriateness 
of the policies being pursued. In other words, no 
recognition would be given to the fact that policies can play 
a role in determining the impact of foreign mining investment, 
and that policy-makers should take account of the likely or 
actual effects of such investment in formulating policies. 
For instance, it might be stated that only a small percentage 
of the foreign exchange earned by a foreign mining project 
remained in the host country, and that the project 
consequently contributed little to government endeavours to 
overcome balance of payments deficits. But the important 
issues in this case (both in terms of their inherent interest 
and in terms of their implications for policy-making) are, 
for example, whether a higher proportion of foreign exchange 
could have been retained if different policies had been 
adopted, or whether a low level of net foreign exchange inflow 
is inevitably associated with this type of project? If the 
latter, could the host country pursue a more sensible strategy 
in attempting to balance its external transactions? 
Second, a crucial issue in examining host country-
foreign investor relations involves the possibility that 
foreign investors might influence host country authorities 
into adopting policies which are in fact not likely to 
maximise host country returns from mineral development. From 
this perspective also it is essential to assess the 
appropriateness of government policies. 
Thus it is not desirable to avoid prescription altogether. 
In any case, it would probably be impossible to do so, as an 
empirical analysis of the impact of foreign mining investment 
will almost inevitably generate conclusions regarding the 
appropriateness of host country policies. 
For these reasons, a compromise approach has been 
adopted. Attention is focused on the extent to which foreign 
mining investment accords v/ith host government policies, but 
in addition the appropriateness of those policies is assessed 
in the light of economic and other circumstances prevailing 
in individual host countries, of their effect on foreign 
mining investment, and of the actual impact of such investment. 
This assessment frequently does involve judgements as to the 
efficiency of allocating resources in one way rather than 
another, but does not require a rigorous economic analysis 
aimed at establishing optimum patterns of resource allocation. 
The second methodological problem arises from the need 
to establish a causal relationship between the occurrence of 
foreign mining investment and empirically-observed phenomena 
in the host country. In one sense, this relationship can be 
established quite easily, as foreign mining projects are 
clearly responsible for particular physical occurrences. 
However, the question arises as to whether the foreign nature 
of the investment concerned is responsible, or whether those 
occurrences would result from any type of mineral development? 
To a n s w e r t h i s q u e s t i o n , w e r e q u i r e a b a s i s of c o m p a r i s o n 
w h i c h , b y i l l u s t r a t i n g w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n in a l t e r n a t i v e 
s i t u a t i o n s , w o u l d p e r m i t t h e e f f e c t o f the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
f o r e i g n n a t u r e o f a n i n v e s t m e n t to b e i s o l a t e d . H o w e v e r , 
s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e in d e v i s i n g a n a c c e p t a b l e b a s i s 
of c o m p a r i s o n . 
O n e a p p r o a c h w o u l d be to a s k w h a t w a s t h e m o s t l i k e l y 
a l t e r n a t i v e to f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t in e a c h i n d i v i d u a l c a s e , 
to i n d i c a t e t h e l i k e l y o u t c o m e h a d t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e 
m a t e r i a l i s e d , a n d to c o m p a r e t h a t o u t c o m e w i t h t h e a c t u a l 
i m p a c t of f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t . T h r e e m a j o r p r o b l e m s w o u l d be 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s u c h an a p p r o a c h . F i r s t , it is f r e q u e n t l y 
u n c l e a r w h a t was t h e m o s t l i k e l y a l t e r n a t i v e to f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t m e n t in p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s . T h i s a p p l i e s , f o r e x a m p l e , 
in t h e c a s e of A u s t r a l i a . A n u m b e r of A u s t r a l i a n i n d i v i d u a l s 
and c o r p o r a t i o n s h a v e i n v o l v e d t h e m s e l v e s v e r y s u c c e s s f u l l y 
in m i n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d it c o u l d be a r g u e d t h a t , in the 
a b s e n c e of f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , a d d i t i o n a l d o m e s t i c r e s o u r c e s 
w o u l d h a v e b e e n m o b i l i s e d a n d a l l v i a b l e m i n e r a l d e p o s i t s 
e x p l o i t e d . ^ T h e m o s t l i k e l y a l t e r n a t i v e to f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t 
w o u l d t h e r e f o r e be d o m e s t i c i n v e s t m e n t . On the o t h e r h a n d , it 
c o u l d be t h e c a s e t h a t e x i s t i n g A u s t r a l i a n c o m p a n i e s h a v e 
a b s o r b e d a l l , o r n e a r l y a l l , of the r e l e v a n t r e s o u r c e s (e.g. 
r i s k c a p i t a l , t e c h n i c a l a n d m a n a g e r i a l s k i l l s ) a v a i l a b l e 
d o m e s t i c a l l y , a n d t h a t t h e m o s t l i k e l y a l t e r n a t i v e to f o r e i g n 
^ If t h i s w e r e t h e c a s e , t h e q u e s t i o n w o u l d a r i s e as to w h y 
d o m e s t i c i n v e s t o r s s h o u l d n o t h a v e u n d e r t a k e n m i n e r a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t s in a n y c a s e . T h i s q u e s t i o n m i g h t be d e a l t w i t h 
in t e r m s o f t h e a b i l i t y of m u l t i n a t i o n a l m i n i n g c o r p o r a t i o n s 
to p a y a h i g h e r p r i c e f o r m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s , a n d / o r in t e r m s 
of a c o m p e t i t i v e e d g e p o s s e s s e d by s u c h c o m p a n i e s in t h e 
d i s c o v e r y of m i n e r a l s . 
investment is no investment. The truth probably lies 
somewhere in between, but precisely where? 
Second, even if it could be stated with certainty that 
domestic investment was the alternative to foreign investment, 
what assumptions are made about the character and behaviour 
of the domestic investors? Would their mining operations 
have been as efficient as those of the foreigners who did 
invest? Would they have enjoyed similar market outlets, or 
applied similar criteria in assessing prospective investments? 
Third, at any particular time the alternative to foreign 
investment frequently is total lack of investment. For 
example, during the 1960s and early 1970s a foreign investor 
explored for, developed and brought into production at a cost 
of A$400 million a massive low-grade copper deposit on 
Bougainville Island in Papua New Guinea. Domestic private 
investment on such a scale was inconceivable: the necessary 
resources, capital or human, simply did not exist. Neither 
was there any possibility that the Australian Administration 
would establish and finance a Papua New Guinea state mining 
company to develop the deposit, regardless of whether foreign 
2 
investors were willing to undertake the pro3ect or not. 
Thus the alternative to foreign financed material development 
was no mineral development at all, and consequently there is 
no basis of comparison on which to identify the effects of 
the foreign nature of the investment which did occur. 
^ This is evident from the Administration's policy 
statements and actions at the time. See Chapter Six below. 
A second approach would be to posit some hypothetical 
form of investment which would then be used as a basis for 
comparison, an approach frequently adopted, though usually 
implicity, in the literature on foreign mining investment 
in developing countries. For example, a comparison is made 
between the impact of the foreign investment and the expected 
outcome had mineral development been undertaken by a highly-
efficient public mining corporation acting to maximise benefits 
and minimise costs from a national perspective; divergencies 
between the two are thought to represent the effect of the 
former's foreign nature.^ 
This approach also creates difficulties, in that it 
requires assumptions regarding the properties which would be 
attributed to various kinds of hypothetical investment. In 
the literature, such assumptions usually reflect the 
political inclinations of the individual involved rather than 
any basis in fact. It is assumed, for example, that private 
enterprise would be inherently more efficient than public 
enterprise, or vice versa. My research produced little 
empirical evidence to support contentions of this type; as 
regards this specific example, efficient and inefficient 
private mining enterprises and efficient and inefficient 
public enterprises were encountered. In addition, the 
comparison frequently does little to illustrate the impact 
of the foreign nature of an investment, because of the type 
of assumption made, a point illustrated by the example quoted 
This approach characterises many socialist critiques of 
foreign mining investment. See, for example. Resources Study 
Group, Navan and Irish Mining: documentation of an £850^000,000 
Robbery, (Dublin, 1972). 
in the previous paragraph. f^o private investor could be 
expected to undertake activities which, though maximising 
benefits from a national perspective, might result in 
financial loss to himself. Thus much of the comparison is 
in reality between the hypothetical investment and any form 
of private investment. 
In fact it proved impossible to devise a general basis 
of comparison which would illustrate the effects of the 
foreign nature of foreign mining investments. All that can 
be done is to make clear in the case studies precisely what 
type of causal relationship is being claimed and, where 
comparisons are made, to make explicit the assumptions on 
which they rest. 
II 
Five general kinds of effects that have arisen, and been 
considered separately, in the literature are dealt with in analysing 
the impact of foreign mining investment in the case study 
countries. First, such investments may generate incomes for 
nationals, by creating employment, providing a market for 
goods and services, providing raw materials for mineral 
processing, or generating economic rents which can be taxed 
by government. These incomes may accrue to the host country 
as foreign exchange, allowing it to finance imports of goods 
and services. Second, the investment process may involve 
provision of resources which are in scarce supply in the host 
country, particularly capital, technology, and technical and 
other skills. Third, foreign mining projects may create 
external economies which allow nationals to enhance their 
incomes, for example if 'spill-over' of technology or technical 
expertise allows domestic enterprises to operate more 
efficiently, or if mine infrastructure is utilised in other 
economic activities. Fourth, mining activity may create 
external diseconomies, by absorbing resources which have 
alternative uses, by using inappropriate technology, or by 
adversely affecting consumption patterns or domestic income 
distribution. Finally, foreign mining investment may have 
politioallij undesirable effects. Host country sovereignty 
may be undermined, or foreign investors may subvert domestic 
political processes to ensure policy outcomes favourable to 
themselves. 
Generation of national incomes 
Perhaps the most apparent impact of foreign investment 
is that the economic activities it allows create financial 
surpluses. One of the principal areas of interest in the 
literature is the question of how and to whom these surpluses , 
accrue. Do they accrue entirely to the foreign investor? If 
not, how are they distributed? How should they be distributed? 
Can foreign investors remove surpluses from host country 
jurisdiction and so skew the distribution in their own 
favour? 
These questions are particularly relevant in the area of 
mineral development, as economic rents or 'profits in excess 
of an appropriately risk-adjusted rate of return on funds 
employed''^ are frequently substantial. The ability of mineral 
B. Smith and A.M. Ulph, Economic Principles and Taxation 
of the Mining Industry: An Introductory Survey, Paper Presented 
to the Workshop on Mining Industry Taxation, Australian National 
University, 18-19 November 1976, p. 26. 
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producers to exact such rents results from the scarcity, 
current or future, of mineral resources (reflecting their 
non-renewability and their uneven distribution), from 
the imperfect nature of competition in mineral industries, and 
from the fact that mineral deposits vary considerably in 
richness, accessibility, and ease of exploitation.^ This last 
factor means that while marginal deposits will, by definition, 
merely generate sufficient surplus to ensure continued 
investment and production, non-marginal mines can generate 
considerably greater surpluses. In sum, mineral exploitation 
can generate profits far in excess of those required to ensure 
continued development. 
This situation provides host country governments with 
an opportunity to enhance revenue substantially. And there 
are strong arguments for asserting that economic rents 
should accrue largely, if not entirely, to the host country.^ 
One such argument is ethical: since mineral resources are 
generally believed to belong to society as a whole, it is 
felt that profits in excess of necessary payments to factors 
of production (e.g. wages, interest payments, operating expenses, 
appropriate returns to capital) should accrue to the community. 
In economic terms, the concept of tax neutrality (discussed 
For a fuller discussion of these factors, see ibid., 
pp. 2 3-5. 
^ In theory, the host country could confiscate 100 per cent 
of economic rents without affecting mineral development, but 
this would remove the incentive for operational efficiency, as 
after-tax profits would remain unchanged for a wide range of 
production costs. 
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in footnote^) offers a strong incentive for appropriation of 
economic rents. 
Thus it is important that host country authorities apply 
appropriate taxation arrangements to foreign mining projects. 
Two general considerations are relevant in formulating such 
arrangements — to maximise government revenue, and to avoid 
deterring investment or distorting production decisions. 
These requirements will frequently conflict, and the extent 
to which they can be reconciled depends importantly on the 
manner in which taxes are collected. 
Profit-based taxes which reduce the post tax rate of 
return below the rate required by foreign investors, or are 
expected to do so, will deter investment; taxes which 
g 
are a cost on production (unit or ad valorem royalties) 
may also distort production decisions. In theory, these 
effects are avoided where revenue is raised solely by 
taxation of economic rents. By definition, such taxation 
will not reduce the post tax rate of return below that 
required by foreign investors, and neither will it affect 
Taxes are not neutral when they apply to that portion of 
revenue which is required to keep a factor (e.g. labour, 
capital) in a certain use. Where non-neutral taxes apply, 
resources will be allocated on criteria other than efficiency 
(which is assumed to be the basis of allocation in a 'free 
market' economy). Thus, a tax system should be designed so 
as to draw as high a proportion of revenue as possible from 
taxes which are neutral, that is taxes imposed on profits in 
excess of those required to keep a factor in a certain use. 
By definition, taxation of economic rents falls into this 
category. In practice, taxes which are neutral will rarely 
provide sufficient revenue, and must be supplemented by non-
neutral taxation. But this simply provides an added motive for 
confiscating as high a proportion of economic rents as possible 
so as to lessen the burden of non-neutral taxes. See B. Smith 
and A.M. Ulph, op.cit., especially pp. 2-4, 9. 
o 
Unit royalties are charged as fixed sums on each unit of 
production, ad valorem royalties as a percentage of the value 
of production. 
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production decisions since it will have no impact on the 
point at which marginal costs equal price. 
However in practice application of rent taxation by 
individual governments may not be neutral in its effects on 
investment and production decisions. Competition among host 
country governments for foreign investment may lead one or 
more of them to forego rents and, where the access of the 
foreign investors to capital and/or to market outlets is 
limited, application of rent taxation by other countries may 
deter investment and/or lead to a decline in utilisation of 
existing capacity. 
In addition, practical difficulties arise in devising 
a tax system which will capture a high proportion of economic 
rents and will capture only economic rents. Governments 
operate with imperfect knowledge, and rarely know what is 
'an appropriately risk-adjusted rate of return'. The rate 
laay be set too high, allowing rents to escape taxation and 
encouraging wasteful investment, or too low, bringing the 
post tax rate of return below that required by the investor. 
There are also important political constraints which militate 
against adoption of a purely rent-based tax system. 
Governments are rarely certain in advance that rents will 
materialise, and neither they nor their constituents are 
prepared to accept the possibility that their country may not 
obtain any financial returns from exploitation of its mineral 
resources. Consequently, profit or production-based taxes 
are usually applied. This of course increases the foreign 
investor's uncertainty as to the outcome of his investment, in 
other words it increases the variance of possible outcomes, 
13 
9 leading him to demand a higher expected rate of return. 
As a result, certain projects may be rendered marginal, and 
economic rents which might otherwise have materialised may 
be reduced or eliminated. Governments may be willing to 
accept this situation because of a preference for an expected 
income stream which, though lower, is more certain. 
Finally, it should be noted that the above discussion 
relates to situations in which governemtns are seeking new 
investment, whether by operating companies or by companies 
which will base their investment decisions on the expectation 
of being treated in a manner similar to such companies. A 
substantially lower rate of return will be required to ensure 
that existing mines continue to be operated efficiently, and 
where no new investments are expected,either by way of 
expansion of existing mines or establishment of new mines, a 
government may be able to capture a very high proportion of 
total profits. 
Thus the important issue is the extent to which host 
country taxation systems reconcile the need for revenue with 
that for further investment and efficient mineral exploitation, 
given the circumstances which prevail in a particular country 
and given the various constraints under which taxing 
authorities operate. Each case study outlines in detail the 
^ The relationship between the variance in possible outcomes 
and expected rates of return is discussed by Ross Garnaut, 
'Resource Trade and the Development Process in Developing 
Countries', in L.B. Krause and H. Patrick, Mineral Resources in 
the Pacific Area, (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1978), 
p. 146. 
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taxation policies of the host government involved and the 
political and other considerations which have helped shape 
them, examines their effects on foreign mining investment, 
and attempts to assess their appropriateness in the light 
of circumstances in that country and of the earlier general 
discussion. 
Another issue which arises in relation to mineral 
revenues is the possibility that foreign mining companies 
might avoid taxation by disguising part or all of their 
profits and removing these sums from host country jurisdiction; 
in other words they may be in a position to define 'taxable 
profit'. The most commonly discussed method of doing this is 
by transfer p r i c i n g . P u t simply, this involves the ability 
of corporations which control more than one stage of the 
productive process (i.e. are vertically integrated) to set 
their own prices for transactions between affiliates. Where 
a foreign investor can engage in this practice, he has the 
ability to define profitability at each stage of the productive 
process and, where these stages occur in a number of countries, 
can determine the point at which profits will appear as taxable 
surpluses. If conditions in a host country warrant it (e.g. 
high levels of taxation, restrictions on profit remittance), 
he can remove profits to another location. 
Transfer pricing creates particular difficulties for host 
countries as the lack of an 'open' market usually denies them 
^^ See, for example, C. Vaitsos, The Process of 
Commercialisation of Technology in the Andean Pact, in H. Radice 
(ed.), 'International Firms and Modern Imperialism' (Penguin 
Books, London, 1975), pp. 183-214; R. Vernon, Sovereignty at 
Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, (Basic Books, 
New York, 1971), pp. 137-9. 
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any reference point by which to judge the 'real' value of 
the commodity concerned. The same is often true v;here it 
is suspected that licence, patent or service fees paid by 
a subsidiary to a parent company are being utilised to 
transfer profits.^^ 
Another way in which incomes may accrue to nationals 
is through creation of employment, seen by many policy-
makers as one of the most important benefits of foreign 
mining investment. Opponents of such investment argue that 
foreign-financed mining projects tend to be capital rather 
than labour intensive, and so employ relatively few people. 
Two distinct questions arise in relation to the capital 
intensity of mining operations. First, could resources 
utilised in mining have been employed in alternative, more 
labour-intensive uses? If not, then from this perspective 
any employment resulting from foreign mining investment 
represents a net gain in relation to a situation in which 
that investment did not occur. Second, could or should 
mining operations themselves be more labour-intensive? It is 
important to clarify what is involved here. In theory, it is 
possible that use of alternative mining methods or technologies 
could allow substitution of labour for capital without 
affecting the size of economic rents. In practice, it is very 
unlikely that this would be the case — in any given situation, 
substitution of one factor for another would probably increase 
^^ For a discussion of this practice, see C. Brundenius, 'The 
Anatomy of Imperialism: The Case of Multinational Mining 
Companies in Peru, Journal of Peace Research, 3, 1972, p. 202. 
For an assessment of how widespread its use is among multi-
national corporations, see 'Is it a right royal rip off?' Age, 
22 July 1975. 
16 
or diminish economic rents, depending on relative factor 
costs. Thus a host country must decide whether its aim is 
to maximise economic rents, in which case it will allow 
foreign investors to employ profit-maximising factor 
combinations, or whether it wishes to maximise employment, 
in which case it must accept that, in certain circumstances, 
economic rents will be diminished. 
Foreign mining investment may also add to national 
incomes by creating additional economic activity through 
linkage development. Proponents of foreign investment 
frequently view projects it finances as 'engines of growth' 
which induce economic expansion elsewhere in the economy by 
creating a demand for goods and services (backward linkage) 
12 
and by supplying inputs to other industries (forward linkage). 
Alternatively, foreign financed projects are seen as 'enclaves' 
which are located in the host country in a geographical sense 
only, and which, because of their pattern of sales and 
purchases, are integrated into the international corporate 
economy of affiliated or associated companies rather than 
into the domestic economy.^^ 
12 
The 'engine of growth' argument is summarised by A. Seidman, 
Natural Resources and National Welfare: The Case of Copper, 
(Praeger, New York, 1975), pp.11-12. For a general discussion 
of the role of linkages in economic development, see A.O. 
Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic development, (Yale 
University Press, 1958), ch. 6. 
^^ The classic exposition of this view is that by H.W. Singer, 
'U.S. Investment in Underdeveloped Areas: The Distribution of 
Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries', American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. XL (May 1950), 
pp. 473-85. For a more recent discussion of the way in which 
multinational corporations are integrated into the international 
corporate economy, see N. Girvan, 'Multinational Corporations 
and Dependent-Underdevelopment in Mineral Export Economies', 
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The case studies outline the extent to which linkage 
development has actually occurred, and attempt to assess 
the degree to which the foreign nature of mining investment 
has inhibited linkage growth, if at all. The appropriateness 
of host country policies towards linkage development is also 
considered. 
For many host countries, a positive contribution to the 
balance of payments is regarded as the principal justification 
for encouraging foreign investment. The foreign exchange 
earnings represented by such a contribution are believed to 
be indispensible if imports of essential goods and services 
are to be maintained. A favourable balance of payments 
effect can emerge from an excess of capital inflow over 
outflow of capital and interest, or from the earnings of 
foreign financed export industries. Critics point out that 
the long-term effect of foreign investment may in fact be a 
balance of payments deficit (which, by definition, must be 
the case on capital account) and, where this is not so, that 
the net balance of payments effect may be very much smaller 
14 than gross foreign exchange earnings. 
Social and Eoonomio Studies, University of the West Indies, 
Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1970, pp. 490-526 [hereafter referred 
to as Multinational Corporations and Beyendent 
Underdevelopment ...]. 
^^ Joseph Grunwald has made this point in relation to the 
capital account in discussing US investment in South America, 
and presents data in its support. See 'Foreign Private 
Investment: The Challenge of Latin American Nationalism', 
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 11:2, 1971, 
pp. 235-6, 245. 
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A number of authors have questioned the validity of 
attaching importance to the balance of payments impact of 
mining projects as such. They point out that this effect 
is largely determined by the extent to which incomes 
generated by mining accrue to domestic factors of production 
and to the taxing authority. As B.L. Johns has commented in 
relation to Australia, 
overseas investment cannot bring about improvement 
in the balance of payments unless it results in 
higher incomes for Australian residents (including 
... the tax receipts of the public authorities) 
... [if] we have already taken account of the 
various ways in which the incomes of Australians 
might be increased as a result of overseas 
exploitation of our mineral wealth, it would be 
inappropriate to allow for the balance of payments 
effect as an additional factor.^ 
From this perspective the only relevant policy question 
relating to the direct balance of payments impact of foreign 
mining investment^^ is whether the increase in domestic 
income it allows is greater than or is matched or exceeded by the 
17 
increase in expenditure on imported goods and services. 
There has been a fundamental failure in some host 
countries to comprehend fully the link between the impact 
of foreign investment on domestic incomes and its effect on 
B.L. Johns, 'Foreign Investment in Australia's Natural 
Resources', in J.A. Sinden, (ed.), The Natural Resources of 
Australia: Prospects and problems for development, (Angus and 
Robertson, 1972), pp.297-8. 
^^ Foreign mining investment and/or mineral exports could of 
course exercise an impact on the balance of payments indirectly, 
for example by creating pressure for currency revaluation. 
^^ See, for example, R. Garnaut, 'Resource Trade and the 
Development Process in Developing Countries', in L.B. Krause 
and H. Patrick, op. cit.,pp.152-3. 
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the balance of payments, principally because creation of 
export income has been identified as the relevant criterion 
in examining this latter effect. This failure has resulted 
in the anomalous situation in which the granting of generous 
taxation concessions to foreign mining companies has been 
justified in terms of the export receipts which mineral 
development is expected to generate, whereas such measures 
themselves reduce the amount of foreign exchange available 
to the host country for purchases of essential goods and services. 
In each case study an attempt is made to calculate 
the net foreign exchange inflow resulting fron foreign 
mining operations. This is done by calculating the 
difference between the inflows of capital and 
export receipts and outflows of dividends, interest payments, 
debt repayments, undistributed profits, and direct and 
induced imports; that difference equals the total of 
domestic incomes, or the 'retained value' of mining 
operations. An attempt is also made to identify the various 
components of national income as accurately as possible. 
This exercise illustrates the link between the impact 
of foreign investment on national incomes and on the balance 
of payments, while the identification of individual categories 
of foreign exchange outflows and of the composition of 
retained value will provide useful evidence on which to assess 
the impact of foreign mining investment and the appropriateness 
of government policies. 
20 
Provision of scarce resources through the investment process 
The most obviously apparent advantage of foreign 
investment in this regard is that it provides capital in 
situations of inadequate supply, whether these result from 
an absolute shortage of domestic capital or from inefficiencies 
in its allocation. Proponents of foreign investment argue 
that host countries can also benefit substantially from 
transfers of technology and technical and other skills, 
especially where processes or skills are passed on to 
18 
domestic companies and/or to other sectors of the economy. 
Those opposed to foreign investment argue that the type of 
technology introduced may be inappropriate (e.g. by 
emphasising use of scarce capital as opposed to plentiful 
labour),^^ and that the skills imparted rarely have 
application outside the foreign investor's own industrial 
20 process. 
The accuracy of these opposing viewpoints will be 
examined in the case studies, but at this stage one general 
point should be made. The application of technologies and 
skills by foreign investors can only be regarded as a benefit 
See, for example, J.B. Quinn, 'Technology Transfers by^ 
Multinational Companies, Harvard Business Review, November 
December 1969, pp.147-61. 
^^ The question arises as to why profit maximising firms would 
not use technologies which took advantage of domestic factor 
endowments, since they could presumably reduce production costs 
by doing so. The explanation might lie in the absence of 
appropriate equipment or techniques (reflecting the concen 
tration of research and development in the developed countries), 
or in the comparatively low cost of capital within the economy 
of the multinational corporation itself. N. Girvan, ^ 
'Multinational Corporations and Dependent Underdevelopment ... , 
pp.315-6. 
^^ ibid.; P.E. Evans, 'National Autonomy and Economic 
Development: Critical Perspectives on Multinational 
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from the host country's point of view to the extent that it 
captures the fruits of the more efficient utilisation of 
resources which results. Where the effect is to render 
otherwise uneconomic mineral deposits marginal, the benefit 
to the host country depends on the extent to which local 
factors of production are employed. Where economic rents 
are generated, it also depends on the degree to which these 
are captured by the taxing authority. 
Creation of external economies 
In addition to any 'spill-over' of technology or 
expertise, foreign mining investment may create external 
economies by providing infrastructure which can be used in 
. . 21 
non-mining activity. Activities which would otherwise be 
uneconomic may be rendered viable, or incomes from existing 
activities may be increased because freight, power or other 
costs are reduced. 
In some cases governments construct infrastructure and 
may or may not charge mining companies for its use. Where 
charges are made the question arises as to whether these 
fall short of, or exceed, the cost of providing infrastructure. 
If the former is the case or if infrastructure is provided 
free of charge, the rationale for such a policy requires 
assessment. 
Corporations in Poor Countries', International Organisation, 
Vol. XXV, No.3, (Summer 1971), p. 682-3. 
21 Where infrastructure is particular to mining operations, 
its provision cannot be regarded as a benefit to the host 
country in addition to the direct economic impact of mining 
itself. 
22 
Creation of external diseconomies 
A number of external diseconomies may be associated 
with foreign mining investment. Foreign investors may 
absorb resources which could have been utilised in other 
economic activities, creating opportunity costs which must 
be allowed for in assessing their contribution to national 
incomes. For instance, foreign concerns sometimes utilise 
precisely those sources of local capital whose paucity 
supposedly justifies their presence. Two major studies of 
22 
foreign investment in general have concluded that this 
practice is widespread, and a third study has estimated 
that US companies operating abroad raise 60 per cent of 23 
their capital locally. 
Also relevant in this context is the fact that foreign 
mining investment absorbs non-renewable mineral resources. 
In this instance an opportunity cost may also be created, in 
that domestic investors who might later have developed the ' 
capacity to exploit those resources are denied the opportunity 
to do so. The point at issue here is whether the immediate 
benefits of foreign-financed mineral development outweigh the 
future benefits of domestically-financed mineral development, 
after application of an appropriate discount rate to the 
latter. 
22 
R. Vernon, op. cit., p. 171; Y. Aharoni, The Foretgn 
Investment Decision Process, Harvard University, Boston, 1966, 
pp.152, 166-7. 
23 
Quoted in A. Mack, 'Theories of Imperialism: The European 
Perspective', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XVIII, No.3, 
(September 1974), p. 519. 
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This is an extremely complex issue, as it demands 
assumptions regarding movements in prices and production 
costs for individual minerals over time, assumptions which 
can seldom be made with very much certainty or accuracy. 
Other issues are also involved. What changes are expected 
to occur over time in the magnitude or significance of any 
spin-off effects anticipated from mineral development? To 
precisely what extent and over what time period is domestic 
expertise expected to develop? Political factors are also 
relevant. For example, a government attempting to establish 
its legitimacy in a newly-independent country or simply 
trying to retain office may place a high value on benefits 
expected to accrue in the short term. 
It would clearly be impossible to reach precise 
conclusions regarding the economic advisability of 'leaving 
minerals in the ground' in any given situation. Thus in the 
case studies this issue is dealt with in general terms only, 
and it is in that context that the appropriateness of the 
time horizons actually employed by decision-makers will be 
assessed. 
An issue related to that of resource absorption 
involves the possibility that foreign investors may pre-empt 
domestic investment, by buying up or pushing out domestic 
firms operating in dynamic and profitable sectors of the 
economy. This could occur, for example, where domestic 
companies lack access to the capital required to develop 
Of course this in itself adds to the uncertainty of 
'leaving minerals in the ground', and will result in the 
application of a higher discount rate to future earnings, 
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mineral discoveries, and have to sell out to foreign 
firms. Alternatively, foreign companies may be able to 
outbid domestic rivals for resources discovered by third 
parties, for instance because the global strategy of the 
foreign company confers additional value on the resource, or 
because its superior technical abilities raise the expected 
rate of return from the project. 
It can be argued that the ability or willingness of 
foreign companies to act in this manner reflects their 
possession of real strengths which increases their capacity 
to exploit minerals efficiently. If the host country can 
capture part of the additional surplus generated by more 
efficient mineral exploitation, the immediate result of 
permitting foreign investment may be an overall increase 
in domestic incomes. On the other hand, it may be that 
pre-emption of domestic investment carries significant long-
25 
term detrimental effects, for example if domestic expertise 
in the mining field is stunted by being denied the returns 
which accrue to the resource developer. 
The case studies will hopefully throw some light on 
these issues. 
Foreign investors may also create external diseconomies 
by encouraging inappropriate consumption patterns in the host 
country. Consumption patterns may be deemed inappropriate on 
a number of grounds, for instance if they result in 
unnecessary use of resources which could profitably be 
2 5 
This viewpoint is argued, for example, by A.G. Frank, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America^ (Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1967), p. 313. 
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employed elsewhere (e.g. use of private cars rather than 
public transportation), or if they lead to expenditure of 
valuable foreign exchange on imported consumer goods. 
Distortion of consumption patterns is likely to be 
associated with consumer goods industries which devote a 
high proportion of their expenditure to advertisement. 
However, mining companies can have an impact if their 
employees represent a visible and well-defined group which 
exerts a 'demonstration effect' by practicing consumption 
patterns of a certain kind. 
Finally, external diseconomies may result from the 
impact of foreign mining investment on domestic income 
distribution. The creation or worsening of disparities in 
wealth between different sections of the community can be 
criticised on various grounds. One is moral, and involves 
the claim that such disparities are inherently evil. Others 
are political and economic in nature. For example, if 
small groups of wage earners become wealthy in comparison to 
the wage-earning population as a whole, one of two equally 
undesirable consequences may result. Should 
general wage levels remain unchanged, the income differential 
between the privileged group and other wage earners may give 
rise to economic and political disruption. If the 
'demonstration effect' exercised by the wealthy few pushes 
general wage levels upwards, economic development may be 
hindered (for example because economically marginal activities 
are rendered uneconomic). Regional inequalities in income 
distribution can also create serious political tensions, 
particularly in newly-independent countries which lack a 
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strong sense of national identity. 
Foreign mining investment may affect domestic income 
distribution in a number of ways. First, it may reduce 
(increase) returns to domestic capital by pre-empting 
(facilitating) its involvement in mining operations which 
yield a higher return than alternative investment 
opportunities. Second, it may increase (decrease) returns 
to labour by influencing wage levels, either directly or 
indirectly. Third, it may increase (decrease) disparities 
in regional income distribution, depending on the 
geographical pattern of its expenditure. 
A substantial number of variables are involved in 
determining the effect of foreign mining investment on wage 
levels and on income distribution generally. The manner in 
which they interact in individual host countries is examined 
in the case studies, and the impact of foreign mining 
projects assessed accordingly. 
The political impact 
Foreign investment is frequently thought to result in 
loss of host government sovereignty, a concept which covers 
a number of issues. Foreign investors are believed to be 
capable of taking decisions which affect the national welfare 
and, in doing so, of ignoring the wishes of host country 
2 6 governments. The decisions involved might relate, for 
? fi 
See, for example, L.T. Wells Jr, 'The Multinational 
Business Enterprise: What Kind of International 
Organisation?', International Organisation, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 
(Summer 1971), pp. 447-8; and S. Hymer, 'The Efficiency 
(Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations', American 
Economio Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1970, p. 447. 
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example, to the location of investments, retrenchment 
decisions, circumvention of credit restrictions (for 
example by transfer pricing so as to accumulate large 
surpluses in the country concerned), withdrawal of funds in 
times of balance of payments problems, or conclusion of 
takeover agreements. 
A distinction must be made in this area between the 
potential power of foreign investors and their behaviour in 
practice. Foreign companies may well refrain from exercising 
any power they may have in order to maintain good relations 
with the host country over the longer term. In addition, 
it is apparent that the potential of various investing 
companies in this regard will vary with the nature of their 
27 . • own institutional frameworks. Where subsidiaries enjoy 
considerable autonomy and are linked to the parent company 
primarily through use of a common technology or trade name, 
little difference may exist between their responsiveness to • 
host government policies and that of domestic companies. 
Where subsidiaries supply components to a productive process 
spanning national boundaries, responsiveness may be very low. 
Between the two extremes, many variations will occur. 
Historically, subsidiaries in the extractive industries have 
been very closely controlled by parent companies, reflecting 
the need to ensure supplies of high-quality products on a 
reliable and punctual basis. 
The question of national control over corporate decision-
making has in fact figured very prominently in the case study 
This point is discussed in detail by L.T. Wells Jr, 
op. cit. 
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countries, and it is consequently dealt with at various 
stages of the narrative rather than as a separate issue. 
Host government sovereignty is also seen to be 
threatened where home country governments intervene on behalf 
of foreign investors or where foreign investors are used as 
an arm of home government foreign policy. In this latter 
regard companies operating abroad might be passive (and even 
reluctant) tools of home government policy, being constrained 
from acting in certain ways, for example by anti-trust laws 
or by regulations prohibiting trade with particular 
countries. Alternatively, they might take positive 
initiatives on behalf of the home government. 
Finally, there is the possibility that foreign 
investors might subvert political processes in the host 
country. This issue brings us to an area which can more 
properly be dealt with in the context of relations between 
host country governments and foreign investors. 
Ill 
This discussion emphasises the fact that policies 
adopted by host country authorities exert a crucial influence 
over the impacts which will result from foreign investment. 
The clearest example of such influence is in the area of 
economic rent distribution, where control over taxation 
assigns a central role to government. Taxation policies, 
in turn, influence the distribution of benefits arising, for 
example, from transfers of technology or technical skills, 
and help determine the balance of payments impact of foreign 
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mining projects. In addition, host country policies in 
relation to linkage development and provision of infrastructure 
can be of considerable significance. On the other hand, the 
effects of mining investment, real or perceived, exert a major 
impact on government policies, as will become apparent in the 
case studies. This situation provides the background for the 
development of relations between foreign investors and host 
governments (or other entities with influence over the decision-
making process), and it is to the analysis of these relations 
that I now turn. 
Much of the existing analytical work dealing with host 
country-foreign investor relations in mineral industries 
concentrates on explaining changes in the relative bargaining 
positions of host countries and foreign investors (frequently 
2 8 
within a framework of game theory). Raymond Mikesell, for 
example, has outlined the way in which bargaining power shifts 
from the foreign investor to the host government as development 
of a deposit proceeds. In general, the bargaining power of 
the foreign investor is greatest before a new investment is 
made and lowest after such an investment is completed and has 2 9 proved profitable. Host governments, initially faced with 
^^ See, for example, R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in the 
Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-
Host Country Relations [hereafter referred to as Foreign 
Investment in ... Mineral Industries] ,{Johns Hopkins Press, 
1971), Ch.2; R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in Copper Mining: 
Case Studies of Mines in Peru and Papua New Guinea [hereafter 
referred to as Foreign Investment in Copper Mining] , (Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1975), pp. 24-33; R. Vernon, op.cit., 
Ch. 2 . 
2 9 • • R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment ^n Copper Mvmng^ 
p. 31. 
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the overwhelming bargaining power of the foreign investor, 
accept mining agreements which are very favourable to the 
latter. Once the investment has been made and becomes 
profitable, however, a shift in bargaining positions takes 
place. The mining venture has made its commitment, it cannot 
remove its physical assets (as can, for example, certain kinds 
of manufacturing concerns), and is therefore unlikely to 
withdraw while it is allowed even a 'modest' return on its 
capital. Political pressure mounts on government to utilise 
its improved bargaining position to increase its share of the 
(now very apparent) surplus generated by mineral development. 
It will usually do so by demanding renegotiation of the 
original agreements. Raymond Vernon has described this 
phenomonen as the 'obsolescing b a r g a i n a n d has analysed 
the manner in which the characteristics of individual metal 
mining industries and of particular host countries affect the 
degree to which shifts in bargaining power occur in specific 
31 
cases. 
Mikesell argues that the main problem caused by such 
developments is one of controlling conflict between the two 
parties. Conflict is regarded as inevitable, but it can be 
mitigated to a very large extent, for example by including 
provisions for renegotiation in the original agreement or by 
allowing for higher state revenues in the event of project 
^^ R. Vernon, op. cit., pp. 46-53. 
^^ ibid., pp. 40-5; 'Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment: 
Hard Choices for Developing Countries, Foreign Trade Review, 
Vol.5, No. 4, (January-March 1971), pp. 504-5. 
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32 profitability being unexpectedly high. Severe conflict xs 
in fact destructive to both parties, as it may lead to 
reduction in the overall surplus available for distribution, 
an outcome which would be in neither of their interests.^^ 
Development of such conflict (or what Mikesell terms 'warfare 
situations') therefore results from decisions which are 
irrational on an economic basis, and involve 'a political act 
usually taken in response to an ideological or other non-
34 
economic motivation'. The main problem is to discover 
'joint maximising rules' which will allow both parties to 
maximise their returns from mineral development without under-
mining their basic relationship.^^ 
T.H. Moran, in a study of foreign investment in the 
Chilean copper industry and in other publications,^^ argues 
that this approach is inadequate. Moran accepts that important 
short-term shifts in relative bargaining strengths do take 
o 2 R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in Copper Mining, pp. 32-3. 
o o 
In Mikesell's words, 'the total rent from the production of 
the resources is not independent of the shares' {Foreign 
Investment in ... Mineral Industries, p. 40). In other words, 
should a host country government demand too high a share of the 
rent, total rent is likely to decline as a result of lower 
investment rates or other reactions on the part of the foreign 
investor. 
Foreign Investment in Copper Mining, p. 29. 
^^ Foreign Investment in ... Mineral Industries., 49, 51-4. 
^^ T.H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of 
Dependence: Copper in Chile, (Princeton University Press, 1974) 
[hereafter referred to as Multinational Corporations and the 
Politics of Dependence]; 'The Theory of International 
Exploitation in Large Natural Resource Investments' [hereafter 
referred to as The Theory of International Exploitation ...], 
in S.J. Rosen and J.R. Kurth (eds.). Testing Theories of Economic 
Imperialism (Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 163-81; 'New Deal or 
Raw Deal in Raw Materials, Foreign Policy, No. 5 (VJinter 
1971-72), pp. 119-34. 
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37 place in the manner described above. But he claims that a 
simple bargaining model which outlines such changes and 
recommends strategies for conflict avoidance and 'joint 
maximisation' does not allow a satisfactory analysis of 
relations between foreign investors and host countries. His 
criticism is based on the contention that such a model ignores 
the dynamic elements involved in the whole political, economic 
and technical framework within which bargaining takes place. 
Moran identifies three such elements as being particularly 
important: (1) changes in perceptions of risk and uncertainty 
over the long term, (2) changes in the monitoring and 
negotiating skills of host country governments and in their 
ability to carry out functions performed by the foreign 
investor, arising from progress along what is described as a 
'learning curve', and (3) domestic political considerations 
resulting from the interplay of local political and interest 
groups and from changes in domestic perceptions of the role 
played by foreign investors. 
Moran points out that the initial foreign investors expend 
large amounts of capital with substantial risks of failure 
before they collect sufficient information to reduce uncertainty 
substantially (e.g. regarding the structure of production costs, 
the 'operating climate' in a particular country). In addition, 
these investors have a monopoly over the capacity to discover 
and develop mineral deposits. The heavy premium they charge 
for uncertainty and their exercise of monopoly power lead 
foreign investors to demand very favourable conditions before 
Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 
p. 93. 
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agreeing to commit funds. Host governments are not qualified 
to gauge the real extent of risk and uncertainty, and 
therefore must accept the assessment made by the investor 
and concede his demands. But once initial investments 
succeed, uncertainty as to the existence of orebodies and as 
to the technical and economic aspects of their development is 
greatly reduced. The host government can consequently drive 
a tougher bargain with subsequent investors, and may well use 
the leverage thus gained to renegotiate earlier, more generous 
agreements. Thus changes in bargaining positions which 
accompany individual project developments are not self-
contained, but rather are associated v/ith a cumulative effect 
which serves to improve the overall bargaining position of 
3 8 the host country. 
The second element involves the concept of a 'learning 
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curve'. A country will initially be lacking in the 
technical, accounting and economic skills needed to analyse 
the proposals and, later, the operations of international 
mining enterprises. In any case, its government will not 
possess the bargaining skills required to put such expertise 
to good use. However, the financial success of initial 
investments provides an incentive to develop capabilities in 
these areas. Thereafter, the host government can monitor the 
activities of foreign concerns more closely. In addition, a 
ibid., pp. 158-62. 
3 9 • • 
So in fact does the first: reduction in uncertainty involves 
a learning process through which the host country accumulates 
information regarding its own geological and other 
characteristics. However, here I am following Moran's typology, 
and he treats the two processes as separate developments. 
Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 
pp. 162-3. 
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monopoly of relevant skills is no longer enjoyed by the 
foreign investor. Government can push home the advantages 
derived from these changes, using the bargaining skills it 
has developed over time to impose stricter conditions on 
40 foreign investors. 
In combination with the reduction of uncertainty 
mentioned above, such progress along the 'learning curve' 
represents 'a fundamental evolution in the balance of power 
between the international investors and the host country', and 
it is within this 'slow but cumulative shift in the balance 
of power' that rapid short-term shifts in that balance take 
41 place. 
In this scheme of things, conflict is not a problem to be 
avoided or mitigated, but rather reflects the struggle by a 
host country to improve its bargaining position and to utilise 
the advances made in this area. Neither do attempts to gain 
control of mining industries reflect 'irrational' decisions 
taken for non-economic reasons. 'There is in fact a rational 
pattern of technology transfer, learning and interest 
articulation beneath the apparent "waves" and "emotions" of 
economic nationalism' and the action of economic nationalists 
represent 'a systematic drive to take over functions, gain 
expertise, acquire knowledge that were previously the monopoly 
42 
of the foreign corporations'. The rational strategy for the 
economic nationalist is to 
40 ibid., pp. 153-6. 
41 
ibid., pp.8, 154. 
^^ ibid., pp. 157, 222. 
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take as full advantage of the foreign 
corporations as he can while they are within 
his range, and not to push them out until he 
is as close as possible to being able to 
duplicate or surpass their feats on the 
international as well as the national scene. 
But pushed out 'they' will be: 'such foreign corporations 
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in thf. long run, to paraphrase Keynes, are all dead'. 
Moran argues that by examining the degree of uncertainty 
prevailing and the extent of progress along the 'learning 
curve', one can gauge 'the array of options open to policy-
makers within the horizon of domestic knowledge and experience 
at each stage of relations with the foreign investors, and to 
measure domestic performance against these options'. In 
fact, there are many instances in which available options 
are clearly not realised. These are explained by pointing 
out that policy is not formulated by a monolithic entitled 
'host country', but rather is 'the outcome of the struggle 
of diverse groups, of successive administrations and their 
adversaries, to maximise their own conceptions of the national 44 
interest through manipulation of [mineral] policy'. Thus 
the third dynamic element is introduced. Political inter-
actions of this type explain 'deviations' from the behaviour 
one would expect from a notional entity (the 'host country') 
acting to maximise the potential returns arising from its 
'objective' bargaining position. 
At certain stages, domestic political and interest groups 
with influence over the decision-making process will see it in 
their interest to make economic or political 'pay-offs' to 
^^ ibid., pp. 157, 222, 224 
44 ibid., p. 169. 
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foreign investors by not exercising the state's full bargaining 
power. Moran explains in detail the reasons for occurences of 
this type at various times in the history of the Chilean copper 
4 5 
industry. He defines 'exploitation' as the extent to which 
a host country suffers financial loss as a result of not 
exercising its full bargaining power. An 'asymmetry of power 
per se' between host countries and foreign investors is not 
viewed as a basis for exploitation, but rather only 'the 
refusal of domestic elites to act in the national interest to 
the extent that they have the power to do so'. There is no 
'exploitation' without complicity on the part of domestic 
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elites. 
The concept of elite complicity is of course found in 
much of the literature on foreign investment in developing 
countries, and it is through such complicity that foreign 
investors are usually thought to subvert host country 
political processes. The elite's willingness to sacrifice 
the national interest is variously attributed to outright 47 bribery by foreign investors, to its belief that foreign 
support is essential for maintenance of a state system within 
4 8 which it is the primary beneficiary, or to the desire of a 
^^ ibid., ch. 6 , The Theory of Exploitation pp. 1 7 1 - 7 . 
^^ Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 
p. 1 5 6 . 
Documented cases of bribery of local elites by foreign 
investors are mentioned in F.B. Weinstein, 'Multinational 
Corporations and the Third World: the case of Japan and South-
east Asia', International Organization, Vol . 3 0 , No.3, (Summer 
1 9 7 6 ) , pp. 3 9 7 - 9 ; 'The U.S. calls a halt to multinational 
bashing'. National Times, 1 6 - 2 1 May 1 9 7 7 . 
^^ See, for example, A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 
in Latin America, pp. 1 1 5 - 9 . 
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certain section of the elite to enlist foreign help in 
maintaining its political dominance. Moran favours this 
last explanation, but stresses that there is no permanent 
mutual interest between local political groups and foreign 
investors in 'exploiting' the host country. (Theories of 
'neo-imperialism' which posit such an interest are regarded 
as static and incapable of explaining change in foreign 
investor/host country relations. Such theories pick one 
point in those relations and wrongly assign permanence to 
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that situation). Rather elite complicity is viev/ed as a 
temporary departure from a long-term trend which is leading 
to greater domestic returns from, and control over, mineral 
industries. Pursuit of this trend is not the preserve of 
any one political or ideological grouping. Moran points 
out that the Chilean Conservative Party, which was at the 
centre of the major 'pay-offs' to foreign investors, 
eventually perceived its interests as different to those of 
US mining companies. It joined with other political parties 
of the centre and left in 'squeezing' those companies, and 
eventually in their nationalisation.^^ 
Moran seems to assume that such an outcome was inevitable, 
Political demands for greater domestic returns from, and 
control over, the copper industry, provided Chilean leaders 
with the impetus for progress along the 'learning curve'. 
Such progress, combined with reduction of uncertainty, put 
Mul tinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 
pp. 217-8. 
ibid., pp.156, 197-215. 
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Chile in a stronger bargaining position. It also reduced 
elite perceptions of the cost of dispensing with foreign 
investment and increased perceptions of the benefits to be 
gained from doing so. Elites of all ideological hues 
therefore inevitably bowed to the political imperatives, and 
took action to improve Chile's position. According to Moran, 
this type of progression was, or is, not confined to Chile 
or to the copper industry, but occurs in other countries and 
in the oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metals industries.^^ 
Thus Moran both offers an explanation for empirically-
observed patterns of behaviour and predicts that host 
country-foreign investor relations will follow an inevitably 
conflictual course, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of 
foreign investment. The case studies will provide empirical 
evidence on which to judge the validity of his propositions, 
but at this stage a number of general points can be made. 
Three relate to the concept of progress along a 'learning 
curve'. First it should be remembered that 'a systematic 
drive to take over functions, gain expertise and acquire 
knowledge' may impose substantial costs on the host country, 
absorbing human and financial resources which have alternative 
uses. Moran assumes that the benefits of following such a 
course will outweigh the costs, but this appears to be a matter 
for investigation rather than a justifiable a priori 
assumption. Second, he does not consider the possibility that 
a host country may exaggerate its ability to 'duplicate or 
surpass' the feats of foreign investors. It is possible that 
^^ ibid.,pp.164-8. 
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host country authorities might overexevoise, as well as 
underexercise, their bargaining power. They may miscalculate 
on their ability to maintain production efficiently after 
the foreign investor has been 'pushed out', and his departure 
may consequently impose considerable costs on the host 
country. Third, it is by no means self-evident that a host 
country will inevitably move along a learning curve even if 
it is in its interests to do so. There are a number of 
aspects to this last question, the first of which concerns 
Moran's contention that elite complicity will necessarily be 
temporary. 
It is not obvious that this will necessarily be the 
case. First, elites may have a continuing interest in 
engaging in complicity; as Moran himself points out, some 
very specific factors combined to persuade Chile's conservative 
elites to abandon their alliance with US multinational mining 
companies, and it cannot be assumed that similar circumstances 
will apply in other countries. 
Second, Moran assumes operation of democratic structures 
in the host country. There is in fact no guarantee that 
domestic elites will respond to public pressures for 
termination of exploitative relationships. Writing in 1974, 
Moran stated that 'no military dictatorship, no matter how 
suppressive of democratic rights, can reverse the movement 
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toward Chilean control of basic natural resources for long'. 
The validity of this statement may well rest on the definition 
of 'for long', but at a time when private multinational 
^^ ibid., p. 248. 
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mining corporations are again being assigned a major role 
in the development of Chile's mineral resources its validity 
can certainly not be taken for granted,^^ 
Third, even where democratic structures do exist, pressure 
for termination of complicity may not materialise. Foreign 
investors may merge into the local landscape over time, and 
this may serve to reduce political pressure against elite 
cooperation. In addition, politicians may not have a 
monopoly over the ability to grant concessions. These may 
also result from bureaucratic processes which are secret in 
nature, and consequently may not attract public attention 
(for instance interpretation of tax legislation by the 
enforcing authority). Finally, it is possible that a mining 
industry, though significant in national economic terms, may 
not be prominent in public consciousness, and for this reason 
also complicity may not be detected. 
Neither is it apparent that the granting of concessions • 
to foreign investors or failure to exercise bargaining power 
must involve complicity. Political actors may inadvertently 
cause outcomes which favour foreign investors, for example if 
bureaucratic or political rivalries weaken a minerals depart-
ment or other agency responsible for monitoring corporate 
activity or formulating mineral policy. It would be incorrect 
to say that complicity (which implies an element of 
deliberateness) occurs in such cases, and it should be noted 
that public pressure for a change in the actor's behaviour 
might not materialise, as no clear link might be perceived 
53 Mining Journal, 28 October 1977, 5 January 1978. 
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between that behaviour and the granting of the concession. 
In addition, a host government's ability to take 
advantage of improvements in its bargaining power may be 
constrained in important ways by political and ideological 
norms held by its constituents. For instance, a popularly-
held belief in the 'sanctity' of private property may render 
unacceptable certain policy initiatives towards foreign 
investors. 
Another issue involves the nature of the concession 
granted to foreign investors. Moran is concerned with the 
support of domestic groups for taxation and pricing policies 
which represent concessions to foreign investors, 
concessions which can of course be withdrawn almost 
immediately. If, on the other hand, the concession involves 
a reduction in host country bargaining power through 
dissipation of expertise, it may take a long time to reverse 
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it. In other words, in addition to the possibility that a • 
country will not utilise the bargaining potential presented 
by progress along the learning curve, there is also the 
possibility that it will, so to speak, slip back along that 
curve. 
This discussion raises a question in relation to Moran's 
concept of 'exploitation'. In his view, this results solely 
from the deliberate actions of domestic political groups. 
But there seems no a priori reason to accept Moran's statement 
54 
Technical and professional staff with the necessary 
experience are hard to find and, as they represent a relatively 
small group among whom communication is at a high level, 
adverse comments regarding a particular country spread quickly 
and can retard attempts to recruit replacement personnel. 
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that 'asymmetry of power per se between host countries and 
foreign investors [is not] a basis for "exploitation"'. 
Whatever the cause of an asymmetry of power (complicity, 
adherence to political norms, occurrence of 'pay-offs' 
elsewhere in the political system), if a foreign investor 
takes advantage of its existence he is exploiting that 
situation. This statement is descriptive, whereas Moran's 
concept of exploitation presumably has a prescriptive 
element in that complicity by domestic elites infers 
politically immoral behaviour on their part. It is descriptive 
because international mining companies will by their nature 
take advantage of a situation which enables them to increase 
profits and/or control over whatever time-period they employ, 
and one cannot rationally expect them to behave otherwise. 
But it is an important statement, in that identification of 
'exploitation' with complicity can result in failure to 
recognise the relevance of other factors crucial to foreign 
investor/host country relations. 
Two other general points arise. First, given that 
political norms favourable to foreign investors may retain 
their force over long periods of time, given that the actions 
of domestic political groups may not be linked in the public 
mind with the concessions which those actions give rise to, 
and given that it may be difficult to reverse certain 
concessions once they are granted, there seems no apparent 
reason why exploitative relationships between host countries 
and foreign investors should not continue on a basis which is, 
to all intents and purposes, permanent. This situation may 
be reflected in a failure either to overcome host country 
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ignorance regarding mineral industries or foreign investor 
behaviour, or to take advantage of improvements in bargaining 
potential. To state such a possibility does not involve 
acceptance of a static 'neo-colonialist' viewpoint; it 
simply accepts that change in host country-foreign investor 
relations may take place to varying degrees and in different 
directions in different situations. 
Second, it is not obviously true that a host country's 
failure to progress along a learning curve must imply a 
failure to maximise returns from foreign-financed mineral 
development. The host country may reach a point on the 
curve which allows it to devise a system of rules governing 
foreign investment so that the difference between the benefits 
it currently receives and those which could be obtained by 
further progress along the curve are less than the costs of 
making that progress. If those rules are permanent and 
generally applicable, yet flexible enough to take account of 
unexpected outcomes (and particularly if the taxation system 
reduces uncertainty for the foreign investor and also allows 
the host country to capture a high proportion of unexpected 
profits), then even limited conflict of the type envisaged by 
Mikesell may be avoided. In other words, the host country 
may be able to negate the effects of short-term shifts in 
bargaining power usually associated with major resource 
projects. 
This of course assumes that the interests of the two 
parties are fundamentally reconcilable. Moran clearly assumes 
the opposite is the case,^^ an assumption stated more 
^^ This assumption is reflected in Moran's belief in the 
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explicitly in Norman Girvan's studies of foreign mining 
investment in South Ttoerica and the Carribbean.^^ Girvan 
believes that such investment results in a clash of 
two economic systems with totally different 
objectives and needs ... on the one hand the 
vertically-integrated multinational corporations 
... on the other hand the national economy ... 
conflict between the corporate and national 
economies over the use of the same resource is 
therefore inherent and inevitable.57 
Much more is involved here than a dispute over the division 
of economic rents, according to Girvan. The production and 
investment decisions of the foreign subsidiary will be 
determined by the global profit-maximising strategy of the 
parent company. The dictates of this strategy may coincide with 
the host country's interests at certain stages, but sooner or 
later shifts in relative production and other costs or the 
parent company's diversification policies will result in 
production and investment decisions inimical to the host 
5 8 
country's interests. Further, the host country will want 
to maximise linkages from mineral development by maximising 
employment, use of domestic sources of goods and services, and 
domestic processing of minerals. The foreign subsidiary will 
wish to minimise labour costs and will apply technology developed 5 9 in its home country to do so. It will tend to purchase goods 
inevitability of fundamental conflict between foreign investor 
and host country. 
Multinational Corporations and Dependent Underdevelopment. ..; 
Copper in Chile: A Study in Conflict between Corporate and 
National Economy^ (Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
University of the West Indies, 1972) [hereafter referred to as 
Copper in Chile\ . 
Copper in Chile, p. 3. 
^^ ibid., pp. 61-2; Multinational Corporations and Dependent 
Underdevelopment p. 504. 
^^ Copper in Chile, p. 16. 
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and services from other subsidiaries within the group or 
through centralised purchasing agencies located in the home 
country, militating against development of domestic linkages. 
For various reasons, processing will also be largely carried 
on outside the host country.^^ 
Even if host country governments capture a high proportion 
of economic rents, Girvan believes that attempts to foster 
growth in agriculture and manufacturing through their expenditure 
are unlikely to succeed because of the impact of foreign 
mining projects on the national economy. First, mining 
creates external diseconomies in relation to other sectors, 
for example by absorbing domestic resources and by raising 
wage rates. Second, the development of linkages from mining 
may well offer the best prospects for growth in other sectors, 
but of course these linkages do not materialise. Third, 
mineral development influences consumption patterns, 
encouraging consumption of expensive consumer durables which 
are difficult to produce locally, but which can easily be 
imported because of the abundant foreign exchange provided by 
. 61 mining itself. 
In Girvan's view, the only v/ay in which a host country 
can avoid this situation is to secure total control over its 
mining industry, eliminating foreign investment and foreign 
6 2 influence altogether. 
^^ ibid., p. 50; Multinational Corporations and dependent 
Underdevelopment pp. 513-5. 
^^ Multinational Corporations and Dependent Underdevelopment 
pp. 520-3. 
^^ ibid., p. 526; Copper in Chile, pp. 61-2. 
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The concern of authors such as Raymond Mikesell with 
'joint-maximising strategies' reflects a belief that drastic 
action of this kind is not necessary in defence of a host 
country's interests, and indeed will have positively harmful 
effects. Though their interests will certainly clash on 
occasion, a fundamental conflict of interest does not exist 
between the foreign investor and the host country; both can 
be better off than in a situation in which foreign investment 
does not occur. Underlying this approach is the belief that 
the economic and other effects of foreign mining investment 
are generally favourable, or that appropriate host government 
policies can render them favourable.^^ 
Thus we are faced with a number of models which posit 
certain conclusions regarding both the impact of foreign 
investment and the nature of the foreign investor-host country 
relationship. Two assume that impact to be unavoidably 
adverse; a fundamental conflict of interest consequently 
exists between foreign investor and host country. One model 
predicts that this conflict will inevitably lead to withdrawal 
of foreign investment, the other that exploitative relation-
ships may persist for extended periods of time. Two other 
models assume that the interests of both parties are 
fundamentally compatible. One predicts that short-term shifts 
in bargaining power will result in limited and temporary 
conflict, the other suggests that such conflict can be avoided. 
^^ R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in ... Mineral 
Industries, pp. 24-5. 
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It is of course very unlikely that a limited number of 
case studies will conclusively establish the validity or 
otherwise of general propositions of this kind. However, 
they may well allow judgements as to individual aspects of 
each, and permit some conclusions regarding their comparative 
usefulness in analysing and explaining empirically-observed 
phenomena. It is against this background that I turn to an 
examination of the role of foreign investment in mineral 
development in the case study countries. 
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Chapter Two 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
IRISH NON-FERROUS MINING INDUSTRY, 1956-1977 
The Republic of Ireland is a country of some 26,000 square 
miles with a population of approximately 3.1 million. The 
twenty-six counties which comprise the Republic became a 
separate political entity in 1922. At Independence, the Irish 
Free State, as it was then known,^ was a predominantly 
agricultural country. This situation resulted in large measure 
from the absence of local supplies of key minerals (especially 
coal and iron ore), from the country's colonial status as a 
specialised agricultural producer for the British market, and 
from the exclusion of the most heavily-industrialised section 
of Ireland (the North East) from the Irish Free State. Over 
the next fifty years, its occupational profile changed 
considerably, so that by 1974 22.6 per cent of the population 
were engaged in agriculture and 29.1 per cent in industry, 
versus 50 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively in 1922. 
2 
This change was heavily concentrated over the period 1946-74 
and was associated with a reorientation of industrial 
development strategy towards encouragement of export-oriented 
foreign-financed projects. 
^ The official title of the twenty-six counties was changed in 
1949 to the Republic of Ireland or Eire. 
During these years, employment in agriculture declined by 
nearly 50 per cent, that in industry increased by 65 per cent. 
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Since 1922, Ireland has been governed under a Westminster-
type parliamentary system, and its Dail (Parliament) has been 
dominated by one or other of the two largest political parties, 
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. In general, economic policy has 
been oriented towards encouragement of private initiative, 
though government action (for example,generation of electricity 
from native fuel resources) has been taken where such initiative 
was lacking. 
As mentioned above, Ireland has not enjoyed an abundance 
of mineral wealth in the past. Over the last two decades, 
this situation has changed dramatically. By 1978, the 
Republic of Ireland had become the world's fifth largest zinc 
producer, its third largest barytes producer, and a significant 
producer of lead and silver. This chapter explains why and 
how this change came about, and examines the economic and 
political impact of foreign-financed mineral development in 
Ireland. 
The most significant mineral deposit discovered to date, 
the Navan zinc/lead orebody, was not brought into production 
until 1977, and consequently its impact cannot be assessed 
with that of the other mines. However the story of its 
development over the period 1970-77, which is the subject of 
Chapter Three, sheds considerable light on the nature of host 
country-foreign investor relations. 
Historical introduction 
During the period 1820-80, copper, lead and zinc mining 
occurred on a large scale in Ireland, but by the late 1870s 
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the industry was in decline,^ and by 1885 mining of non-
ferrous metals had almost entirely ceased. After Independence, 
and particularly after the coming to office of a Fianna Fail 
government in 1932, interest in the development of indigenous 
mineral resources revived. However, various factors militated 
against pursuit of a more vigorous exploration campaign in 
the years 1922 to 1940. Uncertainty existed over the ownership 
of minerals in many areas, a situation which was only 
remedied by the introduction of the Mines and Minerals 
Development Act in 1940. The absence of currently operating 
mines added to this uncertainty, reducing Ireland's 
attractiveness to private mining concerns. The Irish 
government either could not afford to, or did not wish to, 
become directly involved in exploration on a large scale. 
Speaking in 193 6, the then Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
Mr Lemass, made his government's views quite clear: 
The development of mineral resources is a matter 
primarily for private enterprise and I am not 
prepared under present circumstances to undertake 
the acquisition and exploitation on behalf of the 
State of mines ... 
As private enterprise was not enthusiastic in pursuing 
its allocated task, significant mineral development was unlikely 
to occur. 
Raw material shortages caused by the outbreak of war in 
1939 led to a change in government policy. As part of a drive 
^ The principle causes of the decline were increased working 
costs arising from exhaustion of richer, more accessible ores, 
combined with declining prices caused by the discovery 
abundant sources of supply elsewhere in the world. 
^ Bail Debates, 19 February 1936. 
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to fully utilise indigenous resources, a state mining company, 
the Minerals Exploration and Development Company Limited, was 
established and given responsibility for the development of 
metallic mineral reserves. During the period 1941 to 1945, 
the Company investigated a number of deposits, concentrating 
its efforts on the Avoca area of Co. Wicklow. It continued 
its prospecting activity after 1945 under its new short 
title, Mianrai Teoranta,^ and in 1947 commenced detailed 
exploration near Avoca. By 1955, the Company claimed the 
existence of some 13| million tons of ore, with a copper 
content over one per cent. Mianrai Teoranta was not allocated 
the task of developing the deposit; negotiations were under-
taken with Consolidated Mogul Mines of Canada, and in 1956 
a mining lease was granted to Mogul's wholly-owned subsidiary, 
St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited. The government's attitude 
was that state involvement in industry was only justified 
where private enterprise failed to show any interest; private 
interests were willing to develop the Avoca deposits, and 
consequently there was no need for further involvement by 
6 Mianrai Teoranta. 
The Avoca development 1956-1962 
St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited was granted a lease to 
mine the Avoca deposits on the following terms. The Company 
^ The Company's name was changed in 1945 to Comhlucht Lorgtha 
agus Forbortha, Mianrai, Teoranta. 
^ See, for example, the statements by government spokesmen. 
Bail Debates, 8, 9, February 1956. 
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was to spend stipulated amounts on exploration and development 
of the area; if the results warranted commercial development, 
St. Patrick's would construct a concentrator and other 
essential plant at a cost of approximately million. It 
undertook to employ 500 men, and to sell the products of the 
mine at the best price obtainable (defined by an elaborate 
formula included in the lease). The Company would reimburse 
the State for Mianrai Teoranta's exploration expenditure. 
The mining lease was, therefore, a detailed and quite 
complex document designed (at least in theory) to protect the 
State's interests. It took for granted, of course, that 
Mogul possessed the technical and financial resources to 
meet its commitments and to exploit the Avoca deposits 
efficiently. During the Dail debate on the relevant 
legislation, government spokesmen made it clear that Mogul's 
possession of these assets was the main reason why its 
involvement had been sought.^ 
The taxes to be borne by St. Patrick's were not heavy. 
It would pay a royalty of 4 per cent on profits up to 
£350,000, rising to 9 per cent on profits in excess of 
£1,750,000. In February 1956, taxation legislation was 
introduced which had an important bearing for the Company. 
The Finance (Profits of Certain Mines) (Temporary Relief from 
Taxation) Bill proposed to grant total exemption from 
taxation for a period of four years, and 50 per cent 
exemption for a further four years, to Irish registered mining 
companies commencing operations within three years of the 
enactment of the Bill. It seems clear that this legislation was 
^ Dail Debates, 9 February 1956. 
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introduced at Mogul's insistence, despite claims to the 
g 
contrary by the government of the day. 
During the Dail debate on the Bill, its provisions were 
the subject of harsh criticism by the opposition Fianna Fail 
party. The party's spokesman for Industry and Commerce, 
Mr Lemass, later to become Taoiseach (Prime Minister), 
claimed that the Bill was 'designed to encourage raids upon 
Irish mineral resources by foreign financial interests with 
the idea of getting as much profit out of their operations 
as quickly as possible'- He estimated that Mogul would make 
a net profit of approximately £13 million over the life of 
the mine, while Ireland's financial returns would be 
negligible. Other prominent Fianna Fail members, including 
the future Irish President, Mr De Valera, were equally 
critical, but despite their opposition the Bill was passed 
9 
without major amendment. 
Mogul carried out its investigations, decided to proceed • 
with the project, and by late 1958 had installed the 
concentrator and other equipment. During the development 
stage, St. Patrick's fully utilised the £1.76 million raised 
on its behalf by Mogul in Canada. Further funds were needed 
to complete the project, but Mogul was unable to obtain these 
Interviews with retired officials. Department of Industry 
and Commerce and Geological Survey Office, Dublin, 8, 22 
November 1978. [Unless otherwise stated, all interviews were 
held in Dublin]. The fact that Mogul's operation was the 
only one which could conceivably reach the production stage 
within the time limit set by the Bill lends weight to this 
viewpoint. By extending this time limit to seven years in 1959, 
the government gave the measure more general applicability. 
^ Dail Debates, 8, 9 February 1956. 
53 
in Canada, and it requested the Irish government to 
guarantee a loan for the amount required. The (now Fianna 
Fail) government agreed, having received a favourable 
assessment of the project's prospects from a reputable mining 
investment h o u s e . A loan of £1,368,000 was obtained from 
the Irish Life Assurance Company. 
Soon after production commenced, St. Patrick's ran into 
difficulties. It had elected to mine the sub-surface residue 
of ore left around 19th century workings, rather than the 
previous unworked areas delineated by Mianrai Teoranta. 
According to the Chief Geologist of the company now operating 
the Avoca mine, this was 'a fatal decision': cave-ins from 
old workings occurred at a number of points, blocking access 
to sections of developed orebody and leading to serious 
dilution of the ore mined (i.e. reduction in grade due to 
mixing of wast material with the ore).^^ Combined with 
depressed copper prices, the lower grades and reduced 
production resulting from these cave-ins caused serious 
financial difficulties for St. Patrick's. The Company arranged 
a second State-guaranteed loan of £550,000, and also decided 
to attempt more selective mining of higher grade areas. 
Expectations as to the richness of these areas were not how-
ever fulfilled, and dilution of the ore continued. Further 
development work was then undertaken to allow exploitation of 
the South Lode which contained 9 million tons grading 1 per 
cent copper, on Mianrai Teoranta's estimation. The Irish 
Dail Debates^ 21 February 1962. 
^^ Interview with Chief Geologist, Avoca Mines Ltd., Avoca, 
9 November 197 8. 
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government contributed a grant of £240,000 towards this 
work, on Mogul's assurance that it would permit production 
of ore of an economic copper content. 
This assurance was apparently based on a projected rise 
in world copper prices, which failed to materialise. Mogul 
did not have, or was unwilling to commit, the resources to 
tide St. Patrick's over an extended period of low copper 
prices. St. Patrick's went into receivership in May 1962, 
and, despite the injection of another £250,000 by the Irish 
government over the following months, operations had ceased 
12 
by September 1962. St. Patrick's defaulted on its loans, 
which became the liability of the Irish government. 
The Avoca project involved a significant mobilization 
of domestic capital by foreign investors. £2.4 million 
was invested from local sources, compared to Mogul's invest-
ment of £1.76 million. The failure of this first major 
venture in which domestic capital was involved was to have 
important implications. (See p.62 below). 
It is ironic thc.t its failure resulted largely from the 
absence of precisely those assets which supposedly justified 
the choice of Mogul as mine developer. Mogul did not apply 
the financial resources needed to render the project viable, 
and it made a number of technical decisions which were of 
questionable validity. In addition to the decision to mine 
alongside the abandoned 19th century workings, the company 
1 2 It was probably co-incidental that Mogul terminated 
operations three weeks before its exemption under the 1956 tax 
legislation was due to expire. It stood little prospect of 
making significant profits at that stage, and would hardly 
have been influenced by the possible application of taxation 
to hypothetical profits. 
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apparently failed to carry out sufficient development work 
before production commenced, and also attempted to make good 
production losses due to cave-ins by using indiscriminate 
mining techniques which merely worsened the dilution problem.^^ 
The political repercussions of the Avoca failure for the 
Fianna Fail government were immediate and serious. Mr Lemass, 
now Taoiseach,and Mr DeValera, now President, were publicly 
ridiculed for their earlier claims concerning the project's 
likely profitability.^"^ More serious were the accusations that 
government support for St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited 
represented a wasteful use of public monies.^^ It mattered 
little that the Company's failure was primarily due to the 
vagaries of the world copper market^^ and to the technical and 
investment decisions made by a foreign corporation. Future 
Irish governments would be very reluctant to permit state 
financing of mineral development, and the Fianna Fail 
politicians who were to dominate those governments would not be 
disposed to believing that mining companies operating in 
Ireland were enjoying excessive profits. 
The Avoca development has been dealt with in detail 
because of its significance for the formulation of government 
policy towards the mining industry during the following decade. 
^^ Interview with retired official,Geological Survey Office, 
8 November 1978; Bail Debates, 25, 26 July 1962. 
14 Dail Debates, 21 February, 25 July 1962. 
^^ Dail Debates, 25 July 1962. 
^^ VJhen the Avoca project was initiated, the London Metal 
Exchange copper price stood at £430 per ton; on the day 
production commenced, it stood at £ 186 per ton. 
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The period 1956 to 1962 saw an end to direct state involvement 
in the mining industry, the initiation of a policy of affording 
financial incentive to mining companies, a disastrous outcome 
to the State's first major financial involvement in the mining 
industry, and an embarrassing experience for the Fianna Fail 
politicians who were to rule Ireland until 1973. As will 
become apparent, these events were to cast a very long shadow 
indeed. 
The growth of mineral exploraton and development, 1958-1968 
An important side effect of the Avoca development was 
that it brought Ireland to the attention of a number of mainly 
Canadian-based mining companies. In the years after 1956, 
exploration activity increased. Initially, attention was 
focused on locations where mining had previously taken place, 
but towards the end of the 1950s a number of companies started 
to apply geochemical techniques which allowed prospecting of 
'virgin' areas.^^ One of these was Irish Base Metals Limited 
(IBM), a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Canadian-based company, 
Northgate Exploration Ltd. Northgate had been set up in 1958 
by three Irishmen who had emigrated to Canada in the late 1940s, 
Pat Hughes, Michael McCarthy and Matt Gilroy, and had there 
gained experience of the mining industry. Capital was raised 
by selling some 80 per cent of Northgate's stock to Canadian 
investors, while the three founders of the Company themselves 
retained significant shareholdings. 
As is explained on page 59 , this method involved extensive 
soil and water sampling which provided sufficient information 
to allow pin-pointing of likely targets for detailed exploration, 
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In September 1961 IBM undertood geochemical soil and 
water sampling in the Tynagh area of Co. Galway. The results 
were promising, and a drilling programme was initiated. This 
revealed the existence of substantial reserves of lead ore, 
18 
which also contained significant amounts of silver and copper. 
From 1962 to 1964, preparations were undertaken for the 
development of the Tynagh deposit. The Minister for Industry and 
Commerce issued an order, under the 1940 Minerals Development 
Act, taking possession on behalf of the State of all minerals 
in private ownership or concerning which ownership was doubtful, 
to ensure the orderly working of the deposit and to guard 
against obstructionist behaviour by private individuals. In 
December 1962 IBM was granted a 21-year mining lease, which 
provided for royalty payments on a graduated scale to a maximum . . • 19 
of 9 per cent on profits in excess of £1.75 million per annum. 
As the provisions of the 1956 taxation legislation had been 
extended by the 1959 Finance Act, the operating company would • 
be exempt from corporation and income tax for a period of four 
years, and enjoy 50 per cent exemption for a further four. 
Major development work commenced at Tynagh in 1964, and by late 
1965 the mine was in operation. 
The Tynagh discovery brought Ireland to the attention of 
the international mining industry, and led to a spectacular 
^^ Reserves amenable to opencast mining totalled 7 million tons 
grading on average 9 per cent lead and 3 oz. silver per ton. 
Secondary ore zones, which would be mined by underground methods, 
were discovered at greater depth, .but ore reserve estimates 
were not compiled at this stage. 
19 Minister for Industry and Commerce, Report^... for the six 
months ended June 30th, 1975, in accordance with Section 77 of 
the Minerals Development Act 1940, (Department of Industry and 
Commerce, Dublin, 1975), p.9. 
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increase in exploration. In 1962 Mogul Mines Limited, having 
ended its involvement in Avoca, took over the property of the 
Silvermines Lead and Zinc Company in Co. Tipperary, an area 
with a long history of mining activity. In 1963 Mogul located 
two ore zones at the tip of a fault whose existence had long 
been known, but beneath 'green field' areas where no mining had 
previously taken place. Once again, the application of modern 
exploration techniques had been crucial. Production commenced 
in May 1968, and Silvermines became Europe's largest underground 
producer of lead and zinc. 
In July 1966, Gortrum Mines Limited decided to proceed 
with development of a copper prospect at Gortrum, Co. Tipperary, 
and the mine was in production by late 1967. In early 1971 the 
Avoca copper mine was reopened by Avoca Mines Limited, a 
subsidiary of a Canadian company. Discovery Mines. 
Significant reserves of non-metallic minerals were also 
discovered during this period. A large baryte-mining operation 
was established near the Silvermines prospect by Dresser 
Industries of the United States, and by 1972 Ireland had become 
the world's third largest producer of the mineral. In 1969 a 
subsidiary of the Pfizer Corporation commenced mining of high-
quality dolomite (a source of natural magnesite) at 
Bennetsbridge, Co. Kilkenny. 
Two factors were particularly important in facilitating 
this dramatic increase in exploration and mining activity. The 
first was the existence of workable, efficient legislation 
relating to mineral ownership. A high proportion of mineral 
rights was owned by the State, while the Minerals Development 
Act 1940 empowered the Minister for Industry and Commerce to 
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compulsorily acquire any rights still in private hands, should 
this prove necessary. This meant that a company could 
acquire directly from the Government the right 
to explore a given area with the assurances 
that it can get a mining lease ... and that a 
present owner could not block a broad 
development, 
in contrast to the situation in Britain, for example, where a 
company might 
have to deal with a large landowner, several 
small farmers, numerous lots owned by retired men 
of their widows, perhaps a land developer and the 
estate of someone who emigrated to Australia 
thirty years before and died intestate.^O 
Under the British system a company might spend two years in 
obtaining satisfactory title to a particular area. In Ireland, 
this would take literally a few days, and in addition the 
company would know that, if its interest was justified, problems 
would not arise in obtaining permission to proceed with 
development. 
The availability of modern exploration techniques, 
particularly geochemical ones, was equally crucial. Geochemical 
testing, or the analysis of soil and water samples for traces of 
metal, permitted collection of data over large areas devoid of 
surface indications of mineralisation, and thus facilitated the 
pin-pointing of promising locations for further investigation. 
This technique was crucial to the discovery of the Tynagh 
deposit, a discovery which provided the fundamental prerequisite 
for a vigorous exploration programme, i.e. favourably altered 
perceptions as to the geological likelihood of discovering a 
deposit in Ireland. 
D. D. Derry, What Made Ireland Go, Paper presented to the 
Prospectors and Developers Association, 10 March 1969, pp. 5-6. 
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Another important factor was the 1956 taxation legislation, 
21 as amended in 1959. While the financial inducements offered by this 
legislation were not as significant as the factors discussed above, 
they did have a triggering effect. They achieved publicity in 
international mining circles, and offered the prospect of a 
valuable concession to any company fortunate enough to discover 
a commercially viable deposit. Such concessions would have had 
little effect, however, had mining companies felt that the 
possibility of discovering worthwhile deposits was remote, or 
that problems concerning land or mineral ownership would have 
made it difficult or impossible to develop deposits which were 
found. This legislation was also important in that it 
expressed an attitude on the part of the Irish government - a 
welcoming attitude, a determination to facilitate foreign 
mining companies in exploring for and developing minerals in 
Ireland. 
For these reasons, Ireland became an attractive location 
for mining investment. The companies which became involved 
in mineral development were predominantly foreign owned and 
22 financed, and the question arises as to why Irish private 
21 The 1959 amendment gave general applicability to the 1956 
concessions by extending the time limit for commencement of 
production to 7 years. 
^^ Eighty per cent of the Northgate group's shares were held by 
individuals or groups resident outside Ireland, and all of 
Northgate's expenditure on exploration and development was 
financed from abroad. Mogul of Ireland was 75 per cent owned 
by its Canadian parent, while the remaining 25 per cent was held 
by a company with substantial British shareholding. The second 
Avoca development was almost wholly Canadian owned, while both 
it and Mogul were entirely financed by foreign funds. The baryte 
project at Silvermines and the dolomite development at 
Bennetsbridge were 100 per cent owned and financed by US 
companies. 
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enterprise did not play a greater role. It was certainly not 
denied the opportunity. Local investors may not have been 
given the chance to participate in projects financed by 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of vertically integrated multi-
national corporations (such as Bennetsbridge), but they were 
23 given opportunities for involvement elsewhere, and at 
least one company (Northgate) made a deliberate attempt to 
24 
mobilise domestic capital. 
Two factors seem to have been of crucial importance — 
scarcity of risk capital and shortage of entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills. Irish capital has long fought shy of areas 
where the level of risk seemed high. In the 1820s, for 
example, local investors failed to finance the development of 
new banks which, by default, were established by British 
capital. Once these banks began to pay large dividends, Irish 
interests bought out the British shareholders. As opportunities 
for profitable low-risk investment in Ireland were limited, 
large amounts of capital flowed overseas into railway and 
colonial government stocks, and Ireland was a net exporter of 
capital for much of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
This pattern of risk avoidance and investment in low-risk 
outlets abroad continued into the 20th century, and in the 
2 3 
Share issues made by mining companies in Ireland were 
frequently undersubscribed, despite the fact that the highest-
risk stage of mineral development (i.e. exploration) had already 
been successfully undertaken. 
2 4 According to a Northgate official the Company attempted to 
raise loan finance for the Tynagh development from both 
institutional and -private sources in Ireland, without success. 
Interview, 1 November 1978. Northgate did in fact raise some 
equity capital in Ireland. See below, p. 98. 
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1950s and 1960s Ireland still suffered from a shortage of 
private risk capital. In fact during these years there was a 
scarcity of private capital in general, partly as a result of 
2 5 a low savings ration, partly in consequence of the continued 
capital outflow. The limited availabity of private capital is 
illustrated by the fact that of the total new capital of 
£376 million raised by public issue between 1951 and 1965, 
only £36 million was raised by private industrial and 
commercial concerns. The remaining £340 million was subscribed 
to central and local government authorities and to State 
companies. Meanwhile Irish private investment abroad was of 
such magnitude that over two years, 1964 and 1965, the return 
2 G 
on that investment totalled £83 million. Irish investors 
still preferred low risk outlets, domestic or external, and as 
a result funds available to risk-taking private enterprise in 
Ireland were severely limited. 
And it is very clear that mining was perceived as a high . 
risk area. The predominant belief that Ireland possessed few 
minerals, the high cost of exploration, and the apparent danger 
of failure at the development stage (illustrated by the 
experience of St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited) lay behind 
this perception. The extent of caution regarding mining 
investment is evident from the fact that as late as 197 6 share 
offers by resource companies in Ireland were still being 
^^ In the period 1950-55 current savings as a proportion of 
national income were 9.5 per cent; in the Netherlands, for 
example, they were 21 per cent, in Norway 19 per cent, and in 
Denmark 14 per cent. J. Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922, 
(Liverpool University Press, 1970), p. 63. 
^^ ibid., pp. 86-7. 
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27 undersubscribed, despite the fact that two major mineral 
discoveries (Tynagh and Silvermines) had by then been profitably 
exploited. 
The Irish economy has also suffered from a lack of the 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills so essential for 
successful initiatives in the mining field. Quantification of 
this problem is not possible, but many commentators have noted 
2 8 
its importance. The outcome of a weak tradition in commercial 
and industrial activity and of the small-scale family-based 
nature of what activity did occur, this scarcity of human 
resources was worsened by the constant 'brain drain' resulting 
from heavy emigration. 
Thus the field was left to foreign investors, and it seems 
certain that had they not found Ireland an attractive 
investment location, mineral development would not have 
occurred in the 1960s. 
The twenty-year tax exemption 
In 1967 the Fianna Fail government introduced a twenty-
year tax exemption for foreign mining companies operating in 
Ireland. This exemption, announced in the Budget Address on 
11 April, replaced the existing provisions which allowed four 
years of total exemption and a further four years exemption 
on 50 per cent of profits. As none of the mines then known 
to exist had a life expectancy of more than twenty years, the 
27 
See for example, reports of undersubscribed share issues in 
The Irish Press, 26 June 1976. 
^^ See, for example, J.Lee, 'Capital in the Irish Economy', in 
L.M. Cullen, (ed.) The Formation of the Irish Economy, (Mercier 
Press, Cork, 1969), pp. 53-63; J. Meenan, op.cit., p. 155. 
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Irish government was effectively denying itself the 
possibility of obtaining significant revenue from the mining 
• ^ ^ 29 industry. 
By 1967, the extent of uncertainty associated with 
mineral development in Ireland had diminished greatly. Five 
major mineral deposits had been discovered during the previous 
decade (Tynagh, two deposits at Silvermines, Gortrum, and 
Bennetsbridge) and Tynagh and the baryte operation at 
Silvermines were already operating profitably. Considerably 
more information was available concerning geology and 
operating conditions in Ireland than had been the case a decade 
previously. Ireland had also progressed along a 'learning 
curve' to some extent, in that members of the Department of 
Industry and Commerce and of the Geological Survey Office were 
developing expertise in relevant areas. These changes might 
be expected to have placed the Irish government in a stronger 
bargaining position, allowing it to impose more stringent 
terms on foreign mining concerns. It did the opposite, 
introducing terms very much more generous than those which had 
previously applied. What explains this action? 
When announcing the government's decision in his Budget 
speech, the Minister for Finance, Mr Haughey, gave little 
indication of what the answer might be. He stated: 
I am told that a great future expansion in 
exploration and development is possible and that 
additional tax incentives can generate a large 
volume of outside investment ... Many different 
allowances and incentives have been suggested 
^^ Some revenue would continue to accrue in the form of 
royalties, but royalty rates were modest, and royalties were 
only applicable to minerals under State control. 
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but, instead of bringing in rather complicated 
new provisions, I have come down in favour of 
the simple decision to substitute for the 
existing reliefs a twenty-year period of 
complete exemption. 
Mr Haugney's justification of the measure consisted in 
the claim, therefore, that the concession would lead to 
greater foreign investment in the industry and that it was 
simple in nature. The first argument might have held some 
force had the concessions been applicable only to mines 
discovered after the legislation came into effect, but it is 
difficult to understand how additional concessions to existing, 
profitable, mines would encourage future exploration. In 
addition, the government had received clear evidence in the 
previous year that its existing tax concessions were 
successful in encouraging increased foreign investment (see 
below, p.75 ). 
In fact it is apparent that no specific consideration 
was given to the question of what type of measure would best 
serve Ireland's interests. The head of the Mines and Minerals 
Section of the Department of Industry and Commerce, whose staff 
would have been involved in such an exercise, was not even 
consulted on the legislation.^The Irish government clearly 
did not utilise the expertise made available by progress along 
a 'learning curve' by its officials. For example, it also 
failed to consult the Technical Adviser to the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce (an employee of the Geological Survey 
Office), who in fact believed that a more generous exemption 
was totally unnecessary, given the level to which the mining 
^^ Interview with the official concerned, 22 November 1978. 
6 6 
industry had by then developed.^^ 
The complexity of taxation provisions is hardly a 
sufficient justification for not imposing any taxes. As one 
commentator noted wistfully: 
It is my sincere regret that Mr Haughey nor any 
of his successors in the Ministry of Finance 
ever found the laws on income tax equally 
complicated. There are many wage and salary 
earners who would crave for the simplicity of 
a twenty year e x e m p t i o n . 3 2 
Another circumstance which requires explanation is the 
failure of opposition party spokesmen to offer any criticism 
of the measure. Throughout the debate on the Budget Address, 
or during the passage of the legislation through the Dail, 
not a single voice was raised to criticise the granting of 
so generous a concession. 
A credible explanation for the Irish government's 
behaviour has not been advanced to date. Critics of the 
legislation have claimed that Irish politicians served the 
interests of international mining companies without any concern 
for the national welfare, and that the twenty-year tax 
exemption was simply the most blatant example of this tendency. 
However, these critics have not explained why Irish politicians 
should behave in such a manner.^^ I believe a 'pay-off was 
made by Irish politicians to foreign mining companies, but 
that this occurred precisely because those politicians were 
pursuing the national interest as they perceived it. This 
^^ Interview, 8 November 1978. 
M. O'Kelly, Legislation and the Irish Mining Industry, M.B.A. 
Dissertation, University College Dublin, 1978 (Unpublished), 
p. 89. 
^^ See for example, Sinn Fein, The Great Irish Oil and Gas 
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explanation will require some understanding of Irish economic 
history over the decades to 1967. 
Irish economic history 1922-1967; a brief survey 
Since independence, Ireland's most pressing economic 
difficulties have related to continuously high unemployment 
(itself, as we shall see, a cause of other economic ills), and, 
more immediately, to problems in balancing its international 
payments. The balance of payments did not in fact give rise 
to serious difficulties during the first decade after 
independence (1922-32). During this period, the Irish 
34 
government adopted a policy of relative free trade, reflecting 
the fact that at that time the terms of trade generally 
favoured Ireland's main export, agricultural products. In the 
1920s, the value of Irish exports usually equalled approximately 
three quarters that of imports. As Ireland held a strong 
creditor position abroad, it was therefore relatively easy to . 
balance the external payments account.^^ 
However, reliance on agricultural exports offered no 
solution to unemployment and emigration, which continued at high 
Robbery, (Dublin, 1975), p. 1, and Resources Study Group, op.cit.. 
Introduction, p.l. 
^^ In fact, protective measures were taken in relation to certain 
industries during this period, some of which enjoyed considerable 
success in later years. But any all-round tariffs which might 
have raised costs to agriculture, thereby reducing the 
competitiveness of Ireland's principal export, were regarded as 
undesirable. J. Meenan, op.cit., p. 318-19. 
^^ Nevertheless the shape of things to come was evident at this 
stage, i.e. 'an overall deficit in payments in which a surplus 
on invisible earnings does not fully balance the shortfall in 
visible trade'. J. Meenan, op.cit., p. 83 
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levels throughout the 1920s, fed by a stream of people leaving 
the agricultural sector as farming methods became less labour 
intensive.^^ It also subjected Ireland to the vagaries of 
international trade in agricultural commodities. Severe 
economic dislocation accompanied periods of low demand and/or 
depressed prices for agricultural produce, as for example in 
1921-23. 
Fianna Fail leaders had long opposed free trade. They 
believed that to make Ireland independent of international 
market fluctuations, combat unemployment and emigration, and 
reduce the level of imports, it was necessary to foster local 
industries servicing domestic markets and protected by tariff 
barriers against cheaper imported goods, at least at the 
'infant industry' stage. So when Fianna Fail came to power in 
1932 it introduced a policy of protectionism: 43 new duties 
were imposed, and the overall level of duties rose to 45 per 
cent. 
This import-substitution policy succeeded in increasing 
employment in industry from 110,588 in 1931 to 166,153 in 
1938,^^ but it also created serious difficulties. It protected 
inefficient producers, and raised prices for industrial goods. 
The competitiveness of Irish exports consequently declined and 
this, combined with the protectionist policies of customer 
nations and the generally low level of international economic 
activity in the wake of the Great Depression, led to a serious 
^^ Because of the censal periods used, figures for those leaving 
agriculture in the years 1922-30 are not available. An 
indication of the extent of this flow is given, however, by the 
fact that between 1926 and 1936 39,000 people left the 
agricultural sector. J. Meenan, op.cit., p.113. 
L.M. Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, 
(London, 1972) , p. 76. 
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fall in the value of Irish exports. Imports did not decline 
at anything like the same rate, reflecting the fact that many 
of the raw material and other inputs for the new industries 
were not available in, or could not be produced competitively 
in, Ireland, and had to be imported. In 1933-35, for example, 
the value of exports amounted to only half that of imports, 
facing Ireland with a serious balance of payments problem. 
More importantly, perhaps, the positive aspects of a 
protectionist policy were severely limited in their impact. 
Irish markets were small, and did not demand very extensive 
industrial production to fulfil those requirements which 
could be met by import substitution. Further increase in 
employment from this source was therefore unlikely after the 
late 1930s. Meanwhile unemployment remained high; in 1935, 
for example, it stood at 119,497, or approximately 9.7 per cent 
of the workforce. 
The fundamental problem underlying the protectionist 
policy was that its basic assumption was incorrect. This 
assumption was that 
Ireland can be made a self-contained unit, 
providing all the necessities of living in 
adequate quantities for the people residing in 
the Island at the moment and probably for a 
much larger number-
The immediate difficulty was that the Irish peo-ple did not 
accept the validity of this assumption. Their response was to 
utilise imported goods to provide the 'necessities of living', 
thus causing balance of payments problems, or to emigrate in 
order to obtain them, thereby defeating a principal objective of 
38 Sean Lemass, quoted in J. Meenan, op.cit., p. 319. 
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the protectionist strategy. Worse still, protectionist 
policies tended to magnify precisely those problems which 
they were intended to remedy. 
By allowing Irish companies to gain a monopoly position in 
many areas of the domestic market (which was often too small to 
support two concerns) these policies led to substantial 
increases in the cost of living and thus to a decline in real 
living standards. These developments might not of themselves 
have generated serious problems if the population's expectations 
had been low and the option of emigration had not been open. 
But the country's proximity to Britain and the constant flow 
of emigrants across the Irish Sea meant that a large section 
of the Irish population knew about and aspired to a higher 
standard of living and a wider range of goods and services than 
were available in Ireland. When economic conditions deteriorated 
at home, the response of many was to go abroad. 
Thus in the 1930s and 1940s Irish people continued to 
emigrate in tens of thousands. Further decline in population 
narrowed even more the range of industries the home market 
could support, and increased the price paid to keep existing 
industries in production. The vicious circle was complete, as 
these developments in turn made emigration an even more 
attractive proposition. 
The enforced restrictions on imports and on emigration 
caused by the Second World War and its aftermath hid the 
difficulties inherent in the protectionist strategy for a period. 
But in 1955-56, these emerged with a vengeance. In 1955 a large 
deficit on the balance of payments combined with a substantial 
net capital outflow to create a crisis of such magnitude that. 
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as one commentator noted, 'it provoked doubts in some minds as 
39 
to the viability of an independent Irish State'. Ireland 
lacked the buffer provided by her strong creditor position 
abroad in the 1920s and early 1930s, and consequently this 
crisis had a disproportionate impact on the Irish economy. 
To counter the balance of payments problem, severe deflationary 
measures were introduced. These measures did result in a sharp 
reduction in imports, but production and employment were 
adversely affected. Total industrial employment declining by 
11 per cent between 1955 and 1958. 
The severity of the unemployment thus created had a 
serious psychological effect on a country already preoccupied 
with emigration and employment. This impact was sharpened by 
the release of Census data in April 1956, which showed that, 
for the first time since 1926, the population had fallen 
significantly in an inter-censal period (1951-1956). The 
figures indicated net emigration of about 40,000 per annum, 40 
the highest rate since the 1880s. 
In combination, the events of 1955-56 brought home with 
great force the conviction that an alternative economic policy 
to protectionist import-substitution was required. A major 
step towards a new approach was taken by the Coalition 
government in 1956 through certain provisions of the Finance 
Act 1956. These provided for partial remission of corporation 
and income taxes on profits received through new or increased 
export sales. But the new strategy was not explicitly 
^^ G. Fitzgerald, Planning in Ireland, (Institute of Public 
Administration, Dublin, 1968), p. 15. 
ibid., p. 16 . 
72 
formulated or implemented as a coherent policy until the return 
to power, in March 1957, of a Fianna Fail government. 
The basis of the new policy was to be the creation of 
mainly export-orientated industrial concerns financed by 
foreign investment. Foreign investment was to be encouraged 
by the provision to such concerns of generous taxation 
concessions, by a system of government grants to help foreign 
companies set up subsidiaries in Ireland, and by a range of 
other incentives.Effect was given to this policy through 
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legislation introduced in 1957-59. 
This strategy was designed to attack the fundamental 
problems facing the Irish economy, without interfering unduly 
with Irish-owned industries established under the earlier 
protectionist regime. By concentrating on exports, it would 
provide wider outlets for Irish industrial production, thus 
removing the limits placed on economic growth by the small 
size of the domestic market. Increased exports would alleviate 
the balance of payments problem, which preoccupied politicians 
more than ever after the crisis of 1955-56. Inflow of capital 
could also be expected to increase, with similar effect. Most 
important of all, opportunities for employment would not be 
^^ For details of the incentives offered see D. McAleese, 
'Capital Inflow and Direct Foreign Investment in Ireland', Journal 
of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 
1971-72, pp. 80-6. 
The amount and duration of the taxation concessions introduced 
in 1956 were extended by the Finance Acts of 1957 and 1958. 
Grants towards industrialisation in specific areas made available 
by the Undeveloped Areas Act 1952 were extended to the whole 
country in 1957, and the restrictions imposed on foreign invest-
ment by the Control of Manufactures Acts 1932-1934 largely 
dismantled by the introduction of the Industrial Development 
(Encouragement of External Investment) Act in 1959. 
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restricted by the limits of import-substitution industries. 
This fact, combined with the greater availability of goods 
and services made possible by higher exports, would halt the 
flow of emigrants, thus breaking the 'vicious circle' described 
above. 
In effect, the Irish government was offering foreign 
investors a trade-off. It offered them a 'pay-off in the 
prospect of tax-free, profitable investment in a 'favourable' 
business climate. In return, it expected to see additional 
employment and export receipts generated. Thus Irish 
politicians could credibly present themselves to their 
constituents as being capable of dealing with what were 
generally seen as the most serious economic problems facing 
Ireland. This was to be their 'pay-off. 
The Irish government's approach to the mining industry now 
becomes fully comprehensible. Foreign investors were prepared 
to develop an industry which would export 100 per cent of its 
output. In so doing, they would add to the capital inflow, 
provide employment, not compete with any local industrial 
enterprise, and, unlike manufacturing concerns, not require 
government subsidisation through provision of grants or 
facilities. In fact, they would give a government pursuing the 
strategy outlined above all it could ask for. Thus it was to 
be expected that, like other foreign-financed industrial concerns, 
mining companies would receive a quid pro quo. In this instance, 
it took the form of a generous tax concession. An important 
element in this explanation is that Irish politicians assumed 
that foreign mining companies, like their counterparts in other 
sectors, did in fact require a 'pay-off' if they were to 
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undertake (or to continue) mineral production in Ireland. 
This interpretation offers an explanation for a number of 
the discrepancies mentioned earlier. First, it explains the 
failure of Irish governments to take advantage of favourable 
changes in their bargaining power. Utilisation of such changes 
would have been inconsistent with the perceived need to offer 
a 'pay-off to foreign investors. Similarly, the expertise 
which had been acquired by members of the Department of 
Industry and Commerce and of the Geological Survey Office was 
not needed, and this explains why the relevant individuals 
were not consulted in 1967. Second, the failure of the Fianna 
Fail government to justify its decision on the twenty-year tax 
exemption in a credible manner is understandable, in that 
government ministers took for granted public acceptance of the 
wider strategy of which that decision formed a part. By 1967, 
this acceptance was almost universal among the Irish public 
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and among politicians of all the major political parties, 
which explains the failure of the opposition to criticise the 
tax exemption in parliament. 
A number of important questions remain. First, was it in 
fact necessary for the Irish government to make a 'pay-off in 
order to ensure that foreign investors would undertake mineral 
production in Ireland? Second, did Irish decision-makers adopt 
the correct strategy in pursuit of their policy aims? In other 
words, has foreign mining investment generated the benefits 
expected of it? 
^^ This acceptance was based on the attribution of the increased 
growth rates and declining emigration which characterised the 
years 1958-67 to the strategy of foreign-financed industrial 
development. 
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Foreign investor-host country relations in Ireland 
In dealing with the first question, a distinction must 
be maintained between the concessions offered to foreign 
investors by the twenty-year tax exemption and those provided 
by the 1956 legislation. Much of the evidence available in 1967 
suggested that the granting of a more generous concession to 
foreign mining companies was unnecessary. This was certainly 
true of those companies which had committed funds to mine 
development, and were already (or soon expected to be) earning 
substantial profits. It is possible that some additional 
concession was needed to encourage development of marginal 
mines, though the decision to develop Gortrum, a marginal deposit, 
was taken before 1967. It would however have been possible, 
4 4 as was done later, to provide such a concession without 
foregoing revenue from profitable mines. 
The question of investment in exploration is more complex, 
but here too the available evidence indicated the efficacy of • 
existing legislation. During the years 1963-65, exploration 
activity declined from a peak reached in the wake of the Tynagh 
discovery in 1961. In 1965, the qualification period for the 
1956 tax legislation was extended by ten years to April 1976. 
This gave a significant boost to exploration, and in the 
following year the number of new companies becoming involved in 
exploration increased substantially (14 as opposed to six in 
1965 and two in 1964), as did the number of prospecting licences 
45 held and the total area covered by such licences. 
^^ Special provisions relating to marginal mines were included 
in the Finance (Taxation of Profits of Certain Mines) Act, 1974 
These provisions have already been applied in one case. 
M. O'Kelly, op.cit., pp. 139-49. 
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The decline in exploration activity in 1963-65, combined 
with this response to the extension of the 1956 legislation, 
indicate that it was still necessary to offer some financial 
incentive to attract foreign investment into mineral 
exploration of Ireland. It is of course possible that the 
concessions offered by the 1956 legislation could have been 
reduced to some extent without affecting the flow of investment. 
Thus the evidence available in 1967 indicated that the 
granting of a twenty-year tax exemption was not necessary to 
the maintenance of mineral production, or to ensure continued 
investment in exploration activity. What lay behind the 
failure of the Fianna Fail government to correctly interpret 
the situation at that time? 
The immediate explanation is quite simple. Foreign mining 
companies claimed that they needed more generous tax concessions, 
and the government believed them. To understand this response, 
it is necessary to look more closely at the nature of 
relationships between foreign mining concerns and Irish 
politicians. 
First, two aspects of the manner in which Irish politicians 
viewed foreign mining concerns must be emphasised. They clearly 
believed that Ireland should be grateful to foreign concerns 
which brought in their capital and expertise and thus facilitated 
mineral development. As one Deputy expressed it, 'We should 
welcome to this country anybody who is prepared to invest money 
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here and employ people who would otherwise have to emigrate'. 
A number of years later, another Deputy stated the view that. 
^^ Dail Debates, 15 May 1962. 
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'We should be grateful to people who are prepared to come in 
and invest their own money', while one of his colleagues felt 
compelled to 'pay a special tribute to the very progressive 
Canadians who have come here to help in the development of 
our mineral resources There seems to have been no 
awareness that Ireland was engaged in an exchange relationship, 
that valuable mineral resources were being made available to 
foreign investors in return for their capital and expertise, 
and that Ireland should apply the bargaining power 
represented by mineral ownership to ensure maximum returns to 
itself from their exploitation. Rather, a 'begging bowl' 
attitude was predominant: Ireland was fortunate to receive 
foreign mining investment at all, and was consequently 
fortunate to receive any returns from development of its 
minerals. 
The second point is that Irish politicians clearly 
believed that while foreign mining companies knew their 
business well, the Irish authorities knew very little about 
the mining industry. Consequently any intervention on their 
part might have adverse effects. This view was strengthened 
by frequent references to the role supposedly played by the 
government of the day in the Avoca debacle. From the mid 1960s 
onwards, a number of politicians, including the Deputy Leader 
of the Labour Party and the Minister for Industry and Commerce 
in the Fianna Fail government, frequently repeated the assertion 
that government intervention had been responsible for the 
^^ Vail debates, 3 May 1967. 
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failure of the Avoca mine. As we have seen, the prime 
responsibility for that failure lay in the foreign investor 
concerned (see above pp.54-5) . Nevertheless, statements 
attributing blame to the government were not challenged in the 
Dail, reflecting a general acceptance of the viewpoint they 
expressed. Neither was it recognised that the issue of 
government involvement in mining operations was quite separate 
to that of its role in determining the financial and economic 
framework within which those operations should take place. 
Irish politicians, therefore, had scant regard for 
their own bargaining position or for the ability of Irish 
authorities to exercise expertise in the mining field. On 
the other hand, they held the expertise and knowledge possessed 
by foreign mining companies in very high regard. Their response 
to this situation was to accept as valid the mining industry's 
account of what it needed. They drew no distinction between 
what the industry needed and what it wanted, with the result 
that government policy was usually determined by what foreign 
mining companies asked for. 
There is general agreement that the introduction of the 
twenty-year tax exemption followed a period during which 
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foreign mining concerns had demanded more generous concessions. 
The Irish government apparently decided to accept without 
question the claim that a greater incentive was required to 
48 
1972. 
see, for example. Bail Debates, 3, 23 May 1967 and 29 June 
^^ see the statement by the then Minister for Finance on pp.64-5 
above; interviews with officials of the Department of Industry 
and Commerce and of the Geological Survey Office, 24 October, 
8, 22 November 1978. 
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ensure maintenance of production and continued investment in 
exploration. If the Minister of Industry and Commerce had 
consulted his departmental officials, they would have pointed 
out to him that what the mining companies wanted was not 
necessarily what was required to ensure their continued 
involvement. That he failed to do so is clear evidence of the 
automatic way in which government policy responded to the 
demands of foreign mining companies. 
It seems likely that those same companies played a role in 
fostering and enforcing the attitudes discussed above. It is 
very difficult to present conclusive information concerning the 
impact of foreign investors (or, indeed, of any investors) on 
the outlook and attitudes of politicians. The latter will 
rarely admit to being influenced by the representatives of 
corporate interests, while foreign investors are loath to 
acknowledge they possess influence over decision-makers in the 
host country. This has certainly been the case in Ireland. 
Yet it is not possible to ignore this issue simply because 
relevant documentary evidence is not available. 
In the Irish case, it is quite clear that close relation-
ships existed between various politically influential 
individuals and officials of foreign mining companies. The 
President of the Northgate group, for instance, was a personal 
friend of the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, and of a number 
of senior Fianna Fail ministers. A Northgate official informed 
me that its President rarely contacted a civil servant 
concerning any aspect of the group's operations over the period 
from the early 1960s to 1973: he had immediate and continual 
access to senior members of the governing Fianna Fail 
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Party.^^ These relationships were probably strengthened by 
the fact that a number of family relations of senior 
politicians were employed by foreign mining companies. (This 
is not to suggest that any of the individuals involved were 
not qualified for the positions they held). For example, the 
son of the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party became Secretary 
of Tara Mines Limited (an associated company of Northgate's), 
while the brother-in-law of the current Minister for Industry 
and Commerce was also employed by Tara. 
Without engaging in speculation, it can be said that 
relationships of the type described above might have acted as 
a channel for ideas and opinions and represented a means by 
which influence could be exerted. 
Did foreign mining investment generate the economic 
benefits expected of it? The following sections examine the 
economic impact of foreign-financed mining projects over the 
period 1964-77. In certain instances, data required for 
analysis of the non-ferrous mining sector as a whole could 
not be obtained, and in these cases the operations of the 
Northgate group (concerning which information was available) 
are analysed separately. The conclusions derived from such an 
analysis are probably valid for the sector as a whole, as the 
other projects (Silvermines, Avoca) were similar to Tynagh and 
Gortrum in the mining techniques employed, in the materials 
produced, in the extent to which they were foreign owned, and in 
being entirely financed by foreign capital. At times use is 
made of financial statistics relating to the Northgate group. 
^^ Interview, 1 November 1978. 
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and the relevant data is presented in Table 1. 
The various economic impacts are discussed below under 
separate headings. 
Generation of government revenue 
Direct revenue accrued to the government in two ways. 
Royalties were charged on net profits throughout the period 
under review, on a rising scale to a maximim of 10 per cent. 
Mining companies were exempt from corporation tax until 1973,^^ 
after which they became liable at the standard rate (then 
50 per cent). 
Lack of data makes it difficult to accurately assess 
taxation receipts. The Irish government does not publish 
details of royalty payments by individual companies, and 
industry sources are frequently unreliable (see p. 84 ), For 
the industry as a whole, royalty payments to June 1973 were 
£1,869,000; as far as could be ascertained, relevant figures 
have not been released since that date. 
Official information regarding corporation tax is also 
sparse, but accurate figures can be calculated from the 
published accounts of individual companies, and these are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 indicates that the Irish government obtained 
significant amounts of direct revenue after the ending of the 
industry's tax exemption in 197 3, to the tune of approximately 
£9 million in five years. A very high proportion of this 
^^ The twenty-year tax exemption was abolished by the Fine Fail/ 
Labour Party coalition government in September 1973. See p. 113. 
below. 
Table 1 
Financial Statistics, Tynagh and I Gortrum Mines, 1966 to End 1977 (Canadian $'000s) 
1966* 1967* 1968* 1969* 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976* 1977* Totals 
Gross receipts from metal 
and metal concentrate sales 15,792 24,998 24,745 22,257 27,325 23,580 26,891 42,816 40,184 33,798 19,438 22,565 324,389 
Deduct shipping, smelting 
and marketing expenses 5,547 9,556 8,627 6,271 7,679 10,393 10,176 14,700 14,239 13,380 7,830 8,657 117,055 
REVENUE 10,245 15,442 16,118 15,986 19,646 13,187 16,715 28,116 25,945 20,418 11,608 13,908 207,334 
Deduct expenses as follows: 
Operating Expenses 3,387 4,804 4,736 4,293 8,318 8,669 9,303 12,395 14,314 16,374 8,790 10,660 106,143 
Government Royalty 420 738 738 887 834 61 263 1,171 911 19 190 247 6,479 
Taxation attributable to 
mining income - - - - - - - - 2,686 51 
+ + + + 2,737 
Depreciation 967 1,065 1,142 1,399 2,112 2,677 2,431 2,797 3,083 2,357 1 ,806 1,599 23,435 
Amortization of preproduction 
and other expenditures 542 779 791 530 1 ,425 1,510 1,244 1,373 1,172 998 756 754 11,874 
Interest payments 1,257 614 - - 338 303 317 249 - - - - 3,078 
Exploration - 339 495 519 979 1,081 422 526 594 1 ,034 1,541 2,371 9,901 
NET INCOME 
Attributable to mining (1,114) 2,735 9,605 3,185 + + + 169 44,371 
Attributable to Tynagh 3,672 7,103 8,216 8,358 5,640 (1,020) 3,614 8,281 2,827 (1,299) (1,475) (1,723) 42,194 
For Northgate Group 3,783 7,605 8,346 8,721 6,268 (1,306) 3,094 9,120 4,026 1,156 (598) (590) 49,625 
Capital Expenditure 1,022 995 1,020 1 ,382 3,790 5,573 1,709 739 1,043 372 455 243 18,343 
Dividends paid - - 2,725 2,770 2,826 1,510 - - 4,059 1,723 - 1,850 17,463 
For these years, the data applies to the Tynagh mine alone. 
These include operating costs at the mine and also administrative 
and general expenses. 
+ Capital Expenditure consists of additions to fixed assets (buildings, 
equipment etc.) and outlays on the underground development at Tynagh. 
++ As no mining income was received in these years, it is assumed that no NJ 
tax liability was incurred. 
H++ The sum of the figures in this column indicate a loss for the year of 
C.$415,000. Profit on disposal of fixed assets of the Gortrum mine 
amounted to C.$584,000, thus giving an overall profit of C.$169,000. 
"^nnRCF • Mn-rt-h nif n Fvnl n-TTt 1 nn 1 A n^nn-^ l 1 or^ r^  t-r, i 
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Table 2 
Income Tax Liability of Mining Companies in Ireland 
1973-1977 (£'000's) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
Northgate Group* - ** 1,124 23 - - 1,147 
Mogul of Ireland 1,176 1,656 1,356 2,316 1,188+ 7,692 
Avoca Mines Ltd. 50+"^  _ _ _ - 50 
8,899 
Sources: Annual Reports^ Northgate Exploration Ltd., 
Silvermines Ltd., various years; information 
supplied by Avoca Mines Ltd. 
Notes: * - On income attributable to mining only. 
** - Northgate's mining income was subject to tax in 1973, 
but because of accumulated deductable allowances no liability 
was actually incurred. 
+ - In 1977 Silvermines Ltd. did not provide information on Mogul 
of Ireland's tax liability (Annual Report, 1977, p. 4). It 
is presumed that Mogul paid corporation tax at the prevailing 
rate of 45 per cent. 
++ - This liability did not lead to a tax payment. 
revenue was generated by Mogul of Ireland's mine. The Northgate 
group contributed little, because the profitable high-grade 
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mining period at the Tynagh mine was over by 1974, when 
Northgate first became liable to taxation. 
Government revenue also accrues from employee taxation.^^ 
Since much of the labour employed would probably otherwise have 
^^ Tynagh made a substantial profit in 1974, but this was due 
to the unusually high metal prices then prevailing.^ Its 
profitability did not outlast the period of high prices. 
^^ Indirect taxation has apparently been insignificant, as 
mining industry imports have been exempt from customs duties 
and domestic purchases exempt from sales tax. Interview with 
Northgate official, 1 November 1978. 
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been idle, this revenue can be regarded as a net addition to 
national income. On the basis of figures supplied by Northgate, 
employee taxation has been estimated at £12.5 million over the 
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years 1964-77. It was thus similar in scale to total direct 
taxation over the same period (about £11 million). This 
situation reflects the very low levels of direct taxation 
applied prior to 1973, and is unlikely to continue into the 
future. 
Little opportunity has existed for transfer pricing in 
the non-ferrous mining industry,^^ as the operating companies 
sell their output on an 'arms length' basis,^^ and as none of 
their parent companies hold significant interests in overseas 
producers of mining inputs.^^ However, examination of 
Northgate's accounts over the period 1962-77 did reveal a 
number of discrepancies. 
First, the Company's published figures overestimate both 
the liability of the Irish subsidiaries to royalty payments 
and the payments actually made. For example, the Tynagh lease 
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In 1974 28 per cent of the wages and salaries paid to 
Northgate's employees was absorbed by taxation and social welfare 
contributions, and a similar figure probably applied to other 
mines (interview with Northgate official, 1 November 1978). It is 
unlikely that this percentage varied very much from year to year, 
as effective personal tax rates in Ireland change only marginally 
over time. The estimate for employee taxation was obtained by 
applying this percentage to the figures for total wage and salary 
payments contained in Table 3 below. 
^^ Transfer pricing has apparently occurred in the non-metallic 
minerals industry, which is dominated by subsidiaries of 
vertically-integrated multinational corporations. Interview with 
Department of Industry and Commerce official, 28 September 1978. 
^^ Concentrates are sold to independent smelters at prices based 
on LME quotations. 
^^ This was established by examining information disclosed by the 
parent companies in their annual reports regarding their 
associated companies and principal investments. 
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called for royalty payments of £257,000 or C$662,000 in 1969, 
while Northgate stated royalty payments to have been £345,000 
or C$887,000. This divergence was not due to any time lag in 
collection of royalties, as it occurs throughout the period 
1966-77. During these years, total stated royalty payments 
by the Irish subsidiaries amounted to 13 per cent of profits 
attributable to mining, (See Table 1), whereas the maximum 
rates applicable to the Tynagh and Gortrum mines were 9 and 10 
per cent respectively. (A significant proportion of profits 
would have paid royalties at lower rates.) 
In addition, the royalty rates called for in the mining 
leases were not in fact applied. In 1968, for example, total 
royalty receipts by the Irish Exchequer amounted to £200,867. 
(A number of mining and quarrying projects other than Tynagh 
were also liable to royalty payments.) Yet Tynagh's liaibility 
59 in that year was £252,000. 
Profits attributable to mining were C$8,358,000 or £3,248,000. 
Royalty rates would, according to the mining lease, be as follows: 
6% of £700,000 = £42,000 
7% of £350,000 = £24,500 
8% of £700,00 = £56,000 
9% of £ 1, 498, 000 = £ 134 , 820 
£ 3,248,000 £ 257,320 
Source: Minister for Industry and Commerce, op.cit., p.9; Table I. 
^^ Profits attributable to mining were C$8,216,000 or £3,186,000. 
Royalty rates would, according to the mining lease, be as follows: 
6% of £700,000 = £42,000 
7% of £350,000 = £24,500 
8% of £700,000 = £56,000 
9% of £1,436,000 = £129,240 
3,186,000 = 251,740 
Source: Minister for Industry and Commerce, op.cit., p.9; Table I 
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Northgate's motives for overestimating its royalty 
payments are somewhat of a mystery. The only explanation 
which presents itself is that the Company wished to exaggerate 
its contribution to the Irish economy for public relations 
reasons. 
The second discrepancy relates to the application of 
amortization and depreciation allowances to Northgate's Irish 
operations. Expenditures associated with mine development and 
not allowable for depreciation under general tax provisions 
were amortized over the estimated life of the mine; items 
which were so allowable were depreciated over varying time 
periods.^^ It is evident that an element of double depreciation 
was involved in these procedures. The Tynagh mine was still in 
operation in 1977, and amortization and depreciation was 
consequently incomplete. Thus the sum of amortization and 
depreciation allowances should have been less than the sum of 
all relevant expenditures. In fact it was C$3.9 million more,-
indicating that double depreciation had been affected to an 
amount in excess of this sum.^^ 
The result was that Northgate's taxable income, and 
consequently government revenue, was diminished. The allowances 
claimed by Northgate would of course have been sanctioned by the 
taxing authority (the Department of Finance), and the question 
arises as to why Irish officials should condone loss of tax 
^^Northgate Exploration Limited, Annual Report^ 1975, p.22. 
^^ Initial investment in the Tynagh mine was C$13,082,000, and 
subsequent capital expenditure on Tynagh and Gortrum was 
C$18,343,000 (Derived from Northgate Exploration Ltd., Annual 
Reports, 1962-1977). To 1977, amortization and depreciation 
allowances totalled C$35,309,000 (See Table 1). 
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revenue. I return to this question at a later stage, and 
suggest a possible explanation (see Chapter Three, pp.115-17). 
Generation of employment and wage payments 
Mining operations in Ireland are highly capital-intensive, 
and their employment-generating potential is consequently 
limited. For example, the average capital investment per job 
in overseas grant aided firms operating in Ireland was £7,850 
in 1976; the capital cost per job at the Navan mine, which 
6 2 
came on stream in the following year, was £93,800. Direct 
employment in mining increased from 104 in 1964 to 2,100 in 
1977 (about 0.2 per cent of the workforce). 
Though small in extent, the type of employment provided 
does have attractive features. Mining employment is largely 
located outside the most prosperous regions, and therefore 
has a favourable impact on regional income distribution. The 
provision of employment in poorer areas can also have an 
important social impact, as it can stem the flow of local 
people to major Irish cities and abroad, preventing further 
social and economic decline.^^ In certain cases, however, mine 
employment may only delay the process of decline. Such 
employment is finite, and the characteristics of regions 
suffering economic decline militate against alternative 
employment being available when a mine is exhausted. When the 
^^ Total capital costs were £75 million, and 800 permanent jobs 
were created. 
^^ The population of Loughrea, Co. Galway, situated near the 
Tynagh mine, for example, had been falling over many years and 
had reached an all-time low of 2,784 in 1966. By 1968, it had 
reached 3,000. 
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Tynagh mine closes in 1980, for example, it is unlikely that 
more than a small percentage of its workforce will find jobs 
locally. 
Another attractive feature is that the vast majority of 
the mining workforce is male, over 95 per cent in 1974. 
Provision of male employment is seen in Ireland as an essential 
prerequisite for reducing emigration. It has been given added 
urgency by recent developments in the national workforce. The 
decline of traditional male-employing heavy industry has been 
accompanied by rapid growth of foreign-financed light industries 
utilising predominantly female labour. Mine employment has 
made a contribution towards restoring the balance. 
No reliable estimates exist regarding the extent of 
indirect employment created by the industry's purchases of 
goods and services. Kearns^^claims that five additional jobs 
result from every one at the mine. This figure follows a 
generally accepted estimate,^^ but does not seem to reflect 
any detailed research into the question.^^ In fact a job 
multiplier of five seems grossly inflated. For example. 
Nickel et.al.^"^ estimate that 2.0 is the job multiplier for 
the Canadian mining industry, while the Australian Mining 
^^ K.C. Kearns, 'Ireland's Mining Boom: Development and Impact, 
Ameriaan Journal of Eoonomics and Sociology, June 1976, p.263. 
^^ See, for example, J. McConnell, 'Mining — Its value to the 
National Economy', Development, October 1968, p.8; and H. Legge, 
'Revival — Mining in Ireland', in H. Legge (ed.). Mining Ireland, 
(Dublin, 1973), p.9. 
^^ Kearns gives as his source an article in a small provincial 
newspaper, The Vicklow People, while the other authors give no 
source for their estimates. 
Nickel et.al., Eoonomio Impacts and Linkages of the Canadian 
Mining Industry, (Centre for Resource Studies, Kingston, Ontario, 
1978), p.xi. 
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Industry council estimates the multiplier in Australia at 
6 8 
2.75. The Australian and Canadian economies are in a 
position to supply a higher proportion of mining inputs than 
is the case in Ireland, and it is very unlikely that the job 
multiplier in Ireland would be higher than in those countries. 
Thus a multiplier of 2.0 would probably not overestimate the 
mining industry's indirect impact on employment. Total 
employment generated by mining is therefore estimated at about 
6,000 in 1977, or 0.6 per cent of the workforce. 
Table 3 gives details of wage and salary payments to 
mineworkers over the period 1964-77. Total wage and salary 
payments for this period were £44.8 million. It must be 
remembered that a large portion of these wages and salaries were 
expended in areas suffering from economic and social decline. 
They consequently possessed an added significance in that 
their expenditure probably rendered viable services (e.g. 
transport, retail outlets, schools) which would otherwise have, 
been uneconomic. Thus a benefit accrued to the non-mining 
population, but the extent of any such 'spin-off' cannot be 
measured. 
^^ Australian Mining Industry Council, Mining RevieWj November 
December 1977, p. 2. 
Table 3 
Mining Company Expenditure on Wages 
and Salaries 1964-1977 (£'000's)* 
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Year Amount 
1964 58 
1965 171 
1966 400 
1967 795 
1968 1,279 
1969 1,835 
1970 2, 614 
1971 3,334 
1972 3,752 
1973 4, 695 
1974 5,330 
1975 4,725 
1976 5,429 
1977 10,413 
Total 44,830 
Notes: * - The figures for 1973-1977 are estimates, 
based on information supplied by Avoca 
Mines Limited regarding its average wage 
and salary payments in each year. 
Source: Published company documents; information supplied 
by Avoca Mines Ltd. 
Creation of additional economic activity through linkage 
development 
Backward linkage: Detailed information on mining industry 
purchases of goods and services is only available for the period 
1964 —June 1973. The relevant data is contained in Table 4; 
total expenditures during this period were £31 million. 
91 
Table 4 
Local Disbursements by Operating Companies/ 
1964 to end June 1973 (£'000's) 
Year Amount 
1964 257 
1965 939 
1966 1,770 
1967 2,369 
1968 2,912 
1969 4,028 
1970 4,910 
1971 5,714 
1972 4,665 
1973 3,392 
(to end June) 
Total 30,956 
Source: Published Company Documents 
Many of the inputs used in mining have been imported, 
particularly machinery and equipment. The Canadian origin of 
the companies concerned apparently influenced sourcing of 
equipment purchases, which have been made almost exclusively 
in Canada. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Irish 
mining industry could have provided a sufficiently large market 
to allow the economies of scale required for efficient domestic 
production of items such as underground mining equipment or 
concentrating machinery. The only real choice facing any 
investor (domestic or foreign) would have been whether to make 
the purchase in, for example, Britain, Canada or the United 
States. Assuming that Canadian suppliers were competitive, it 
is therefore unlikely that Ireland's interests suffered from the 
inclination of foreign investors to purchase goods in their home 
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country. 
The proportion of total capital expenditure being made in 
Ireland has risen sharply over the period since early mineral 
developments took place. For the most recent project completed, 
the Navan zinc/lead mine, the relevant figure was 57 per cent.^^ 
Accurate figures are not available for earlier projects, but a 
measure of the change can be obtained by calculating total 
local expenditures (which would include some non-capital items) 
as a percentage of capital costs during the development period 
of the Tynagh zinc/lead deposit, 1964-65."^^ This figure is 
18 per cent. Since almost all equipment purchases continued 
to be made abroad, the trend in other categories of expenditure 
has clearly been more dramatic than these figures suggest. 
Two factors account for this trend. First, the companies 
involved in later projects have felt it necessary, for 
political reasons, to be seen to make as large a contribution 
as possible to the Irish economy. They have consequently 
followed a deliberate policy of using local sources of supply 
were possible. Second, Irish firms seem to have been slow 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented by mineral 
development. This lag in linkage development probably reflected 
the time required for local companies to acquire the relevant 
information, skills and capabilities. Indeed, information was 
apparently the key factor, as many of the opportunities available 
^^ Information supplied by Tara Mines Ltd. 
The relevant amounts are C$1,993,000 for local expenditures 
and C$11,000,000 for total development costs. 
^^ This has been the case particularly as regards the Navan 
development. 
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involved activities (e.g. shaft sinking, provision of 
structural steel) already being carried on by local firms. 
The proportion of current expenditures being made in 
Ireland has also increased over time, probably for the same 
reasons, and stands at about 80 per cent for currently operating 
72 mines, as opposed to about 65 per cent during the early 
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period of Tynagh's operations. 
It should be noted that the companies involved did not 
utilise commodities produced by affiliates. Had they done so, 
their attitude towards using domestic sources of goods and 
services might have been different. 
Forward linkage: All non-ferrous minerals produced in 
Ireland were exported in concentrate form, and consequently 
forward linkage was absent. The reasons for its failure to 
emerge are complex, and require detail examination. 
Since the early 1960s, the Northgate group had been 
committed to constructing a zinc smelter in Ireland. Over the. 
period 1966-68, it spent C$400,000 on detailed feasibility 
studies, which indicated the project was viable. By Spring 
1969 Northgate had purchased a suitable site, and it set 
about establishing a consortium to finance the project. It 
hoped that the undertaking would be shared on a 40:40:20 basis 
between itself, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) and Mogul of Ireland. 
It was necessary to involve Mogul as the Tynagh mine alone 
could not provide sufficient concentrate to supply the smelter, 
7 ? 
This is the proportion which applies to the Navan zinc/lead 
mine and the Avoca Mines copper mine. Information supplied by 
Tara Mines Ltd. and Avoca Mines Ltd. 
^^ Derived from Tables 1 (p.85) and 5 (p.97). 
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intended to have an annual capacity of 60-75,000 tons zinc. 
RTZ's participation was sought because, as a major mining 
and finance house, it could assist in raising capital for the 
project, and also because of its experience in the zinc 
smelting business. RTZ's motives for involvement were, as it 
turned out, less straightforward. 
At this time, a cartel controlled the European zinc 
industry, and its members did not welcome an independent 
competitor. They would do all in their power to prevent the 
construction of a smelter in Ireland but, if one was to be 
built, they wished to involve it in the cartel. In order to 
influence the course of events as much as possible, they were 
anxious that a member of the cartel should participate in the 
Irish project. RTZ was nominated for two reasons. First, 
its zinc smelter at Avonmouth, near Bristol, drew part of its 
concentrate supply from Irish mines, and rerouting of these 
concentrates could cause it difficulties. Second, the bulk 
of Irish zinc output would be sold on the British market in 
competition with the Avonmouth smelter. 
A date was fixed for the signing of the consortium 
agreement, but at this stage Northgate ran into trouble. 
When the Tynagh and Silvermines deposits were discovered, 
Northgate and Mogul had encountered serious difficulties in 
raising development finance. Irish, Canadian and international 
banks were approached, without success. All attached significant 
risks to mineral investment in a country which had seen only one 
major base metal mining operation during the previous century, 
and that had been a financial disaster. The only funds available 
were customer credits from the smelters who were to purchase 
mine output. 
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One condition attached to these loans was that the mining 
companies would supply their entire output to the smelters 
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concerned until repayment was complete. Unlxke Tynagh, Mogul 
had not yet repaid its loans in 1969. Given what has been said 
above, it is not surprising that the smelters held Mogul to its 
commitment. Mogul concluded that it could not depart from the 
terms of its contracts, and could not therefore divert its 
concentrates to an Irish smelter.^^ This dealt Northgate's 
plans a serious blow since, as mentioned above, Tynagh alone 
could not support a viable smelter. 
Another blow was in store for Northgate. Its officials 
were gathered in a Dublin hotel for the signing of the 
consortium agreement when they were informed of RTZ's withdrawal 
from the project. RTZ had allowed Northgate to proceed as far 
as possible with project development, making alternation of its 
plans as difficult, time-consuming and expensive as possible. 
It then dropped out at (literally) the very last moment. 
Northgate had been deprived of an important source of 
concentrates, and of a source of finance and of the relevant 
technical expertise. It kept the smelter 'on the boards' for a 
number of years, but to all intents and purposes the project 
was dead. 
Thus the first stage of forward linkage failed to 
materialise, at least for the time being. The use of foreign 
capital played some role in that failure, but in this instance 
the type of foreign capital involved (i.e. smelter loans) was 
the most important factor. Had Mogul of Ireland had access to 
Interview with Northgate official, 1 November 1978. 
^^ ibid. 
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'normal' channels of credit, it would have accepted the 
conditions attached to the smelter loans. 
However, in the final analysis, it was the withdrawal 
of a principal source of the required capital and expertise 
which killed the smelter project. No matter how or by whom 
Irish mineral developments were financed, it was probably 
inevitable that a painful lesson would be imparted to the 
operating companies by the members of the European zinc cartel. 
Significantly, the next time a smelter project was mooted (1976), 
the foreign zinc smelting company chosen to participate had no 
links with that cartel.^^ 
Net foreign exchange inflow 
Mineral exports as a percentage of total exports were at 
their highest in 1970 at 4.7 per cent, declining to 1.3 per 
cent in 1977, primarily as a result of a rapid rise in the 
value of total exports (almost 300 per cent between 1970 and 
1976)."^^ With the commissioning of the Navan mine, the 
contribution of mineral exports will increase substantially. 
Table 5 calculates the net foreign exchange inflow 
resulting from Northgate's mining operations. Net smelter 
revenue represents the total value to Ireland of ore exported. 
Items representing expenditures in Ireland can be identified, 
and since Northgate's financial subsidiary in Ireland, IBM, 
remitted cash balances to the Canadian parent company at 
^^ The company was New Jersey Zinc, a subsidiary of the Gulf and 
Western Corporation. 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Trade Statistics of Ireland, 
(Government Printer, Dublin), various issues. 
Table 5 
Net Foreign Exchange Inflow, 
Tynagh and Gortrum Mines, 1966-1972 (C$'OOP's) 
1966+ 1967+ 1968+ 1969+ 1970 1971 1972 Totals 
Net Smelter Revenue 10,245 15,442 16,118 15,986 19,646 13,187 16,715 107,339 
Local Disbursements 2,203 2,268 3,344 2,981 6,210 7,469 5,689 30,164 
less Import Content of Local 
Disbursements* 980 1,009 1,488 1,326 2,764 3,324 2,532 13,423 
Net Local Disbursements 1,223 1,259 1,856 1,655 3,446 4,145 3,157 16,741 
Payroll Costs 960 1,349 1,346 1,485 2,582 3,657 4,122 15,501 
Dividends to local share-
holdings - - 545 554 565 302 - 1,966 
Government Royalty 420 738 738 887 834 61 263 3,941 
NET FOREIGN EXCHANGE INFLOW 2,603 3,346 4,485 4,581 7,427 8,165 7,542 38,149 
- As % Net Smelter Revenue 25.4% 21.6% 27.8% 28.6% 37.8% 61.9% 45.1% 35.5% 
Source: Table 1; Published company documents. 
Notes: + Only the Tynagh mine's operations are included in these years. 
* Import content of local disbursements was taken as 44.5%, an 
estimate derived from published company documents. 
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three-monthly intervals, it can be taken for granted that 
net revenue remaining after charging these items left the 
country. Precise data was available regarding all major 
categories of local expenditure: payroll costs, government 
royalties, local disbursements, and dividend payments to local 
shareholders. The only item which required estimation was the 79 
import content of domestic expenditure. 
Table 5 indicates that net foreign exchange inflow amounted 
to 35.5 per cent of the value of export receipts over the period 
1966-72. It was accounted for by government revenue (10 per 
cent), payroll costs (41 per cent), domestic purchases of goods 
and services (44 per cent), and dividend payments to local 
shareholders (5 per cent). 
Table 5 also shows that the proportion of export receipts 
retained in Ireland increased substantially over this period. 
Two factors explain the change. Metal prices were depressed 
in 1971-72, and so a greater proportion of revenue was being 
directed towards current and capital expenditure (a substantial 
proportion of which was made in Ireland), and a smaller 
proportion towards dividends and undistributed profits (very 
little of which remained in Ireland). Secondly, as mentioned 
above, the proportion of capital and current expenditures being 
made in Ireland increased during these years. 
The net foreign exchange effect disclosed in Table 5 would 
be augmented by any inflow of capital associated with Northgate's 
operations in Ireland. Over the period to 1965, Northgate 
Interview with Northgate Exploration Ltd. official, 1 November 
1978. 
7 Q See the notes to Table 5. 
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expended some C$13 million in association with the Tynagh project, 
(After that date capital expenditure was financed from mineral 
sales). Of this amount, some C$4.1 million was expended in 
8 0 
Ireland. Thus total net foreign exchange inflow was about 
C$42.3 million, or 35 per cent of total gross foreign exchange 
inflow. 
Table 5A outlines the composition of foreign exchange 
outflows resulting from Northgate's operations. Almost 30 per 
cent of the outflow consisted of distributed and undistributed 
profits, indicating the significance of the low tax rates 
applied to mining companies in determining their balance of 
payments impact. 
Table 5A 
Composition of Foreign Exchange Outflow, 
Northgate Group, 1966 - 1972 (C$'000's). 
Category 
Loan Repayments 
Interest Repayments 
Dividends paid abroad 
Undistributed Net Income* 
Operating and Capital 
Expenditure Incurred 
Abroad** 
Import Content of Local 
Expenditures 
Total 
Amount (C$'000's) 
15,785 
2, 829 
7,866 
12,117 
17,171 
13, 423 
69,191 
% of Total 
22. 8 
4.1 
11.4 
17.5 
24. 8 
19.3 
100.0 
Source: Tables 1 and 5; Published company documents. 
Notes: * - This figure equals the sum of net profits plus depreciation 
and amortization allowances, less dividends, capital 
expenditure, and loan repayments. 
** - This figure was derived by subtracting payroll costs and 
local disbursements from the sum of operating, exploration 
and capital expenditures. 
^^Derived from Northgate Exploration Ltd., Annual Reports^ 
1961-1965; Published company documents. 
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Provision of scarce resources through the investment process 
Foreign mining companies played a crucial role in providing 
capital for mineral exploration and development, a point 
discussed in detail above. They also played an important part 
in providing the technology and technical expertise required to 
apply that capital efficiently. 
The clearest example of the transfer of a particular 
technology to Ireland involved the application of large-scale 
trackless underground mining methods to low-grade orebodies. 
This technique had been applied and perfected in Canada, and 
Mogul Mines Limited was the first company to attempt a similar 
exercise in Ireland. Though a failure financially, the Avoca 
project did demonstrate the feasibility of applying this mining 
method to Irish orebodies. It was later employed to develop 
the Silvermines and Tynagh underground mines. 
The technology applied by foreign mining companies was 
apparently not inappropriate, as there is no indication that 
other than capital-intensive highly-mechanised mining methods 
could have been employed in working low-grade underground mines 
of the type established in Ireland. 
Northgate's Tynagh mine offers an example of a situation 
in which availability of specific skills played a crucial role 
in permitting mineral development. Tynagh's ore was extremely 
complex. In addition to the variety of rock types involved 
(seven different categories were used to state ore reserves in 
1971), the ore minerals were contained in a black/brown mud 
where sand-sized particles were bonded by fine clay-like 
substances, making mineral extraction very difficult. Five 
separate concentrates, lead, zinc, copper, bulk lead/zinc and 
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'lead oxide' had to be produced; specialised metallurgical 
skills were applied to permit efficient flotation of 
individual ore minerals, allowing profitable exploitation 
of a complex deposit. ^ ^ 
Initially, much of the skilled labour utilised in mineral 
development was supplied by the parent companies, but most 
expatriates were quickly replaced by Irish personnel. For 
example, when Avoca Mines Limited commenced production in 1971, 
a high proportion of skilled manual labour and nearly all 
professional and managerial staff were Canadian; seven years 
8 2 later, only a handful of Canadians remained. 
Creation of external economics 
Little or no 'spin-off effects resulted from the transfers 
of skills and technologies described above. Expertise in under-
ground mining or in metallurgy was of no relevance to other 
sectors of the economy. Neither was it utilised by domestic 
mining companies,which were exclusively involved in quarrying 
using open pit methods which had long been applied. 
The contribution of the mining industry to infrastructural 
development has been modest as a result of the already highly-
developed state of social and physical infrastructure in 
Ireland. Nevertheless, the industry has had some impact. This 
has in general been indirect, in that infrastructural development 
has been carried out and financed by state or local authorities. 
81 
For references to literature describing the problems en-
countered at Tynagh and the solutions adopted, see C. Burton, 
'Production and Reserves of Base Metals in Ireland', 
Teahnology Ireland, September 1977, p. 40. 
8 2 
Interview with Avoca Mines Ltd.'s Production Manager, Avoca, 
9 November 1978. 
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but has depended for its viability on use by mining companies. 
For the most part, such development has also facilitated non-
mining activity. 
The channel in the port of Galway was deepened in 1964 to 
allow export of Tynagh's ore, and the port's tonnage limit was 
thereby raised from 2,000 to 5,000. Docks were enlarged and new 
storage facilities constructed. Though the closure of Tynagh 
will lead to a substantial decline in traffic, Galway's port 
will continue in use, for example in the importation of oil 
products. At Foynes, on the Shannon estuary, a new jetty 
capable of taking ore ships up to 25,000 tons was constructed 
to serve the lead/zinc and barytes mines at Silvermines. Once 
again, this port is capable of handling non-ore cargo. In 
addition, its existence has enabled Foynes to take advantage 
of opportunities presented by oil exploration off Ireland's 
west coast, and six wells were drilled out of Foynes in 1978 
8 3 
alone. A new railway line was built to link Silvermines 
with Foynes, but it is unlikely that significant non-mine 
traffic utilises this section. 
No information could be obtained regarding costs incurred 
or revenues received by public authorities in relation to 
provision of infrastructure. 
Creation of external diseconomies 
There is no indication that significant external diseconomies 
have been associated with mineral development in Ireland. 
Unemployment was high during the period under review, especially 
Q O 
Offshore Oil, 21 October 1978, p.31. 
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in the areas in which mining took place, and it is consequently 
unlikely that significant opportunity costs resulted from 
labour absorption. Little domestic capital was mobilised, 
but domestic investors were not denied the opportunity to 
become involved in the mining sector. As to whether minerals 
should have been conserved until Irish investors were able 
to grasp that opportunity, the earlier discussion indicated 
that the obstacles to their doing so were deep-seated and 
showed little sign of diminishing. Given that Ireland faced 
severe and immediate economic problems, the preference of 
policy-makers for immediate foreign-financed mineral development 
seems justified in economic terms; given the political 
imperatives facing Irish governments, it was probably inevitable. 
It is unlikely that mining activity exerted a major influence 
on domestic income distribution. Returns to national investors 
do not seem to have been affected, and it is unlikely that 
mining's demand for labour influenced wage levels significantly, 
given substantial unemployment. Miners wages were above the 
national average (by 37 per cent in 1973), but the numbers 
involved were small (0.2 per cent of the workforce) and not 
very 'visible' within the national economy, and so the difference 
is very unlikely to have exercised any 'demonstration effect' 
on wage levels. 
Foreign-financed mining projects did contribute to the 
government's central aim of increasing employment and export 
receipts- Its contribution to employment was modest, reflecting 
the capital intensity of mining operations, the absence of 
mineral processing, and the lag in backward linkage development. 
There was apparently little opportunity to vary the labour 
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intensity of mining operations. The absence of mineral 
processing was partly due to the use of smelter credits in 
funding mineral development, but mainly to the inexperience of 
the company involved in dealing with the European zinc cartel. 
The lag in linkage development could probably have been overcome 
had government adopted a more interventionist approach. It is 
clear that foreign mining companies would have been responsive 
to pressure to purchase goods and services locally, while 
government could have ensured that local suppliers were informed 
of the available opportunities. 
Irish policy-makers adopted the wrong criterion in assessing 
the contribution of foreign-financed mining projects to the 
balance of payments. The criterion applied was that of export 
receipts, rather than of net foreign exchange inflow, and 
consequently the implication of low tax rates for the balance of 
payments was not apparent. Had taxation rates been higher, so 
would the scale of net foreign exchange inflow. 
The criterion of export receipts suited Irish politicians 
very well of course, for two reasons. First, it offered a more 
easily definable and readily understandable measure by which 
those politicians could demonstrate their 'success' to the Irish 
public. Second, it obscured the true implications, from Ireland's 
point ov view, of the type of relationships which developed 
between them and the foreign investors concerned. 
Conclusion 
Ireland's modern mining history had an inauspicious start, 
and the failure of the Avoca development reinforced the reluctance 
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of Irish private investors and of Irish governments to invest 
in raineral exploration and development. However, conditions 
for such investment were fundamentally favourable, and over 
the period 1958-77 foreign mining companies applied their 
capital and expertise in establishing a thriving mining 
industry. 
Foreign-financed mineral development helped alleviate 
Ireland's economic difficulties, but its contribution could 
have been significantly greater. That it was not was primarily 
due to the failure of Irish governments to capture economic 
rents generated by mineral exploitation. That failure resulted 
from the attitudes of Irish decision-makers towards foreign 
mining investors, attitudes which some of those investors 
apparently helped foster and enforce and which led decison-
makers to the mistaken belief that a generous 'pay-off' was 
necessary if mineral exploration and development was to continue, 
As a result, Irish governments were denied revenue which could' 
have been utilised to promote economic development elsewhere in 
the economy, while the positive impact of mining projects on the 
balance of payments was substantially diminished. 
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Chapter Three 
THE NAVAN ZINC/LEAD DEVELOPMENT; A CASE STUDY OF 
FOREIGN INVESTOR - HOST COUNTRY RELATIONS 
One of the nany companies which undertook exploration in 
Ireland in the vzake of the Tynagh discovery was Tara Exploration 
and Development Company Limited, a Toronto-based firm. Tara 
was closely linked with Northgate, having been established by 
the same small group of men. Over the period 1962-69, 
Tara undertook an extensive exploration programme, without 
success, but in 1970 its fortunes changed dramatically. 
On 4 November 1970 Tara announced in a brief statement 
that it had 'encountered mineralisation... in the first drill-
hole of a new prospect near Navan, Co. Meath.' As further 
drilling results were released, it became apparent that Tara's 
find was on a scale unprecedented in Ireland's mining history. 
In early 1973 the Company stated proven ore reserves at 
77 million tons, grading on average 11.0 per cent zinc and 
2.7 per cent lead,^ and the orebody is still open at depth. 
^ Tara Exploration and Development Company Limited, Annual 
Re-port, 1975 , p. 11. All references to Annual Reports in this 
Chapter are to those of Tara Exploration and Development 
Company Limited, except where otherwise stated. 
^ In other words the limits of the orebody had not been 
encountered when drilling ceased. Tara followed normal mining 
practice in not drilling up its orebody completely: drilling 
at depth is expensive, and serves little purpose when reserves 
sufficient to sustain a 25 year operation are already known 
to exist. 
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Tara had discovered v/hat is now one of the world's largest 
known deposits of zinc and lead.^ 
In the years after the Navan discovery, a major political 
debate developed concerning the position of the mining industry 
4 
and its contribution to the Irish economy. The scale of 
Tara's find generated considerable public interest, and a 
number of political groups took advantage of this situation to 
demand changes in the structure of the industry. The most 
influential of these was the Resources Study Group (RSG), a 
Dublin-based organisation which succeeded in greatly increasing 
public awareness of the issues involved. Along with Sinn Fein 
(Gardiner Street), a small socialist party, and with left-wing 
members of the Labour party, the RSG campaigned for 
nationalisation without compensation of all foreign mining 
companies. Other political groups, while anxious to ensure 
continued foreign investment in the industry, demanded abolition 
of the twenty year tax exemption.^ 
Ireland changes its government - and its mineral policy 
When the Fianna Fail party was defeated in the general 
election held on 23 February 1973, it was clear that the Fine 
The Navan discovery represented the equivalent of an addition 
to total non-communist world reserves as they stood in 1971 of 
9.32 per cent in zinc and 2.26 per cent in lead. F. Walsh, 
'The Navan Zinc-Lead Mine', Irish Geography, 10, p.95. 
^ I have analysed this debate in detail elsewhere. See 
C. O'Faircheallaigh, 'The Role of Foreign Investment in the 
Development of the Irish Mining Industry; 1955-1975', MA 
Dissertation, Department of International Relations, Australian 
National University, March 1976, unpublished, pp.39-48. 
^ See Resources Study Group, op.cit., inside cover, for 
references to relevant statements by various groups. 
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Gael/Labour party coalition which replaced it would alter 
mineral policy in important ways. Strong pressures in this 
direction would certainly be generated by sections of the 
Labour party which, at its annual conference in 1972, had 
passed a resolution calling for the nationalisation without 
compensation of the country's mineral resources.^ 
The newly-appointed Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
Mr Justin Keating, indicated that he regarded the formulation 
of a comprehensive policy covering the development of Ireland's 
natural resources as one of his most urgent tasks. He gave 
no specific indications as to what actions might be taken in 
this area, but ruled out the possibility of nationalising the 
mining industry, for political rather than financial or technical 
reasons: 
I don't advocate total public control of oil and 
gas and mines. I do not advocate this because I 
am a democrat. No Irish government has a mandate 
to do this. I am not going to ram down the throats 
of the Irish people what they do not want. 
As Mr Keating pointed out to the Labour party conference in 
1973, v/hatever his personal preferences, legislation v;ould 
have to be framed in such a way as to ensure the support of 
Fine Gael in both the Cabinet and the Dail.^ For these reasons, 
it was essential to find a middle road 'between the two ends 
of the possible outcom.e, one end total nationalisation, the 
, 9 
other end the previous policy of total private control . 
^ The Irish Times, 26 September 1973. 
The Irish Times, 15 February 1975. 
^ The Irish Times, 15 October 1973. 
^ Interview, Radio Eireann, 4 July 1974. 
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Mr Keating's general political beliefs also gave clear indication 
of the policies he would pursue in relation to the mining 
10 sector. 
After a life-long involvement in the socialist movement 
Mr Keating was deeply committed to its ideals, but had strong 
views on how these should, or should not, be implemented. 
Perhaps m.ost importantly, socialism had to be democratic. 
Thus his determination not to 'ram down the throats of the 
Irish people' measures which they did not want and to press 
only for measures on which there was a consensus within the 
Coalition. Keating's second basic tenet was that efficiency 
should be the keynote of any enterprise, public or private. 
A scientist by training, a farmer and veterinary surgeon by 
trade before his election to office, Keating had himself 
built up one of the finest Jersey herds in Ireland; he regarded 
the high standards of efficiency which he applied to his private 
life as indispensable in public and private enterprise if 
Ireland's social and economic problems v/ere to be solved. He 
was appalled, for example, by the pouring of British funds into 
projects such as Concorde and into firms such as British 
Leyland. He was equally appalled by the ignorance of and 
lack of feeling for the business world which he perceived 
among the civil servants of his Department (Industry and 
Commerce), and described their lack of business skills as 
' terrifying'. 
The following section is based largely on an extensive 
interview held with Mr Keating in Dublin on 1 December 1978. 
Unless otherwise stated, all quotations are taken from this 
interview. 
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The public sectors of countries such as Britain and 
Ireland left a great deal to be desired, therefore, in terms 
of efficiency. On the other hand, Keating believed that private 
enterprise and the capitalist system within which it operated 
had failed to solve the urgent problems facing Ireland and the 
world, for example, poverty, environmental despoliation, and 
energy shortages. Thus there was a great need for effective 
planning within a democratic framework. This necessitated 
the active involvement of the state in key areas on the economy. 
Keating saw another, and complementary, reason for direct 
state participation in business. He had been a member of the 
Irish Council of Ministers when the 'oil crisis' occurred in 
October 1973. The Irish government set out at this juncture 
to find out where Ireland's oil was coming from, and found 
that it could not do so. Oil was being traded among the 
multinationals on the high seas, and the original source was 
impossible to discover. In addition, the crisis called 
attention to the pricing policies of oil companies in Ireland. 
Keating believed that the ability of the Shell/British 
Petroleum group, for exam.ple, to avoid making a taxable profit 
on turnover in excess of 30 million in 1972^^ was indicative 
of the ability of those companies to take their profits in 
whatever part of the world they wished. In general, he 
considered that private enterprise 'may have very strong 
reasons...for not being completely frank with the state'. 
Direct state involvement in commercial activity was necessary 
if governm.ent was to overcome its ignorance in such areas. 
^^ The Irish Times, 4 May 1975. 
Ill 
In Keating's words, 
we could monitor their costs, we would know if 
one of them was making huge profits because we 
would be plugged into the whole cost structure 
through our own state c o m p a n y . 
In addition, competition between private and public 
enterprises v/ould raise the general level of efficiency in 
the economy; it would force the public sector 'to apply the 
efficiency, the standards, the methods, even the accounting 
of private industry to the public s e c t o r I t would end 
the v;oeful ignorance of public servants concerning the business 
world, allowing them to monitor private enterprise effectively 
and to ensure that its activities furthered government planning 
aimed at dealing with social and economic problems. 
VJhat Keating wanted was a system within which the public 
and private sectors interacted constantly, adding to the 
efficiency of the former and the social utility of the latter. 
The implications of this outlook for the mining industry 
were clear. Mr Keating's aim would be to actively involve 
the Irish government in the industry, presumably through 
equity participation in existing companies and eventually 
through initiatives by the state on its own behalf in mineral 
exploration and development.^^ In general, it was obvious that 
Keating would have very little sympathy with the laissez-faire 
12 
ibid. 
Interview, Management, December 1973 , p. 15. 
13 
^^ Only for those who wished to see them. A number of key 
individuals in the mining industry obviously did not. See 
below, p.133-4. 
^^ In fact in December 1973 Mr Keating v;ent on record as 
indicating his intention to obtain negotiated equity holdings 
for the State in mining companies. 
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policies of his predecessors. Hov/ever, it is clear from what 
was said above that the attitude of his Cabinet colleagues 
rather than Mr Keating's personal preferences would be the 
final determinant of mineral policy. 
Throughout the summer of 1974 speculation continued as 
to precisely what initiatives Keating would take. It was 
reported that an interdepartmental committee, set up by the 
Fianna Fail government in 1971 to review raining taxation and 
royalties, particularly the twenty year tax concession, had 
been ordered to extend its terms of reference. Legislation 
recently implemented by other governments was to be examined, 
and a policy formulated which would take account both of 
Ireland's special needs and of current international trends.^^ 
V7hen this committee reported, it did not recommend abolition 
of the twenty year exemiption. A substantial minority favoured 
abolition, but Department of Finance representatives who 
dominated the committee held the opposite view, and their 
viewpoint prevailed. Keating rejected the committee's 
recommendation, as he believed that Ireland's bargaining 
position had improved to such a degree that it was no longer 
necessary to offer generous tax concessions, and because he 
felt that international developments had left Ireland very 
much out of line with other mineral producers in terms of tax 
concessions offered. 
Keating undertook the 'wheeling and dealing' necessary 
to gain Cabinet support for his initiative, but encountered 
^^ The Irish Times, 14 August 1973. 
Interview, 1 December 1978 . 
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considerable opposition. Mr Tully, the Minister for Local 
Government, who had long been a champion of mining interests, 
opposed the measure throughout, as did a number of other 
ministers. Keating nevertheless succeeded in obtaining 
Cabinet ratification, though the final decision was far from 
18 unanimous. 
The decision to end the twenty year tax concession v/as 
announced on 25 September 1973, before Keating had outlined 
any general policy on mineral development. Apart from making 
this decision public, the statem.ent released by the government 
was vague. It stated the view that Ireland's mining industry, 
'having reached its present state'of development should now 
make a suitable and equitable contribution towards the ever-
increasing cost of promoting national development'. This 
contribution would be obtained through the imposition of 'normal 
taxation' (i.e. 50 per cent of profits) 'after deducting 
certain allowances in respect of expenditure under such headings 
as exploration, prospecting, development and new plant and 
machinery'. It also stated that negotiations would take place 
with the mining companies to fix a sliding scale of royalties, 
19 
but no details concerning royalty rates were given. 
Keating's decision was met by a torrent of criticism by 
mining industry spokesmen, who claimed the abolition of the 
exemption would deter foreign investment in mineral exploration. 
20 
18 ibid. 
^^ The Irish Times, 26 September 1973. 
The controversy which followed the ending of the twenty 
year exemption has been described in detail elsewhere. See 
C. O'Faircheallaigh, op.cit., pp.57-64. 
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A study which examined exploration activity in the v/ake of 
the decision has indicated that these fears were unfounded. 
This study (by M. 0'Kelly) shows that the exploration industry, 
dominated until about 1970 by small mining companies and by 
independent 'wildcatters', thereafter attracted a higher 
proportion of large multinational mining concerns. From 1971 
to 1977, the number of such companies on the Irish scene 
grew without interruption. 0'Kelly concluded that Keating's 
21 
initiative 'was a non-event as far as they were concerned'. 
In his view, stability of operating conditions and more 
concrete evidence of major mineral occurrences were of 
greater importance to such companies than were tax incentives. 
The Navan discovery provided the concrete evidence, and it is 
clear that the ending of the tax exemption was not seen as 
indicating instability in operating conditions in Ireland. 
The circulation of the Finance (Taxation of Profits of 
Certain Mines) Bill, 1974, on 1 April of that year clarified 
the government's taxation policy. The Bill officially terminated 
the mining companies' exemption from income and corporation 
taxes. It stated, however, 'that relief [would] be provided 
for marginal mines which might otherwise cease to operate 
because of the potential tax burden'. Much of the rest of 
the Bill was devoted to outlining the allowances which the 
mining companies would be permitted to offset against taxation. 
Section 2 provided that all expenditure on exploration would 
qualify for immediate allowance, as would development costs 
for any mine brought into production. Section 6 provided 
^^ M. O'Kelly, op.cit., p.153. 
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for an additional special allowance of 20 per cent of all 
expenditure on exploration. Section 7 provided that 120 per 
cent of the value of all new plant and machinery could be 
immediately written off against taxation, v;hile Section 8 
enabled expenditure incurred through the purchase of mineral 
deposits to be offset against taxation over the mine life or 
22 
over twenty years, if shorter. 
These provisions have two principal effects. First, they 
exempt from taxation profits equal to 20 per cent of a mining 
company's expenditure on exploration, plant and machinery. 
Second, they postpone tax liability for a period determined 
by the scale of capital expenditures and the level of profits; 
in this instance the loss to government is represented by the 
notional interest on deferred revenue. 
It is not possible to predict precisely what the impact 
of the 1974 Act will be in particular cases, but its provisions 
will certainly soften the effect of the withdrawal of the tax 
exemption. In addition, it is evident that these provisions 
are being interpreted generously by the taxing authority, the 
Revenue Commissioners (a division of the Department of Finance), 
and that this will significantly increase their impact. As 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, an element of double 
depreciation was involved in Northgate Exploration Limited's 
application of depreciation and amortization allowances over 
the period 1962-77. Closer examination of its accounts showed 
that this practice apparently did not occur prior to 1973. In 
that year, the sum of allowable expenditures was C$29,312,000, 
^^ Bail Debates, 1 May 1974. 
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substantially more than that of depreciation and amortization 
allowances (C$ 22,785,000). Four years later, the sum of 
allowable expenditures was C$31,425,000, while that of 
depreciation and amortization allov/ances had jumped to 
C$35,309,000.^^ Over the period 1973-77, the provisions of 
the 1974 Act were clearly applied in a manner calculated to 
afford Northgate a significant additional measure of tax relief. 
Thus the tax liability of mining companies has not 
increased as substantially as would first appear. This 
situation apparently results from decisions taken by civil 
servants in the Department of Finance rather than by politicians, 
According to Mr Keating, neither he nor his Department had 
any input into the form of the new legislation; the 
'technicalities' of taxation provisions were regarded as purely 
a matter for the Department of Finance. He has also stated he 
knew the Revenue Commissioners, v/ith the agreement of the 
Department of Finance, would draft a mild piece of 
legislation and interpret its provisions 'very generously^^ 
What explains the behaviour of the civil servants concerned, 
and Keating's failure to seek more stringent provisions? 
As mentioned earlier, the Department of Finance opposed 
the termination of the tv^ enty year tax exemption, and its 
officials apparently decided they would at least partly 
counteract its withdrawal. A request to interview the 
relevant officials was rejected by the Department of Finance, 
on the grounds that the Revenue Commissioners do not discuss 
23 Derived from Table 1, and p. 86, n.61. 
^^ Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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application of tax legislation to individual companies or 
2 S 
particular sectors of industry with the public. Consequently 
I can only speculate as to the motives of those involved. 
Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, these 
individuals may have continued to hold attitudes towards 
foreign mining companies of the type discussed in the previous 
Chapter, and consequently believed it v;as still necessary to 
grant tax concessions if mineral exploration and production 
was to be maintained. Second, Department of Finance officials 
may have resented Keating's intrusion into a policy area they 
regarded as their own preserve, and been determined to assert 
their authority. Both factors may well have been involved. 
Keating's failure to act was apparently due to his belief 
that he was fortunate to have secured implementation of any 
taxation measure, given the depth of opposition within the 
Cabinet, and that attempts to obtain more stringent provisions 2 S 
would be fruitless. 
Thus the ability of civil servants to act in the manner 
described above was partly due to the continued adherence 
of some politicians to the attitudes described earlier. It 
also reflected the fact that their actions were not, and are 
not, public knowledge in Ireland. The effect of a twenty 
year tax exem.ption is easily grasped by the layman, but that 
of investment and depreciation allowances and of the manner 
in which they are interpreted is not. In addition, relevant 
9 cr 
Correspondence with the Departm.ent of Finance, September-
October 1978. 
2 6 Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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information is difficult to come by, as the Revenue Commissioners 
do not publish details of their transactions with individual 
companies, and since the annual reports of Canadian mining 
27 
companies are not freely available in Ireland. (Most of 
those companies operate in Ireland through wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, which are private companies and therefore not 
required to publish their accounts under Irish law.) 
One question remains. Given these comments, why was 
the twenty year exemption ended? It seems clear that the 
political imperative was important: the pressure generated 
by the Resources Study Group, Sinn Fein, and the left wing 
of the Labour party paid off, though the inability of these 
groups to influence decision-makers in the Department of 
Finance rendered their victory rather a hollow one. From 
Keating's point of view, the main importance of the initiative 
seems to have been tactical: it informed the mining industry, 
in the most dramatic fashion possible, that he meant business 
and that changes of a more significant nature were on the way. 
Bula Limited, and Irish mining legislation 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to explain 
developments in the area of mineral ownership in the wake of 
the Navan discovery. As pointed out above (pp. 58-9) 
the Mineral Development Act, 1940, had provided a workable 
system of mineral ownership and was an essential element 
underlying mineral developments in the 1960s. Section 14 of 
Thus it proved necessary to obtain some of the reports 
used in this study in Toronto. 
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the Act provided that 
Whenever it appears to the Minister [for Industry 
and Commerce] that there are minerals...[ which ] are 
not being worked or are not being worked efficiently 
...the Minister, with the consent of the Minister 
for Finance, may by order...compulsorily acquire 
such minerals or compulsorily acquire an exclusive 
mining right in respect of such minerals. 
Section 22 allowed the Minister to grant to any person a 
licence to work minerals thus acquired. In effect, these 
sections ensured that if and when an exploration company 
discovered minerals, the Minister could acquire those minerals 
and permit that company to work them. He was not required to 
do so, but by the late 1950s it was assumed that he would. This 
assumption underlay the whole exploration effort from 1959 
onwards, as it ensured that claim-jumping would be impossible 
and that successful companies would enjoy their just rewards. 
In December 1970, Tara Mines Limited applied for a mining 
lease for that portion of the Navan minerals which were in 
state hands. But part of the deposit was privately ovmed, and • 
Tara commenced negotiations with a local farmer, Mr Wright, in 
order to purchase the land involved. Tara offered VJright the 
agricultural value of the land, around £80,000; the conpanv 
felt that it was the only bidder in the field, and therefore 
need go no higher. It was wrong. 
Wright was unwilling to sell his farm at the price 
offered by Tara. His plight came to the attention of Tom 
Roche, Vice Chairman of Cement Roadstone Limited, the largest 
quarrying concern in Ireland. Roche obviously made some very 
quick decisions based on his long years of experience in the 
quarrying industry, and offered Wright £500,000, plus a 
tv/enty per cent stake in the company which would hold the 
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mineral rights. Wright accepted, and by an agreement dated 
18 March 1971 signed his farm over to Roche. On the following 
day, a private company, Bula Limited, v/as incorporated in 
Dublin, and ownership of the land and mineral resources was 
vested in it. 
On 22 March 1971 it was revealed that the Minister for 
Industry and Comjnerce, Mr Lalor, had signed a compulsory 
acquisition order under the 1940 Act taking the minerals 
concerned into state ownership. This would defeat Roche's 
purpose in buying the land as Lalor could simply turn the 
minerals over to Tara. The Minister's order was dated 15 March, 
three days before Roche's purchase was finalised, and Lalor 
later claimed that he had signed the order on 12 March before 
departing for Canada to attend St Patrick's Day celebrations 
there. The Minister's memory was apparently playing him 
tricks, because Roche's solicitors v;ere informed by the 
relevant authorities on the morning of 18 March that no order 
covering the lands concerned had then been made. In fact it 
would seem that Lalor failed to sign the order before leaving 
for Canada, and then signed a backdated copy on his return to 
2 8 
Dublin, a procedure not permitted under Irish law. 
Bula Limited decided to contest the Ministerial order in 
the Courts, on the grounds that it had in fact been backdated 
and, more generally, that Section 14 of the 1940 Act, which 
allowed for compulsory acquisition of minerals, was 
unconstitutional in that it infringed rights of private 
^^ On 24 March Mr Lalor informed the Dail that he was annoyed 
at himself 'for not acting more swiftly' [Bail debates, 2A March 
1971). Like Tara, he had never considered the possibility 
that their might be another player in the field. 
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29 property. The implications of this latter claim were far-
reaching. If upheld, it would invalidate all orders (18 
altogether) previously made under the Act, and undermine the 
mineral exploration industry in Ireland. 
Bula's case commenced in the High Court in July 1972. 
But before then, another important development had occurred. 
By March 1971, disturbed by the Bula action and anxious to 
develop its deposit, Tara was pressing the Department of 
Industry and Commerce to issue a mining lease. Department 
officials v;ere loath to do this before the ownership issue 
was settled, wary of any other legal pitfalls which might 
await them.^'^ Tara brought pressure to bear on Fianna Fail 
politicians with whom it had contacts, and within 48 hours a 
dramatic change had occurred. The Minister for Industry and 
Commerce gave Tara a written undertaking that it would be 
granted a mining lease; this document was (perhaps appropriately 
as things turned out) dated 1 April 1971. It did not specify 
the terms on which the lease would be granted. Armed with 
this commitment, Tara began to develop that part of the orebody 
not in dispute. 
Bula Limited v/on its High Court case in April 1973, and 
the appeal brought against this decision in the Supreme Court 
29 The relevant section of the Act is quoted on the previous 
page. Article 43 of the Irish Constitution, in the following 
terms, guarantees protection of private property: 'The State 
accordingly guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish 
the right of private ownership or the general right to transfer, 
bequeath, and inherit property'. The 1940 Act seems to threaten 
this guarantee in no uncertain terms; it must be remembered 
that the Act was introduced in wartime and was meant as a 
piece of emergency legislation. 
Interview with Department of Industry and Commerce official, 
11 February 1976. 
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by the M i n i s t e r for Industry and C o m m e r c e , in March 1974. 
The High Court ruling d e c l a r e d the M i n i s t e r i a l order invalid 
on the p r o c e d u r a l grounds o n l y , and failed to d e a l w i t h the 
question of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , leaving the validity of the 
1940 Act open to d o u b t . In combination w i t h l e g a l advice 
obtained by M r Keating shortly after coming to o f f i c e , this 
uncertainty was to impose an important constraint on government 
action. That advice was that if the M i n i s t e r i a l order of 15 March 
1971 or any o t h e r order issued under the 1940 Act was upheld 
on p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d s , it could only be deemed constitutional 
if the o r i g i n a l o w n e r were compensated at the full commercial 
value of the ore in the g r o u n d . Thus in the Navan c a s e , for 
example, the state would have to pay farmer Wright the estimated 
value of the nine m i l l i o n tons of lead/zinc ore which lay under 
31 
his land before it could permit Tara to mine it. The 
significance of this constraint w i l l later become apparent. 
Nothing had yet been revealed concerning government policy 
on the c r u c i a l questions of state equity participation in 
^^ The practice to date had been to compensate owners only to 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l value of the land c o n c e r n e d . It would be w e l l 
nigh impossible, of c o u r s e , to estimate the value of 'ore in 
the g r o u n d ' . The High Court judges doubtless realised this, 
which may explain their failure to rule on the constitutional 
issue. They were able to avoid the question on that occasion 
because the o r d e r was invalid on p r o c e d u r a l grounds. However, 
if and when a case was brought on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d s , this 
would not be the c a s e . 
The full implications of the Bula case were not felt in 
this instance, as 85 per cent of the Navan orebody was already 
in state hands and Tara could therefore proceed with development. 
Others were not so fortunate. American Smelting and Refining 
Company (ASARCO), for e x a m p l e , discovered after it had identified 
a lead/zinc prospect that a l l of the land on w h i c h it was 
situated had been bought by l o c a l businessmen 'a la Bula . 
ASARCO abandoned this prospect a l t o g e t h e r . 
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mining ventures and the level of royalties to be imposed. 
Both would be negotiated with the companies concerned, and 
discussions took place with Tara Mines Limited as early as 
October 1973. The Company, armed with the undertaking given 
on 1 April 1971, was anxious to finalise arrangements for the 
granting of a mining lease. Initial development work at Navan 
had proceeded rapidly, but mcajor loan capital could not be 
raised until leasing arrangements were finalised, A further 
reason for haste was the rapid escalation in projected capital 
costs, as rates of inflation mounted both in Ireland and abroad. 
The negotiations with Tara did not result in the granting 
of a lease. Litigation over the ownership of mineral rights 
at Navan was still in progress, and in fact v;as not closed 
until 4 March 1974. The Department of Industry and Commerce 
maintains that the delay in granting a lease to Tara was the 
result of this litigation, in that no lease could be issued 
32 
until the questions it had raised were clarified. Tara 
has pointed out that all of the minerals in dispute lay north 
of the river Blackwater, whereas it was seeking only permission 33 
to mine on land south of the river. 
Keating maintains that the delay in issuing a lease was 
solely due to the litigation, in that he accepted the need for 
caution and also in that the State's bargaining position would 
be stronger if it were in possession of 100 per cent of the 
minerals. However, the Minister certainly wished to strengthen 
his position in other v;ays, and for this he needed time. 
32 
Annual Report, 1973, p.4 
Interview with Department official, 11 February 1976. 
33 
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Immediately he came to office, Keating stated his intention of 
making himself familiar with all aspects of the mining 
industry's operations. In addition, he was determined to 
enhance the expertise available in his Department, Industry 
and Commerce. Keating persuaded the then Secretary of the 
Department to retire early. In his place he appointed Mr Joe 
Holloway, formerly trade secretary with the Irish embassy in 
London and a person with considerable knowledge in the area of 
mineral resource policy. Keating strengthened the powers of 
the Secretary, and improved Holloway's access to himself. He 
also doubled the number of relevant technical personnel in the 
Geological Survey Office, and arranged to draw on the expertise 
available through the government-run Institute for Industrial 
Research and Standards. 
Keating would have liked to do more, particularly in 
hiring specialists from academic life and private enterprise 
on a short term basis, but the Department of the Public 
Service vetoed this possibility. Keating had earned the ire 
of this Department by refusing to implement the recommendations 
for civil service 'reform' contained in the 'Devlin Report'. 
In Keating's view, this report was attempting to achieve an 
even more 'closed' civil service structure, whereas he believed 
that greater openness and interaction between the service and 
the academic and business worlds was required. Keating was 
also unpopular with the civil service establishment because he 
had raised Holloway to the position of Secretary above the 
heads of senior career civil servants within the Department 
of Industry and Commerce. With his emphasis on technical 
expertise and external recruitment, Keating was seen as a 
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threat by the administration-oriented career civil servants 
who dominate the Irish Civil Service, and on that rock many 
34 
of his proposals foundered. Thus the Minister's attempts to 
increase Ireland's progress along the relevant 'learning curve' 
were hampered by factors which were quite independent of any 
relationship between host country authorities and the foreign 
investors concerned. 
Other preparations also took time. In November 1973 the 
Coalition did not have an agreed mineral resource policy, and 
formulation of a policy position was essential before negotiations 
could commence. The interdepartmental committee which had 
reviewed mining taxation was then examining the wider area of 
general mineral policy, and was assessing measures adopted by 
other governments. This committee was due to report in May 
1974. Its recommendations would then be submitted to the 
government, which would have to decide whether to accept, amend 
or reject them. 
While these preparations were underway, Tara was getting 
into financial difficulties. In January 1974 an agreement 
was reached under which Noranda Mines Limited, a large 
Canadian-based mining and smelting concern arranged a C$6 
million loan. In return, Noranda received five year warrants 
to purchase a total of 100,000 treasury shares of Tara 
Exploration and Development Company Limited. This agreement 
seemed to mark the beginning of a new stage in the involvement 
of foreign investors in the Irish mining industry. To that 
^^ Keating had hoped, for example, to employ accountants and 
economists with experience of working in the mining industry. 
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time, foreign-owned mining concerns operating in Ireland (such 
as Northgate, Avoca Mines Limited) had been small by 
international standards, with their Irish operations accounting 
for a large part of their activities. All of those concerns 
carried out the actual process of mining themselves, usually 
through wholly-owned Irish subsidiaries. Noranda, in contrast, 
was a large mining concern by world standards (its assets in 
1976 exceeded C$2 billion). Its activities in Ireland would 
represent only a small fraction of its overall operation, and 
it would not participate directly in the working of minerals 
in Ireland. 
Some commentators regarded the arrival of Noranda on the 
Irish scene as a disturbing development, taking the view that 
the nature of its involvement would make it considerably more 
difficult for the Irish government to influence and control 
than companies such as Tara.^^ From this viewpoint, the delay 
caused by Mr Keating's preparations might be seen as having 
inadvertently let the wolf in by the back door while strengthening 
the front door against the fox. This view was hardly valid, 
however, as the wolves, if wolves they were, had been hammering 
on the door for quite some time, and there was nothing the 
Minister could do to keep them. out. 
Since its Navan find, which had raised Tara to the status of a 
large mining concern by international standards, a take-over 
bid for the company had been expected, and in February 1974 
it materialised. Cominco Limited, which holds a duopoly 
position in the Canadian zinc industry with Noranda, and 
^^ See, for example. The Irish Times, 3 September 1974 
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Charter Consolidated, the London arm of the Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa Limited, made a bid which valued 
Tara at C$162 million. Tara's management, determined to retain 
control of the company, rejected the offer. In so doing, 
Hughes, McCarthy and Gilroy turned down a tax-free capital gain 
to themselves estimated at C$25 million.^^ They fought a 
tenacious battle against the take-over bid, but the need to 
issue shares to raise initial development capital had seriously 
weakened their hold on Tara, and they were forced to seek 
Noranda's assistance. Noranda responded and the bid was fought 
off, but in return for its help it received an option to 
purchase a controlling interest in Tara at a later date, an 
option it exercised in March 1978-^"^ 
From Ireland's point of view, what was most disturbing 
about these events was the total incapacity of any Irish 
agency to influence the outcome of a battle for control of 
the country's most valuable single natural resource. On 
18 February, the government stated publicly that there was 
no action it could take, as the company involved was under 
Canadian jurisdiction. In consequence Keating, who was 
anxious to intervene and prevent the take-over, was unable 
4- ^ 38 to do so. 
The Bula Agreement 
By July 1974, negotiations were underway between the 
^^ Interview with Tara official, 1 December 1978. 
The Irish Times, 14 November 1975 , 2 March 1978. 
3 8 Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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Department of Industry and Commerce and Bula Limited concerning 
the development of Bula's section of the Navan orebody. 
These negotiations seem to have proceeded smoothly and 
rapidly. Keating was well disposed towards Bula, a wholly 
Irish-owned company, and the Bula directors, having pulled off 
a coup of impressive magnitude, were doubtless prepared to 
accommodate the Minister's wishes. At the end of July agreement 
had been reached between the two parties. The text of the 
Agreement, entitled Bula Limited - Inter-Party Agreement, 
was later released by the Department of Industry and Commerce. 
The financial provisions were as follows. Corporation 
tax would apply at the standard rate (50 per cent), but as 
Bula's minerals were in private ownership no royalties would 
be charged. Bula Limited would hand over to the State, free 
of charge, 25 per cent of its equity (Article 2.02). In 
addition, the company would sell to the Minister a further 
24 per cent of its shares, at a price fixed by independent 
consultants (Articles 2.01, 3.01(a)). The purchased shares 
would not, however, have voting rights (Article 9.01(a)). 
The Minister would appoint two out of the company's seven 
directors (Article 4.05). Article 8.04 provided that Bula 
Limited would 'distribute by way of dividend the entire 
profits of such financial year as shown in the audited accounts 
of the Company remaining after taxation applicable thereto'. 
This requirement would not apply where limits on dividend 
payments were contained in loan agreements or where its 
auditors advised the Company that its commitm.ents made 
dividend payments inadvisable. 
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A large part of the Agreement was concerned with safe-
guarding the state's interests, mainly by prohibiting non-
39 
commercial practices by the operating company. Other parts 
of the Agreement dealt with operational aspects of the Navan 
development. Article 8.05 provided that if and when a zinc 
refinery was established in Ireland, Bula would supply 
concentrates to it 'on normal and reasonable commercial terms'. 
Bula was guaranteed an equity stake in any smelting venture, 
in proportion to the percentage of smelter supplies provided 
by the company, but would not be compelled to take up this 
equity (Article 9.07(a)). 
Considerable emphasis was placed on ensuring Ministerial 
access to corporate information. Articles 6.01 and 8.07 
called in general terms for the Company to supply full 
information on its business activities, and to give the Minister 
access to its 'properties, books and records'. Article 9.02 
required that the Minister be provided annually with full 
details of the ownership of Bula Limited's shares. 
In theory, the State 'take' under these arrangements 
would amount to almost 75 per cent of profits. However, 12 
per cent of this would be accounted for by dividends from 
shares purchased at their full commercial value. In addition, 
the provisions of the Finance (Taxation of Profits of Certain 
Mines) Act 1974 would ensure that the 'free' State 'take' of 
62h per cent would in practice be significantly below that figure 
For example. Article 8.03 prohibited the payment to 
employees or contractors of any amounts in excess of the value 
of work done. Article 8.03(d) prohibited the sale by Bula^of 
any of its products 'at less than a fair commercial price', 
while Article 5.15 demanded that adequate provision be made 
for depreciation. 
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On the other hand, Keating had ensured inclusion of 
provisions designed to further his overall strategy, outlined 
above (see pp. 109-11). It will be remembered that Keating's 
major priorities were to ensure direct state involvement in 
productive enterprises, to educate civil servants in the skills 
practiced by private enterprise, and to ensure effective 
government monitoring of private businesses. A State shareholding 
of 49 per cent in Bula represented a significant step towards 
the first object, though a far cry, of course, from the 
ultimate aim of a state-owned independent mining company. The 
nomination to Bula's Board of Directors of two civil servants 
(one from Industry and Commerce, and one from the Geological 
Survey Office, as it turned out) was a step towards 
development of the required skills in the civil service. Their 
presence on the Board, and the access to information 
guaranteed under the Agreement, would ensure that Bula's 
activities could be closely monitored. From this point of 
view, the Bula Agreement was a significant triumph for 
Keating. 
Given the importance Keating attached to exerting influence 
over the Company, the inclusion of a clause denying the 
Minister voting rights over the purchased shares seems puzzling. 
Keating has stated that, during negotiations, Bula expressed 
considerable concern at the prospect of the State holding 
49 per cent of its voting rights. Bula felt that a change in 
company law, or the purchase by the state of one per cent of 
its equity, could leave the Minister in control. Since this 
was certainly not the stated purpose of government participation, 
the Company asked Keating to surrender the voting rights over 
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24 per cent of his holding. 
Keating saw the force of this argument. He was concerned 
primarily with acquisition of expertise and knowledge, and 
with fostering interaction between the public and private 
sectors. Control over the purchased shares was not necessary 
for the former and might interfere with the latter if it 
aroused suspicion of state involvement in the private sector. 
Thus he granted Bula's request, in return for concessions on 
4 0 
another area of the agreement. 
Following the agreement with Bula, and given that Tara 
had long been impatient to commence mining at Navan, it was 
expected that the Minister's negotiations with the company 
would rapidly reach a satisfactory conclusion. In fact, the 
two parties were to fight a protracted battle before arrange-
ments for the granting of a mining lease were made. 
The negotiation of the Tara Agreement 
By 8 July 1974, serious negotiations were under way 
between the government and Tara. On that day, Mr Keating 
outlined his proposals to the company's representatives. 
These were similar to the terms accepted by Bula, with an 
important exception. Since the bulk of Tara's minerals were 
state-owned, the Minister proposed to impose a royalty of 
10 per cent. The total state 'take' under such an arrangement 
would be 77.05 per cent. 
Mr Keating also sought non-financial terms of the type 
agreed with Bula, providing for disclosure of information, 
4 0 Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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appointment of government-nominated directors, and the 
diversion of concentrates to an Irish smelter. 
At this stage, Tara's position was very far from the 
Minister's. The single most important issue from its point 
of view was state participation. The company claims that on 
8 July it was prepared to accept a state 'take' of 64 per 
cent of profits, but admits privately that it was opposed 
in principle to equity participation by the Minister. 
This is in contrast to its public statements at the time, 
which claimed that the issues at stake were the price to be 
paid for the 24 per cent of shares to be purchased, and the 
overall level of government r e v e n u e . T o understand the 
company's stand on the issue of state participation, it is 
necessary to look more closely at the character of its senior 
management, which remained unchanged in composition after 
the Noranda take-over. 
Hughes and his associates were unusual in the mining 
industry in that they both managed Tara and were also heavily 
involved in the ownership of the company. This circumstance 
gave Tara's senior management an involvement in the company's 
affairs which was unusually personal and deep. They felt 
very strongly about recent developments in the Irish mining 
industry, and liked little of what they saw. For example, 
Hughes had been shocked and angry at the termination of the 
twenty year tax exemption in 1973. Change was doubly hard 
to accept in that for many years the Fianna Fail party had 
41 Interview with Tara official, 1 November 1978. 
42 
The Irish Times, 28 August 1974; interview with Tara Mines 
Limited Public Relations Officer, 12 February 1976. 
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seen its interests and those of the mining companies as 
synonymous. The blame for the industry's changed circumstances 
was attached in large measure to the activists of the Resources 
Study Group and other organisations, who marched the streets 
of Dublin demanding a higher public return from mining 
activities. As far as Hughes and his associates were concerned. 
it was their sweat and their money which had built up the 
mining industry in Ireland, yet now those people who had 
put nothing into the industry were demanding their (Hughes 
43 and company's) hard-earned profits. 
In this scheme of things Keating seemed to represent all 
that was undesirable to a miner or a businessman. Not content 
with taking profits, Keating wanted to control part of the 
company, appoint directors to the Board, and dig out information 
from company files and records. To individualistic 
entrepreneurs who had fought hard and denied themselves a 
personal fortune to prevent a private competitor from gaining • 
control of Tara, the idea of state influence on such a scale 
was anathema. Hughes and his associates would fight long and 
hard to deny Keating his ambition. 
Tara's management obviously did not realise that 
Keating's commitment to state participation was as strong and 
as deeply felt as their own opposition to it. They believed 
he was responding to popular political pressure in demanding 
equity participation, to a nationalist sentiment which 
wanted Ireland to 'own' part of its largest single natural 
resource, and that his refusal to abandon his demand was 
^^ Interview with Tara official, 1 November 1978. 
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44 designed deliberately to provoke the company. In fact, 
Keating had to overcome considerable political opposition 
within the government before his policies were accepted, and 
the concept of state involvement in the private sector was 
an integral part of his whole political philosophy. There 
was another, more immediate reason why he would fight hard 
to obtain state participation in Tara. 
On coming to office and reading the files on the Navan 
situation, Keating had concluded that the mining area was a 
'shambles', and would stay that way until workable legislation 
on mineral ownership could be devised. He was still concerned, 
of course, with making the best of a bad lot, but believed 
that a much more rewarding field lay in the area of offshore 
oil. In 1971, a significant discovery of natural gas was 
made off Ireland's south coast. This had spurred interest in 
the country's offshore resources, and by 1974 a large number 
of multinational oil companies were anxious to commence 
exploration. Keating had promised to release the terms under 
which exploration would be permitted by early 1975, Knowing 
that the oil companies would be watching his negotiations with 
Tara closely, he was determined to be seen as a tough bargainer 
The government planned to demand a free equity holding of 25 
per cent in any commercial oil finds made, and Keating felt 
that if Tara did not accept such a condition the oil majors 
44 Interview with Tara official, 1 November 1978. 
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45 certainly would not. 
Given these attitudes and perceptions, a head-on encounter 
between the Irish government and Tara was almost inevitable. 
After 8 July, a total of seven meetings was held between 
the Company and officials of the Department of Industry and 
Commerce, without result. On 16 August, the government and 
Tara clashed in dramatic fashion. The company announced it 
was closing down operations at Navan, and that it had issued 
a writ against the Minister of Industry and Commerce, suing 
for a mining lease and for damages for losses caused by the 
delay in granting it. The writ issued by Tara asked for a 
court ruling ordering the Minister to grant a licence on 
'reasonable terms', which it claimed it was entitled to as a 
result of the undertaking given by Mr Lalor, the then Minister 
for Industry and Commerce, in April 1971. It also asked for 
a ruling that the Minister would be going beyond his powers in 
demanding state participation as a condition of granting a 
mining lease. 
Tara claims that Keating put forward his position on 
8 July as non-negotiable, that it therefore felt that further 
discussions were futile, and that drastic action had to be 
In dealing with the wider context of negotiations between 
international corporations and host governments, A. Kapoor 
has noted that governments frequently attempt to set precedents 
which may eventually lead to the achievement of particular 
policy aims, even if they are required to make concessions in 
other areas at that particular point in time. See A. Kapoor, 
'International Business - Government Negotiations in Developing 
Countries', in A. Kapoor and P.D. Grub, (eds). The Multvnat^onal 
Enterprise in Transition, The Darwin Press, New Jersey, 1973, 
pp.367-83. 
^^ The Irish Times, 24 August 1974. 
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47 taken to protect its shareholders' interests. Tara apparently 
took Keating at his word, but why? A company official told 
me that they believed, 'on previous experience', that Keating 
meant what he said. Keating admits that he put his demands 
forward as 'final' on 8 July, but claims that all negotiators, 
whether in the boardroom or the market-place, present their 
initial offer as 'final'."^^ It is certainly clear that Keating 
49 
took a tough stand at the early negotiating sessions. 
However, it does seem strange that Tara did not consider the 
possibility that he was engaging in a bargaining ploy. State 
negotiators almost inevitably start off the bargaining process 
by adopting an extreme position, presenting this as their 
'final offer' in order to seem intimidating.^^ 
It may be that Tara's personnel had such a jaundiced view 
of Keating as to expect him to prove an exception to the rule 
and that their response was based more on pre-conception than 
Interview with Tara Mines Limited PRO, 12 February 1976; 
interview with Tara official, 1 November 1978. If Tara 
believed that there was little point in further negotiation, 
the question arises as to why it attended seven negotiating 
sessions between 8 July and the mine closure. It may be that 
Tara was anxious to present itself as the 'reasonable' party, 
willing and anxious to compromise and was therefore reluctant 
to break off negotiations after the first meeting. 
4 8 Interview, 1 December 1978. 
^^ This was confirmed in interviews held with civil servants 
who either took part in the negotiations or who were involved 
in 'back-up' work. 
For example, Litvak and Maule have described how the 
Guyanese aovernment, in bargaining with foreign bauxite-mining^ 
companies^ put forward its initial position as 'non-negotiable 
when it was in fact willing to compromise on major issues. See 
I.A. Litvak and G.J. Maule, 'Forced Divestment in the 
Caribbean', International Journal, Vol.XXXII, No.3, Summer 197/, 
p.505. 
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on 'previous experience'. Whatever the reason, it is apparent 
that Tara was convinced that Keating would maintain his 
intransigent position. Tara also believed that this intransigence 
would not be limited to the question of state participation, 
but would extend to the overall share of profits which Keating 
was demanding for the state. This is illustrated by the fact 
that when the company was considering the closure strategy its 
officials set out to balance the likely finanoial costs of 
closure against the finanoial concessions they expected it to 
force from Keating.^^ That such an exercise was carried out 
points once again to the tremendous importance of the way in 
which one party in a bargaining process perceives the other. 
Because if Tara wrongly convinced itself that Keating could 
not be bargained down on the financial arrangements in the normal 
process of negotiation, then the figures might show the adoption 
of a 'closure strategy' to be economically rational, and the 
52 
figures might be terribly wrong. 
Persuaded of the Minister's intransigence, Tara's 
management decided to 'go to the Irish government full belt', 
to hit Keating as hard as possible and where it was least 
expected. Thus, the strategy of mine closure and legal action 
was devised. It was felt that this strategy would hit the 
Interview with Tara official, 25 November 1978. The 
figures which Tara used in this exercise apparently left 
little doubt as to the economic rationality of a 'closure 
strategy'. 
^^ I do not want to exaggerate the degree of confidence or 
certainty with which Tara adopted this course of action. In 
fact its officials had doubts (and still do) as to whether 
the decision they took was the correct one. But the important 
point is that given Tara's assumptions a 'closure strategy' ^ 
was the only course of action which seemed economically rational 
to the company. 
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government particularly hard for two reasons. First, considerable 
pressure for a settlement would be generated by the laying 
off of 500 workers. Tara expected a hostile public reaction 
to this move, but was unconcerned, believing that, as time 
went on, the onus would shift to Keating, who could be presented 
as the cause of the delay, and that he would be forced to 
compromise. 
Secondly, it believed that the Irish government had a great 
deal more at stake as a result of Tara's litigation than Tara 
itself did, in other words, that the government simply could 
not afford to lose the case, and would therefore accept a 
compromise rather than see litigation through to the finish. 
Behind this belief lay the element in Tara's writ which called 
for payment of an unspecified sum of between £20 - £50 million 
in compensation for the delay caused in granting the mining 
lease. Tara's officials remembered Avoca, where the loss of 
public moneys to the tune of £2.5 million had created such a 
reaction that it would be almost twenty years before an Irish 
Minister again contemplated state involvement in a mining 
concern. They believed that if Keating lost £20 - £50 million 
the Fine Gael/Labour party Coalition would be destroyed as a 
political force for an equally long period. They were also 
convinced that Keating's colleagues would take a similar 
view and, realising how much they had to lose, would put 
pressure on him to compromise. Tara knew that a number of 
Ministers and also certain Fine Gael backbenchers were uneasy 
at Keating's treatment of the mining companies. The Coalition 
was under strain as a result of this and other issues, and Tara 
felt that the pressure exerted by this strategy would break the 
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government before it broke the company itself.^^ This, as 
we shall see, was an absolutely crucial judgment. 
Tara also believed that its strategy would have tactical 
value as it would involve the company in action of a type 
least expected of it. Tara would do precisely what private 
corporations in such a bargaining situation are not supposed 
to do - take on a sovereign government in open conflict. 
The company's officials believed that restraints imposed on 
government action by the nature of the Irish Constitution 
would prevent any retaliation against it, and consequently 
that Tara would emerge victorious from this conflict. The 
nature of those restraints is examined in detail below. 
Keating felt that Tara's strategy reflected strong pressure 
exercised in Tara's boardroom by Noranda. He believed that 
Noranda, in common with many Canadian mining companies, hated 
the idea of state participation and did not want government 
representatives on their boards or guaranteed state access to 
corporate information. He was convinced that, given a certain 
amount of secrecy, such companies could utilise accounting 
procedures and other methods to remove surpluses from host 
countries, despite having conceded generous financial terms 
in negotiations. Keating feels that this pressure led Tara, 
which should have realised that he couldn ' t budge on the issue 
of state participation, to pursue an irrational strategy, 
54 
thereby doing itself considerable harm in the longer term. 
This belief may have led the Minister to adopt a more 
^^ Interview with Tara official, 1 November 1978 
54 Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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entrenched position after the mine closure occurred. 
Two points must be made here. First, whether Keating's 
assessment of Noranda's position was correct or not, it is 
certain that Tara's management needed no encouragement to 
fight state participation tooth and nail. If its strategy 
was irrational, then this reflected the attitudes of the 
company's own staff. The second point is that, as mentioned 
above, Tara did not realise the importance of the participation 
issue to Keating. Obviously, a negotiator should never take 
it for granted that his opponent sees his point of view. 
Rational or not, the strategy was implemented. On 
Monday 19 August, Tara Mines Limited instructed contractors 
on its Navan site to wind up their operations by the following 
Friday. The government took the view that Tara was engaging 
in blackmail, and gave its full support to Keating in saying 
that as a result of the closure Tara would have to take the 
initiative if talks were to reopen. The company duly approached 
the Minister, and meetings were held on 27 and 28 August. 
But little common ground existed between the two parties, 
and when the second meeting broke up, no date was arranged for 
further negotiations. 
On 30 August Mr Keating delivered a forceful speech which 
was interpreted by the press as threatening Tara with 
nationalisation if it did not come to an agreement.^^ Given 
See, for example. The Irish Times, 31 August 1974. The 
relevant passage was 'any attribution of the decision to suspend 
activities at the Navan mine to the lease terms which were 
offered must be looked upon by the Minister as nothing more than 
an attempt to force him to grant a lease to Tara on terms 
unacceptable to the government. The Minister will not bow to 
such pressure and must remain free...to safeguard the interests 
of the people as a whole The Minister is now considering as a 
matter of urgency what further action can be taken to protect 
[those] interests.' 
141 
what was said above regarding Keating's attitude to 
nationalisation (see p.108 ), it is unlikely that this option 
was seriously considered. In any case, Tara's legal advice 
was that nationalisation would be unconstitutional, whether 
compensation was paid or not.^^ The Minister may have 
received a similar opinion; certainly, as mentioned above, he 
had been advised that com.pensation would have to be paid at 
the full commercial value of the deposit. An alternative 
course of action might have been to offer a mining lease to 
Tara on the government's terms (thus fulfilling the obligation 
arising from the undertaking given on 1 April 1971), and, if 
the company rejected those terms, to offer the lease to some 
other mining concern. A host of difficulties would have 
arisen as a result, however. First, Keating's legal advice 
was that the obligation was to offer a lease on 'reasonable' 
terms, and clearly Tara could have initiated endless litigation 
as to what constituted, or what did not constitute, 'reasonable' 
Secondly, Tara could have sued the Minister for compensation in 
lieu of its investment in the Navan mine, thereby placing him 
in an extremely awkward situation politically. (Once again 
the spectre of Avoca raised its headi) Thirdly, the Minister 
would have had to compulsorily acquire that portion of the 
Navan deposit privately held by Tara.^^ As noted earlier, 
the constitutionality of the 1940 Minerals Development Act 
under which the Minister would make such an acquisition was by 
56 Interview with Tara official, 25 November 1978. 
^^ Tara's part of the orebody has been described as 'a brack, 
with minerals in private ownership forming the currants'. 
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then in question, and Tara would certainly have gone to court 
on this issue had Keating attempted to obtain its minerals. 
Thus Tara's judgment was proved correct in one sense. 
Keating was enmeshed in the legal and judicial constraints 
of the Irish constitutional system, and he in fact took the 
only course of action open to him - he sat back and did nothing. 
By December, the Minister had countered Tara's legal 
moves by himself asking for a High Court ruling on certain 
questions of law pertaining to Tara's writ. Keating's principal 
motive in initiating this litigation seems to have been to 
defer the hearing of Tara's case: as will become apparent, 
he had come to believe that the longer the Navan mine stayed 
closed, the better his bargaining position would become. 
Clearly, the Irish legal system could work for the Minister as 
well as against him. 
By this stage, Tara's position was weakening. In earlier 
years, assured of the Fianna Fail government's co-operation, 
Tara had spent freely on the Navan development. Tara's belief 
in its power to influence Irish decision-makers had backfired, 
because by late 1974 the company was deep in debt and going 
deeper with every month that passed. It therefore needed to 
reach an agreement very badly indeed. Apparently Tara's 
management had made a fundamental miscalculation in believing 
that the Coalition government would break before the company did. 
Keating claims that in late January 1975 Tara came to 
. . 58 
him and agreed to compromise on the issue of state participation. 
Tara's viewpoint is of course different, and its officials 
5 8 Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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emphasise that Keating made important departures from his 
earlier position. This was in fact the case, and reflected 
the Minister's own weaknesses. 
The most significant of these was probably the lack of 
support for his position among members of his own Labour party 
in Cabinet. This lack of support had, with the exception of 
one individual, nothing to do with the policy issues involved. 
Keating was constantly at loggerheads with the Minister for 
Posts and Telegraphs, Connor Cruise O'Brien, who opposed every 
major initiative undertaken by Keating. O'Brien had known 
Keating from childhood, and according to the latter O'Brien 
had always had, and still did have, a personal dislike for him. 
In addition, Keating had clashed head on with O'Brien on 
government policy towards civil rights in the face of threats 
to law and order posed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
5 9 
campaign in Northern Ireland. Mr O'Leary, the Minister for 
Labour, was ambitious for the party leadership, which was 
expected to fall vacant in the near future, and he used every 
opportunity to undermine Keating's position as he saw the 
Minister for Industry and Commerce as his most formidable 
opponent. Most importantly of all, the sympathy of Mr Tully, 
the Minister for Local Government, lay with Tara, and Keating 
believed that Tully, through his son, John, Secretary of 
Tara Mines Limited, was keeping the company informed of all 
relevant discussions and decisions in Cabinet.^^ This 
O'Brien was in favour of curtailing civil rights to deal with 
the threat, Keating felt that such a policy was exactly what the 
IRA wished to see and that it would play straight into the 
IRA's hands. 
Interview, 1 December 1978. 
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represented a tremendous weakness from Keating's point of view, 
as he felt there could be no secrecy from Tara regarding any 
matter which had to go before Cabinet. Keating would not, 
for example, have his minimum acceptable position endorsed 
by Cabinet, as he believed Tara would learn of it, placing 
the company in a very strong bargaining position. 
As we have seen, another major constraint facing Keating 
arose from the nature of the Irish Constitution and the 
weaknesses inherent in the 194 0 Minerals Development Act. In 
effect, Keating could not pose nationalisation even as an 
ultimate sanction, a situation different from that of most 
host country governments. Neither could he take compulsory 
acquisition measures, because of the political restraint 
represented by the need to pay very large sums in compensation. 
In combination, these constraints meant that if Tara did not 
work the Navan mine, nobody would. And while Keating might 
be able to achieve delays, he could not hold up a development 
on the scale of that mine indefinitely. 
Both parties were therefore in weakening positions, and 
it was likely that a compromise would be reached. A few days 
before the Supreme Court was to give its ruling on the Minister's 
writ, it was announced that an agreement had been concluded 
between Tara and the Irish government. 
The Tara Agreement 
The terms of the arrangement, contained in two documents, 
an Agreement and a Mining Lease, were as follows. The State 
would receive, free of charge, 25 per cent of the shares of 
Tara Mines Limited, the operating company, but there would be 
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no purchase of shares as there had been in the case of Bula 
Limited. Royalties would be charged on pre-tax profits at a 
rate of per cent [Mining Lease, p.16), and profits would be 
subject to corporation tax (then 50 per cent) after deduction 
of royalty payments, exploration expenditure, and allowances 
permitted under the Finance (Taxation of Profits of Certain 
Mines) Act 1974. Tara would turn over to the state, free of 
charge, that portion of the Navan minerals (about 6 million 
tons ore) in its possession {Agreement, B). As in the Bula 
Agreement, a provision regarding the payment of dividends was 
included, though its terms were less stringent: not less than 
50 per cent of the accumulated balance on the Profit and Loss 
Account would be distributed in each year. It was left to the 
discretion of the Minister, rather than to the company's 
auditors (as in Bula's case) to determine circumstances in 
which it would not be advisable to so distribute profits 
{Mining Lease, p.17) . 
The Minister would appoint two directors to the Tara Mines 
Limited Board, or 25 per cent of its members, whichever is 
greater {Agreement, 3.03). As in the Bula Agreement, clauses 
were inserted guaranteeing Ministerial access to Tara Mines 
Limited's 'property, books, and records', and also requiring 
the company to provide such 'additional financial and operating 
data and other information as to the business and properties 
of the Company as the Minister may from time to time request' 
{Agreement, 6.06: Mining Lease, p.5). These requirements 
apply to the operating company only, and the Minister will 
have no guarantee of access to information relating to or held 
by the parent company, Tara Exploration and Development 
146 
Company Limited. 
As in Bula's case, Tara agreed to supply concentrates 
to an Irish zinc refinery 'on reasonable terms', if requested 
to do so. Tara would be offered an equity holding in any 
such refinery, but would not be compelled to take it up. 
The overall State 'take' under these arrangements will 
stand at a nominal rate of 64 per cent. Because of the operation 
of the 1974 Act, the real level of State revenue will be 
significantly lower. 
Tara's senior management did not accept the new situation 
with good grace. By March 1978, it was believed that Hughes, 
McCarthy, and Gilroy had almost completely liquidated their 
personal shareholdings in Tara. Hughes resigned from the 
Tara Mines Limited Board before the government-appointed 
directors took up their positions.^^ 
The conduct and outcome of negotiations 
Two interlocked but separate issues were at stake in the 
negotiations between Tara and the Irish authorities. The 
first involved the percentage of Tara's profits which would 
accrue to the Irish government, the second related to the 
degree to which that government would participate in, and 
exercise influence or control over, Tara's corporate decision-
making process. These issues were interrelated for two reasons. 
First, the Irish government saw equity participation in the 
operating company as a means of exercising influence and/or 
control, but such participation would of course increase the 
61 The Irish Times, 14 November 1975, 2 March 1978. 
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proportion of Tara's profits accruing as government revenue. 
Secondly, Keating believed that the Irish Exchequer would 
suffer financial loss in the longer term if a measure of 
control were not obtained. 
Mr Keating achieved his principal objective by obtaining 
a 25 per cent equity participation in Tara Mines Limited. In 
addition, he gained acceptance of government-appointed 
directors on the company's Board, and of guaranteed Ministerial 
access to Tara Mines Limited's records and files. However, he 
gained no such privileges in relation to the parent company. 
Tara officials saw this as an important concession to the 
62 
company, but the practical significance of the distinction 
appears to be limited. The Minister might be prevented from 
obtaining relevant corporate information, but as all payments 
of profits, royalties and dividends will be assessed on the 
income of Tara Mines Limited, and as significant transfers of 
goods and services do not occur between Tara Mines Limited c o 
and its parent, this limitation is unlikely to have important 
financial implications for Ireland. 
The Tara Agreement also gave the Irish government 
considerable influence over the distribution and use of 
corporate funds, as a result of the provisions which demand 
payment of dividends at a certain level and allow the Minister 
discretion in determining when dividends should not be paid. 
In this regard, the position of Tara Mines Limited will be 
6 2 Interview with Tara official, 1 November 1978. 
^^ Tara Mines Ltd's output is sold to independent smelters 
while its parent does not produce, or supply it with, mining 
inputs, 
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quite different from that of Northgate Exploration Limited's 
Irish subsidiary, IBM. IBM's use of funds was entirely at 
the discretion of Northgate's Board of Directors, located in 
Toronto. Tara's parent company will of course be free of 
government influence in this area. In other words, while 
the investing company remains free to use the funds it 
receives as it wishes, the Minister can play a significant 
role in determining the extent of these funds at any given 
time. 
The Irish government made important concessions in the 
area of financial returns to the state. First it yielded on 
the issue of a purchased shareholding. From the Minister's 
point of view, this was a financial concession, though Tara 
viewed it as a diminution of potential Ministerial control 
over the company. If, as seems certain, Keating would have 
agreed to forego the voting rights of the purchased shares, 
as he did in Bula's case, the concession does seem essentially, 
financial.^^ 
The Minister made another important concession by reducing 
the royalty rate from 10 per cent (the figure he originally 
sought) to per cent. Department of Industry and Commerce 
officials have claimed that this reduction was a trade-off 
against Tara's granting to the State its mineral rights 
at Navan. Royalties could not, of course, have been charged 
on those minerals while they remained in private ownership. 
^^ It is impossible to express this concession in monetary 
terms, as one cannot predict what Tara's profit margins will 
be. If metal prices are high they will probably be substantial, 
as will, therefore, the dividends payable on 24 per cent of 
the company's equity. 
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However the mineral rights involved related to only 6 million 
tons of ore, and a simple numerical calculation will quickly 
show that the Minister was very much the loser by this bargain.^^ 
Turning to the conduct of negotiations, a number of 
points emerge. First, the perceptions of the parties involved 
of one another played a central role in shaping events. Tara 
was convinced that Keating would not compromise on the issue 
of financial returns to the State, and partly in consequence 
it adopted an aggressive strategy designed to force his hand. 
Keating eventually made substantial financial concessions, but 
claims that Tara could have won them without confrontation. 
It is apparent that, had Tara based its approach on the 
experience of international mining companies in other countries, 
it would not have accepted Keating's intransigent attitude in 
the early negotiating sessions at its face value. 
On his part, Keating mistakenly took for granted that 
Tara understood the political imperatives, ideological and 
practical, which led him to stand fast on the issue of state 
participation. In consequence, the Minister misinterpreted 
Tara's reaction to his stand, attributing that reaction to 
pressure exercised by Tara's foreign owners. This lack of 
If a unit value of 1 be set on the profit-generating 
potential of each ton of ore, then the return to the Minister 
from charging 10 per cent royalties on that ore to which he 
held mineral rights can be compared to the return he will 
receive from charging a rate of 4N per cent on the whole of 
Tara's section of the deposit. 
Rate A: 10% royalties on 61.2 million tons - 6,120,000 units 
Rate B: 4?5% royalties on 67.2 million tons - 2,799,000 units 
Loss by charging rate B rather than rate A - 3,321,000 unxts 
The scale of the Minister's concession here is clear. Once 
again it is impossible to express it in monetary terms, as there 
is no way of judging what the profit-generating potential of 
ore in the ground actually is. 
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understanding of both sides led to the adoption of entrenched 
positions, an outcome which imposed costs on all involved. 
A second point is that Tara apparently made an error of 
judgment in deciding that it could successfully 'take on' the 
Irish government. Certainly the legal and political constraints 
arising from provisions of the Irish Constitution protected 
the company from retaliation, but Tara underestimated the 
cohesion of the Coalition government and Keating's ability to 
'sit tight' while pressures mounted on the company. Those 
pressures did mount, and eventually forced Tara to compromise. 
A number of commentators have noted that, as a general rule, 
private corporations operate under much tighter time constraints 
than do government agencies.^^ Tara ignored this rule, or 
at least believed that it could prove an exception to it, 
and the company suffered as a result. It is uncertain how 
much the closure actually cost Tara. However, given that 
inflation in Ireland was then running at an annual rate in 
excess of 20 per cent and that interest charges on existing 
loans would have been substantial, the cost was certainly higher. 
Thirdly, Keating introduced an extraneous factor into the 
bargaining situation with Tara. The Minister was prepared to 
make financial concessions to the company in order to establish 
principles which would be applied to off-shore oil operators. 
These concessions would be made good if and when oil was 
discovered. It seems probable that the Minister could have 
secured a higher financial return to the State from the Navan 
development had he been prepared to make concessions in the 
^^ See, for example, A. Kapoor, op.cit., p.375. 
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area of state participation. The question arises whether he 
should not have attempted to obtain as high a return as 
possible from minerals known to exist, rather than concern 
himself with hypothetical oil discoveries. Only time will 
tell whether his decision was justified. 
Fourthly, the Irish government's 'objective' bargaining 
power was not fully mobilised or utilised, but in general 
this did not result from any pay-offs to or trade-offs with 
foreign investors. The following factors were responsible. 
1) The relevant technical and financial expertise could not be 
fully developed because of institutional and bureaucratic 
constraints. 2) The Irish Constitutional framework imposed 
limitations on government action. The Irish authorities did 
not believe that it was desirable or possible to change that 
framework because they perceived in the Irish electorate (and 
themselves felt) an adherence to certain norms, the most 
significant of which involved a belief in the 'sanctity' of 
private property. Those norms existed quite independently of 
any relationsnips between foreign investors and domestic 
political groupings. 3) The position of the relevant government 
Minister was undermined by his party colleagues for reasons 
which in general were unconnected to any relationship between 
themselves and the foreign investors concerned. 
Conclusion 
The discovery of the Navan deposit lead to a considerable 
To date, no commercial oil wells have been discovered off 
the Irish coastline. 
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increase in public awareness of issues relating to foreign 
mining investment, particularly the twenty year tax exemption. 
Political pressure was mobilised for its withdrawal, with 
apparent success. However some politicians and the civil 
servants responsible for taxation policy apparently continued 
to believe that a substantial 'pay-off was required to foreign 
investors if mineral exploration and development were to proceed, 
and the latter effected such a 'pay-off by implementing 
provisions which in practice afford a substantial measure of 
tax relief to foreign mining companies. The complexity of 
these provisions and the secret nature of the bureaucratic 
processes involved in their interpretation militate against 
public awareness that a 'pay-off is being made, and diminish 
the possibility that political pressure will be generated for 
its termination. 
Negotiations concerning term.s for the development of the 
Navan deposit were dominated by the issue of state 
participation in the operating company. The central issue 
was influence and control over the corporate decision-making 
process, and both parties were willing to accept a lower 
level of financial returns if they could thereby achieve 
their respective aims in this regard. The issue of state 
participation left little room for compromise and this, 
combined with mutual misperceptions by the negotiating parties, 
largely explains the conflictual nature of host country-
foreign investor relations. 
Legal and constitutional factors played a crucial role 
in determining the course of negotiations. They allowed 
Tara to take action which threatened to undermine mineral 
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exploration in Ireland and place the government in a 
politically dangerous position, while they also protected the 
Company from retaliation. This clearly weakened the government's 
bargaining position, which was also undermined by other 
political and bureaucratic processes generally unconnected to 
the host country-foreign investor relationship. 
Tara however overestimated the strength of its position, 
and in particular miscalculated on the government's ability 
to delay an outcome and thus force the Company to compromise. 
The government achieved its aim of ensuring state equity 
participation in the Navan development, but at some sacrifice 
in financial terms. The persistence of attitudes favourable 
to the interests of foreign investors among Irish civil 
servants and some politicians will probably further diminish 
the revenue which Ireland will receive from exploitation of 
the Navan deposit. 
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Chapter Four 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ZAMBIAN COPPER INDUSTRY, 
1964-70 
Historical introduction 
In 1891 the British government granted control of an 
indeterminate region north of the Zambezi river to the 
British South Africa Company (BSAC), formed two years earlier 
by Cecil Rhodes. The territorial limits of the grant were 
subsequently fixed (with little reference to existing 
linguistic or tribal boundaries) by Britain, Germany, Portugal 
and Belgium; this area, which later became Zambia, was then 
inhabited by some 100 distinct tribal groups, and covered 
285,000 land-locked square miles of the Central African 
Plateau.^ It was governed (as Northern Rhodesia) by the 
BSAC itself unti 1924, when the British Colonial Office 
assumed administrative control. A legislative council was 
then created; because Northern Rhodesia's electoral laws 
2 
disenfranchised Africans, it was dominated by representatives 
of the white settler community. Though the Colonial Office 
v/as officially responsible for the administration of Northern 
Rhodesia, the legislative council exercised a major impact on 
government policy. 
The BSAC's interest in the country derived from its 
potential mineral wealth. The Company encouraged prospecting 
^ Zambia is bordered by Angola, Zaire, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, and the Caprivi Strip of Namibia. 
^ In 1957, for example, 86,000 Europeans and only 1,700 
Africans were registered as voters. 
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by pioneer firms and individuals, but the results were 
disappointing. In 1923 it decided to grant exclusive 
prospecting rights over extensive areas to large companies. 
Many of the groups which obtained rights were interlocked 
4 
in a complex web of mutual or shared ownership, at the 
centre of v/hich stood the Anglo American Corporation of South 
Africa (AAC), and the US-based Selection Trust. Both 
controlled a number of concession companies,^ and by the late 
1920s they dominated mineral exploration in Northern Rhodesia. 
Only corporations of this size, closely linked with the 
international financial and mining communities, had access 
to the large amounts of risk capital and the technical 
expertise required to mount a systematic exploration effort. 
That effort was spectacularly successful, revealing the 
existence of a number of massive sulphide copper deposits 
within an area 90 miles long by 30 miles wide, known since 
as the Copperbelt. 
These orebodies were developed by foreign capital and 
imported skilled labour. The first of the large mines opened 
in 19 31, and others quickly followed. Expansion continued 
during the 1940s and 1950s in response to increases in the 
Copper deposits were located below sites which had earlier 
been mined by Africans, but ore grades were considerably 
lower than in neighbouring Katanga and the ores were oxidised, 
making smelting difficult. 
The complexities of corporate ownership have been 
disentangled by F.L. Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Copiperhelt, 
1899- 1962: Technological Develo-pment up to the end of the 
Central African Federation (Manchester University Press, 
1971), Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
^ AAC also held minority interests in individual Rhodesian 
Selection Trust (RST) group mines. 
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Western World's demand for copper;^ production was fully 
integrated from an early stage, with the bulk of copper 
exports being in refined form from the mid 19 30s onwards. 
By 1964 Zambia's annual production had reached nearly 
630,000 tonnes, making her the world's third largest copper 
producer and its largest exporter of the metal.^ 
In 1953 Northern Rhodesia joined with Southern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
The Federal government, based in Salisbury, was firmly under 
the control of Southern Rhodesian settlers, who used their 
political power to concentrate economic development in the 
south. Customs barriers were removed within the union, and 
industries created to take advantage of the regional common 
g 
market were almost exclusively located in Southern Rhodesia. 
Federation was deeply resented by Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia; against their will they had become subjects of 
a government which sought to perpetuate white domination 
and racial discrimination. The African National Congress 
(ANC) was established to oppose Federation. In 1958 the 
movement split and its more militant faction, led by Kenneth 
Kaunda, formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP). 
In 1962 the African leaders reluctantly agreed to contest 
This demand was fueled by World War II, post-war 
reconstruction, and armaments manufacture associated with 
the Cold War and the conflict in Korea. 
Zambia Mining Year Book 1969 , p.27. 
O 
These included textiles, metals and machinery, agricultural 
equipment, oil refining and motor car assembly. Even a 
plant generating hydro-electric power for the Copperbelt from 
the Zambezi river was located south of the border. 
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elections under a highly restricted African franchise; 
in the event, Africans won a majority in the legislature and 
formed a government based on a temporary coalition between 
ANC and UNIP. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1963, 
and in January 1964 UNIP won a convincing electoral victory. 
Kaunda requested immediate independence from Britain, and 
the Republic of Zambia came into existence in October 1964. 
The development of the copper industry had exercised 
little direct impact on Zambia's predominantly subsistence 
economy.^ A high proportion of the industrial goods and 
services used by the mines were imported; few linkage 
industries emerged, and those which did (power generation, 
rail transportation, timber and metal products) failed to 
achieve self-sustaining growth. The Copperbelt consumed 
substantial quantities of locally-produced agricultural 
goods, but these were largely supplied by a small number of 
expatriates who had established commercial farms along the 
line-of-rail running from Livingstone in the south through 
the Copperbelt to the Katangan border. Because of the 
Copperbelt's geographical concentration, mine infrastructure 
did little to stimulate other economic activities. Neither 
did wage payments represent a significant stimulant - African 
wages were low (especially until 1953),^^ while expatriate 
^ In the 1920s some 96 per cent of Zambians were engaged in 
subsistence farming. R.E. Baldwin, Economic development and 
Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia 1920-1960 
(University of California Press, 1966), p.17. 
Practically all capital good were imported, while as late 
as 1960 only 15-20 per cent of operational stores were 
purchased locally. R.E. Baldwin, op.cit., p.37. 
^^ See below, Table 11. 
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workers remitted a large part of their incomes or spent 
12 
them on imported goods. 
Neither were mineral taxes or mining company profits 
expended so as to stimulate economic development on a broader 
front. Taxation levels were low until 1948, and from 1953 
onwards a substantial portion of mineral revenues was 
channeled to Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. From 1954-55 
to 1959/60, the net drain from Northern Rhodesia was £56 
m i l l i o n t h e Northern Rhodesian government's total capital 
expenditure amounted to £50 million over the same period, 14 
indicating the significance of this loss. Much of the 
public expenditure which was made in Northern Rhodesia was 
directed towards the monetary sector, while little reached 
rural areas away from the line-of-rail. For example, spending 
on roads and railways was almost exclusively concentrated on 
the Copperbelt and copper export routes, with the result 
that many agricultural areas (in the Central and Eastern 
Provinces, for instance) were unable to take advantage of 
the markets provided by mining activity. 
In general, the mining companies did not diversify 
their activities, and either remitted their profits or used 
them to expand copper production. The BSAC made no substantial 
investments in Northern Rhodesia over the period 1930-1963, 
during which time it received some £90 million in net profits 
^^ R.E. Baldwin, op.cit., pp.184-5. 
^^ The net drain equals the difference between federal tax 
receipts originating in Northern Rhodesia and direct federal 
expenditure in Northern Rhodesia plus its share of income tax 
A. Martin, Minding Their Own Business: Zambia's Struggle 
Against Western Control (Hutchinson, London, 1972), p.36. 
14 ibid. 
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from its mineral rights.^^ AAC and Rhodesian Selection 
Trust (RST) reinvested part of their profits in mining 
activities, but the rest they remitted; over the years 
1954-1963, for instance, dividend payments by the various 
operating companies amounted to £259 million.^^ Outflows of 
dividends, undistributed profits and net interest payments 
frequently exceeded 20 per cent of net national income.^^ 
The pattern of government spending described above 
reflected the white minority's ability to win the lion's 
share of public expenditure for itself, an ability well 
illustrated by the fate of a ten year development plan 
formulated by the Colonial Office in 1947. This envisaged 
that African housing, African education and rural development 
would absorb 31 per cent of planned expenditure. The white-
dominated legislature succeeded in changing this emphasis. 
Expenditure on European education and housing and on public 
works along the line-of-rail was increased, while the 
allocation of funds to African housing and education and 
18 
rural development was cut to 17 per cent. In general, 
patterns of public expenditure discriminated heavily against 
M. Nziramasanga, The Copper Export Sector and the Zambian^ 
Economy (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 
1973), p.27. The BSAC's only commitment of funds involved 
interest bearing loans made to help finance the Kariba power-
generating project (£4 million) and African housing on the 
Copperbelt (£2 million). 
^^ M. Naziramasanga, op.cit., p.27. 
^^ In 1953, for example, they amounted to 26 per cent of net 
national income. R. Hall, Zambia (Pall Mall Press, London, 
1965), p.276. 
18 R.E. Baldwin, op.cit., pp.195-6. 
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Africans; for example, during the federal period expenditure 
on European education averaged £103 per child, on African 
19 
education £9 per child. 
Economic discrimination characterised the private as 
well as the public sector. Fertile agricultural land along 
the line-of-rail was reserved for Europeans, and a 
discriminatory policy of prices and quotas used to limit the 
Africans' share of the profitable local maize market. On 
the Copperbelt, European mineworkers established, and for 21 
many years maintained, a monopoly of all skilled positions. 
Racial discrimination took social as well as political 
and economic forms, and many of those who formed Zambia's 
first government, including the President, Dr Kaunda, had 
suffered personal humiliation under a system of racial 
segregation which branded them as second class citizens 2 2 
in their own country. It is important to keep this back-
ground of discrimination and deprivation in mind, for it was 
to exert a strong influence on government policy towards 
the mining companies in the period after Independence. 
Mineral revenues and the prospects for national development 
At Independence, Zambia's economy was characterised by 
four notable features, each a cause of considerable concern 
to the new government. The most apparent was the sharp 
19 R. Hall, op.cit., p.172. 
2 0 
A. Martin, op.cit., p.32. 
^^ See below, p. 174. 
^^ For Dr Kaunda's own account of his experiences, see his 
Zambia Shall Be Free - An Autobiography (Heinemann, London, 
1972) . 
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discrepancy between a rural subsistence sector in which some 
70 per cent of Zambia's four million people eked out a 
precarious existence, and an urban sector clustered along 
the line-of-rail, based on a large modern mining industry 
and providing a small number of expatriates (about 78,000 
in 1959) with a standard of living high even by north European 
standards. Some 225,000 Africans were also employed in the 
urban sector, at incomes far below those of expatriates but 
23 
well above those of subsistence farmers. 
Another important feature was the degree to which the 
economy was dependent on copper mining. In the early 1960s, 
it provided about 90 per cent of exports, from 35 to 70 per 
cent of government revenue (depending on copper prices), 24 
and accounted for about 48 per cent of net domestic product. 
If the impact of service and ancillary industries and of 
government expenditure financed by mineral revenues was 
taken into account, the last two figures would be considerably 
higher. The corollary of this dependence was the relative 
insignificance of manufacturing and agriculture - in 1964, 
mining accounted for 47 per cent of GDP, manufacturing for 25 
only 6 per cent, and agriculture for 11 per cent. 
A third feature involved the almost total absence of an 
indigenous skilled workforce, reflecting the neglect of 
African education and the lack of training facilities for 
^^ See pp. 251-60 below for a more detailed discussion of income 
distribution in Zambia. 
24 Zambia Mining Year Book, 1969, p.28. 
^^ Derived from C. Elliott (ed), Constraints on the Economic 
Development of Zambia (Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 
1971), Table 1.9, p.16. 
162 
Africans on the mines. (It was illegal for an African to 
become an apprentice before 1959.) At Independence there 
were only 103 Zambian university graduates and 1,200 high 
school graduates, while the mining industry's skilled 
workforce was comprised almost exclusively of expatriates. 
The fourth feature was Zambia's dependence on her white-
dominated southern neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Rail links passing through Rhodesia carried about 90 per cent 
of Zambia's exports and imports, while in 1964 Rhodesia 
supplied about 40 per cent of Zambia's imports and South 
2 6 
Africa a further 20 per cent. 
The structure of the economy could not be altered without 
massive government investment. If productivity was to be 
increased in the rural areas, training programmes would have 
to be undertaken, farmers supplied with seeds, fertilizer, 
and equipment, and facilities provided for transporting, 
storing and marketing agricultural goods. Educational 
expenditure would have to rise substantially if an indigenous 
skilled workforce was to be created. Industrial development 
would have to be fostered if the economy was to be diversified 
and its dependence on Southern Africa reduced. In pursuit 
of this last aim, the government would also have to seek 
alternative transport routes for Zambia's international trade. 
Given Zambia's economic circumstances, much of the 
required investment would have to be financed from mineral 
revenues. During the colonial period, a substantial portion 
of such revenues accrued to the BSAC, which retained the 
^^ Derived from S. Goodman, 'The Foreign Exchange Constraint', 
in C. Elliott, op.cit.. Table 8.4, p.245. 
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right to impose royalties when it granted leases to AAC and 
RST in the 1920s. Royalty payments equalled 13 .5 per cent of the 
'price' of copper (in fact, the average LME (London Metal Exchange) 
price over a given period), less per long ton produced. 
In other words, royalties became payable once the LME price 
exceeded K118.52 per long ton. By the late 1950s, prices 
were well above this level and royalty payments were 
consequently substantial, amounting to nearly K24 million 
2 8 
in 1960. The Zambian government wished to capture this 
revenue, for political as well as economic reasons. Many 
Zambians viewed the BSAC as an archetype of colonial exploit-
ation, as a parasite which engaged in no productive activity 
but drained Zambia of its wealth. To them, political 
independence would have little significance if economic 
exploitation of this type was allowed to continue. 
In October 1963 the UNIP/ANC coalition government opened 
negotiations with the BSAC for purchase of its royalty rights. 
The Company refused an offer of 22 annual instalments which 
would render a present capital value of K70 million, claiming 
it had no certainty that payments would in fact be made over 
a long period. The BSAC asked the British government to 
guarantee payment, but the request was refused and negotiations 
broke down. 
By February 1964 UNIP's political position was stronger, 
and the colonial officials who had previously advised its 
Zambia established a separate currency unit in January 1968, 
the Kwacha (K), at the rate of £l sterling = 2 Kwacha. 
^^ The exact amount was £11,850,000. P. Slinn, 'The Legacy 
of the British South Africa Company;, in W. Bostock and 
C. Harvey, (eds) , Eaonomic Independence and Zambian Copper: 
A Case Study of Foreign Investment (Praeger, New York, 1972), 
p.44 . 
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leaders were being replaced by more radical expatriate staff. 
The government began to relaise that the royalties might 
be acquired for substantially less than had previously been 
anticipated. It did not wish to resort to compulsory 
acquisition so as to avoid adverse publicity among the 
international financial community at a crucial stage of 
Zambia's development. In addition, a referendum would have 
been required to amend the British-designed constitution, which 
prohibited such action. The government decided to examine 
the legal basis of the BSAC's claim to mineral ownership. 
Detailed historical research revealed that the treaties on 
which the BSAC based its claims were of doubtful validity, 
and in any case did not encompass the area which later became 
the Copperbelt. It also showed that the British government 
had been aware of these circumstances when it reaffirmed 
29 
the BSAC's right to charge royalties in 1950. 
The relevant evidence, published in September 1964, 
provided the Zambians with a valuable bargaining counter, 
and won them the support of most moderate British press opinion, 
They now argued they had no legal or moral obligation to the 
BSAC; any such obligation rested v;ith the British government, 
which had allowed the BSAC to extract revenue illicitly. 
In order to assure investors of Zambia's good faith, they 
offered to pay the BSAC a nominal sura, but insisted the 
British government would have to make up the balance of any 
settlement. 
Talks were initiated between the British and Zambian 
governments and the BSAC towards the end of September. Zambia 
offered K4 million while the Company demanded K36 million. 
2 9 A. Martin, op.cit., p.125. 
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The British government refused to make up the balance, and 
the Zambians then warned a referendum would be held to permit 
compulsory acquisition if their offer was rejected. Faced with 
this prospect, the BSAC capitulated.^^ 
The Zambian government's first sortie into the field 
of mineral policy seemed to promise well for the future. It 
acquired a major source of revenue at very little cost in 
financial terms or in terms of Zambia's reputation with the 
international financial community. In doing so, it showed 
an awareness of the need to reconcile short-term revenue 
requirements with Zambia's longer-term need for continued 
investment. In the event, this early promise was not to be 
fulfilled. 
Taxation and the formulation of mineral policy, 1964-9 
In the years after 1964 mineral taxation became an 
increasingly contentious issue in Zambia. Two types of 
taxation were involved. Royalties were paid by all mines 
according to a single formula (outlined above), while income 
tax was charged on profits after deduction of royalty payments. 
The maximum income tax rate was 4 5 per cent, but lower rates 
applied to companies mining low grade ores or engaged in 
expanding production.^^ 
The mining companies opposed the imposition of royalties, 
claiming they might make it unprofitable to extract lower-grade 
The British government had meanwhile agreed to match the 
Zambian offer, and the BSAC thus received £4 million or K8 
million. The agreement was concluded some three hours before 
Zambia's Independence ceremony. 
^^ In 1965, for example, five different rates were charged 
(35, 41.25, 42.5 and 45 per cent). See the statement by the 
Financial Minister, Mr Wina, Zambia Hansard, 15 July 1965. 
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ores from existing mines, since they were a charge on 
production which took no account of costs. Royalties might 
also deter investment in new mines by reducing or eliminating 
potential profits. Any tax would of course reduce profits, 
but a royalty (unlike a profits tax) could eliminate profit 
altogether, or even turn it into a loss. The likelihood of 
this happening was increased by the fact that Zambian copper 
was then sold at producer prices which were often substant-ially 
32 
lower than the LME prices on which royalties were calculated. 
The companies also argued that application of a single 
royalty rate to all mines was inequitable, since less profitable 
companies paid higher effective tax rates than more profitable 
33 
ones. 
Initially, it appeared the government would amend the 
tax system, but in the event no initiative was taken. 
Government spokesmen justified their inaction on the grounds 
that the system had worked well for the BSAC and had provoked 
little criticism from the companies prior to Independence, 35 and consequently that it should work well for Zambia. They 
also pointed out that genuinely marginal mines could claim 
36 remission of royalties. 
32 See p. 169 below. 
33 A. Martin, op.cit., pp.128-9. 
^^ In December 1964 the Minister for Mines and Labour, 
Mr Chimba, stated that urgent consideration was being given 
to formulation of new legislation governing mineral royalties. 
Zambia Hansard, 15 December 1964. 
^^ See the Statement by the Minister for Mines and Co-operatives, 
Mr Zulu, Zambia Hansard, 10 August 1965. 
ibid. 
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Zarabian politicians were understandably suspicious of 
the companies' new-found concern with the royalty system, 
but their suspicions diverted their attention from the fact 
that significant changes were underway in Zambia's mining 
industry. The most important involved the cost structure 
of copper extraction. Ore grades were falling, requiring 
increased throughput to maintain metal production. Mining 
was taking place at deeper levels, and consequently 
ventilation, drainage, and haulage costs were increasing. 
Labour costs were also rising rapidly.^^ Over the period 
1964/7-1967/8, the total average cost per ton incurred at the 
o Q 
mine increased by 4 5 per cent. At the same time, transport 
costs were rising, particularly after the re-orientation of 
trade routes which followed the Rhodesian Unilateral 39 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Profits were 
already being eroded, and royalties consequently represented 
a proportionately greater burden. That burden might be 
bearable while prices were high, but when prices fell it was 
bound to have a major impact. 
Another significant change concerned the attitude of 
the copper companies themselves. From the mid 19 30s to the 
late 1950s, AAC and RST had been attempting to increase 
their share of the world copper market, a strategy which called 
for major expansion of mining capacity in Zambia. By 
Wage costs increased by 49 per cent between 1964/5 and 
1966/7. Derived from M. Bostock, 'The Background to 
Participation', in M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit.. Table 5.3, 
p.117. 
38 ibid. 
^^ Transport costs per ton of copper exported increased by 
some 34 per cent from 1964 to 1967. Zambia Mining Year Book, 
various issues. 
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Independence, this situation had changed. As one commentator 
noted in 1964, the companies 'are earning a comfortable 
return ... under present market-sharing arrangements, and 
apparently will not attempt to enlarge their market share 
40 
in the future'. Political developments had also influenced 
corporate attitudes. Company officials feared an independent 
government might nationalise the mines, force localisation 
too quickly, raise tax rates, or allow political considerations 41 
to influence marketing policies. Their inclination was to 
avoid major new commitements until the character of the new 
regime became clear, though sufficient funds would be invested 42 
to maintain the value of their assets. 
In sum, whereas the companies had a strong inclination 
to invest in new capacity during the decades prior to 
Independence, they were now disinclined to do so, and positive 
incentives were required if this attitude was to be changed. 
The tax system in force in 1964 certainly did not offer 
such incentives, and neither did the modifications subsequently 
made to it (for example granting of royalty rebates to 
unprofitable mines, application of lov;er tax rates to marginal 
or rapidly - expanding mines). The concessions involved 
were not automatic, were frequently granted after considerable 
4 3 delay, and their exact extent was not known in 
40 R. Baldwin, op.cit., pp.34-5. 
41 A. Martin, op.cit., pp.122-3. 
42 ibid. 
^^ The Bancroft mine, for example, paid royalties during 1964 
when its operations were running at a loss; by August 1965 
the government had not yet decided what remission (if any) 
it would receive. 
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44 advance. This last point was particularly important, since 
companies considering new investments could not predict 
their tax liability. 
For most of the early 1960s, world copper production 
exceeded demand, exerting downward pressure on copper prices. 
The major international copper companies co-operated in reducing 
deliveries to the market, and prices were held stable over 
the period late 1961 to late 1963 (at about £234 (K468) a ton 
on the LME). The supply-demand position improved in late 
196 3 and the LME price began to rise. However most of the 
major producers (including AAC and RST), fearing that 
substantial price increases would lead to substitution of 
aluminium for copper, set their own prices. The producer 
price was gradually increased from £234 (K468) to £335 (K670) 
a ton, but LME prices rose much more quickly, at times to 
well over £600 (1,200) a ton. In April 1966 the Chilean 
companies increased their prices from £336 to £486 a ton, 
effectively abandoning the producer price system. The Zambian 
companies decided they had no option but to follow suit, 
and switched to an LME-based pricing system. 
The Zambian government wished to capture part of the 
additional revenue which this switch would generate, and it 
immediately introduced a copper export tax, which would equal 
40 per cent of the amount by which the LME price exceeded 
This was because, as the Minister for Mines and Co-operatives 
explained, each case was to be dealt with on its own merits 
•bearing in mind the need to stimulate foreign investment 
and to expand mineral production...' {Zambia Hansard, 
10 August 1965). However, as pointed out in the text, the 
uncertainty created by such an approach was likely to deter 
investment. 
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£300 (K600) a ton. Imposition of such a tax was apparently 
45 
being contemplated in any case. The government was unhappy 
at the loss of potential revenue caused by producer pricing; 
introduction of the copper export tax would have forced the 
companies to adopt an LME-based system, since they could not 
afford to pay the tax if they continued to sell at the lower, 
producer price. 
The copper export tax succeeded in its main aim, earning 
K245 million for the government over the following three 
years,^^ but it compounded the disadvantages of the royalty 
system since it too was a charge on production which took no 
47 account of cost. 
Despite its inconsistencies and its weaknesses, Zambia's 
mineral taxation system remained unchanged until 1970. The 
government's lack of initiative in this area reflected its 
failure to come to grips with the basic problems of formulating 
a mineral policy to suit Zambia's circumstances. Public 
policy statements invariably emphasised the need to increase 
production, but the implications of this requirement were 
not e x a m i n e d . W o u l d it be necessary to sacrifice tax revenue 
^^ A. Martin, op.cit., p.136. 
^^ Republic of Zambia, Financial Report (Government Printer, 
Lusaka, various issues). 
^^ In theory it was a tax on exports but virtually all 
production was exported. 
^^ See the statement by the Minister for Mines and Cooperatives, 
Zambia Hansard. 10 August 1965; Republic of Zambia, F^rst 
National Development Plan, 1966-1970 (Government Printer, 
Lusaka, 1966), p.31. 
The First National Development Plan, for example, 
repeatedly emphasised the need for increased production, but 
did not discuss the reasons for pursuing this aim or the 
requirements for its successful implementation. (See Chapter 
VI of the Plan, 'Mines'). 
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in order to encourage investment in new capacity? If so, 
how much was the government prepared to forego? In fact, 
was the priority to maximise production (and so employment 
and export receipts) or was it to maximise revenue? 
What explains this failure to formulate clear policy 
priorities for an industry so crucial to Zambia's economy? 
The importance of copper mining may itself provide part of 
the explanation. Zambia's political leaders were conscious 
of their ignorance of the industry,^^ and may have been 
reluctant to take initiatives which might damage it, especially 
when existing arrangements were producing very substantial 
revenues. In addition, the government was not under significant 
political pressure to act. The parliamentary opposition 
made only feeble attempts to capitalise on the government' s 
inaction,^^ while vigorous political debate was generally 
lacking in a country where the politically able were nearly 
5 2 
all employed by government or the public service. Zambia's . 
leaders faced other major problems which were of immediate 
political significance (the Rhodesian situation, rural 
development), and may have been reluctant to utilise the 
limited administrative capacity at their disposal to formulate 
policies for an industry which was then operating very 
profitably. 
A. Martin, op.cit., p.132. 
What criticism there was came almost entierly from European 
members, whose motives were suspect in the eyes of many 
Zambians. See the statements by Burney {Zambia Hansard, 
20 July 1967) and Stanley {Zambia Hansard, 4 August 1967) , 
for example, and the reactions to them by Zambian members. 
^^ A. Martin, op.cit., p.132. 
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Probably as a result of these factors, appropriate 
machinery for formulating mineral policy was not established. 
A separate Mines Department was not created, and Mines 
shared ministries in turn with Labour, Cooperatives, Industry 
and Trade, and Lands; thus the attention of the politicians 
responsible for mining was divided. In 1968 a Mines and 
Minerals Development Unit was established within the Ministry 
of Lands and Mines, and this might have formed the basis for 
efficient policy-making. However its staff was drawn from 
very disparate backgrounds, their individual capabilities 
varied markedly, turnover was high, and consequently the 
quality and content of advice given to policy-makers varied 
considerably over time. For this reason, and because its 
expatriate staff was distrusted by some politicians, the Unit 
had little impact onpolicy-making.^^ Turnover at the 
54 
ministerial and permanent secretary level was also high, 
making it difficult for the individuals involved to acquire 
relevant expertise, and militating against continuity in 
policy-making. 
One effect of the weakness in policy formulation was 
that considerable energy was devoted to issues which a thorough 
analysis of policy priorities would have shown to be 
peripheral, for example that of marketing. Zambia's copper 
was sold to independent merchants and fabricators by London-
based subsidiaries of AAC and RST, who could be expected to 
sell copper at the highest available price subject only to 
^^ ibid., p.133. 
^^ Ministerial responsibility for Mines changed hands five 
times between 1964 and 1969. 
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what they conceived to be the long-term interests of the 
copper mines. Since the government could legislate to 
enforce its will where it perceived a divergence between 
55 
those interests and its own, there seemed little reason 
for it to become directly involved in marketing. Yet over 
the period 1966-9 much time and effort was invested in 
(unsuccessful) attempts to achieve such an involvement.^^ 
The lack of effective policy-making had another, more 
serious effect. AAC and RST were waiting for indications of 
the government's competence and of a favourable attitude 
towards themselves, and they regarded the royalty issue an 
an important test. They were not asking that their overall 
tax burden be significantly reduced, but rather that it be 
redistributed from less profitable to more profitable mines, 
and it would therefore cost the government little to grant 
what they regarded as a major concession. The government 
failed the test, with the result that the companies 
(particularly RST) deferred consideration of a number of 
major new mineral developments.^"^ 
The role of expatriate labour 
Another major issue facing the government concerned the 
white expatriates who dominated the skilled manual, supervisory, 
technical,professional and managerial categories in the copper 
For example, imposition of the copper export tax would 
almost certainly have forced the companies to change their 
pricing policies had they not already done so. 
^^ These attempts are outlined in A. Martin, op.cit., pp.136-7. 
^^ RST apparently deferred consideration of developments at 
Baluba and Chimbishi. A. Martin, op.cit., p.132. 
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industry. Until the mid 1950s, mining was mainly carried on 
5 8 
by gangs of unskilled Africans under white supervision, 
a system which originally grew from necessity. When mining 
commenced, African labour consisted mostly of subsistence 
farmers who worked on the Copperbelt for short periods, 
returning to their villages when they had earned enough cash 
to meet poll taxes or other commitments. They possessed no 
industrial skills and had few opportunities to acquire them, 
because their periods of employment were so brief and because 
they lacked formal education. 
By the late 1920s many Africans were settling on the 
Copperbelt, and raking up permanent employment in the mines. 
Despite this change, white workers, organised from 1936 in 
the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers Union, continued to hold 59 
all skilled and supervisory positions. Their monopoly 
was based on agreements with the mining companies which 
reserved certain job categories (known as 'A' Schedule jobs) 
for whites, and on legislation which prevented Africans 
from becoming apprentices. 
By 19 45 the companies were anxious to proceed with 
localisation, but the European Union prevented this. It 
refused to allow job fragmentation (breaking down of existing 
job categories into tasks which could be performed by more 
numerous and less skilled Africans), and asserted the principle 
of equal pay for equal work, regardless of race. Though 
A substantial proportionof African workers (26 per cent in 
1950) were non-Zambians. See P.O. Ohadike, Development of 
and Factors in Employment of African Migrants in the Copper 
Mines of Zambia, 1940-1966 (Institute of Social Research, 
University of Zambia, 1969) . 
^^ Some substitution of African for European labour did 
however occur; operation of trucks, underground locomotives, 
and drilling equipment for example, was turned over to Africans 
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admirable in theory, application of this principle would 
effectively block localisation, since the companies refused 
to employ Africans at rates of pay which included an 
inducement element designed to attract skilled personnel 
to Zambia. At this stage, the companies failed to press 
the matter, but in 1954 they adopted a stronger stand. RST 
threatened to terminate its European employees' contracts 
unless they accepted job fragmentation and a dual wage 
structure. In 1955 the Union agreed to release twenty-four 
low-skilled jobs from the 'A' schedule, and allow them to be 
fragmented by Africans at lower rates of pay. 
In 1959 a further 38 low-skill jobs were released, but 
with Independence on the horizon the companies realised that 
more fundamental change was required. Recongizing that a 
complete reorganisation of manning structures was needed if 
Zambianisation was to proceed rapidly, they wished to vastly 
increase job fragmentation and job modification. This would 
involve identification of components in functions previously 
performed by Europeans which Africans could perform or for 
which they could quickly be trained. This exercise was completed 
in 19 6 3; the coming to power of a Zambian administration 
in Lusaka considerably weakened the political strength of 
the European Union, and it accepted the new manning structures. 
The companies also wished to establish the temporary 
status of their European workforce. Under the Federation, 
Europeans had been encouraged to think of themselves as 
permanent residents of Northern Rhodesia; now they would be 
regarded as expatriates who would supply their skills and 
experience only for so long as these could not be provided by 
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Zambians. Their new status was fully established by 1966, 
when all Europeans were given fixed term contracts. 
The immediate impact of these changes was to give less 
educated miners a chance to advance to a much larger number 
of jobs of intermediate skill; by 1966, over 3,300 Zambians 
were performing tasks with a significantly higher degree of 
skill and/or responsibility, and it was expected that this 
number would have increased significantly by 1970 .^ *^  In 
the longer term, the ending of the European workforce's 
entrenched position offered the prospect of Zambianisation 
at the higher levels of the industry. However, this prospect 
would not be realised for some time to come, given the almost 
total absence of suitably-qualified Zambian candidates for 
technical, professional and managerial positions. 
The Take-over decision 
As mentioned above, Zambia was characterised by a high 
degree of economic dependence in 19 64; dependence on Southern 
Africa for vital imports and transport routes, dependence on 
foreign capital and labour, A basic element of President 
Kaunda's political philosophy was the desire to escape from 
this situation,^^ a desire given greater urgency by the Rhodesian 
UDI. Determined to loosen Zambia's links with the South and to 
enforce UN sanctions against Rhodesia, the government encouraged 
rapid growth of domestic manufacturing capacity, creating boom 
Republic of Zambia, Report of the Commission of Inqutry ^nto 
the Mining Indusry, 1966 (Government Printer, Lusaka, 1966) , 
pp. 13-14, [Hereafter referred to as Commission of Inqmry, 
1966] . 
^^ Zambia's Economic Revolution, Address by His Excellency 
The President, Dr K.D. Kaunda, at Mulungushi, 19th April 196B 
(Government Printer, Lusaka, n.d.), p.l. [Hereafter referred 
to as ZaTibia's Economic Revolution.] 
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conditions in Zambia's economy. Over the period 1964-6, 
manufacturing output grew by 171 per cent, while output 
6 2 
in the construction sector grew by 215 per cent. 
Economic expansion brought problems of its own. Many 
of the companies it benefited had close links with Southern 
Africa. The Rhodesian UDI and Zambia's determination to 
disentangle itself from the South reduced their time horizons 
significantly,^^ and they attempted to maximise profits in 
the short term and to remit a high proportion of those profits 
immediately. Many withdrew large amounts of capital by 
meeting replacements costs from local borrowings and distributing 
all profits. Such practices created a serious drain on 
the balance of payments, reduced the amount of loan capital 
available to domestic enterprises, and left many industries 
under-capitalised.^^ The economic boom also caused inflationary 
pressures - demand expanded rapidly while trade restrictions 
were causing bottlenecks in supply, and some companies took 66 
advantage of this situation to impose massxve price increases. 
The government's response to these problems was announced 
by President Kaunda at Mulungushi in April 1968. Local 
borrowing by foreign- and expatriate-owned companies would be 
curtailed, while dividend payments abroad would be limited 
^^ C. Harvey, 'Growth and the Structure of the Economy' in 
M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., Table 4.1, p.90. 
^^ M. Bostock, 'The Background to Participation', in M. Bostock 
and C. Harvey, op.cit., p.112. 
^^ Zambia's Economic Revolution, pp.iii-v. 
65 .. ibid. 
^^ ibid., p.38. 
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to the lower of 50 per cent of profits or 30 per cent of 
equity c a p i t a l . T h e government would greatly expand its 
direct involvement in the economy, by asking a number of 
major manufacturing and distribution companies to 'invite' 
6 8 
the State to purchase 51 per cent of their equity. Only 
in this way, argued the President, could the government ensure 
that price and profit levels and investment policies would 
be determined with Zambia's interests in mind, and that 
production could be rationalised and unnecessary duplication 
eliminated.^^ 
The vehicle for state participation would be the Industrial 
Development Corporation (INDECO), a government agency which 
had played a major role, directly and indirectly, in fostering 
industrial expansion since Independence."^^ INDECO would 
negotiate values and terms of payment for the State's share-
holdings with the companies involved, but the President 
stated that compensation would be based on book value.^^ 
No mention was made of government participation in the 
mining companies, but the President did express criticism 
of their investment policies: 
I want to say to the mining companies that I 
am very disappointed at the virtual lack of 
mining development since Independence. Apart 
from very small developments and some further 
^^ ibid., pp.27-8, 50. 
^^ ibid., p.38. 
ibid., pp.38-40, 43. 
INDECO participated in joint ventures with private companies, 
provided loans and other forms of assistance to prospective 
investors, and established a number of major transport 
organisations. 
^^ 'Book value- normally reflects the historical cost of a 
company's assets less whatever has been provided for 
depreciation on them. 
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development at existing mines, we have 
seen nothing. The companies claim that 
the royalty system has been against new 
development... I do not agree ... I have 
been following their accounts and I know 
very well that they could have embarked 
upon further expansion if they chose to 
devote part of their profits for this 
purpose. Instead of re-investing they 
have been distributing over 80% of their 
profits every year as dividends. 
Nevertheless, Dr Kaunda stated, the government would change 
the royalty system. No details were announced, but the 
new arrangement would leave government revenue substantially 
unchanged while meeting the companies' criticisms. The companies 
for their part would be expected to expand production; they 
would be subject to the general limitation on dividend 
remittances, and would be expected to reinvest the 50 per 
cent of profits retained in Zambia. 
Was this criticism of the companies justified? First, 
it should be noted that two separate issues were in fact 
involved - development of additional capacity and reinvestment 
of profits. The rate of development of new capacity certainly 
slowed down after 1964. Copperbelt production increased by 
73 
only 14 per cent between 1964 and 1969 (see Table 6), 
compared with 21 per cent between 1960 and 1965 and 72 per 
cent between 1955 and 1960 . However after Independence 
mining was taking place at deeper levels and ore grades were 
declining, and the amount of investment required to maintain 
production increased. Investment of this type was charged to 
72 ibid., pp.49-50. 
^^ More precisely, AAC's production declined by 2.4 per cent 
while RST's increased by 28 per cent. A. Drysdall, 'Prospecting 
and Mining Activity, 1895-1970', in M. Bostock and C. Harvey, 
op.cit., p.7 3 . 
ibid. 
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Table 6 
Zambia's Copper Production, 
Selected Years 1942-1964, and 1964-1978 
Year Production 
COOO's Metric Tonnes) 
1942 251 
1946 185 
1950 281 
1954 385 
1958 380 
1960 589 
1964 632 
1965 696 
1966 623 
1967 663 
1968 685 
1969 720 
1970 684 
1971 651 
1972 718 
1973 707 
1974 698 
1975 677 
1976 709 
1977 656 
1978 643 
Sources: R.E. Baldwin, op.cit.. Table 2.2, p.33; Zambia 
Mining Year Book, various issues. 
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working costs rather than appropriated fromprofits (a more 
usual procedure) , and for this reason President Kaunda' s 
claim that only 20 per cent of profits were reinvested was 
somewhat misleading. For example, AAC group mines declared 
profits of K88.6 million over the period 1964-8,"^^ of which 
K12.6 million or 14 per cent was appropriated for capital 
expenditure- But capital investments totalling K36.4 million 
were made in maintaining production, and if these had been 
appropriated from profits rather than charged against working 
costs AAC's reinvestment rate would have been 39 per cent. 
This is similar to the rate achieved by the Northgate group in 
7 8 Ireland (37 per cent), and by Bougainville Copper Limited 
79 
in Papua New Guinea (42 per cent). Significantly, neither 
of these companies expanded capacity substantially during 
the periods to which these figures apply. 
This discussion illustrates a point made earlier: the 
Zambian mining groups (unlike some other foreign companies) 
were willing to maintain the value of their investments, but 
were reluctant to invest in new capacity (for reasons mentioned 
above). The measures announced by President Kaunda did nothing 
to over come this reluctance, firstly because his promise 
to change the royalty system was not acted upon, secondly 
This is the procedure followed by Bougainville Copper Limited 
and by the Northgate group, for example. 
Derived from R. Sklar, Corporate Power in an African State: 
The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in 
Zambia (University of California Press, 1975), p.55. 
ibid. 
Derived from Table 1 above. 
Derived from Table 18 below. 
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because restriction of dividend remittances had no impact 
on investment. The companies simply accumulated the blocked 
8 0 
funds in local bank accounts. 
The issue of prospecting and mining rights also required 
urgent attention if new mineral developments were to proceed. 
The government had acquired only the BSAC's mineral rights, 
and other companies (including AAC and RST) held rights, in 
perpetuity, over a large part of the country. If the companies 
decided to 'sit' on known mineral deposits or to ignore certain Q 1 . , 
areas, the government could neither force them into activity 
or award mining or prospecting rights to other, more energetic 
firms. Corporate ownership of mineral rights also prevented 
the State from exercising control over aspects of mining 
operations considered vital to its interests, for example 8 2 
production and recovery rates and cut-off grades. 
By early 19 69 it was apparent that the long-awaited 
initiative on mineral policy would soon by under way. Andrew 
Sardanis, a forceful businessman who as Chairman of INDECO had 
In fact the manner in which the restrictions were enforced^ 
further undermined confidence in the government's administrative 
capabilities. The enforcing authority, the Bank of Zambia, 
was not given clear instructions as to what accounting methods 
should be used in defining 'profit' (and so permissible 
dividends). On two occasions the Bank delayed payment of 
dividends until the companies were threatened with suspension 
of dealings in their shares by the London Stock Exchange, 
which led President Kaunda to intervene and order payment to 
be made. 
^^ The question arises as to why the existing companies might 
not wish to exploit known depostis or open up new areas. They 
might simply be unwilling to make the required investment in 
Zambia. On the other hand, they might be attempting to restrict 
supply to world markets in order to maintain prices, a strategy 
which might be in Zambia's interests. However, Zambian 
leaders displayed little sympathy with the concept of 
production curtailment as a price support mechanism. 
8 ? A. Martin, op.cit., p.151. 
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implemented the take-overs announced at Mulungushi, was 
appointed Permanent Secretary of the Trade, Industry, and 
Mines Department, and drafting of legislation on taxation 
and mineral rights was soon under way. Action could not be 
taken on the latter until the constitutional restriction on 
compulsory acquisition of private property was removed, and 
the government received permission to do this in a referendum 
held in June 1969. By July the new legislation was ready; 
its details were announced by the President at Matero Hall, 
Lusaka, on 11 August. 
The President began by repeating his claim that AAC 
and RST were failing to reinvest enough of their profits 
in development. He went on to mention the problems caused 
by corporate ownership of mineral rights, and announced 
that all such rights would revert to the State. Existing 
mines would be granted mining leases for twenty five years, 
the size of the lease depending on the rate of extraction. 
Where minerals had been discovered but not exploited, the 
finder would either proceed with development within three 
years or surrender his rights. Companies engaged in 
prospecting could complete their work, and if minerals were 
discovered apply for mining leases. The rights of companies 
not engaged in exploration or development would revert to 
the State immediately. The President also announced that all 
new mining ventures would be expected to offer the State at 
8 3 least 51 per cent of their shares. 
Towards Complete Independence, Address by His Excellency 
the President, Dr K.D. Kaunda, to the UNIP National Council 
held at Matero Hall, Lusaka, 11 August 1969 (Government 
Printer, Lusaka, n.d.), pp.29-34. [Hereafter referred to as 
Towards Complete Independence.] 
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Proposed changes to the taxation system were also 
outlined. Royalties and export tax would be replaced by a 
mineral tax amounting to 51 per cent of profits. Income tax 
at the standard rate (45 per cent) would be charged on the 
balance of profits, giving a total tax rate of 73.05 per 
. 84 cent. 
These initiatives had been expected, but the President's 
third major announcement had not. The AAC and RST mines 
would be asked to sell 51 per cent of their shares to the 
State- INDECO would negotiate purchase terms, but again 
book value would form the basis of compensation. The State 
would not pay for its share immediately, but would 
8 5 do so out of future dividends. 
What prompted the government to seek majority ownership 
of the copper mines? The official reason was that state 
control of the mines was essential if economic independence 
was to be achived. As President Kaunda stated, 
... I wanted the mining economic reforms to 
set the Nation well and truly towards its 
economic independence. I do not think 
that this can be achieved without the Nation g^ 
acquiring full control of the existing mines... 
The belief in the need for state control was based on the 
assumption that national and corporate policies would frequently 
conflict. Six specific areas of potential conflict were 
ibid., pp.35-6 
^^ ibid., pp . 36-7 
86 .. .. ibid., p.36. 
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8 7 identified, the first of which involved the mining companies' 
purchasing policies. As mentioned above, Zambia was determined 
to reduce imports from Rhodesia/South Africa (which 
traditionally supplied a high proportion of mining industry 
inputs), even if alternative sources of supply were more 
8 8 
expensive. The mining companies, on the other hand, 
wished to stick to suppliers whom they knew well (indeed 
some were affiliated companies), and on whom they could 
therefore rely to meet their requirements efficiently. In 
addition, it was usually cheaper and almost always quicker 
to obtain supplies from Southern Africa than from Europe or 
elsewhere. 
A second area, that of investment policies, has already 
been discussed in detail. A third involved the issue of 
Zambianisation. While important advances had been made since 
Independence at the semi-skilled and lower supervisory levels, 
progress had been slow in the skilled manual, technical, 
professional and managerial categories. For example, in 
1969 over 95 per cent of artisans were still Europeans, while 
there were no Zambian underground managers, assistant under-
ground mangers, mine captains, metallurgists, or mining 
engineers.^^ A fourth concern was that the companies might 
^^ Towards Complete Independence, pp.29-31; Zambta[s Eaonormc 
Revolution, pp.7, 38-40, 49-50; C. Harvey, 'Economic 
Independence', in M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., pp.3 
M. Ndulo, 'The Requirement of Domestic Participation in New 
Mining Ventures in Zambia', kfvioan Social Research, 25 (June 
1978), pp.399-403, 412. 
^^ In certain cases this policy was based on economic as well as 
political grounds, as the government hoped it would 
encourage industrial growth in Zambia. 
^^ Copper Industry Service Bureau, Training for Zambianisation 
in the Mining Industry (Kitwe, n.d.), pp.5, 12; information 
supplied by Mining Industry Manpower Services Unit (MIMSU). 
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employ methods such as over-invoicing of goods purchased 
from affiliates to remove profits from Zambian jurisdiction. 
Fifthly, it was feared that mining methods might be employed 
which were inimical to Zambia's long-term interests, for 
example in the areas of grade control and dilution. Finally, 
it was felt that employment, wage, and pricing policies adopted 
by the companies might conflict with national economic and 
social goals. In addition to and partly arising from these 
specific issues, there was a general feeling that Zambia's 
sovereignty would be undermined if an industry on which its 
future depended was controlled by foreigners. 
Two important issues arise: were these fears justified 
and, if so, would majority state ownership remedy the situation? 
These questions are considered in the next Chapter,but of 
immediate relevance is that Zambia's leaders clearly answered 
both in the affirmative. Thus the initiatives announced 
at Matero can be seen as continuing a broad strategy, 
formulated as a logical response to perceived problems and 
first implemented at Mulungushi. 
However other factors played a part in the decision to 
take those initiatives and in the timing of that decision, 
and, as we shall see, its timing was to exert a major impact 
on the outcome. In 19 6 8 the government had felt that the 
cost of compensation on a scale sufficient to persuade the 
companies to continue managing the industry would be 
prohibitive.^^ But the take-overs announced at Mulungushi 
had been paid for out of future profits, effectively relieving 
9 Q A. Martin, op.cit., p.158. 
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the State of financial cost, and INDECO had negotiated 
contracts with the previous owners under which they continued 
to provide managerial and technical services. There seemed 
no reason why the mining companies could not be taken over 
in the same way, especially since the Chileans, whose expertise 
was highly regarded in Lusaka, had recently nationalised 
91 
their copper industry under a similar arrangement. 
Another relevant point was that major initiatives in 
mineral policy were about to be taken in any case, and it 
seemed sensible to implement all the desired changes at once, 
placing the industry on a firm footing and eliminating 
uncertainty. But perhaps the most important influence on 
the timing of the decision arose from short-term political 
considerations. In August 1969 President Kaunda was under-
going the severest political test of his career. Shortly 
before, a major political crisis had resulted from clashes 9 2 
between the President and the judiciary. UNIP was deeply 
divided along tribal lines. By August 1969 these divisions 
had crystallised around Simon Kapwepwe, Vice-President of 
Zambia and UNIP, and the Matero meeting of UNIP's National 
Council seemed certain to witness open conflict. The 
announcement of the latest set of 'reforms' was sure to 
divert attention from these issues. In the event the President 
used his considerable powers of oratory to make the most of 
^^ ibid., pp.158-9. 
^^ These resulted in the sudden departure from Zambia of the 
Chief Justice, Mr Skinner, who had been a founder-member of 
UNIP and a personal friend of Kaunda's. His flight shocked 
many expatriates, undermining their confidence in their own 
futures in Zambia. 
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9 3 
the occasion, and his success in rallying the Party behind 
him was almost total. It placed him in such a strong position 
that he was able to neutralise the threat from Kapwepwe 94 within a few weeks. 
Thus the Take-over decision was both a logical outcome 
of the government's broader economic and political strategy 
and of shorter-term tactical and political imperatives. 
The public reaction of AAC and RST to the Matero 
announcement was moderate. Neither questioned the basic 
principle of majority state participation, and both indicated 
their willingness to negotiate compensation payments and 
management contracts. Negotiations took place over the period 
September-November 1969, and an agreement was signed on 
24 December 1969, the principal provisions of which are 
95 outlined below. 
The terms of the Take-over 
Two new mining companies. Roan Consolidated Mines 
Limited (RCM) and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Limited 
(NCCM), were formed through amalgamation of the RST and AAC 
group mines respectively. Ownership would be divided between 
^^ See Towards Complete Independence, especially pp.30 5. 
9 4 A. Martin, op.cit., p.62. 
^^ The terms of the arrangement were contained in_a Master 
Agreement and various subsidiary documents including 
management contracts, sales and marketing contracts, and 
the Memoranda and Articles of Association of the two new 
Government mining companies. The contents of these documents 
are summarised in M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., Appendix A, 
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the government (51 per cent) and the private shareholders. 
The government would appoint a majority of the directors of 
both companies, to be known as 'A' directors; the minority 
shareholders would elect the remaining, 'B', directors, who 
would chose the Managing Director of each company from among 
their number. 
AAC would receive 51 per cent of the book value of 
its mines (K125,766,000). The RST group mines were not in 
fact treated on a strictly 'book value' basis, as their 
accounting methods had led to undervaluation of their assets. 
Those assets were valued at K165 million and so RST and the 
other shareholders would receive K84.15 million. In both 
cases, payment would be made by the Zambia Industrial and 
Mining Coproration (ZIMCO), though the government's sharees 
would be held by the Mining Development Corporation(MINDECO). 
ZIMCO would effect payment by issvking bonds bearing interest 
at 6 per cent, repayable to RST in sixteen semi-annual 
instalments and to 7VAC in twenty four semi-annual instalments. 
Provision was made for accelerated repayment in certain 
circumstances; if two-thirds of MINDECO's dividends from 
either RCM or NCCM exceeded the guaranteed fixed annual 
payments, the additional income would be applied to bond 
repayment. If MINDECO's total dividend income fell below 
97 
In RCM's case the minority shareholders were RST 
International (20 per cent), Zambia Copper Investments 
Limited (ZCI), a holding company for AAC's Zambian interests 
(12.5 per cent), and non RST shareholders in the former RST 
group mines (16.5 per cent). ZCI was the sole private share-
holder in NCCM. 
The faster repayment to RST was also a recognition that it 
would be disadvantaged by application of the 'book value' 
principle. 
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the fixed annual payments, on the other hand, no postponement 
of those payments was provided for. Thus the State might 
not in fact pay for its shares out of future profits. 
A management and consultancy contract was negotiated 
in both cases. Details of AAC's contract were not released, 
98 
but It was similar to RST's, outlined below. RST would 
continue to provide the managerial, financial, commercial, 
technical and other services which it had previously supplied 
to or procured for the individual mines. These services 
would include production planning, capital expenditure 
estimates, advice on mining operations, engineering 
consultancy, recruitment of expatriate staff, and purchasing 
of goods outside Zambia. In exchange for these services, 
RST would receive .75 per cent of the operating company's 
gross sale proceeds, 2 per cent of its consolidated profits, 
an engineering fee of 3 per cent of the constructed costs 
of projects, and a recruiting fee of 15 per cent of each 
expatriate employee's first year's gross earnings. 
RST could terminate the contract at two years' notice, 
to expire at any date after 31 December 1979, or after two 
years' notice to expire before that date if advice given by 
the 'B' directors was repeatedly ignored by the 'A' directors. 
RCM could terminate the contract if RST's shareholding in 
RCM fell below 20 per cent, or if the standard of the services 
supplied by RST fell below that which it had provided to 
RCM's predecessors. 
98 M . Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit.. Appendix A, p.229. 
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AAC and RST would continue to market Zambia's copper 
output. Their sales contracts would be exclusive, and 
remuneration would equal 0.75 per cent of gross sales. 
In fulfilling their contracts, RST and AAC undertook 
to give training and experience in relevant functions to 
staff seconded from RCM, NCCM, or MINDECO. 
The Articles of Association of RCM and NCCM contained 
important provisions relating to managerial control of the 
companies. RCM and NCCM would pay dividends equal to their 
consolidated net profits 'after deduction only of 
appropriations in respect of capital expenditure, expenditure 
for exploration and prospecting, and reserves for necessary 
working c a p i t a l A p p r o p r i a t i o n s for capital or exploration 
expenditures would require the approval of both 'A' and•'B' 
directors voting separately, as would other major corporate 
actions, for example alteration of RCM's or NCCM's Articles 
of Associaton, participation by RCM or NCCM in non-mining 
activities or in mining activities for which they could not 
obtain finance on commercially competitive terms or which the 
•B' directors did not regard as commercially viable, or 
any act ... that, in the opinion of a majority 
or the 'B' directors, [was] not directed 
toward ... the optimization of production 
and profit of RCM and NCCM. 
However, the 'B' directors would not 'unreasonably' withhold 
their consent 'having regard to the interests of RCM (and 
NCCM) and to the interests of the shareholders'. 
^^ ibid., p.235. 
ibid., p.235. 
ibid. 
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The Zambian government agreed to refer any disputes 
arising from the arrangement to the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes. It also agreed that 
all disputes would be governed by the law of Zambia as in 
force at the time the arrangement was concluded, disregarding 
any subsequent legislation. In addition, the government 
made specific undertakings as regards taxation and exchange 
control legislation. While any part of the ZIMCO bonds were 
outstanding, the overall rate of tax payable by RCM and NCCM 
would not be increased, and dividends paid by them would 
be free of Zambian taxation, as would all payments arising 
from the ZIMCO bonds. Provisions relating to capital allowances 
and to tax treatment of exploration expenditure would also 
remain u n c h a n g e d . B o n d repayments, interest payments, 
dividends payable to non-Zambian shareholders, and sales 
and management contract fees would all be exempt from exchange 
control. 
Breach of any aspect of these arrangements by the Zambian 
government (including the management contracts) would make 
all the ZIMCO bonds due and payable immediately. 
The impact of the Take-over 
TO what extent did these terms allow realisation of 
the Zambian government's objectives? On one level, its aim 
was to acquire an income-generating asset free of financial 
cost, and thus it hoped to pay for its shareholding out of 
future profits. In the event, the ZIMCO bonds were redeemed 
These provisions were contained in the Income Tax 
(Amendment) Act 1970. 
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in September 1973 (see p.213below), and so it is impossible 
to state with certainty whether that hope would have been 
realised. It is possible to compare what ZIMCO's liabilities 
to AAC and RST would have been had the bonds not been redeemed 
with the dividends which the government has actually received 
from NCCM and RCM, and this is done in Table 7 , for the 
period 1970-8. The data probably gives an accurate picture 
of what would have happened had the Take-over arrangements 
run their course, since the failure of RCM and NCCM to pay 
dividends after 1974 reflected their inability to generate 
operating profits rather than any change of investment policies 
103 following the bond redemption. 
Table 7 indicates that the government was mistaken in 
its belief that its shareholdings could be paid for out of 
future profits; if the projections in the Table are accurate, 
it would have had to pay about K60 million in compensation 
from other sources. The government's expectations as to 
the copper industry's profitability were disappointed for 
three main reasons. First, production costs rose rapidly over 
the period 1970-7; costs at the mine increased by 96 per cent 
in RCM's case and 84 per cent in NCCM's,^°^ while average 
^^^ Both RCM and NCCM incurred operating losses in 1975/6 and 
1977/8 and generated small operating profits in 1976/7. 
^^^ NCCM might of course generate sufficient profit in the _ 
years 1979-82 to compensate for earlier losses, but transactions 
involving RCM would have been completed by 19 78, and Table 7 
indicates that these would have resulted in a loss to government 
of K37,735,000. 
RCM, Annual Reports, 1971 and 1977; NCCM, Annual Bepovts, 
1971 and 1977. 
Table 7 
Direct Financial Impact of the 1969 Take-over on the Zambian Government, 
1970-3 (Actual) and 1974-8 (Estimated) (K'000'7) 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Totals 
Source: 
Notes: 
MINDECO's Dividend 
Entitlement 
7,653 
11,225 
10,459 
15,816 
22,588 
3,324 
71,065 
RCM 
ZIMCO's Liability^ 
6,800 
13,600 
13,600 
13,600 
-H-
15,059 
13,600 
13,600 
13,600 
5,341 
108,800 
Balance 
+ 853 
- 2,375 
- 3,141 
+ 2,216 
+ 7,529 
- 10,276 
- 13,600 
- 13,600 
- 5,341 
- 37,735 
MINDECO's Dividend 
Entitlement 
+ 
39,270 
17,850 
26,520 
21,930 
105,570 
NCCM 
ZIMCO's Liability' 
+ 
22,650 
15 ,100 
17,680 
15,100 
15,100 
15,100 
15,100 
15,100 
130,930 
++ 
Figures for ZIMCO's liabilities were obtained from M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., p.228; 
figures for dividend entitlements were derived from NCCM, Annual Reports, 1971-8 and 
RCM, Annual Reports, 1970-8. 
* Payments would have termined in 1978. 
** Payments would have continued until 1982 
+ NCCM did not issue separate financial results for 1970 and so the figures for 1970 and 
1971 have been combined. NCCM would not have been subject to accelerated compensation 
payments in either of these years as the relevant clause did not become effective until 1972. 
++ Accelerated compensation payments would have been called for in these years. 
Balance 
+ 16,620 
+ 2,750 
+ 8,840 
+ 6,830 
- 15,100 
- 15,100 
- 15,100 
- 15,100 
- 25,360 
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transport costs rose by 40 per cent.^'^^ Second, the period 
1974-8 was characterised by a prolonged trough in copper 
prices. Finally, production levels were adversely affected 
by bottle-necks in transport routes, shortages of skilled 
personnel, and a disastrous cave-in at Mufulira, RCM's largest 
mine, in October 1970. In fact production levels fell after 
1969 ,^ "^^  whereas substantial increases had been hoped for. 
The Zambian government could not have predicted these 
developments, but it could have allowed for unforseen 
circumstances: depressed prices, rising production costs, 
and natural disasters were no strangers to the mining industry. 
Specifically, the government could have negotiated a clause 
allowing for postponement or deceleration of compensation 
10 8 
payments in years of low or no profits, corresponding 
to the shareholders' right to obtain accelerated compensation 
when profits were high. The absence of such a provision 
represented a serious weakness in the Take-over arrangement. 
The profitability of the operating companies was also 
relevant to the balance of payments impact of the Take-over. 
It was felt that a high proportion of profits would flow out 
of Zambia if private ownership continued; on the assumption 
that profits would exceed compensation payments, outflow of 
these payments would not therefore represent a drain on the 
balance of p a y m e n t s . I n the event, not only was that 
assumption not justified, but the factors responsible (low 
Zambia Mining Year Book, 1971, p.43 and 1977, p.31. 
^^^ See Table 6. 
Bostock and Harvey have suggested a number of ways in 
which such a provision could have been formulated: op.ext., 
pp.174-5. 
109 A. Martin, op.cit., p.159. 
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prices, production shortfalls, higher production costs)^^^ 
themselves adversely affected the balance of payments.^^^ 
Consequently the outflows of foreign currency created by 
compensation payments exercised a proportionately greater 
impact. 
By purchasing equity on the terms it did the government 
added to the risks inherent in dependence on the copper 
industry - compensation payments would further reduce 
government revenue in times of low prices or other adverse 
conditions, and would exacerbate the impact of such conditions 
on the balance of payments. However, over the years 1964-9 
Zambia had experienced no difficulties in balancing its 
external transactions, and by 1969 had accumulated substantial 
foreign currency.^^^ Its public revenues had exceeded all 
current and capital government expenditure in each year 
except 1968.^^^ It could therefore be argued that the 
government could well afford to take such risks if they offered 
the prospect of achieving a central policy goal - national 
control of the copper industry. 
The earlier outline of the Take-over terms indicates 
that the Zambian government failed to achieve that goal, 
as an examination of their implications for the areas of 
potential corporate-government conflict discussed above reveals, 
Changes in production costs are relevant in this context 
because a high proportion of mining industry inputs are 
imported. 
^^^ Zambia's balance of trade was in surplus by K384.1 million 
in 1973 and in deficit by K76 million in 1975. Republic of 
Zambia, Economic Report, 1976 and 1977. 
^^^ S. Goodman, 'The Foreign Exchange Constraint', in 
C. Elliott, op.cit., pp.238-9, 249. 
^^^ M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., p.167. 
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The position as regards purchasing policies would remain 
essentially unchanged, since AAC and RST would retain 
responsibility for purchasing outside Zambia. Neither did 
the government obtain a significantly greater degree of control 
over the crucial area of investment policies. Changes in 
accounting procedures implemented in 19 70 prevent a detailed 
comparison of corporate investments before and after that 
114 
year, but the general trend is clear. As mentioned above, 
over the period 1964-8 the AAC group mines made total capital 
expenditures equal to 39 per cent of net profits as defined 
by accounting procedures employed after 1970 (see p. 181); 
the equivalent figure for NCCM in the period 1971-4 was 44 
per cent, by no means a spectacular increase. Even this 
increase cannot be attributed solely to the Take-over. 
Nearly a quarter of NCCM's capital expenditure during this 
period was on the Tailings Leach Plant at Chingola. This 
development resulted from the discovery in 1968/9 by AAC 
staff of new methods for recovering copper from mine tailings, 
at costs which were less than half the average for the group 
mines.^^^ Use of the new techniques offered the prospect 
of very high returns on investment, a prospect which AAC 
would have been unlikely to ignore, especially given the 
favourable changes in Zambia's tax regime. Thus this 
^^^ As mentioned above, prior to 1970 the mining companies 
charged capital expenditures designed to maintain production 
against revenue. The Annual Reports of the individual companies 
did not give a breakdown of charges against revenue (see, 
for example, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, Annual Report, 
1966). Consequently it is impossible to gain an accurate 
picture of capital expenditures by individual mines. 
^^^ In 1977, for example, production costs at the tailings 
leach plant were below K300 per tonne, while average costs for 
the NCCM mines were K752 per tonne. Interview with NCCM 
official, Chingola, 27 July 1978; NCCM, Annual Report, 1977, 
p.27. 
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additional expenditure would probably have occurred regardless 
of the Take-over. 
Comparable investment figures are not available for RST, 
but it is significant that RCM distributed a higher 
proportion of its net profits in dividends over the period 
1971-4 than RST did during the years 1964-8 (54 as against 
50 per cent),^^^ while its reinvestment rate was low even in 
comparison to AAC's in the period prior to the Take-over 
(32 as against 39 per cent).^^^ 
It is evident, therefore, that the Take-over failed 
to bring about a major increase in the proportion of profits 
being reinvested. There were two aspects to this failure. 
The first involved the provision in RCM's and NCCM's Articles 
of Association calling for distribution of all profits 'after 
deduction only in respect of capital expenditure, expenditure 
for exploration and prospecting, and reserves for necessary 
working capital'. A high dividend level was of course essential 
if the government was to make its compensation payments; but 
the outcome was that profits could not be accumulated for 
investment at a later date. Yet this would have to be done 
if reinvestment rates were to increase substantially, as some 
years would elapse between initiation of capital projects 
• . 118 and the phase of major capital expenditures. 
The level of current investment was nevertheless flexible; 
however, the management contracts gave the minority share-
holders considerable influence in this area. They carried 
lie Derived" from RST Limited, Annual Report, 1968, p.19, and 
RCM Annual Report, 1971-4. 
117 Derived from RCM, Annual Reports, 1971-4. 
^^^ The Tailings Leach Plant at Chingola, for example, was 
initiated in 1970, while the period of major capital 
expenditures was 1973-5. 
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out project evaluation and capital expenditure estimates 
and were thus responsible for assessing the viability of 
individual investments. Those considered unviable could be 
vetoed by the 'B' directors. On the other hand, its powers 
to appoint directors might have enabled the government to 
criticially analyse such assessments, if the individuals 
involved were adequately qualified and could draw on relevant 
expertise from an independent source. As we shall see, 
these conditions were to be fulfilled, but the reinvestment 
figures quoted above indicate that the formal constraints 
were too powerful for this to make very much difference. 
Neither did the new arrangement give the government 
a significantly greater say in Zambianisation policies. No 
provisions relating to Zambianisation were included, other 
than that the companies supplying management and other 
services would provide 'suitable experience' to employees 
of RCM and NCCM. The Managing Directors of the operating 
companies would retain complete discretion in employing, 
promoting, and dismissing staff. 
As regards the possibility of over-invoicing, the 
presence of government directors might increase the flow of 
relevant information and force management to justify its 
choice of suppliers and the prices paid for major purchases; 
once again, the calibre of the government's appointees would 
be all-important. The ability of government directors to 
monitor the conduct of mining operations would be more 
problematic, since they would be unlikely to possess the 
necessary specialised technical knowledge. It is one thing 
to question whether an item has been purchased at the best 
2 0 0 
available price, quite another to question, for example, 
whether cut-off grades begin applied in a particular mining 
situation are appropriate. However,if the government developed 
some expert capacity in this area the situation might be 
different. Finally, the government's position as majority 
shareholder might enhance its ability to ensure that corporate 
wage, employment, and pricing policies were in line with 
national economic and social goals, but the power of the 'B' 
directors to veto any action not designed to optimise profit 
or production could restrict that ability. AAC and RST 
would hardly have refused to adopt policies which did not 
affect their profitability in any case, while they could now 
reject policies which would have that effect. 
In order to obtain its shareholding, the government 
also temporarily surrendered control in areas where it had 
previously exercised jurisdiction, particularly in the field 
of taxation and exchange control legislation. In addition, 
it allowed its freedom to be circumscribed in a more general 
way. If it was in breach of any aspect of the arrangement, 
all ZIMCO bonds would become payable immediately, and the 
minority shareholders could refer the dispute to the 
International Council for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID is supported by international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
who might well insist that Zambia abide by any ICSID ruling 
as a condition of granting it loans or other forms of 
• ^ 119 assistance. 
^^^ As Mark Bostock and Charles Harvey have commented, the 
mining companies thus ensured 'that their own private agreement 
is an inseparable part of the whole complex of Zambia's 
international financial arrangements'. M. Bostock and C. Harvey 
op.cit./ P'151. 
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The influence of the minority shareholders might be less 
in practice than would appear from an analysis of the formal 
arrangements. They would possess a strong incentive to 
retain the goodwill of the Zambian government, both in order 
to protect their remaining investments and to ensure that 
ZIMCO would honour its financial obligations. Repeated use 
of their veto would certainly undermine that goodwill, and 
it would probably only be used in extreme circumstances. 
On the other hand, the ultimate power of decision-making 
remained with the foreign investors, who would also wield 
singificant influence over the day-to-day decision-making 
process, because of the legal and other constraints contained 
in the Take-over arrangements. 
Legislative initiatives, 1969-70 
The Take-over was accompanied by major changes to 
legislation governing mineral rights and taxation. In 
general terms, the intiative on mineral rights was clearly 
appropriate, since it opened up new areas for exploration 
and ensured that existing right-holders would either pursue 
serious prospecting programmes or abandon their claims. A 
substantial number of foreign mining companies expressed 
interest in the areas released, and some undertook major 
exploration programmes. Certain of these were for minerals 
other than copper (mainly uranium and diamonds), and covered 
120 areas away from the line-of-rail, both significant 
Reoublic of Zambia, Geological Survey Department, Map 
of Prospecting, Exploration and Mining Licenae Areas 
(Government Printer, Lusaka, 1976). 
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developments given the government's desire to reduce the 
dominance of copper mining and to foster rural development. 
The search for radioactive minerals has already met with 
some success, and the government has recently signed agreements 
with Agip of Italy and Saarberg Interplan of West Germany 
for development of uranium deposits.^^^ 
A more specific issue involves the requirement on 
applicants for prospecting licences to offer the State a 
51 per cent share in any mining venture which might eventuate. 
This requirement represents a basic element of government 
policy which some companies may find unacceptable, but 
in addition the manner in which it is framed may itself act 
as a disincentive to exploration. The State decides whether 
it will exercise its option when and if a mining lease 
is applied for; if it does so, it then pays its full share 
122 
of prospecting and exploration costs. But if the prospecting 
effort fails, the State incurs no liability; it avoids the 
initial risk, but benefits from any successes. In justifying 
this approach, the government argues that it should not invest 
Zambia's limited financial resources in high risk activities, 123 
and should consequently leave prospecting to private companies. 
This argument may be valid in theory, but in practice it may 
not be possible to attract private investors unless the State 
accepts some of the initial risk, and in fact MINDECO has 
become directly involved in exploration ventures on a number 
124 of occasions. 
^^^ Mining Journal, 13 April 1979, 11 May 1979. 
^^^ M. Ndulo, op.cit., pp.408-9. 
^^^ Republic of Zambia, Second National Development Plan, 
1972-6 (Government Printer, Lusaka, 1971), p.91. 
^^^ For example with Noranda Mines Ltd. and Geomin. 
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Before examining the 1970 tax legislation, two points 
should be m a d e . F i r s t , despite the Take-over, it was hoped 
that private investment would continue to play a major role 
in m i n e r a l development, as evidenced by the heavy reliance 
125 
on private exploration companies. Second, the operating 
companies would continue to function on commercial lines, 
and would assess potential investments accordingly. In 
other w o r d s , investment decisions crucial to the mining 
industry would continue to reflect perceptions of likely 
profitability, which in turn would be influenced by the extent 
and character of taxation. 
Under the new tax regime, a l l taxes are based on profits, 
and this removes the more obvious anomalies of the old 
system; less profitable mines no longer pay higher effective 
tax rates than more profitable ones, taxes cannot exceed 
profits, and unprofitable mines cannot be taxed. The 'reforms' 
of 1969-70 also removed a great deal of the uncertainty 
which had surrounded the whole area of taxation, an important 
prerequisite if investment was to expand. However, the 
new system has one important drawback. 
Application of such a high flat rate of tax (73.05 per 
cent) w i l l certainly act as a disincentive to private mining 
investment. The new rate is almost e q u a l to the marginal 
rate under the old system (74.42 per cent for rises in the 
copper price above K600 per long ton), and substantially 
higher than the average rate applied over the period since 
^^^ Clearly such companies would only explore in the 
expectation of playing a major role in developing any 
discoveries. In any case, Zambia lacked the technical and 
financial resources to undertake major developments alone. 
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126 Independence (62 per cent for the AAC group mines). The 
1970 legislation did allow investors to recoup their initial 
127 
outlays before tax was applied, but because of the high 
tax rate it would probably take a considerable period of 
time for those outlays to generate a significant return. 
Andrew Gordon has quoted the example of a mine constructed 
over three years and subsequently earning annual profits 
equal to 35 per cent of total capital expenditure. Recoupment 
of capital together with interest at 12 per cent on the 
unrecouped balance would not be achieved until the 10th 
year of operations; with interest at 15 per cent, not until 12 8 
the 20th year. Given the relatively short term horizons 
of investors in Central Africa, the deterrent effect of such 
a system must be significant. 
That effect would be proportionately greater where 
profits were in any case expected to be slim because of factors 
such as low ore grades or geographical isolation, a point 
which might apply equally to new mines or to certain parts of 
existing ones. The government might logically disregard 
the likely effects of the tax system on marginally profitable 
operations if its only concern was with revenue generation. 
It is in fact anxious to see such operations proceed because 
of the direct economic benefits they are expected to create 
^^^ R. Sklar, op.cit., p.54, n.61. 
All capital expenditure could be written off immediately 
against revenue in calculating profits, and losses could be 
carried forward indefinitely. These provisions were altered 
in 1973 (See below, p.213). 
^^^ A. Gordon, 'The Prospects for New Mine Investment', in 
M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., p.192. 
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(employment, export receipts, infrastructural development),^^^ 
and an appropriate tax system should clearly take this 
requirement into account. In theory the new system does 
so, in two ways. 
First, mineral tax (but not income tax) can be reclaimed 
to the extent that the return on equity falls short of 12 
per cent.^^^ In practice, this provision is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on investment decisions, as the 
rate of return it 'protects' is unlikely to approach that 
required by foreign investors, especially since major mineral 
developments in Zambia are likely to have a fairly high 
debt : equity ratio.^^^ A return of 25 per cent on equity 
has been quoted as 'reasonable' for a project with a 1 : 1 
debt : equity ratio,^^^ a low ratio by current standards.^^^ 
Second, the Zambian government stated that it would 
negotiate lower tax rates for specific projects which would 
134 otherwise not be viable. VJhile they might encourage 
log 
The Second National Development Plan states that mineral 
development is needed 'to increase employment opportunities, 
Government revenue, foreign exchange earnings, and development 
of rural areas' (p.85). 
Republic of Zambia, Mineral Tax, Chapter 667 of the Laws 
of Zambia (Government Printer, Lusaka, 1970), Section 7. 
^^^ The higher the debt:equity ratio, the greater the risk 
borne by the equity investor, and hence the greater his 
minimum expected rate of return. 
^^^ A. Gordon, 'The Prospects for New Mine Investment', in 
M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., p.196. 
^^^ The debtrequity ratio for the Bougainville project was 
2.1:1, that for the Navan zinc/lead mine was 8:1. 
A. Gordon, 'The Prospects for New Mine Investment', in 
M. Bostock and C. Harvey, op.cit., p.197. 
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development of marginal prospects which were discovered, 
discretionary provisions of this type are unlikely to have 
a significant impact on companies contemplating exploration, 
since they would not know in advance how eligibility would 
be determined or precisely what concessions would be available 
In sum, the revised tax system ensures that the Zambian 
government will continue to reap substantial benefits from 
existing, profitable mines but, though it removes some major 
faults of the old system, it continues to deter investment 
in new projects (particularly marginal ones), in working of 
lower-grade ores in existing mines, and particularly in 
exploration. It does not appear to reflect any serious 
attempt to reconcile Zambia's need for revenue with its need 
for continued exploration and investment. 
This judgement may seem harsh, since significant 
exploration has taken place under the new system, and since 
a number of potential projects are now being assessed. 
However, a closer examination of the companies involved 
indicates that their investment decisions may be influenced 
by considerations which are not strictly commerical. Three 
of the most active groups, including both the companies which 
have signed development agreements, are state agencies of 
European countries (France, Germany and Rumania). All three 
have been seeking uranium, and their involvement in Zambia 
has been motivated by the desire of their home governments 
to secure reliable supplies of energy minerals rather than 
by expectations of profitable investment.^^^ One of the most 
^^^ This is illustrated by the case of Agip, for example, 
which has agreed to pay Zambia at least 10 per cent of the 
value of uranium production even if its operations turn out 
to be unprofitable. Mining Journal, 13 April 1979. 
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active private companies, De Beers, holds a monopoly position 
in the world diamond industry; a representative of the 
company informed the author that its search for diamonds in 
Zambia was motivated primarily by its determination to preserve 
that monopoly, and that it would not wish to develop any 
discoveries it might make under the existing fiscal regime.^^^ 
It seems therefore that few foreign investors find Zambia 
an attractive location on purely commercial grounds, yet 
it is on these grounds that investment in copper and other 
base metals must be sought. 
The Zambian government's negotiating effort 
The initiatives of 1969-70 failed to resolve either of 
the major issues which concerned the Zambian government-control 
of the mining industry and taxation and investment. In 
addition, there were significant drawbacks to the manner in 
which the government obtained its majority shareholding. 
Major weaknesses clearly still existed in the formulation 
and implementation of mineral policies. Some of these resulted 
from the timing of the Take-over. As mentioned above, short-
term political considerations hastened its announcement. 
Very little detailed preparation had been undertaken before-
hand, and only some half a dozen of Dr Kaunda's closest 
associates even knew that a take-over was planned.^^^ Once 
the announcement was made, the government was anxious to 
Interview with Director, Anglo American Central Africa 
Ltd., Lusaka, 1 August 1978. 
137 
A . Martin, opc.it., p.156. 
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conclude negotiations rapidly to prevent uncertainty among 
investors and expatriate mineworkers; the whole process of 
preparation and negotiation took place over a period of only 
138 
ten weeks. 
As a result there was little opportunity to identify 
policy aims, establish priorities, and select policies 
designed to achieve their implementation; indeed there was 
not even time to develop institutional structures within 
which these processes could take place, or to assemble a 
body of individuals capable of carrying them out. The 
government's negotiators were consequently at a serious 
disadvantage. The failure to establish priorities meant 
that they were pursuing a wide variety of aims, not all of 
them mutually consistent and relating, for example, to revenue 
generation, investment policies and production rates, 
corporate decision-making, and the extent and character of 
compensation. They were also at a tactical disadvantage 
since they had little opportunity to develop their own 
bargaining positions, and had to react to those of the 139 companies. 
The time constraint does not explain the failure to 
devise a more appropriate tax system, since the new legislation 
was prepared well inadvance. Clearly, Zambia's politicians 
were not yet convinced of the need to devise workable tax 
legislation which would enoouvage mining investment, 
probably because they believed that the copper industry would 
Dr Kaunda delivered his Matero speech on 11 August; 
agreement in principle on all the major issues was reached 
by 18 October. 
139 A. Martin, op.cit., p.167. 
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continue to operate profitably and to expand production 
V7hile subject to high levels of taxation, as it had done 
under the colonial regime. This belief might have been 
dispelled by a competent advisory staff whose advice was 
taken seriously, but such a group did not exist. 
The efficacy of the advisory staff was of course 
important to the whole negotiating effort, and it is apparent 
that important deficiencies existed in this area. As in 
the earlier period, the staff was diverse in origin (it 
included Britons, Chileans and Eastern Europeans), and the 
perspectives and assumptions of its members frequently differed, 
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as did the advice they offered. Staff members did not 
enjoy close liaison with senior politicians, partly because 
there was insufficient time either for suitable institutional 
structures to be established or for mutual confidence to 
develop. Racial differences may also have created a barrier; 
many senior politicians were still reluctant to trust white 
advisers, particularly when dealing with European-owned 
mining companies. ^ In this context, the absence of suitably-
qualified Zambian advisers takes on added significance. 
That absence resulted partly from a general scarcity of 
educated personnel, but it also reflected the government's 
failure to allow senior administrative staff greater stability 
of tenure, or to devise an effective institutional framework 
within which they could operate. 
Interview with Anthony Martin, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978 . 
The Eastern Europeans, for example, apparently failed to 
realise that the operation of a free market for copper imposed 
important constraints on the government's freedom of action. 
^^^ Interview with Anthony Martin, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978. 
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Thus the government lacked either the opportunity or 
the capacity to formulate and pursue policies appropriate 
to Zambia's circumstances. In consequence it tended either 
to follow the lead of other LDC copper producers or simply 
to opt for the status quo. Its decision to seek control of 
the industry by acquiring majority ownership, for example, 
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was influenced by the earlier Chilean decision to do so. 
Yet Chile's circumstances were very different - a high 
proportion of technical and managerial positions in its 
copper industry were held by Chileans, while its government 143 
had developed a wealth of expertise regarding the industry. 
In the field of taxation, the Zambians opted for the status 
quo in its crudest form - it simply enshrined the marginal 
tax which had prevailed over a short (and atypical) period 
144 prior to the Take-over. 
It is of course possible that the Zambian government's 
bargaining power was essentially weak and v/ould have remained 
so even if adequate preparations had been made. Copper 
production could not be maintained without the cooperation 
of the AAC and RST, who effectively possessed a monopoly 
of skilled labour, and thus were certainly in a strong 
bargaining position. However, it is evident from the 
discussion above that certain of the government's failures 
could have been remedied. Nevertheless, an important question 
does remain - given the corporate monopoly of mining skills, 
was it appropriate for Zambia to puruse control of the 
^^^ A. Martin, op.cit., p.159. 
^^^ T.H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics 
Dependence, p.125-6. 
^^^ It may or may not be coincidental that the total tax 
rate applied to mining companies in Chile in 1969 was also 
73 per cent. N. Girvan, Copper in Chile, p.30. 
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copper industry in the manner it did? This issue will be 
discussed in the next Chapter. 
Conclusion 
At Independence, Zambia's political leaders inherited 
an economy utterly dependent on an industry about which they 
knew very little. Their initial reaction was to maintain 
the status quo, lest any action on their part jeopardise 
the vital mining industry. This approach had one important 
advantage - existing copper mines continued to operate and 
to generate very substantial revenues (some K360 million 
14 5 
over the period 1964/5-1969), with which the government 
could finance its development effort. It also had an 
important disadvantage - it ignored the fact that positive 
action was required if the mining industry's long-term need 
for continued investment was to be met. 
The need for such action was not adequately recognised 
at any stage during the post-Independence period, for various 
reasons. The government was under considerable pressure 
to maximise revenues in the short term to meet Zambia's 
urgent need for massive public investment, and the longer-
term implications of taxation policies tended to be ignored. 
Many politicians distrusted and disliked the mining industry, 
making them reluctant to grant the 'concessions' without 
which private investment would not be forthcoming. This 
attitude was understandable, given that the industry's growth 
had been inextricably linked with the establishment of a 
state which for half a century discriminated against its 
Republic of Zambia, Financial Report (Government Printer, 
Lusaka, various issues). 
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African inhabitants in economic, political and social terms. 
However, it did much to inhibit a logical approach to mineral 
146 
policy formulation. Also important in this regard was 
the absence of an effective advisory staff and of a suitable 
institutional framework for policy-making. 
Because such an approach was lacking, and because of 
changed circumstances within the copper industry itself, 
the private mining companies were unwilling to commit funds 
on the scale required if the government's plans for expansion 
were to be met. For this and for other economic, political 
and ideological reasons, the Zambian Government sought 
control of the mining industry, but the take-over arrangements 
it negoitatied did not allow it to achieve many of its basic 
policy aims. This failure was partly due to the timing of 
the government's initiative, which was determined by short-
term poltiical considerations, while weaknesses in the policy-
making process again played a part. 
^^^ Thus when President Kaunda delivered his Matero speech, 
his scathing indictment of Cecil Rhodes' grand imperial 
schemes for Central Africa and his derision of the copper 
companies' new-found concern with royalties brought thunderous 
applause, but had very little to do with the cold realities 
of investment and production. 
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Chapter Five 
NATIONAL versus CORPORATE CONTROL OF MINERAL RESOURCES; 
THE ZAMBIAN COPPER INDUSTRY, 1964-78. 
The redemption of the ZIMCO Bonds. 
The Zambian government quickly came to realise the 
weaknesses of the 1969 Take-over arrangements, and in August 
1973 announced their amendment. The outstanding ZIMCO bonds 
would be redeemed immediately, and the minority shareholders 
would therefore lose their immunity from changes to taxation 
and exchange control legislation. The government took 
advantage of this situation to end the immediate write-off 
of capital expenditure allowed by the 1970 tax laws, and to 
impose a withholding tax of 20 per cent on dividends payable 
to foreign shareholders. 
Redemption of the bonds did not allow the government to 
unilaterally alter the management and other contracts or 
RCM's and NCCM's Articles of Association. Negotiations were 
undertaken with AAC and American Metal Climax (AMAX) (the 
principal minority shareholder in RCM),^ and it was agreed 
that the management, sales and purchasing contracts would 
be terminated. The government would establish a state 
company to market Zambia's copper, while the operating 
companies, RCM and NCCM, would become self-managing. 
However AAC and Af4AX would continue to second senior 
^ RST International merged with AMAX in 1970. 
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technical and managerial personnel and to supply, on 
request, certain services which NCCM and RCM could not 
2 
themselves provide. The Articles of Association of RCM and 
NCCM were amended so as to weaken the powers of the minority 
shareholders. In particular, the requirement for separate 
votes of 'A' and 'B' shareholders and directors on certain 
specified issues was removed. However, it was provided 
that a quorum which would include two 'B' directors would 
have to be present before the Boards of Directors could take 
decisions on a (more limited) range of issues. These 
included the raising of loans and participation in non-mining 
activity, but excluded appropriations for capital or 
exploration expenditure and amendment of the companies' 
Articles of Association.^ Thus AAC and AMAX did not 
entirely lose their power of veto, since the 'B' directors 
could absent themselves and block certain initiatives, but 
its range was narrowed and the ability of the 'A' directors 
to further amend the Articles of Association would make its 
frequent use very unlikely. The 'B' directors also ceded 
the right to choose the Managing Directors of NCCM and RCM 
to the government. 
The financial cost of these changes was high. In 
order to redeem the ZIMCO bonds, the government raised two 
Eurodollar loans totalling US$150 million, at interest rates 4 we 11 above those borne by the ZIMCO bonds. In addition, 
NCCM, Annual Report, 1976 , p. 5. 
^ RCM, Statement to Shareholder's, 31 October 1975 , p. 3-6. 
The loans carry variable rates of interest; in 1974, 
these stood at about 8.5 per cent, but have since increased 
in line with rising international lending rates. 
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it paid K33 million to AAC and K22 million to AMAX in 
compensation for early termination of the various 
contracts. 
Once again, the principal motivation for the 
government's initiative was the search for control. First, 
it was frustrated by the limitations on its power to 
amend taxation and exchange control legislation. The 
immediate write-off of capital expenditure meant that 
effective tax rates were low; for example, RCM paid only 
19 per cent of its profits in taxation in 1972, NCCM 23 per 
cent in 1973,^ as opposed to the nominal rate of 73 per cent, 
Tax liability was of course only being postponed, but the 
prospect of the mining companies paying low rates of tax 
was politically unpalatable, especially since prices and 
profits were on the increase after a number of lean years 
(1970-72).^ In addition, the capital allowances had been 
granted to encourage expansion of copper production, but as 
yet there was little evidence that they were having the 
desired effect.^ (The low tax rates mentioned above 
resulted from write-off of capital expenditure designed to 
maintain production.) The whole question of investment 
policies was in fact still unsettled; in announcing the 
redemption of the ZIMCO bonds, President Kaunda asserted 
that the minority shareholders had used their powers to 
^ RCM, Annual Report, 1972, p.10, NCCM, Annual Report, 
1973, p.14. 
^ In 1972/3, for example, NCCM's tax rate of 24 per cent 
was charged on profits of KlOO million. 
See Table 6. 
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ensure that a high proportion of profits would continue to 
be distributed, and that loans would be used to finance 
g 
what development did occur. 
The government was anxious to amend exchange control 
provisions so it could capture part of the substantial 9 
dividends then flowing to foreign investors. It expected 
to obtain an additional source of revenue by marketing 
Zambia's copper; it now felt competent to perform this 
function,^^ and saw no reason why marketing fees (which 
amounted to about K4.5 million in 1972/3)^^ should accrue 
to AAC and AMAX. 
The government was also concerned with a number of 
non-financial matters. It had envisaged in 1970 that the 
management companies would gradually transfer managerial 
functions to RCM and NCCM, but this had not occurred to any 
great extent. In addition, it felt that the management 
companies had failed to amend their purchasing policies so 
as to reduce imports from South Africa. Finally, it was 12 concerned with the slow pace of Zambianisation. 
Republic of Zambia, Address by His Excellency, 
Br K. D. Kaunda, at the Press Conference on the Redemption 
of the ZIMCO Bonds, SI August 1973. 
^ Over the period 1971-73, foreign shareholders received 
a total of K96 million in dividends. RCM and NCCM, Annual 
Reports, 1971-3. 
^^ Interview with Department of Finance Official, Lusaka, 
1 August 1978. 
^^ This figure equals .75 per cent of the gross value of 
metal sales by RCM and NCCM. 
^^ Interview with Department of Finance Official, Lusaka, 
1 August 1978. 
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This discussion raises once again the question of 
whether Zambia's interests were in fact in conflict with 
those of the foreign shareholders. In the following 
sections, the economic impact of copper mining is analysed, 
and this analysis should provide some relevant empirical 
evidence. 
Generation of government revenue. 
As Table 8 illustrates, copper mining is an extremely 
important, though unstable, source of government revenue, 
accounting for 46 per cent of total revenue over the years 
1964-75. This figure does not fully reflect the copper 
industry's significance, since it excludes employee and 
indirect taxation^^ and revenue generated by ancillary and 
service industries dependent on copper mining. 
Principally because of price fluctuations, copper 
revenues are extremely unstable, even over short time 
periods. For example, revenue was K57 million in 1964 and 
K163 million in 1966, K251 million in 1970 and K56 million 
in 1972. This instability causes serious economic problems. 
Since revenue fluctuations are unpredictable, government 
14 cannot plan appropriate levels of expenditure in advance. 
Information is not available regarding these items, 
but they are probably substantial. In 1973, for example,_ 
employee taxation amounted to K44 million and customs duties 
to K38 million, and mining activity certainly accounted for 
a significant proportion of both. 
^^ Zambia's Financial Reports show that huge discrepancies 
frequently exist between budget estimates of mineral revenues, 
compiled early in the financial year, and revenue actually 
received in the same year. See, for example. Financial Report, 
1971, Schedule B, and 1974, Schedule B. 
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Table 8 
1964-1978 (K million) 
Year Copper Revenue (A) Total Revenue (B) (A) as 
of (B) 
1964 57 108 53 
1965 134 189 71 
1966 163 255 64 
1967 146 276 53 
1968 183 306 60 
1969 237 401 59 
1970 251 435 58 
1971 114 316 36 
1972 56 302 19 
1973 108 385 29 
1974 341 647 53 
1975 59 448 13 
1976 12 443 3 
1977 - 498 -
1978 - 533 — 
Totals 1,861 5 ,542 34 
Source: Zambia Mining Industry Year Bookj various issues. 
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And once a particular level of expenditure has been planned, 
raajor difficulties arise in adjusting it dov/nwards ov 
upwards to take account of the revenue which actually 
materialises. It is difficult to adjust capital spending 
upwards quickly, since long lead times usually occur 
between planning and implementation of capital projects; 
a similar difficulty arises with certain categories of current 
expenditure, because many sectors of Zambia's economy are 
characterised by bottlenecks in supply and inelasticities 
in demand.^^ On the other hand, hastily implemented cuts 
in capital expenditure may be wasteful, since resources 
already committed to uncompleted projects may be lost; cuts 
in current expenditure may be politically hazardous, 
particularly if they affect v;ages, food subsidies, or social 
services. 
As a result of this situation, the government 
must often accumulate cash reserves in times of high prices, 
and resort to deficit financing when revenues contract. If 
prices are depressed for an extended period of time, deficit 
financing imposes an unacceptable burden, and expenditure 
must be cut. Thus by 1977, for example, outstanding public 
debts had reached K9 50 million, with annual repayments 
estimated at K88 million and interest at K49 million,^^ 
together equal to 28 per cent of total recurrent revenue in 
that year. The government was compelled to reduce current 
^^ See C. Elliott, op.cit. 
Derived from Mining Journal, 24 February 1978. A 
conversion rate of 1 Kina = £0.69 sterling was used in 
calculating these figures. 
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and capital expenditure,^^ and in an economy where 
maintenance of employment and investment levels depends 
heavily on government expenditure, such action clearly has 
serious consequences. 
In the longer term, perhaps the most serious effect of 
revenue fluctuations may be to undermine the attempt to 
deal with the underlying problem, Zambia's dependence on 
copper mining. That attempt must include steadily-expanding 
investment in agriculture and industry, but revenue 
fluctuations make it extremely difficult to sustain such 
investment. 
Have foreign mining companies removed profits from 
Zambian jurisdiction, depriving the government of revenue? 
Since Zambia's copper is sold to independent fabricators, 
what is involved is the possibility that subsidiaries of 
AAC and/or RST (AMAX after 1970) operating outside Zambia 
over-charged the Zambian companies for mining equipment or 
other supplies. Lack of empirical data makes it difficult 
to deal with this issue, but one general point should be 
made. Both mining groups would have to be involved if 
over-charging was to escape detection; otherwise a simple 
comparison of invoices would reveal what was happening. As 
far as could be established, AAC alone has major shareholdings 
18 
in non-Zambian companies which produce inputs for mining. 
^^ The 197 8 Budget provided for a decline in money terms 
of 4 per cent in current expenditure and of 14 per cent in 
capital expenditure. 
^^ At least two of AAC's wholly-owned subsidiaries 
manufacture mining equipment and supplies; AI>1AX does not 
appear to hold interests in any companies which do so. Anglo 
American Corporation of South Africa Limited, Annual Report^, 
1976, p.82-3; Mining Journal Limited, Mining Annual Review 
1979, p.17-19, ('AMAX'). 
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and there seems no reason why the RST group mines (or RCM 
after 197 0) would transfer profits to AAC. 
Thus while the opportunity for transfer pricing 
existed in theory, it seems unlikely that it occurred. 
Generation of employment and wage payments. 
Table 9 gives details of Zaitibian and expatriate 
employment in the copper industry over the period 1952-78. 
Mining employment is of considerable importance in national 
terms, accounting for 15 per cent of those in paid employment 
in 1975. Information regarding indirect employment is 
lacking, but the number employed in ancillary and service 
industries must be considerable. 
A number of points emerge from the data in Table 9. 
Expatriate employment fell by 35 per cent in the four years 
after Independence, reflecting the rapid Zambianisation of 
semi-skilled and lower supervisory positions. It changed 
little over the period 1968-73, because Zambianisation 
proceeded much more slowly at higher skill levels. 
Thereafter, it fell substantially, by 30 per cent over the 
period 1973-8. This decline was not entirely due to 
Zambianisation; the mining companies were unable to find 
replacements for some of the expatriates who departed.^^ 
Shortage of skilled expatriate staff has important consequences 
for the efficiency of mining operations, both immediately 
For example, there was a net loss of 3 2 expatriate 
metallurgical engineers over the period 1973-7, while 
only 10 Zambians were available to replace them. 
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Table 9 
Employment in the Copper Industry-
Selected Years 1952-1970 and 1970-1978 
Year Expatriate African Total 
1952 5,504 36,668 42,172 
1956 7,067 37,533 44,600 
1960 7,528 36,806 44,334 
1964 7,455 38,097 45,552 
1968 4,845 43,198 48,043 
1970 4,375 44,094 48,469 
1971 4,751 44,997 49,748 
1972 4,600 46,245 50,845 
1973 4,505 48,287 52,792 
1974 4,392 51,736 56,128 
1975 4,495 52,992 57,487 
1976 4,060 53,082 57,142 
1977 3,609 55,446 59,055 
1978 3,245 53,437 56,682 
Sources: Commission of Inquiry, 19 66, Appendix XVI; 
Zambia Mining Year Book, various issues. 
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and in the longer term. It has contributed to the 
difficulties encountered in maintaining copper production 
20 
in recent years, and its impact is likely to increase 
as time goes on (see p.272 below). 
Various factors account for the high turnover among 
expatriates^^ and the inability of the companies to find 
replacements. Particularly important is the lack of security 
offered by fixed-term contract employment; other factors 
are the politically unstable situation in Southern Africa, 
shortages of foodstuffs and other items in Zambia, urban 
violence, and delays in obtaining clearance for repatriation 
22 
of savings and severance payments. 
Table 9 also shows that Zambian employment grew by 
11,300 between 1970 and 1977. The reasons for this increase 
are not immediately apparent. Zambianisation had some 
impact, but over the period 1973-7, for example, Zambian 
employment in those job categories subject to Zambianisation 
increased by only 1,376,^^ while total Zambian employment 
grew by 7,159. Production did not increase over the period 
1970-7 (see Table 6), while development work was at a 24 substantially lower level in 1977 than in 1970. 
As Table 6 indicates, copper production fell substantially 
between 197 3 and 1978. 
^^ In 1978, turnover among expatriates was 35 per cent. 
Zambia Mining Year Book, 1978, p.32. 
^^ These were among reasons cited by expatriate staff 
interviewed at RCM's Mulfulira Division and NCCM's Chingola 
and Centralised Services Divisions, July-August 1978. 
^^ Derived from information supplied by MIMSU. 
^^ Shaft-sinking, development of main drives and cross cuts, 
and stope preparation were all at a lower level in 1977 than 
in 1970. Zambia Mining Year Book, 1973, p.21; 1978, p.30. 
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Only two explanations for the increase in Zambian 
employment present themselves. A deliberate policy of 
increasing such employment may have been pursued in the wake 
of the 19 69 Take-over, either by adopting more labour-
intensive mining techniques or simply by 'feather-bedding'. 
25 
Government officials deny that this has occurred, but 
the only alternative explanation is that productivity has 
fallen, requiring expansion of the workforce to maintain 
production. Productivity would have to decline very 
substantially to necessitate such a large increase in 
employment, and there is no conclusive evidence that this 
has occurred.^^ 
Generation of employment on the Copperbelt has carried 
an opportunity cost in that labour has been withdrawn from 
subsistence farming, and in areas close to the mines 27 
agricultural activity has suffered severely. Those who 
migrated to the Copperbelt were of course given an opportunity. 
to substantially increase their incomes. 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, employment policies 
were identified as another area in which corporate and 
national interests might clash. Zambia's mining industry 
could not have competed on the world market had it not been 
based on large-scale productive units using substantial 
^^ Interview with Department of Finance Official, Lusaka, 
21 July 1978. 
^^ The industry has certainly encountered difficulties in 
maintaining production, despite substantial capital investment, 
but this has been due largely to shortages of goods and 
services and of skilled labour, and in most cases unskilled 
or semi-skilled labour could not be substituted for the missing 
factors. 
See below p. 249. 
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amounts of capital and applying a high level of 
2 8 
technological expertise, and this placed a major 
constraint on the industry's potential for creating 2 9 
employment. Nevertheless, as R. E. Baldwin has demonstrated, 
significant changes have occurred in the precise nature of 
mining methods in line with shifts in the relative costs 
of semi-skilled labour, skilled labour, and capital, and 
these changes have exercised a significant impact on total 
employment. In the 1930s, for example, African semi-skilled 
labour was cheap in comparison to machinery and the skilled 
expatriate labour needed to operate and maintain it, and 
the mining companies adopted labour-intensive mining 
m e t h o d s . I n the late 1940s and the early 1950s, average 
African wages more than doubled, with the result that the 
cost of semi-skilled labour grew much more quickly than that 
of skilled labour and equipment.^^ The companies responded 
by initiating a far-reaching mechanisation programme which 
allowed them to double production over the period 19 52-60 
without increasing their use of African (that is semi-
skilled) labour (see Tables 6 and 9). 
Were corporate employment policies in conflict with 
national interests? From the point of view of Zambia's 
2 8 
For example, small scale productive units of the type 
operated by Africans in the pre-colonial period could not 
have competed with the giant open-pit mines of North America 
and Chile. 
29 
R. E. Baldwin, op.cit.. Chapter 4. 
ibid, p. 89-92. 
^^ Between 1949 and 1958, African earnings rose by 284 per 
cent, European earnings by 61 per cent; equipment costs 
increased by 100 per cent between 1947 and 1958. R.E.Baldwin, 
op.cit., p.96. 
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resource endowment, it might have been appropriate to 
maximise use of relatively plentiful semi-skilled labour 
and minimise use of scarce capital and skilled labour. 
However, this would not be so if additional government 
revenue could be generated by pursuing profit-maximising 
factor conibinations and that revenue expended so as to create 
more employment than would result from pursuit of the 
(limited) opportunities for substitution of labour for 
capital in the mines. A judgement on the issue depends, 
therefore, on whether the mining industry was expected to 
contribute towards economic development by maximising direct 
employment or by providing revenues to fund government 
expenditures. As mentioned above, the Zambian government 
failed to come to grips with this issue, and it is therefore 
impossible to decide whether a conflict of interest existed. 
Table 10 gives details of wage and salary payments in 
selected years over the period 1952-77. Table 11 compares 
average expatriate with average African incomes in the same 
years, and illustrates the huge income differentials which 
existed in the early and mid 19 50s. These gradually narrowed 
as a result of pay increases won by African mineworkers and 
of the large-scale promotion of Zambians to more skilled 
positions after Independence. However, by 1977 the 
differential was still very large (8:1 in favour of 
32 expatriates). 
The ratio had earlier fallen to 6:1. Two factors 
account for its subsequent increase. Additional incentives 
had to be offered to attract expatriates in 197 5, and there 
was a large increase in the lower-skilled (and so lower-paid) 
element of the Zambian workforce in 1976/7. 
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Table 10 
Wage and Salary Payments by the Copper Mining Companies/ 
Selected Years 1952-1973 and 1973-1977 (K'OOOs)* 
Year Expatriates Africans Total 
1952 16,512 6,307 22,819 
1956 32,438 12,461 44,899 
1960 32,521 18,992 51,513 
1965 42,176 28,344 70,520 
1968 36,822 56,157 92,979 
1973 45,460 81,075 126,535 
1974 51,533 93,309 144,842 
1975 52,970 95,404 148,374 
1976 54,409 112,412 166,821 
1977 61,866 125,823 187,689 
Source: Derived from R. E. Baldwin, op.cit.. Table 4.4, 
p.90, and Commission of Inquiry, 1966, Appendix XVI; 
information supplied by MIMSU. 
Note: * Figures for years prior to 1968 have been 
converted to Kwacha at the rate of £ sterling = 2 Kwacha 
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Table 11 
Average Expatriate and African Incomes on the Copper Mines, 
Selected Years, 1952-1973 and 1973-1977 (Kwacha) 
Year Average Expatriate Average African Ratio of 
(A) to (B) 
1952 3,000 172 17 : 1 
1956 4,590 332 14 : 1 
1960 4,320 516 8 : 1 
1965 5,871 716 8 : 1 
1968 6,847 1,300 5 : 1 
1973 10,091 1,679 6 : 1 
1974 11,773 1,804 7 : 1 
1975 11,784 1,803 7 : 1 
1976 13,401 2,117 6 : 1 
1977 17,142 2,269 8 : 1 
Source: Tables 21 and 22 
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Creation of additional economic activity through 
linkage development. 
Forward linkage: Almost all of Zambia's copper 
production is integrated to the refining stage. Copper 
fabricating industries have not been established, with the 
exception of a small plant which produces copper wire and 
cable for the domestic market and absorbs less than 0.5 per 
33 
cent of total copper output. 
Copper fabrication could create important benefits for 
Zambia, particularly by generating additional employment and 34 
higher and more stable foreign exchange receipts. 
However, economic constraints severely limit Zambia's 
potential in this regard, the most significant of which 
arise from Zambia's distance from the principal consuming 
areas, Europe, Japan and North America. Transport costs for 
fabricated goods would be considerably higher than for 
unwrought copper, because they require greater care in ^^ 
handling and packaging and incur higher insurance charges. 
Even more important, the success of fabricating enterprises 
depends on their ability to provide quick delivery and 36 
continuity of supply over a wide range of products and 
Zambia's geographical position would place local fabricators 
at a severe disadvantage in this regard. Other factors 
^^ This plant is jointly owned by the Zambian Government and 
a consortium of private companies which includes NCCM and 
RCM. 
Prices for fabricated copper products fluctuate much 
less severely than those for copper metal. 
^^ R. Prain, Copper: The Anatomy of an Industry, (Mining 
Journal Books, London, 1975), p.124. 
^^ ibid, p. 124-5. 
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militating against local fabrication are the tariffs which 
37 developed countries impose on fabricated imports, and 
the high degree of skilled labour involved in what are 
38 
frequently technologically-complex processes. 
During the mid-19 60s, the Zambian government was anxious 
to establish a plant which would supply copper wire and 
cable and semi-manufactured products to the domestic and 
East African markets. AAC and RST (especially the latter) 39 were reluctant to become involved in any such venture. To 
the Zambians, this was further evidence of the mining 
40 
companies' unwillingness to reinvest their profits. AAC 
and RST were reluctant to undertake any new commitment for 
the time being, but in the case of copper fabrication this 
general disinclination was heightened by the existence of the 41 
obstacles discussed above. 
The government decided to proceed alone, and 
commissioned an independent feasibility study; later a 
consortium was formed, headed by a major U.S. copper 
producer and fabricator, Phelps Dodge, to examine the project. 
Faced with the prospect that potentially rival companies 
Unwrought copper, on the other hand, is usually exempt 
from duty. For a discussion of this point, see A. Young, 
Industrial Vivevsifioation in Zambia, (Praeger, New York, 
1973), p.174-5. 
^^ For an account of some of these processes, see R. Prain, 
op.cit. , p. 115-7. 
^^ Unlike AAC, RST was very much a specialised mining 
concern, which explains its greater reluctance to become 
involved in a manufacturing project. 
R. Sklar, op.cit., p. 93-4. 
See, for example, R. Prain, 'Prospects for Fabricating 
Copper in East and Central Africa', Selected Papers, 4, 
p.39-49, (The RST Group, London, 1968). 
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might establish a fabricating plant in Zambia, AAC and 
RST modified their attitudes and joined in establishing the 
copper wire and cable plant mentioned above. It was 
decided not to produce semi-manufactured products, but it is 
not known whether this was because the government accepted 
that such activity would be uneconomic or because the 
consortium was unwilling to undertake it. The government 
certainly now recognises the strength of the economic 
constraints in this area. It has not attempted to expand 
local fabrication since the Take-over, and has sanctioned 
NCCM's decision to invest in copper fabricating facilities 
• T:, 42 in France. 
Backward linkages: Prior to 1964, the mining industry's 
domestic expenditures were dominated by payments for 
43 
electricity, transport services and construction= Few 
manufactured inputs were produced locally, reflecting the 
competitive advantage derived by Rhodesian and South African 
producers from economies of scale associated with the larger 44 
size of their domestic markets and, after 19 53, the 
discriminatory policies of the Federal Government in 
Salisbury. After Independence the Zambian government 
offered protection and encouragement to new manufacturing 
NCCM is engaged in a joint venture with a French 
company to establish a continuous casting plant which will 
process Zambian copper. 
^^ In 19 56/7, they accounted for over 80 per cent of 
domestic expenditures. See R. E. Baldwin, op.cit.. Table 
2.4, p.38. 
^^ This competitive advantage usually outweighed transport 
costs to Zambia. 
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concerns supplying mining inputs. Items now produced 
locally include chemicals, basic metal products, machinery, 
explosives, copper wire and cable, and sulphuric acid. 
Some of these industries have not achieved minimum 
45 
economies of scale, with the result that the mining 
companies frequently pay well in excess of import parity 
prices for the goods involved. This raises once again the 
question of precisely what role the copper industry is 
expected to play in Zambia's economy. In effect, a portion 
of its sales receipts is being used to subsidise inefficient 
industries, at the expense of profits and so government 
revenue. That revenue might make a greater contribution to 
economic development if it were collected and directed into 
other sectors of the economy. On the other hand, some of 
the industries involved may create external economies which 
makes the support they receive worthwhile. Obviously a 
carefully selective approach is required, but there is little 
evidence that such an approach was applied in the years 46 after Independence. 
With only one exception conflicts of interests have 
apparently not arisen between the mining companies and the 
47 
government regarding use of domestic inputs. The 
exception concerned the substitution of domestic coal for 
^^ For example, the plant at Kafue which produces ammonium 
nitrate for use in making explosives has an annual output 
of about 26,000 tons, whereas annual production of about 
50,000 tons is required to achieve minimum economies of 
scale. B. De Gaay Fortman, 'Zambia's Markets: Problems 
and Opportunities', in C. Elliott, op.cit., p.217. 
^^ ibid, p. 217-8. 
^^ Conflicts have occurred regarding the origin of those 
inputs which continue to be imported. 
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imported material in 1965/6. Zambian coal cost 
substantially more than imports from the Wankie colliery 
in Rhodesia, because the Zambian deposits were undeveloped 
and because the coal was of inferior quality and thus 
less energy-efficient and harsher on smelting and other 
equipment. AAC and RST were consequently reluctant to use 
domestic material; AAC had an additional interest in 
importing coal since it owned the Wankie colliery. 
However, both responded immediately to Zambian Government 
directives to reduce imports, and assisted in the 
48 
development of domestic coal reserves. 
Economic constraints impose major limitations on Zambia's 
capacity to develop forward and backward linkages. However, 
considerable progress has been made in those areas where 
opportunities have been available. In pursuing these 
opportunities, the Zambian Government found its interests 
in conflict with those of the mining companies on two 
occasions, but on both it was able to achieve its 
objectives, in one case by involving other corporate 
interests, in the second by exercising its governmental 
powers in a routine manner. 
Net foreign exchange inflow. 
Copper exports provide about 95 per cent of Zambia's 
export revenue, but as Table 12 illustrates they represent 
a very unstable source of foreign exchange. Prolonged 
periods of low copper prices cause serious foreign currency 
shortages, restricting the availability of essential imports 
48 R. Sklar, op.cit., p.145. 
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Table 12 
Copper Exports and Total Exports by Value, 
1964-1978 (K million) 
Year Copper Exports* Total Exports Copper as 
% of total 
1964 302 327 92 
1965 348 375 93 
1966 466 490 95 
1967 440 467 94 
1968 519 538 96 
1969 729 752 97 
1970 687 710 97 
1971 454 480 95 
1972 499 536 93 
1973 703 738 95 
1974 847 900 94 
1975 479 518 93 
1976 705 749 94 
1977 661 706 94 
1978 608 649 94 
Source: Zambia Mining Year Book, various issues. 
Note * Includes exports of cobalt which is mined as a 
by-product of copper 
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of goods and services. This problem became so acute during 
19 77 that in some cases allocations of foreign exchange to 
49 
importers were reduced to 10 - 25 per cent of normal, 
and severe shortages of many imports resulted. 
Due to lack of relevant statistical data, it is not 
possible to calculate the net foreign exchange inflow 
generated by Zambia's copper industry on a basis similar to 
that applied in the previous case study.^^ However, it is 
possible to estimate the net effect of NCCM's exports on 
current account for a year of high prices (1973/4) and one 
of low prices (1975/6). 
In 1973/4, NCCM's exports were valued at K555 million.^^ 
Non-wage production costs and capital expenditure totalled 
52 
K241 million, of which NCCM's Chief Economist estimates 
that 50 per cent or K120.5 million were expended abroad.^^ 
The import content of domestic purchases by the mining 54 
companies has been estimated at 28 per cent, indicating 
induced imports by NCCM of K33.5 million. Dividend payments 
to foreign shareholders were K32.8 million,^^ while expatriate 
49 Mining Journal, 4 November 1977. 
^^ For example figures for items such as interest payments 
and capital imports are not available for certain periods. 
^^ These included exports of lead and zinc valued at 
K28 million. 
^^ Derived from NCCM, Annual Report, 1974, p.14 and 
information supplied by MIMSU. 
^^ Interview, Lusaka, 31 July 1978. 
^^ Derived from N. Kessel, 'Mining and the Factors 
Constraining Economic Development', in C. Elliott, op.cit., 
p.261. 
^^ Derived from NCCM, Annual Report, 1975, p.17. 
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remittances are estimated at K8.8 million. Interest 
payments abroad were K2 million. Thus it is estimated 
that foreign exchange outflows totalled about K19 8 million, 
implying a net positive effect of K357 million, equal to 
64 per cent of export receipts. Government revenue 
5 8 
accounted for K19 8 million or 56 per cent of this sum; 
wages and salaries (20 per cent) and domestic purchases of 
goods and services (24 per cent) accounted for the 
remainder.^^ 
In 1975/6 NCCM's exports were K327 million, and total 
foreign exchange outflows are estimated at K202.7 million, 
implying a net foreign exchange inflow equal to only 38 per 
cent of export receipts. No government revenue was 
generated in 1975/6. 
The difference between the net foreign exchange inflow 
estimates for the two years (64 versus 38 per cent) raises 
an important point. VJhen copper prices fall, not only do export 
receipts decline, but the proportion of those receipts 
accruing as net foreign exchange inflow also falls. This is 
It has been estimated that expatriate employees remit 
30 per cent of their incomes. Derived from S. Goodman, 'The 
Foreign Exchange Constraint', in C. Elliott, op.cit., p.235, 
n. 4 . 
Total interest payments were K4 million, while about half 
of NCCM's loans were raised abroad. Interest_rates on 
foreign and domestic loans are apparently similar. 
^^ Taxation was K164 million and the Government's share of 
dividends K34 million. NCCM, Annual Report, 1974, p.14, 17. 
^^ Derived from NCCM, Annual Report, 1974, and information 
supplied by MIMSU. 
These figures were calculated on the same basis as those 
for 1973/4, from data contained in NCCM's 1976 Annual Report 
and information supplied by MIMSU. 
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because government revenue (which is itself sensitive to 
declining prices) accounts for such a high proportion of the 
net inflow, and it partly explains the severity with which 
declining copper prices affect Zambia's capacity to import 
goods and services. 
Provision of scarce capital resources. 
Foreign equity capital played an indispensable role in 
the initial development of Zambia's copper mines, as 
investment on the scale required could not have been 
generated internally. Once mining operations were well 
established, equity investment became less important, as the 
bulk, of capital expenditure could be financed from retained 
profits.^^ Foreign capital still plays a major role in 
Zambia's mining industry, though the type of investment 
involved has changed. Since 1970 there has been a very 
large increase in the use of loan capital, a form of finance 
almost unknown in the industry until 1968/9, when the AAC 
group mines raised two major loans from Japanese companies. 
Table 13 gives a breakdown of RCM's and NCCM's capital 
expenditures for the period 1971-7, according to the manner 
in which they were financed (loans versus reinvested profits) 
This shov/s that 53 per cent of RCIl's expenditures and 38 per 
cent of IICCM's were financed by loan capital. A substantial 
proportion of this capital has come from outside Zambia: in 
^^ For instance the RST group mines reinvested K53 million 
from profits over the period 1959-68, while new equity 
investment was insignificant. Roan Selection Trust Limited, 
Annual Report, 1968, p. 18-19. 
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Table 13 
Funding of Capital Expenditure in the Copper Industry 
1971-1977 (K million) 
Year Capital 
Expenditure 
Appropriated 
from profits 
Amount % 
Loan finance 
Amount 
NCCM 
1971* 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
43 
42 
59 
69 
59 
39 
16 
43 
30 
39 
46 
40 
5 
100 
71 
66 
67 
68 
13 
12 
20 
23 
19 
34 
16 
29 
34 
33 
32 
87 
100 
Total 327 203 62 124 38 
RCM 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Total 
28 
34 
28 
27 
37 
34 
56 
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28 
12 
11 
20 
24 
20 
115 
100 
35 
39 
74 
65 
36 
47 
22 
17 
7 
13 
34 
36 
129 
65 
61 
26 
35 
100 
64 
53 
Source: NCCM, Annual Reports, 
1971-7. 
1971-7; ROA,Annual Reports, 
Note: 
Includes expenditures made in 1970. 
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1977 , 60 per cent of RCM's outstanding loans and 7 6 per cent 
6 2 
of NCCM's had been raised abroad. These figures under-
estimate the role of foreign capital, as some 'local' loans 
are refinanced with foreign banks.^^ 
No foreign equity has been invested in mineral 
development (other than in exploration) since 1969. The 
minority shareholders in RCM and NCCM have refused to 64 
participate in new share issues, while no other concerns 
have undertaken major projects. This picture may change if 
Zambia's uranium prospects are exploited, and it will almost 
certainly have to change if major base metal deposits are to 
be developed. Ibr example, current estimates indicate that 
it would cost about US$1 billion to develop the massive 
low-grade copper deposit at Lumwana.^^ Loan finance for such 
a project would be difficult to find unless substantial 
equity investment was forthcoming. It is doubtful whether 
Zambia could supply that investment from internal sources 
without depriving other sectors of much-needed capital 
expenditure; the mining industry already absorbs about 20 
per cent of total public and private capital investment-^^ 
^^ Derived from NCCM, Annual Report, 1977, p.24, and RCM, 
Annual Report, 1977, p.19-20. 
^^ Interview with NCCM's Chief Economist, Lusaka, 
31 July 1978. 
^^ NCCM, Circular to Members and Notice of Extraordinary 
General Meeting, 19 September 1978, p.3. 
^^ Interview with MINDECO's Consulting Engineer, Lusaka, 
17 July 1978. 
^^ This figure applies to the period 1971-6. Derived 
from Table 13 and Republic of Zambia, Economic Report, 1976, 
Table 6, p.27. 
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Thus foreign equity investment may again come to play 
an important part in the development of Zambia's minerals. 
The method in which capital investment was being 
financed over the period 19 71-3 was one reason given by 
the Zambian government for its redemption of the ZIMCO 
bonds. However, increased use of loan capital was not in 
itself the problem. When negotiating the Take-over terms, 
the government had placed considerable value on the fact 
that the mining companies carried little or no debt burden 
and could therefore raise substantial loans to fund 
development programmes.^^ Raising of loans required the 
approval of 'A' directors, and the government could have 
prevented use of loan capital if it had so desired. The 
real problem was that a higher share of profits was not 
being reinvested in addition to the loans. As mentioned 
above, the minority shareholders succeeded in keeping 
reinvestment rates at a low level after 19 70,^^ and their 
interests were clearly in conflict with the government's in 
this instance. 
Provision of technical and other skills. 
Until the early 1950s, the mining companies obtained 
their skilled personnel almost entirely by recruiting qualified 
expatriates and training (exclusively white) apprentices; 
Africans were taught only the most basic industrial skills. 
^^ A. Martin, op.cit., p.173 
^^ See pp. 197-3. 
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This reluctance to train African employees initially 
reflected their low educational qualifications and high 
turnover rates. The first meant that training would be 
costly, the second that the mining companies would receive 
little in return for the expense. By the mid-1940s both 
factors were of less relevance - turnover had declined 
substantially, and as a result many Africans had gained a 
measure of practical education through work experience. The 
companies were now anxious to train Africans to replace 
expensive expatriate workers, but the opposition of the 
European union effectively precluded on-the-job training, 
while Northern Rhodesia's schools failed to produce suitable 
Zambian candidates for formal advanced education. 
By the early 1960s both of these obstacles had been 
removed, though the legacy of colonial educational policies 
would take many years to overcome. The mining companies 
initiated a broad training programme, eventually operating 
at three levels.^^ The first was designed to equip Zambians 
for semi-skilled and lower supervisory positions 
predominantly by on-the-job training, the second to produce 
Zambian artisans and technicians by a mixture of formal trade 
school education and on-the-job training, the third to help 
develop a supply of technical and professional graduates, 
principally through a programme of scholarships and 
sponsorships. 
^^ These training programmes were not established 
simultaneously, and in fact training of semi-skilled workers 
was essentially complete before third-level educational 
programmes were established. 
242 
Progress on the first level was rapid, and by 1968 
the programme was essentially complete Two major 
problems have arisen regarding the second, both involving 
the role of expatriates in on-the-job training. First, 
expatriate skilled labour has been in short supply for much 
of the period since 1964; the available staff have been 
fully occupied in maintaining copper production, and have had 
little time to assist apprentices assigned to them. 
Secondly, expatriate workers are aware that they are 'training 
themselves out of a job', and some are reluctant to pass on 
their skills, particularly if their own job mobility is 
71 
limited. The outcome is that newly-qualified Zambian staff 
assigned to the operating divisions are frequently unable to 
7 2 
deal with practical work situations, and have either to be 
returned for further training or left to acquire skills on 
a trial-and-error basis. The first must cause frustration 
and resentment, the second inefficiency and, where 
underground work is involved, danger. 
Training of technical and professional graduates has 
progressed very slowly, for two main reasons. First, it 
was some time before appropriate educational institutions 
^^ Training of new recruits continued, of course, and 
existing workers received additional training to familiarise 
them with new techniques or to qualify them for promotion. 
This applies particularly to long-time residents of 
Zambia, who do not wish to live elsewhere, and to those 
nearing the end of their working lives. 
^^ Interview with Mill Superintendent, Mufulira Mine, 
Mufulira, 26 July 1978. 
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7 3 
were established. Second, there has been a shortage 
of suitable candidates for appropriate degree courses. 
The mining industry's main requirements are in the 
engineering and related fields, and third level 
institutions consequently need a high intake of school 
leavers with backgrounds in mathematics and science. 
Unfortunately, it is precisely in this area that school 
output is weakest; in 1975, for example, only 30 '0' level 
candidates examined in mathematics, physics and chemistry 
received the grades required for admission to university 7 4 
level in each subject. 
As a result of these factors, the number of Zambian 
graduates employed in the mining industry has remained very 
low: in 1978 only 92 were working in mining/geology, 
Until 1970 , when a Department of Technical Education 
and Vocational Training was set up, technical and vocational 
training was carried on by a multiplicity of poorly 
co-ordinated agencies, with the result that overlaps occurred 
in some areas and deficiencies in others. A university was 
not established until 1967, and it was 1973 before the 
University of Zambia (UNZA) created a School of Mines which, 
in combination with its School of Engineering, could offer 
a complete range of courses corresponding to the mining 
industry's requirements. 
^ MIMSU, From African Advancement to Zambianisation in 
the Mining Industry: -Policies, Programmes, and Progress, 
Mimeo, 1 June 1978 , p. 6. The paucity of adequately-qualified 
candidates is illustrated by the fact that many of those 
admitted to UNZA on mining industry scholarships fail to 
reach the requisite standard in the first year examinations 
which determine their eligibility for the Schools of Mines 
or Engineering. They must pursue teaching degrees in 
Science or Arts, and consequently the mining industry's funds 
are used to produce graduates for which it has little or 
no use; in June 19 78, for example, mining industry awards 
supported 138 students attending the Schools of Mines and 
Engineering and 72 pursuing education degrees. MIMSU, 
Monthly Statistical Report, June 1978, Table A9.1. 
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metallurgy/chemistry and engineering.^^ This picture will 
improve as additional students graduate from UNZA, but the 
mining industry estimates that there will be a shortfall of 
954 in its requirement for technical graduates in 1982, 
assuming no wastage in training or in e m p l o y m e n t . I f 
graduate output remains at the 1980 level, it will be nearly 
20 years before this shortfall is met, again assuming no 
wastage. 
The basic difficulty in increasing graduate output 
arises from the perceptions of Zambian students as to the 
options and opportunities open to them. Since Independence, 
the government has been Zambianising the large number of 
civil service positions formerly held by expatriates. 
Students who graduate from three or four year courses in 
commerce or public administration, for example, are therefore 
assured of immediate employment. A student pursuing a 
technical career on th.e mines, on the other hand, must 
complete a five year degree course, and then obtain up to 
three years' practical experience before beginning work in 
7 8 
his professional capacity. Even at this stage, his income 
will not be substantially greater than that of a contemporary 
MIMSU, From African Advancement to Zambianisation. . . , p.11, 
ibid, p.14. 
In 1980 , about 55 students on mining industry awards 
will receive degrees from UNZA in Natural Sciences, Engineering 
and Mines. MIMSU, Monthly Statistical Report, June 1978, 
Table A9.1. 
A graduate mining engineer, for example, will spend about 
three years gaining practical experience before being 
appointed a mine captain. 
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who joined the civil service. V'Jhile this situation exists, 
students will have little incentive to pursue science 
subjects at school or at university, and until it changes 
the mining industry will not receive the supply of graduates 
79 
it requires. 
Training in the mining industry is now the 
responsibility of the Zambian government, but the foreign 
investors (especially AAC) still play a crucial role in the 
provision of skills at the highest technical and professional 
level. Staff with the ability and experience to fill 
positions at this level are in short supply (both in 
Central and Southern Africa and world-wide), and many would 
not choose to work in Zambia without the security of employment 
and opportunities for advancement which they derive from 
being attached to a major international mining concern. 
Thus a number of AAC' s senior staff in Zcimbia refused to 8 0 
transfer to NCCM, and are now seconded to NCCM by AAC. 
Many of RCM's staff do not have this option, because 
its major foreign shareholder, AMAX, is not as closely 
involved in the Zambian mining industry as AAC. RCM has 
consequently found it more difficult than NCCM to attract 81 and retain high-calibre recruits. 
^^ Student attitudes may not be the only factor involved 
— the primary school system may fail to prepare students for 
science subjects, secondary schools may not provide adequate 
facilities for teaching those subjects. However, until 
student attitudes change any such deficiencies are unlikely 
to be remedied and, even if they were, a solution to the 
problem would still require a change in attitudes. 
These included NCCM's current Chief Economist,its 
Technical Director, and a number of senior consulting 
engineers. Interview with Director, Anglo American Central 
Africa Limited, Lusaka, 1 August 197 8. 
Interview with MINDECO's Consulting Engineer, Lusaka, 
17 July 1978. 
246 
The Zambian government has cited the slow pace of 
Zambianisation as one reason for seeking increased control 
8 2 
over the copper industry. However, it is not simply a 
question of the government being wholly committed to rapid 
Zambianisation and the companies or later the minority 
shareholders being against it. 
In general terms, both parties have feared that rapid 
Zambianisation would reduce efficiency and so profitability. 
Emphasis has been placed on 'proper and efficient' 
Zambianisation, not just by company officials, but also by 83 
the Department of Mines, and this may have led to over-
caution in some cases. On the other hand, both parties have 
had a strong financial incentive to replace expatriate staff 
who inflate wage bills and so reduce profits. 
In more specific terms, the principal constraint on 
Zambianisation at the technical and professional level has 
arisen from the nature of the educational system, and what 
has been most lacking in this area is a government initiative 
to expand the supply of suitably-qualified candidates. The 
government's desire to obtain high school and university 
graduates to fill administrative positions has probably 
contributed to the development of an educational system with 
a low output of science-oriented students, and to the absence 
of serious attempts to rectify the situation. The mining 
companies have not actively retarded progress in this area. 
8 2 See above, p. 216. 
^^ This was the phrase used by the Department's Assistant 
Permanent Secretary to describe its approach to Zambianisation, 
Interview, Lusaka, 18 July 1978. 
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They have not denied financial assistance to available 
candidates for third level education, and have apparently 
84 
not discriminated against Zambian graduate employees. 
However, they could have adopted a more positive attitude, 
for example by attempting to isolate routine components in 
the work of expatriate graduate employees (for instance 
chemists) which could be performed by Zambian technicians, 
an approach which is now being adopted with considerable 
85 success. 
Turning to the skilled manual level,^^ responsibility 
for the scarcity of expatriate staff to provide on-the-job 
training is shared by the companies and the government. The 
companies have not (until recently) employed expatriates 
whose sole or major responsibility would be training, 
8 7 
probably because of the expense involved. This option 
could usefully have been examined at a much earlier date. 
On the other hand, the government could have done more to 
encourage expatriate recruitment, for example by ensuring 
rapid exchange control clearance for remittances. 
O A A number of commentators have taken a contrary view on 
this point, claiming that the white management has slowed 
down the promotion of Zambians. Many graduates are frustrated 
by the requirement for extended practical training, and some 
certainly believe that they are discriminated against, but 
the records of the Manpower Planning, Training, and Zambianisation 
Unit show that, on average, Zambian graduates are promoted 
more rapidly than Europeans recruited at the same level. 
Interview with the Head of the Manpower Planning, Training, 
and Zambianisation Unit, Kitwe, 28 July 1978. 
^^ ibid. 
Zambianisation below the artisan level was completed 
rapidly and need not concern us here. 
A major initiative was taken in this regard in 197 3/4 
when the number of expatriates engaged full time in 
training was doubled. 
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The attitude of expatriate workers to Zambian 
apprentices and trainees raises more complex questions. 
Management can do little when faced with employees who 
refuse to pass on their skills. Any attempt to keep a rigid 
check on trainees and to penalise employees where lack of 
progress was evident would almost certainly be counter-
productive; it would be resented by expatriates, and would 
probably lead to further resignations and compound the 
problem of finding replacements. The difficulty in this 
area is a deep-seated one. Because of their key role in the 
industry, management is very loath to take action against 
expatriates who are retarding Zambianisation; the risk in 
terms of loss of efficiency is simply too high. No new 
initiatives have been taken in this area since 1973, 
indicating that this factor has acted as a constraint on the 
Zambian government, just as it did on the foreign investors. 
The requirement for rapid Zambianisation has conflicted 
with other interests being pursued by the government or the 
companies or both, and this explains why progress has 
frequently been slow. Corporate and national interests may 
have come into conflict on this issue, but only in the sense 
that government would have liked the companies to be more 
enterprising in those areas where its other interests were 
not threatened. 
Provision of infrastructure. 
As mentioned earlier, the spin-off effects of mine 
infrastructure have been limited by the Copperbelt's 
geographical concentration. The mines are served by only 
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one major railway line and one bitumenised road, both of 
8 8 
which follow the same route. This is in contrast to the 
experience in Rhodesia or South Africa, for example, where 
mineral deposits were more widely scattered, requiring 
extensive branch railway systems serving large geographical 
areas. The situation may change if Zambia's widely-
dispersed uranium deposits or other orebodies away from the 
line-of-rail (such as Lumwana) are developed. 
Absorption of domestic resources. 
Foreign mining companies have not mobilised 
8 9 
significant amounts of domestic capital in Zambia, but 
their activities have absorbed substantial amounts of 
agricultural labour over an extended period of time. 
Anne Seidman has estimated that some villages have lost up 
to 60 per cent of their male populations in the 20-40 age 
group, leading to over-use of existing cultivated land and a 90 serious decline in productivity. 
Mining has also absorbed some agricultural land, but 
because of the Copperbelt's geographical concentration its 
impact in this regard has not been widely felt. 
^^ The railway line was in fact constructed prior to 1909 
to serve the Broken Hill lead/zinc mine and the Katanga 
copper mines, and the discovery of the Copperbelt did not in 
itself stimulate major new developments; the mines were 
simply connected to the existing rail system by spur lines. 
However the Copperbelt's discovery did ensure the system s 
long-term viability. 
See p.237 above. 
A. Seidman, Alternative Development Strategies for 
Zambia, (Land Tenure Centre, Wisconsin, June 1973), p.5-6. 
Cultivation of new land has traditionally been performed 
mainly by males in the 20-40 age group. 
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Impact on consumption patterns. 
The mining industry has had a major impact on 
consumption patterns in Zambia. It has drawn into close 
contact a large expatriate community and a substantial 
proportion of Zambia's population, with the result that 
Zarabians have attempted to emulate expatriate patterns of 
consumption. 
This has had four major effects. First, it has 
fuelled Zambian demands for incomes on a par with those of 
expatriates, a point dealt with below in discussing income 
91 
distribution. Second, it has created a substantial 
demand for imported goods and services. This may not create 
problems in times of high copper prices, but it certainly 
does so when low prices reduce Zambia's capacity to import 
essential goods and services. Third, Zambians frequently 
(indeed usually) fail to achieve the income levels required 
to support expatriate standards of consumption, and this 
sometimes leads to corruption or malpractice in the civil 
service and government. The Reports of Zambia's Auditor-
General list many cases of misappropriation of funds by 9 9 
public servants, while at least two serious cases of 
financial malpractice at the political level have been 
revealed.^^ Finally, there has been a spill-over effect into 
^^ See pp. 251-60. 
^^ See, for example, Republic of Zambia, Report of the 
Auditor-General, 1974, (Government Printer, Lusaka, 1974), 
p. 8, 9, 14, 27. 
^^ In 1971 four government ministers were dismissed after 
a commission of inquiry found them guilty of financial 
improbity. In 197 3, a number of senior politicians apparently 
used their access to confidential information to make hefty 
profits on trading in ZIMCO bonds; in 1978 this matter was 
being investigated by the Zambian police. 
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the countryside; rural Zambians have become aware of the 
consumption levels enjoyed by many urban dwellers, and this 
has contributed to rural-urban migration with its attendant 
9 4 
social and economic problems. 
It is difficult to envisage how Zambia could have 
obtained the benefits of mineral development without 
incurring some costs as a result of changed consumption 
patterns, but these costs would probably have been 
considerably less had Zambianisation not been delayed for 
so long. 
Wage levels and income distribution. 
The mining industry has had a major impact on income 
distribution, for two reasons. First, because the industry's 
factor payments represent such a large proportion of the 
v;ealth generated in Zambia, changes in the relative use of 
various factors have important consequences for income 
distribution. Second, the mining industry's payments to 
labour influence labour payments in other sectors of the 
economy through a 'demonstration effect', and this in turn 
has a significant impact on national income distribution. 
In both cases, the mining industry's wage policies are a 
crucial factor. 
During the period 1964-6, Zambian mineworkers received 
a number of substantial wage increases, through collective 
bargaining with the mining companies (12 per cent in 1964, 
The most serious of these involve unemployment, urban 
crime, and the poverty and disease of the shanty-towns 
which have sprung up in Lusaka and other centres. 
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11 per cent in January 19 66) , and through a government 
award (22 per cent in August 196 6). Various factors 
contributed to their ability to win these increases. Their 
trade union was militant, cohesive, and highly organised, 
and consequently in a strong position to disrupt the 
enormously important copper industry. The government would 
have found it difficult to resist the mineworkers' demands, 
even if it had wished to, but it could hardly deny their 
right to close the huge income differentials separating 
95 
them from expatriate miners. Copper prices rose 
substantially over the period 1964-6, and since African wages 
constituted a relatively small proportion of total production 
costs,^^ the companies could pay the wage increases and still 
expand their profits. 
It is difficult to assess precisely what effect these 
wage increases had on income distribution within the mining 
sector, as problems arise in isolating their impact on 
relative factor use. Mechanisation certainly continued during 
and after the period of wage increases; this is evident 
from developments at individual mines, and from the fact 
that the increase in production over the period 1964-9 was 
only just matched by the increase in employment, while much 
^^ The governing party, UNIP, supported the mineworkers' 
case before the 1966 Brown Commission. 
^^ They accounted for about 18 per cent of total production 
costs in the early 1960s. R. E. Baldwin, op.cit., p.107. 
See A. Nziramasanga, op.cit., p.67 , 70 , for an account 
of developments at the Chingola and Mulfulxra mines. 
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of the latter resulted from fragmentation of existing 
. . 98 
positions. However, it is not certain that mechanisation 
was entirely due to wage increases; tax treatment of 99 
expenditure on equipment was made more favourable in 1964, 
and this may have had some effect. Neither is it known 
whether the entire increase in employment was due to job 
fragmentation. However, even if it is assumed that, solely 
because of wage increases, the relevant increase in 
proudction failed to generate any additional employment (or, 
in other words, that job fragmentation was entirely 
responsible for the increase in employment which did occur 
and that mechanisation was entirely due to wage increases), 
total payments to labour at 1969 average wages would still be 
very much greater than if the average wages and the output/ 
labour ratio which applied in 19 6 4 had remained unchanged.^^^ 
In fact employment would have had to decline by 43 per cent 102 
from the 19 6 4 level for the two to be the same. 
Thus wage increases effected a redistribution of income 
from mining companies to Zambian labour. In one sense, it was 
98 
See Tables 6 and 8. 
^^ A. Nziramasanga, op.cit., p.65, 67. 
In addition, certain of the innovations which led to 
mechanisation may have been forced on the Zambian companies 
by the need to remain competitive with other copper producers, 
^^^ If the additional employment which actually materialised 
is excluded, wage payments in 19 69 would have been K49.5 
million; if the 1964 labour output ratio and average wages 
had remained unchanged, the equivalent figure would have been 
K28.2 million. (Derived from Tables 8 and 10.) 
102 Derived from previous footnote. 
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clearly preferable from Zambia's point of view that 
income should flow to nationals rather than to foreign 
companies who would probably remit a large part of it.^ *^ ^ 
However, it must be remembered that some 60-7 0 per cent of 
gross profits were absorbed by taxation, and thus 
redistribution of profits in favour of labour would also 
involve redistribution of government revenue in favour of 
labour. Any such development would have important 
implications for domestic income distribution, as we shall 
n 104 see below. 
Wage increases in the mining industry had a major 
impact in other sectors of the economy. The industry acted 
as a 'wage l e a d e r w i t h other workers attempting to 
emulate the miners, and pressure was exerted on the 
government (as an employer and as an industrial arbitrator) 
and on private companies to grant substantial pay increases, 
This trend was particularly evident after the government-
appointed Brown Commission awarded miners a 22 per cent pay 
rise in August 1966. Within a year, public service workers 
had obtained increases of 20 to 80 per cent, construction 
workers 33 per cent, agricultural workers 30 per cent, and 
workers in service industries 25 to 55 per cent.^°^ The 
Given that the companies were then only maintaining the 
value of their investments, it was entirely possible that all 
of the additional income would have been remitted. 
This point was given greater force when the Government 
further increased its entitlement to profits by becoming a 
majority shareholder in the mines. 
Evidence of the industry' s role as a 'wage leader' is 
presented by J. B. Knight, 'Wages and Zambia's Economic 
Development', in C. Elliott, op.cit., p.99-102. 
ibid. Table 4.3, p.102. 
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search for higher wages cannot be solely attributed to the 
operation of a 'demonstration effect'. Independence raised 
the expectations of all Zambian workers, and the high level 
of expenditure permitted by buoyant copper prices increased 
demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour. Nevertheless, 
events in the mining industry did provide a catalyst.^^^ 
Even more importantly, wages in the industry were already 
108 
considerably higher than in other sectors, and large 
percentage increases in miners' wages meant that the le-oeZ 
of expectations of other workers (and consequently their 
wage demands) would be high. 
General wage increases had a number of important economic 
effects, with one of the most significant resulting from 
their impact on government finances. In the mid 19 60s, the 
government employed about 65,000 people or 30 per cent of 
the wage-earning workforce, and wage rises consequently had 
a major impact on current expenditure. Pay increases in the 
mining industry also had a direct effect on government 109 
finances since they reduced profits and so taxation. The 
impact of these developments was not very evident during the 
mid-19 60s, as high copper prices ensured that revenue 
exceeded all capital and current expenditure. However, high 
^ It is significant that the largest wage increases 
occurred in the year after the Brown Commission award^rather 
than in the two years after Independence. R. Jolly, 'The 
Skilled Manpower Constraint', in C. Elliott, op.cit.. 
Table 2.4, p.36. 
See below, p. 258. 
Richard Jolly has calculated that mineral revenue over 
the period 1965-9 would have been some K50 million greater 
if African wage increases had averaged 5 per cent per annum 
and expatriate rates had remained constant. R. Jolly. 'The 
Seers Report in Retrospect', African Social Research, 11, 
(June 1971), p.14. 
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wage levels had been established in the public service and 
the mining industry, and these did not fall when copper 
prices declined, with the result that sufficient revenue 
was not available to maintain capital expenditure.^^^ The 
point has already been made that one of Zambia's principal 
goals, economic diversification, v/ill not be achieved unless 
a substantial level of capital investment can be maintained. 
Wage increases also had a significant though unquantifiable 
effect on employment. Labour costs represent a substantial 
proportion of total production costs in the manufacturing 
and agricultural sectors,^^^ and the large pay increases of 
19 64-9 had a major impact on their employment-generating 
potential, for two reasons. First, they encouraged use of 
capital-intensive techniques. Second, they reduced 
Zambia's competitiveness as a potential exporter (especially 
in the East African region where wage rates were already 
lower than in Zambia),^^^ and increased the competitiveness 
of imports. Thus opportunities for industrial and 
agricultural development based on export markets and import 
113 substitution were reduced. 
Capital expenditure had to be reduced after periods of 
depressed prices in 1971/2 and 1975/6. 
^^^ In the mid 19 60s, wage payments accounted for from 20 to 
40 per cent of total production costs in these sectors. 
J. B. Knight, 'Wages and Zambia's Economic Development', in 
C. Elliott, op.cit.. Table 4.4, p.104. 
112 ibid., Table 4.6, p.108. 
^^^ Devaluation of the Kwacha might have counteracted the 
effects to some extent by making exports cheaper and imports 
dearer. However, mineworkers would probably be able to win 
compensatory wage increases, thus beginning the whole cycle 
once again; in addition, the effects of devaluation on import 
prices would be indiscriminate, and prices of goods and 
services essential to the development effort would also increase, 
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Partly for these reasons, grov/th in employment over 
the period 1964-70 was not as rapid as had been anticipated 
- 83,000 as against the minimum expected figure of 
114 
100,000. In addition, about two thirds of the increase 
came in the construction sector and the public service,^^^ 
and the growth in both was to a large extent a 'one-off 
phenomenon — the construction industry in response to the 
high demand created by unusually buoyant copper prices and 
the reorientation of transport routes, the public service 
as a result of the establishment of a full government 
apparatus after Independence. In the late 19 60s and early 
1970s, the growth in employment was not maintained. At the 
same time, the urban population grew at about 8 per cent per 
annum, with the result that the number of urban unemployed 
increased by an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 a year.^^^ It was in fact unlikely that expansion in industrial 
employment could have matched the growth in urban population, 
117 
regardless of wage rates. Since much of that growth 
resulted from rural-urban migration, any attempt at dealing 
with unemployment would have to focus on rural development; 
thus the impact of wage increases on the prospects for such 
development was especially significant. 
Republic of Zambia, Second National Development Plan,^.^ 
^^^ Employment in the construction industry grew by 38,000 
during these years, that in the public service by 20,000. 
A.Martin, op.cit., p.222-
^^^ R. Sklar, op.cit., p.120. 
^^^ A. Young, op.cit., p.230. 
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Pay increases for wage-earners had a major impact on 
distribution of income between rural and urban Zambians. 
The incomes of peasant farmers did not increase at nearly 
as high a rate as did urban wages. Over the years 1964-8, 
average peasant earnings increased by 53 per cent in money 
terms; average earnings of wage-earners outside the mines 
increased by 125 per cent, those of mineworkers by 10 5 per 
118 
cent. In addition, urban wage increases affected the 
terms of trade between rural and urban areas. Goods and 
services provided by the urban to the rural sector became 
more expensive while the price of agricultural goods rose 
much more slowly; in veal terms, rural incomes increased 
by only 4 per cent over the period 1964-8, while those of 
wage-earners outside the mines increased by 52 per cent and 119 those of mineworkers by 3 5 per cent. Thus the additional 
120 
wealth accruing to Zambians over this period was very 
unevenly distributed, further skewing income distribution in 
favour of the urban areas. In 1964, wage earners outside 
the mines earned, on average, three times as much as peasant 
farmers, mineworkers seven times as much (at 1968 prices); 
in 196 8, the equivalent figures were four and a half times 121 and nine times. 
^^^ Derived from A. Martin, op.cit., Appendix, Fig. 7. 
ibid. 
GDP increased at an average rate of 13 per cent between 
1964 and 1970. 
^^^ Derived from A. Martin, op.cit.. Appendix, Fig. 7. 
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When the gap between rural and urban incomes expands, 
rural-urban migration increases. This in turn weakens the 
prospects for the rural development which might stem further 
migration as it creates labour shortages, frequently 
deprives villages of their most enterprising inhabitants, and 
can make it uneconomic to maintain existing services or 
provide additional ones. At the same time, wage increases 
reduce the government's capacity to increase rural incomes, 
as less money is available to finance services and the 
capital investment which might create income-generating assets. 
It is difficult to see how the Zambian government could 
have avoided these problems. It inherited a mining industry 
in which huge wage differentials separated blacks and whites, 
and there was very little it could do to prevent black 
workers from attempting to change this situation. Having 
conceded the mineworkers' demands, it would have found it 
very difficult to resist those of other workers, or to avoid 
the consequences of not doing so. However, its inability to 
avoid these difficulties had important consequences for its 
mineral policies, consequences which were not fully taken 
into account. 
First, the government's desire for rural development 
called for a redistribution of income in favour of rural 
Zambians. From this perspective, it would have been 
preferable to allow the mining companies to pursue profxt-
maximising factor combinations, thus maximising tax revenues 
and the government's ability to divert resources into the 
rural sector. However, there are some indications that this 
has not been done since the 1969 Take-over (see above, p. 224); 
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certainly government statements on employment policies show 
little awareness of their implications for income 
122 
distribution. Similarly, the policy of encouraging 
inefficient production of mining inputs effectively 
redistributed income from the government to urban workers. 
Second, it was apparent that the continued presence 
of a large number of expatriate miners would continue to 123 
exercise an upward effect on Zambian wage levels. It was 
essential that Zambianisation proceed as rapidly as possible; 
yet, as mentioned above, the government displayed little 
urgency in this area. 
Once again, the implications of policy alternatives had 
not been fully spelt out. 
Ownership and control of mineral resources. 
Before proceeding further, two other areas of potential 
conflict should be mentioned. The first involved the issue 
of the mining companies' purchasing policies. From what has 
already been said on this subject, it is apparent that a 
real conflict of interest did exist in this area: the 
companies were anxious to maintain their links with Southern 
Africa, the government wished to break them. 
The second, which concerns mining practices, is more 
complex because the issues involved are technical in nature 
and because disagreements frequently occur even among 
^^^ Republic of Zambia, First National Develoipment Plan, 
1966-70, Ch. vi; Second National Development Plan, p.85. 
^^^ Average Zambian wages increased by 7 5 per cent between 
1968 and 1977 (see Table 10)-
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disinterested experts as to what constitutes 'best mining 
p r a c t i c e ' T h e government believed that the companies 
might adopt practices inimical to Zambia's interests, for 
example by high-grading or by allowing excessive dilution of 
ore. High-grading can be a perfectly sound mining practice 
125 
in certain circumstances; what the government feared was 
that the companies would continually extract the richest 
ores to maximise profits in the short term, leaving behind 
ore which could have been extracted profitably along with the 
richer material but which would be uneconomic to mine on its 
own. If this occurred, Zambia would be deprived of employment, 126 
export earnings, and revenue. A certain degree of dilution 
is inevitable in any mining operation; however, excessive 
dilution might occur where companies were unwilling to invest 
in facilities for disposal of waste prior to processing, 
leading to higher operating costs and lower profits. 
As regards both these practices, the basic issue was the . 
discount rate applied by the companies to future earnings; 
application of a high rate might make it worth their while 
to sacrifice lower-grade ore (and thus reduce total profits) 
in order to maximise short-term profits, and not worth their 
while to invest in waste disposal facilities so as to reduce 
future operating costs and increase future profits. 
See, for example, the contrary views expressed on the 
subject of high-grading in E. G. Thomas, 'Justification of 
the concept of high-grading in metalliferous orebodies', 
Mining Magazine, May 1976, p.393-7; and G. P. Walduck,_ 
'Justification of the concept of high-grading in metalliferous 
orebodies - a dissenting view'. Mining Magazine, July 1976, 
p.65-7. 
^^^ E. G. Thomas, op.cit., p.397. 
^^^ Revenue would of course be increased in the short term, 
but total revenue would be lower. 
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As mentioned already, it is extremely difficult to 
obtain conclusive evidence on questions of this type. 
However, at least one independent authority believes that 
the companies did engage in systematic high-grading, and that 
127 
this resulted in loss of workable ore, while it is 
certainly true that their time horizons were short in the 
period after Independence. Thus the government's belief was 
probably justified that conflicts of interest might exist in 
this area. 
In sum, five areas have been identified where conflicts 
of interest did exist or may have existed: pricing of 
imported goods, sourcing of imports, mining practices, 
Zambianisation, and investment policies. Was majority state 
ownership of the operating companies the best way to ensure 
that national interests would be protected in these areas? 
One point is immediately clear — majority ownership 
would not in itself ensure such an outcome. The government's 
directors and their advisory staff would have to be 
sufficiently qualified and well-informed to defend Zambia's 
interests in a situation where ownership and control would 
be shared with corporations who were extremely knowledgeable 
about the Zambian and international mining industries. 
Information was of crucial importance as regards pricing 
and sourcing of imports. Import pricing could not be 
monitored unless information was available regarding prices 
Interview with L. Gustafson, Professor of Economic Geology, 
Research School of Earth Sciences, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 4 April 1978. It should be noted that 
the taxation system applied to mining companies encouraged 
high-trading by making exploitation of lower-grade ore 
unprofitable. 
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offered by suppliers other than those affiliated to the 
parent companies. If imports from Southern Africa were to 
be reduced, it would be necessary to know which items could 
12 8 
be obtained elsewhere and where to obtain them. Armed 
with the relevant information, the government's directors 
could press its case; without it, they could do little. 
The cost of obtaining information would hardly be 
excessive. The range of items purchased in large enough 
quantities to provide opportunities for significant tax 
avoidance was limited, and most were freely traded (for 
instance mining, transport and electrical equipment). The 
search for information on prices would also reveal whether 
alternative sources of supply were available. 
Monitoring of mining practices v/ould require a higher 
degree of technical expertise and thus the recruitment of 
specialised staff. However, once again the cost need not be 
prohibitive; substantial salaries would have to be offered 
to attract personnel with the necessary depth of practical 
experience, but the numbers required would be small. There 
would be no need to continually monitor working methods in 
every mine; selective checks carried out on a random basxs 
. . 129 would have an effect throughout the industry. 
The issue of investment policies is more complex. Its 
most obvious aspect was the unwillingness of the foreign 
^^^ For example, much of the equipment on the Copperbelt was 
South African, and it might therefore be difficult to 
obtain spare parts elsewhere. 
^^^ If the information gathered in the process was applied 
in seeking more cost-efficient mining methods, the exercise 
might more than pay for itself. 
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investors to reinvest profits. In the absence of taxation 
measures which might have persuaded them to change their 
minds, the only alternative was for the government to obtain 
full control over dividend policy. To do this, it apparently 
had to obtain majority ownership; it was obvious that 
exchange control over dividend remittances, for example, had 
no effect.^^^ But there was a second dimension to this 
issue. Any investment decision depends on how the technical 
and economic feasibility of the prospective project is 
assessed. For example, if recovery of metal from waste 
dumps was being considered, it would be necessary to determine 
whether or to what extent it was physically possible to do 
this. The conclusions would in turn influence assessments 
of economic viability, which would also be based on 
projections of future metal prices and production costs. If 
these functions were carried out by the minority shareholders, 
government directors would be powerless to question their 
conclusions unless they could call on independent experts 
who could examine the methods and assumptions used in 
determining technical and economic viability. Government 
control over dividend policies would have little impact if 
the minority shareholders continued to decide what was and 
was not worth spending money on. 
To understand the importance of this point, xt is 
necessary to outline briefly the structure of decision-making 
in the mining industry. Since the 1969 Take-over, the 
position in theory is that the government sets broad policy 
See below, p.182 
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guidelines for the industry; these are conveyed to the 
company boards, which formulate specific policies accordingly. 
The Managing Directors exercise executive power and translate 
these policies into action.^^^ This may be the way in 
which decision-making actually occurs on issues such as 
wages policy, but in the crucial area of investment policies 
the situation is in fact more complex. 
Initiatives which lead to investment decisions 
frequently come from operating divisions, where staff see a 
132 
need or an opportunity for investment. The initial 
assessment work is carried out by technical staff at this 
level, in co-operation with accounting and finance staff 
from the Centralised Services Division. If it is felt that 
the project warrants further expenditure, it is submitted to 
the Technical Officer.^^^ This individual plays a crucial 
role in decision-making. He views competing requests for 
funds and decides which, if any, will be forwarded to the 134 
Managing Director and the Board for their consideration. 
If the Board initiates proposals itself, they must be 
submitted to the Technical Director and his staff, who assess 
their technical and economic viability. 
^^^ Interview with NCCM's Managing Director, Lusaka, 
31 July 1978. 
132 
The Chingola Leach Plant project, which constitutes the 
largest single capital investment undertaken by the industry 
since 1970, originated in this way. 
^^^ Interview with officials at NCCM's Centralised Services 
Division, Kitwe, 25 July 1978. 
134 
Interview with NCCM's Managing Director, Lusaka, 
31 July 1978. 
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Thus if the government directors were not simply to 
rubber-stamp investment proposals deemed acceptable by the 
minority shareholders, they would require access to an 
independent source of technical expertise. The government 
would not have to duplicate every feasibility study, but 
only to ensure that its directors could request a second 
opinion if their investment proposals were declared unviable, 
and that projects suggested by the operating divisions and 
declared unviable by the technical staff could be 
re-examined. 
As far as is known, an information system of the type 
described above was not established after 1970, which may 
have contributed to the failure of the Take-over to give the 
government effective control, though other factors were of 
course more important. The government did show awareness of 
the need for technical expertise, and MINDECO was given the 
task of monitoring the management and operating companies. 
It recruited a small but highly-qualified staff which 
included at least one specialist in each of the main areas of 
mining activity, for example geology, metallurgy and 
engineering. MINDECO was soon operating as an effective 
monitoring agency,^^^ and undertaking detailed technical 
^ 136 
studies regarding various aspects of mineral development. 
The legal and other restrictions contained in the 1969 
Take-over arrangements prevented the government from gaining 
^^^ As one of AAC's directors commented, 'nothing was done 
in the mining industry without MINDECO knowing about it'. 
^^^ Interview with MINDECO's Consulting Engineer, Lusaka, 
17 July 1978. 
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effective control over the copper industry, despite the 
expertise it had developed, and it reacted by terminating 
the management contracts. The government subsequently took 
the view that since the operating companies were self-managing 
there was no need to monitor their activities.^^^ MINDECO's 
specialist staff was disbanded, and its monitoring role 
ended. 
With the termination of the management contracts, RCM's 
and NCCM's Managing Directors became government appointees 
and their Technical Directors and other senior technical 
staff were seconded from AAC and AMAX rather than working 
directly for those companies. The earlier outline of 
decision-making in the field of investment policies indicates 
that these changes probably had little significant impact. 
As mentioned above, the Managing Directors can only make 
investment decisions on the basis of the Technical Directors' 
recommendations. The latter and their senior staff are 
usually long-time employees of AAC or ZU^X/RST, and many hope 
138 
to achieve further advancement within these companies. 
Without questioning the integrity of the individuals 
involved, it is very likely that this background influences 
their perceptions and the criteria they apply in making 
decisions. Thus an independent source of expertise was still 
required if government directors were to ensure that criteria 
137 
Interview with NCCM's Managing Director, Lusaka, 
31 July 1978. 
This applies especially to NCCM's senior staff, but 
RCM's Technical Director, for example, is also on secondment. 
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other than those employed by the minority shareholders could 
be applied in decision-making. 
A number of cases have arisen since 1974 which 
illustrate this point. One resulted from the government's 
desire to establish a fertiliser plant at Kafue to reduce 
Zambia's dependence on imports. Additional domestic 
supplies of sulphuric acid were required if this project 
were to proceed. Collection of sulphur emissions from the 
Mufulira smelter would provide these supplies, and the 
government asked RCM's technical staff to examine the 
feasibility of installing a collection plant. Their study 
concluded that technical and economic factors would render 
such a project infeasible.^^^ This may or may not have been 
the case - the important point is that the Zambian government 
lacked the capacity to obtain a second opinion on the matter. 
It may have been that the assumptions employed in the study 
were too conservative, or that its terms of reference were 
inappropriate from the government's viewpoint. For example, 
the investment might not be warranted in terms of its direct 
financial yield, but might be desirable from a national 
perspective if the direct and indirect effects on employment 
and the balance of payments and the fact that it would 
considerably reduce pollution from the smelter^ '^ '^  were taken 
into account. The ability to ensure that broader perspectives 
of this type are considered surely lies at the heart of any 
^^^ Interview with MINDECO's Consulting Engineer, Lusaka, 
17 July 1978. 
Interview with Mufulira Smelter Foreman, Mufulire, 
26 July 1978. 
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attempt to establish national control over mineral 
development. Other relevant cases have involved the 
possibility of substituting domestic coal for imported heavy 
fuel oil as a source of power in certain processes, and that 
of assisting small miners by giving them access to smelting 
and other facilities. These are matters which have been 
141 
raised by the government — it is not known whether projects 
proposed by the operating divisions have similarly been 
declared unviable. 
What explains the government's failure to retain the 
expertise developed in 197 0-4? It may have failed to 
realise the extent to which the minority shareholders would 
retain their influence, though MINDECO certainly understood 
the reality of the situation.^^^ However, by 19 7 3 MINDECO's 
advice was no longer being heeded; the organisation had 
become involved in a political power struggle, and this was 
in fact a key element in what occurred. 
MINDECO was headed by an extremely competent and 
politically-astute Zambian, D. C. Mulaisho. Mulaisho was 
deeply distrusted by Zambia's 'old guard' nationalists, who 
saw him (correctly) as a potential leader of an emerging 
political grouping of well-educated young Zambians. This 
group favoured a more pragmatic, economically-oriented 
approach to major policy issues (especially in regard to 
Zambia's relations with Rhodesia and South Africa), and it 
was regarded as a threat to their dominance by the older 
ibid, 
ibid. 
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politicians. MINDECO, with its considerable potential 
influence on the enormously important mining sector, 
represented a powerful political base for Mulaisho, and with 
its predominantly white expatriate staff was consequently 
suspect in the eyes of many senior politicians. When power 
resided with the foreign companies, these politicians were 
at least assured that it would probably be exercised in a 
neutral fashion as regards the various factions within UNIP. 
Mulaisho and MINDECO also earned the displeasure of 
key officials on UNIP's Central Committee by their attitude 
towards the possibility of establishing a steel mill in 
Zambia. These officials apparently viewed this project as 
an important symbol of Zambia's national status, and MINDECO 
was requested to carry out a feasibility study. This 
concluded that the venture would prove hopelessly 
14 3 
uneconomic, much to the chagrin of its proponents. 
By 197 3 MINDECO had too many powerful enemies who were 
glad of the opportunity to declare its activities superfluous, 
and who would have regarded claims that its continued 
existence was essential for effective government control of 
the copper mines as mere self-justification. This raises an 
important point - Zambia was still without a body of experts 
trusted by her senior politicians. MINDECO had been unable 
to stay above politics, while the Mines Department was still 
characterised by the weaknesses discussed in the previous 
chapter, except that turnover among senior Zambian staff was 
ibid. 
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144 even more rapid after 1970, and that raany of its 
technical and professional positions were now simply 
unoccupied for want of suitable candidates. In 1974, for 
example, only half of the established positions at this 
n ^ 145 level were filled. 
It is evident that majority ownership alone would not 
bring about effective government control, but was it 
essential if such control were to be established? For 
instance, the government might have gained considerable 
influence by obtaining minority participation (with the right 
to appoint a minority of directors) and developing sources of 
information and technical expertise on the lines described 
above. The latter would enable it to discover when corporate 
behaviour was in conflict with national policy aims; where 
this was the case, government directors could press for 
changes, and if their efforts failed sanctions could be 
imposed on the companies using normal legislative powers. 
Only in the area of profit reinvestment might such an approach 
leave the government without influence. Another alternative 
did of course exist in this area also - the government could 
have attempted to devise a taxation system which would have 
enoouvaged reinvestment.^^^ 
Between 19 70 and 1978, the Ministry of Mines had eight 
different Permanent Secretaries and the same number of 
Ministers. In 1978 alone, three different individuals held 
the post of Permanent [sic] Secretary. 
^^^ Republic of Zambia, Annual Report of the Mines Develop-
ment Department, 1974, (Government Printer, Lusaka, 1976),p.33 
It is debatable whether such a strategy would have 
succeeded in the wake of the decision to take over the mines. 
The government clearly took the view that it would not - the 
only initiative it took on taxation over the period 1973-8 
was to increase the total tax rate from 7 3 to 7 5.5 per cent 
(in 1976) . 
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Another aspect of the Take-over involves its effects 
on the quality of middle-level and senior management in the 
industry. Many expatriates are not prepared to commit their 
careers to government-owned mining companies operating in 
only one country. The result is that turnover among middle-
level professional, technical and managerial personnel is 
very high, while the calibre of recruits has fallen. In fact 
many positions at this level are occupied by recent graduates 
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seeking experience before applying for positions elsewhere. 
Disturbing in itself, the longer-term implications of this 
situation are even more serious. As senior technical and 
managerial staff leave the industry through retirement or 
for other reasons, suitable replacements will become more 
and more difficult to find. ROM and NCCM can, of course, 
attempt to recruit experienced personnel from abroad, but, 
particularly in the technical field, experience obtained 
elsewhere is a poor substitute for knowledge gained by working 
for many years in a particular industry and indeed frequently 
in a particular mine. Thus Zambia's copper industry may well 
face a managerial crisis until such time as Zambian graduates 
with sufficient experience become available. 
Conclusion. 
Two points arise from this discussion. First, a rational 
analysis of its situation would have led the Zambian 
government to seriously consider alternative strategies to 
Interview with Assistant Permanent Secretary, Ministry 
of Mines, Lusaka, 18 July 197 8. 
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that of assuming majority ownership. Secondly, if it 
was decided that majority ownership was the only 
acceptable policy, such an analysis would have led the 
government to acquire and retain an expert knowledge of the 
copper industry. It did not adopt such an approach, 
primarily because of political factors, not simply short-
term considerations of the type which determined the timing 
of the Take-over, but more fundamental factors which 
reflected basic features of Zambia's internal and 
international political situation. 
As mentioned above. Northern Rhodesia was created through 
amalgamation of disparate tribal and linguistic groupings. 
By Independence, Zambians had not developed a common culture 
or language which might have acted as a unifying force, and 
most lacked any strong sense of national identity. Their 
primary identification was still with their tribe and the 
region it inhabited. Reflecting this situation, political 
allegiance followed tribal or regional lines. There was 
little support for the concept that a government, whatever 
its own political power base, should continue to distribute 
economic and other benefits to all Zambians regardless of 
tribal or geographical origin. Consequently loss of 
political power was equated with loss of rights and privileges^ 
with the result that the political system has been under 
constant and severe strain from the threat of violent 
conflict between tribal and regional groupings, or of 
secession by one or other grouping. The continued operation 
of the system has depended on the ability of President 
Kaunda, who is not identified closely with any one group, to 
274 
centralise considerable executive power in his own hands, 
and to maintain a balance of power between the various 
factions. 
This situation has affected the formulation of mineral 
policy in a number of ways. First, President Kaunda views 
his own role as crucial, and is consequently prepared to go 
to considerable lengths to maintain his position; this 
attitude explains, for example, his use of the 19 69 
Take-over decision for political purposes. Second, 
centralisation of power in the President's hands has led to 
a quasi-dictatorial method of decision-making. It will be 
remembered, for instance, that the President did not inform 
even his Cabinet of the Take-over decision before it was 
announced. This approach militates against the (sometimes 
extended) discussion and analysis which can be crucial to 
rational decision-making. Third, the President is 
constantly on guard lest any individual establish a power 
base which might threaten the delicate balance of power or 
his own position, while senior politicians are determined 
that their rivals will not steal a march. Fears of this 
type lie behind the constant shuffling of senior political 
and administrative personnel, and they underlay MINDECO's 
failure to survive as an efficient monitoring agency. 
Fourth, that sense of insecurity has made Zambian 
politicians extremely sensitive to powerful foreign interests 
in their midst, and no foreign interest was more powerful 
than the mining companies. 
The companies were doubly feared and disliked because 
they were owned and managed by whites. It is important to 
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emphasise again that many of the individuals who have 
governed Zambia since Independence suffered insult and 
injury under a discriminatory political regime whose 
existence was inextricably linked with the activities of the 
copper companies. This had a major impact on governmental 
attitudes — it made it difficult to assess rationally the 
need for the companies, their skilled personnel, and the 
need for white advisers to assist in policy formulation. It 
was easy and indeed satisfying to take over the companies, 
dispense as quickly as possible with expatriate staff, and 
formulate policy without consulting outsiders. It would 
have been very much more difficult, and perhaps politically 
dangerous, to offer corporate tax concessions, encourage 
expatriates to stay, and act on the advice of white advisers. 
Political circumstances in Southern Africa reinforced 
these tendencies. The racism from which Zambians had 
suffered was still being practised against fellow Africans 
in Rhodesia and South Africa. Objectionable in itself, this 
situation was made even more so by Zambia's vulnerability to 
economic and even military attack from these countries; 
indeed at times it seemed that her very existence was 
threatened. And the mining companies v/ere closely linked 
with those same countries. AAC was South African owned, both 
149 parent companies operated in Southern Africa, and both 
^ For example after UDI in 19 65, after the closure of the 
Rhodesian border in 1973, and more recently with Rhodesian 
military attacks which have reached Lusaka itself. 
For details of AAC' s and AMAX' s operations in Southern 
Africa, see R. Sklar, op.cit., p. 169-76. 
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operating groups drew a high proportion of their goods and 
services and their employees from that region. Little wonder 
that Zambian leaders feared and distrusted the mining 
companies, or that they had a sharp desire to assume 
ownership of the copper industry, regardless of possible 
economic costs and indeed regardless of a rational 
examination of the best available means to acquire effective 
control. 
Zambia's colonial past intrudes into nearly every 
aspect of mineral development. Copper mining has supplied 
large amounts of government revenue and foreign exchange, 
but colonial policies led to a lopsided pattern of economic 
development which has left Zambia utterly dependent on 
these sources of income, creating major obstacles to 
successful implementation of development policies. The 
copper industry has generated considerable employment and 
wage incomes both directly and in industries supplying it 
v;ith goods and services, but the closure of huge wage 
differentials established under the colonial regime has 
absorbed government revenue and indirectly retarded the 
prospects for rural development. The technically-complex 
copper industry offered opportunities for Zambians to acquire 
new skills, but colonial educational and employment policies 
prevented them from taking advantage of those opportunities, 
and the legacy of those policies is still evident. In 
addition, the failure to localise more quickly meant that 
the copper industry's adverse impact on consumption patterns 
was increased. 
Thus her colonial past has reduced the benefits which 
Zambia receives from mineral development and increased its 
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costs, while it has also militated against the rational 
policy formulation which would have allowed Zambian 
leaders to make the best of the situation they inherited. 
278 
Chapter Six 
AUSTPvALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS 
FOREIGN MINING INVESTMENT, 1945-1975 
Historical introduction 
Australia was discovered by the Dutch in 1606, declared a 
British colony in 1788, and became a federation within the British 
Commonwealth in 1901. Its land area is 7.69 million square 
kilom.eters, much of it arid, barren, and remote from the eastern 
and southern coastal cities in which most of Australia's 14.3 
million inhabitants live. Seventy one per cent of its workforce 
are employed in services (including government and public 
authorities), and 21 per cent in a manufacturing sector which 
enjoys a high degree of tariff protection. Agriculture and 
mining employ relatively few Australians (7 and 1 per cent 
of the workforce respectively),^ but both are efficient, export-. 
oriented sectors which together provide Australia with 75 per 
cent of its export income. Australia has long experienced 
heavy and continuous imports of capital, used both as a source 
of investment and as a means of balancing its external payments, 
in which a surplus on the trade balance is usually converted 
into a deficit on current account by a substantial deficit 
2 on invisibles. 
^ Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1980 Handbook, (Hongkong, 
1980), p.134. 
^ The main invisible debits are transportation, travel 
expenses and investment income. 
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Australia's federal system was established with the 
intention of having a weak federal government exercising 
enumerated powers in areas such as defence, external affairs 
and immigration,^ and strong state governments exercising all 
residual powers and 'supreme in most fields of social and economic 
4 
concern'. In the event, the federal government's effective 
authority increased steadily after 1901, with the two world 
wars and the depression of the 1930s representing watersheds 
in this process. However the states have vigorously defended 
their traditional powers; of particular significance in the 
present context is their continued control over mineral rights, 
a factor which has exercised an enormous impact on the process 
of mineral development. 
The Australian economy is characterised by a strong 
government sector embracing transport, communication, provision 
of infrastructure, health, education and other social services.^ 
However, the Liberal/Country Party governments which have 
dominated federal politics since the late 1940s have generally 
opposed government intervention in commercial activity, except 
where private initiative has been lacking. The Labor governments 
of 1972-1975, the second of which was removed from office after 
a major constitutional crisis, adopted a more interventionist 
approach in this regard. 
For a complete listing of these enumerated powers, see 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Year Book of Australia, 
1973, (Government Printer, Canberra, 1974), pp.12-13. 
4 
J.D.B. Miller and B. Jinks, Australian Government and 
Politics, (London, 1971), p.38. 
^ J.D.B. Miller, 'Economic Choices and Chances', Seminar 
paper presented at the Australian National University, 12 April 
1979, p.5. 
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Australia's federal parliament comprises a House of 
Representatives, chosen in proportion to population, and a 
Senate comprised of equal numbers of members elected from 
each state. Consequently, the government of the day may 
not enjoy a majority in the Senate, which can use its 
considerable powers of obstruction and delay to frustrate 
government initiatives. 
Australia has a long history as an important mining 
country,^ but at the end of the Second World War mining 
activity was at a low ebb, reflecting the decline of gold 
mining and the aeneral absence of new mineral development. 
Over the next thirty years, this situation changed dramatically, 
and by 1975 Australia was one of the world's leading mineral 
producers. The first significant discoveries in the post 
war period were of uranium, at Rum Jungle in the Northern 
Territory (1949) and Mary Kathleen in Queensland (1954) ; at 
the same time, the value of mineral sand deposits along the 
Nev; South Wales and Western Australian coasts was recognised. 
These discoveries acted to stimulate exploration, and in the 
mid and late 1950s massive bauxite deposits were located in 
Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. 
The removal of export bans on iron ore in 1960 led to the 
discovery and development of huge reserves of the mineral 
in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The mid and 
late 1960s saw discoveries of nickel in Western Australia 
and Queensland, uranium in the Northern Territory, and massive 
coal deposits in Queensland and New South Wales. In addition, 
^ G. Blainey, The Rush That Never Ended: A History of 
Australian Mining, (Melbourne University Press, 1969). 
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production of 'older' metals such as copper, lead, zinc 
and tin expanded significantly. Over the period 1965-1977, 
the value of minerals produced in Australia increased by 
more than four times (at constant prices), and the value of 
mineral exports by more than seven times. 
A number of factors accounted for this rapid grov/th 
in mineral exploration and development. Technological 
developments in the industrialised countries created markets 
of 'new' metals such as aluminium, nickel and uranium, while 
economic expansion in the United States, Europe and Japan 
greatly increased demand for minerals such as iron ore, coal 
and copper. The rapid growth of the Japanese economy was 
particularly significant, as Australia's geographical location 
gave it a competitive advantage in supplying Japanese 
markets. Developments in mining techniques and in sea 
transport of bulk minerals facilitated the economic working 
and shipment of bulk commodities with lov; unit values (iron 
g 
ore, coal, bauxite). Government policies also played an 
important part. The establishment of the Bureau of Mineral 
Resources, Geology and Geophysics by the federal government 
in 1946 provided exploration companies with a valuable 
and inexpensive supply of basic geological information, and 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics (BMR), 
Australian Mineral Industry Annual Review, 1977, (Government 
Printer, Canberra, 1977), Table 10, p.12; Table 12, p.18. 
g 
The single m.ost important technological development was 
the application of capital-intensive highly-mechanised 
mining methods (developed in earlier decades to mine low-
grade copper deposits in the U.S.) in the working of bulk 
commodities with lov; unit values, such as iron ore and bauxite 
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many major discoveries resulted from advice proffered by the 
Bureau. Tax concessions offered by the Commonwealth government 
represented a major financial incentive, and also demonstrated 
a generally favourable attitude towards mineral development, 
whether financed by Australians or foreigners, an important 
consideration at a tim.e when m.any newly-independent mineral 
producing countries were enforcing harsher terms on foreign 
investors. 
For reasons explained below, m.any of the most significant 
and lucrative mineral developments of the 1950s and 1960s 
were financed and owned by foreign investors. This 
Chapter examines the policies adopted by Australian governments 
towards those investors, particularly over the period 1972-1975. 
The Labor governments v/hich held office during these years 
were notable for the number, range and significance of the 
initiatives they took towards the mining industry. However, 
their policies v/ere rarely expressed or justified in a 
cohesive or comprehensive form; consequently, major policy 
initiatives will be examined individually, after which an attempt 
will be made to draw various policy elements together and to 
outline their underlying assumptions. In the next Chapter, 
the validity of those assumptions and the appropriateness of 
government policies will be analysed in the light of an examination 
of the economic and other effects of foreign-financed mining 
projects. 
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Australian policies towards foreign investment, 1945-1972 
By the late 1960s, the extent of foreign ownership and 
control in the mining industry was causing concern to many 
Australians. According to Bureau of Statistics figures, foreign 
ownership in the metal mining industry (expressed as a percentage 
of the value of production accounted for) increased from 39.8 
per cent in 1963 to 53.6 per cent in 1968, while foreign control 
9 
increased from 51.0 to 68.7 per cent over the same period. 
Adding to the concern was the fact that direct investment from 
a single country, the United States, accounted for nearly all of 
this increase.^^ Concern with foreign investment in the mining 
industry was part of a broader re-appraisal of the role of such 
investment in the economy as a whole. Since 1945, Australian 
governments and their electorates had generally accepted that 
foreign investment was in Australia's benefit,^^ but by the . 12 
mid-1960s this assumption was increasingly being questioned. 
Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia, 
Treasury Economic Paper No.l, (Canberra, May 1972), Table 18, 
p. 25. The criteria employed in defining the extent of foreign 
ownership and control are outlined in Appendix A, pp.138-9, 
of the Treasury Paper. 
^^ ibid, p.26. 
^^ B. Fitzpatrick and E.L. Wheelwright, The Highest Bidder: 
/I Citizen's Guide to the Problems of Foreign Investment vn 
Australia, (Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1965), pp.xi-xii. 
Public concern was generated on occasion, for example in the 
mid-1950s, when the U.S.-owned General Motors Holden earned 
very high profits, but it was not sustained. 
^^ See, for example. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of 
the Committee of Eeonomia Inquiry, May 1965, (the 'Vernon 
Report'), (Government Printer, Canberra, 1966), p.293; 
B. Fitzpatrick and E.L. Wheelwright, op.cit.; E.W. Peters, 
A Financial Invasion: the Take-over of AustraUa, (Melbourne, 
1968) . 
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The leaders of the ruling Liberal Country Party coalition 
publicly stated their sympathy v/ith their constituents' fears, 
but generally failed to formulate policies which might have 
allayed them. As early as 1964, the Prime Minister, Sir 
Robert Menzies, expressed his concern with the increasing 
dominance of foreign investment, but proposed no action to 
stem or reverse the trend; rather he placed his hopes on an 
appeal to foreign investors 'to give Australians a share in 
their companies'.^^ In 1969 his successor, Mr Gorton, stated 
his government's desire to see foreign investors operating 
on a joint basis with Australian concerns, and expressed 
confidence that overseas companies would respond to this 
desire.^^ Despite evidence that these appeals were falling 
on deaf ears,^^ similar statements v/ere still being made 
by the Liberal Prime Minister, Mr McMahon, in 1972.^^ In the 
intervening years, very little had been done to ensure that 
the government's 'hopes' v/ould be realised, while the extent 
of foreign ov/nership and control in the mining and manufacturing 
sectors steadily increased. 
^^ Quoted in B. Fitzpatrick and E.L. Wheelwright, op.cit., 
p.xiii. 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of 
Representatives, Vol.65, 16 September 1969, p.1382. 
^^ For example a detailed survey of American investment_in 
Australia published in 1966, had revealed that most American 
companies were unwilling to admit Australians as shareholders 
or partners. D.T. Brash, American Investment in Australian 
Industry, (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 
1966), pp.67-71. 
^^ CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.80, 26 September 1972, 
p.1920. 
Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia, 
Table 16, p.22; Table 18, p.25. 
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Ad hoc measures were taken in response to particular 
situations. In May 1965 restrictions were placed on local 
borrowings by foreign firms in an attempt to ensure that 
Australian companies would not be deprived of capital, but these 
18 
were not rigorously applied. In September 1969, a revised 
set of restrictions was introduced, with the ability of foreign 
companies to borrow in Australia being expressly related to the 
proportion of their equity held by Australians. Action was 
taken on two occasions to prevent foreign take-overs of individual 
firms in 'sensitive areas' (life assurance and uranium mining), 
and in 1972 an agency was established to screen future foreign 
take-over proposals, after a rush of such transactions had 
generated widespread public concern. 
By the mid-1960s, a difference in emphasis was appearing 
within government ranks, with the Country Party under Mr (later 
Sir) John McEwan advocating the need for more positive action 
to encourage Australian participation in industrial and resource 
development. To this end, McEwan established the Australian 
Industry Development Corporation (AIDC). However, the AIDC 
was severely constrained in the type and range of activities 
it could undertake in attempting to assist Australian 
enterprises (see below, p.290). 
None of these measures represented a fundamental departure 
from the previous 'open door' policy towards direct foreign 
investment, and there was in fact no serious re-appraisal of 
18 
H.F. Bell, 'Australian Government Policy in Relation to 
Foreign Investment', Australian Quarterly, Vol.48, No.l, 
(March 1976), p.47. 
19 CPU, House of Representatives, Vol.80, 26 September 1972, 
p.1917. 
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policy in this area, reflecting the coalition's belief that 
the overall impact of foreign investment was overwhelmingly 
19 
in Australia's favour. 
This general attitude was reflected in the government's 
approach towards foreign investment in the mining industry. 
In a major statement on mineral policy to the federal parliament 
in 1972, the Minister for National Development, Mr Swartz, 
stated that a prime objective was 'to ensure that Australians 
participate effectively both in the equity capital of natural 20 
resource projects and in their management'. However the 
Minister did not offer any suggestions as to how this 
objective might be achieved, and indicated that there was 
no intention of taking any action regarding the high current 21 level of foreign ownership and control in the mining industry. 
In the immediate post-war period, the Labor Party 
generally shared these favourable attitudes towards foreign 
22 investment. However by the early 1960s Labor Members of 
Parliament were expressing disquiet with the increasing role 
2 3 of foreign concerns, an attitude given considerable impetus 
19 
CPd, House of Representatives, Vol.80, 26 September 1972, 
p.1917. 
^^ Australia's Natural Resources: Ministerial Statement and 
Review, Parliamentary Paper No.212 (1972), p.2. 
21 ibid, pp.15-17. 
22 
For an outline of the manner in which Labor Party policy 
developed, see H.F. Bell, op.cit., pp.44-58. 
^^ See, for example, the statements by Labor MPs, CPD, House 
of Representatives, Vol.35, 11 April 1962, pp.1588-98. 
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by the large-scale f o r e i g n - f i n a n c e d m i n e r a l developments of 
the 1960s. By 1972 the e a r l i e r b i p a r t i s a n approach had 
disappeared. The L a b o r Party still supported foreign involvement 
24 
in mineral d e v e l o p m e n t o f f i c i a l l y , but it also advocated 
active intervention by the C o m m o n w e a l t h to contain the growth 
of foreign o w n e r s h i p and c o n t r o l of m i n e r a l resources and 
to encourage A u s t r a l i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n in mineral 
development. 
In replying to the 1972 M i n i s t e r i a l statement on 
resources p o l i c y , Labor spokesmen outlined their Party's 
position in greater d e t a i l . They recommended that in future 
priority be given to A u s t r a l i a n s and Australian companies in 
resource d e v e l o p m e n t . W h e r e m i n e r a l resources were already 
in the possession of foreign c o m p a n i e s , Australians should 
be offered a chance to p a r t i c i p a t e in their development 
either directly or t h r o u g h the share m a r k e t . If domestic 
private investment w e r e not f o r t h c o m i n g , the Australian 
government should c o n s i d e r entering into partnership with 
the foreign c o n c e r n . In g e n e r a l , they were critical of what 
they saw as the L i b e r a l P a r t y ' s 'colonial m e n t a l i t y ' and 
its 'soft approach to m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s ' , and 
recommended that g o v e r n m e n t adopt a harder line to ensure I 25 
'maximum A u s t r a l i a n e q u i t y , p a r t i c i p a t i o n and control' More 
specifically, they argued the need for government action to 
ensure that pricing p o l i c i e s adopted by foreign mining concerns 
were in A u s t r a l i a ' s i n t e r e s t s , that such companies would supply 
C?D , House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , V o l . 8 1 , 26 October 1972 
p.3343. 
25 
ibid, p p . 3 3 4 3 - 5 1 . 
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the government with detailed information regarding their 
operations, and that Australian minerals would, as far as 
2 6 
possible, be processed in Australia. 
On 20 September 1972 the Labor Party released a statement 
of its policy towards foreign investment in general. This 
emphasised the need to contain and even reverse the trend of 
growing ownership and control in resource industries, stating 
that a Labor government would 'act as necessary to retain and 
regain maximum Australian ownership of and control of industries 
27 
and resources'. It also outlined concrete proposals for 
encouraging Australian participation in resource development. 
The role of the AIDC would be expanded, with the objective of 
ensuring 'majority Australian ownership and control over 
existing and future enterprises'. A National Development 
Corporation would be established to mobilise Australian capital 
by issuing Commonwealth-guaranteed National Development Bonds; 
where necessary, domestic funds v/ould be supplemented by selling-
these bonds overseas. Another aim of this Corporation would be 
to ensure that existing Australian equity in resource projects 
remained in Australian hands. The government would also 
encourage life assurance companies and superannuation funds to 
increase their investments in resource projects by granting 0 o 
taxation and other incentives. In general, the emphasis 
v/ould be 'not so much [on] permitting foreign capital to do 
Ibid, pp.3347-8. 
27 
Foreign Investment and Associated Matters: Resolution by 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, 20 September 1972, 
(Canberra, 1972) . 
2 8 . Ibid. 
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less [than on] permitting persuading and enabling Australian 
2 9 capital to do more'. 
A Labor government would review the taxation provisions 
applying to mining companies, take action to ensure that 
export prices were maximised, and pursue maximum treatment and 
fabrication in Australia of Australian resources.^^ 
The Labor Party was elected to office on 2 December 1972, 
and over the next three years attempted to implement the 
policies outlined above. For the purposes of this analysis, 
its initiatives can be divided into five categories, though 
many of the measures taken were in practice closely linked. 
The first category involved plans to mobilise Australian private 
capital, the second concerned direct government participation 
in mineral exploration and development, the third involved 
formulation of ownership guidelines for future mining projects, 
the fourth the application of controls to mineral exports, and 
the fifth the amendment of income tax legislation governing the• 
mining sector. 
Mobilisation of domestic capital and the AIDC 
The AIDC was chosen as the agency through which it was 
hoped to mobilise private domvestic investment capital for 
resource exploitation. Under the establishing legislation,^^ 
^^ CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.80, 26 September 1972, 
p.1923. 
30 . ibid, pp.1922-3. 
^^ The Australian Industry Development Corporation Act 1970. 
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the AIDC's role was primarily to provide short-term assistance 
to Australian private enterprise in an attempt to increase 
domestic participation in industrial and resource development. 
It did this mainly by bringing together parties who in combination 
might be able to undertake major projects, and by providing 
a part of capital requirements (in loan or equity form) where 
this would ensure project viability. It was expected to sell 
any equity it acquired to private investors at the earliest 
opportunity, it could only purchase equity when providing 
capital for development, it could not itself initiate investment 
proposals, and could not be the sole Australian participant 
in joint ventures with foreign concerns. Its borrowing 
powers were limited and it was normally expected to borrow 
abroad.^^ Clearly the AIDC's powers and the scope of its 
activities would have to be expanded if it was to perform the 
role assigned to it in Labor party policy. 
Proposals to do so were incorporated in legislation 
introduced by the Minister for Overseas Trade and Secondary 
Industry, Dr Cairns, in August 1973. The Australian Industry 
Development Corporation Bill in 1973 proposed that the AIDC 
would be allowed to initiate investment proposals itself, 
retain shares it purchased, borrow more substantial amounts 
on foreign and Australian markets, and purchase equity in 
existing concerns. Capital to fund the AIDC's activities 
would be mobilised through the National Investment Fund (NIF), 
3 3 to be established by concurrent legislation. The NIF would 
^^ CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.85, 30 August 1973, p.654. 
^^ The National Investment Fund Bill 1973. 
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set up savings plans similar to superannuation schemes to 
w h i c h individual Australians could contribute; contributions 
up to a certain limit would be tax deductible. It would also 
establish a number of investment divisions, and for each 
division there would be a series of investment bonds and a 
corresponding portfolio of assets. Income to the investor 
would be paid out of the income earned by the assets in his 
division of the fund, and to encourage investment the government 
would contribute $10 to the fund for each $100 invested by 
individual Australians. Investment bonds would also be used 
to channel foreign investment into mining projects. The 
foreign investor would be entitled to income earned by the 
project and to the benefit of any growth in its capital value, 
^ ^ 34 
but ownership and control would remain in Australian hands. 
The AIDC's principal aims would be to create opportunities 
'for the ordinary citizen to share in the kind of capital 
appreciation which so far has been confined to a very small 
percentage of the Australian people', and in the process to 
strengthen the individual Australian enterprise so that large 
Australian companies could grow up alongside the existing . • 35 foreign ones. 
The AIDC would have two other roles. VJhere the Corporation 
deemed it 'economacally prudent and possible to do so' it 
would act to regain control of foreign-owned industries. Indeed 
in Dr Cairn's personal view one of the AIDC's main aims would 
^^ CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.85, 30 August 1973, 
pp.655-7. 
35 ibid, p.656. 
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be to 'buy back Australia^^ and he stated his approval for 
a proposal by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) to sell 
5 per cent of its equity to the Corporation.^^ 
The second role would be to act as an intermediary for 
government involvement in mineral-related developments. Where 
the AIDC decided it should not invest contributors' funds in 
a project because of high risk levels or the scale of 
expenditures involved, the government might decide to provide 
the necessary capital itself, and would do so through another 
division which it proposed to add to the AIDC, the National 
Interest Fund.^^ Labor spokesmen made it clear that the Fund 
would be used as a vehicle for direct government participation 
in resource development, particularly in mineral processing 
39 (for example uranium enrichment). 
The Liberal and National Country parties opposed the Bills 
on a number of g r o u n d s . T h e y claimed that the AIDC would do 
^^ ibid, 29 August 1973, p.515. 
'The High Cost of Nationalism', Age, 14 April 1973. Dr 
Cairns apparently soon lost his enthusiasm for the CRA scheme. 
^^ Government capital would be kept separate from other funds 
to protect contributors from loss, and the government would 
exercise control over its expenditure, whereas the AIDC would 
enjoy considerable autonomy in its other investment decisions. 
^^ CFD, House of Representatives, Vol.86, 16 October 1973, 
p.2176. 
Only those objections based on economic grounds are dealt 
with in the text. The opposition also rejected the Bills on 
ideoloaical grounds, arguina that the AIDC's activities would 
bring about a massive transfer of resources from the private ^ 
to the public sector, a 'socialisation of Australian industry , 
a prospect which both parties found repugnant. CPB House 
of Representatives, Vol.86, 16 October 1973, pp.2162-6, 21/4. 
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little to mobilise additional domestic investm.ent, pointing 
out that Australia already had a very high savings ratio by 
world standards. Rather, because of the incentives they would 
offer to investors, the AIDC and the HIF would successfully 
compete for funds v/ith existing savings institutions and with 
government and semi-government agencies. Capital invested by 
the Corporation would thus be withdrawn from other uses, for 
example provision of housing and other infrastructure. If 
the foreign investment displaced by the AIDC left the country, 
the overall level of investment would decline, with consequent 
loss of income, employm.ent and government revenue. The 
opposition argued that in fact foreign concerns would not 
invest in enterprises which they neither owned nor controlled, 
and would not transfer their funds into activities traditionally 
41 
carried on by building societies and other saving institutions. 
Opposition spokesmen were particularly critical of schemes 
to 'buy back' equity in foreign mining companies, arguing that 
they might not in fact ensure Australian control of the 
enterprises involved while creating costs of the type outlined 
above. Support for this argument was drawn from the 1972 
Treasury Paper on Overseas Investment, which had outlined the 
manner in which foreign mining companies could, by well-timed 
minority issues of shares in their subsidiaries, increase the 
size and profitability of their Australian operations without 
foregoing ultimate control. The Treasury had concluded that 
'such issues may in fact yield a rather small return to Australia , 42 in terms of alternative uses of dom.estic savings . 
41 . ibid, pp.2162-7. 
Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia, p.97 
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The issue of share purchases in mining companies raised 
tv.'O broader questions. The first related to efficiency in 
the allocation of capital resources. The opposition was not 
convinced that the AIDC could guarantee returns on funds higher 
than or even equal to those being earned by private investment 
corporations, and believed that it might well earn lower rates 
as its investment decisions would be influenced more by the 
desire to maximise Australian ownership than by purely comjnercial 
criteria. Consequently opposition spokesmen could see no 
43 
reason for transfering private investment capital to the AIDC. 
The second issue involved the relationship between ownership 
and control. The opposition accused the government of failing 
to examdne this relationship in detail, and claimed that 
Australian control of mineral development could be ensured 
without resort to what it saw as the unnecessary expense of . . 44 
acquiring ownership of foreign mining concerns. 
The government's view was that foreign concerns would in 
fact be willing to invest in mineral developm.ent through the 
AIDC, partly because such investment vrould yield a substantial 
profit, but m.ore im^portantly because the investor would be 
given guaranteed access to the minerals being produced: this 
was thought to be a more significant consideration than being 
granted equity, particularly to Japanese companies operating 4 5 in the energy minerals sector (coal, uranium). Government 
^^ CPU, House of Representatives, Vol.86, 18 October 1973, 
pp.2343-4 . 
ibid, 16 October 1973, pp.2172-4. 
45 ibid, Vol.86, 16 October 1973, p.2170. 
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spokesmen pointed out that Australia generated some 90 per cent 
4 6 
of her capital requirements internally, presumably im.plying 
that the economy v/ould not be unduly affected if foreign funds 
weve withdrawn. It v/as also emphasised that a major part of 
the AIDC's activities would involve mobilisation of Australian 
capital to develop new mineral discoveries, and that in these 47 
cases there would be no question of displacing foreign capital. 
The government claimed that Australia would suffer 
considerable loss if it failed to bring foreign-financed mining 
projects under national control. Their principal concern was 
that mineral exports would be underpriced, reducing tax 48 liability (and so government revenue) in Australia. As 
Dr Cairns stated, 
without strong Australian participation, we v/ill have 
the prospect of Australian resources and industries 
being developed to m^aximise the global profits of 
multinational corporations, and very often at lower 
prices than if we in Australia were able to match a 
little closer their monopolistic pov7ers.49 
More generally, it was claimed that Australia's lack of control 
over her mineral resources was one factor in placing her in an 
'economically subservient position' in relation to her principal 
trading partners, denying her the opportunity to use her 
possession of valuable resources as a bargaining counter in 
diplomatic negotiations, and effectively reducing Australia's 
46 . . ibid, p.2186 
ibid, p.2190 
^^ ibid, pp. 2170, 2190. 
49 ibid, Vol.85, 30 August 1973, p.653. 
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^ 4-- 50 control over its own destiny. 
The AIDC and NIF Bills were delayed in the Senate, 
reintroduced in the House, delayed once again by the calling 
of a general election in April 1974, and introduced for a 
third time in July 1974. The Senate finally accepted an 
amended version of the AIDC Bill in March 1975.^^ It continued 
to reject the NIF legislation, which was of course integral to 
the government's whole concept of the AIDC's role, and which 
had not yet been ratified when Labor was removed from office 
in November 1975. 
Direct government participation in mineral exploration and 
development 
The platform on which the Labor party fought the 1972 
election included a call for 
the comprehensive developm.ent under Government control 
of Australia's mineral resources with emphasis on the 
need for discovery of new deposits and direct Common-
wealth and State participation in oil and mineral 
search and exploitation ...^^ 
In December 1973 the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Mr Connor, 
introduced legislation for the establishment of a Petroleum 
and Minerals Authority (PMA), which was intended to be the 
principal vehicle for federal government action in this area. 
50 ibid, Vol.86, 16 October 1973, pp.2186, 2191. 
^ The most significant amendments prevented the AIDC itself 
from raising funds except by borrowings, enjoined it to dispose 
o f shares 'not necessary for the performance of its functions , 
and placed restrictions on its ability to gain control over 
business enterprises. 
^^ CPB, House of Representatives, Vol.87, 4 Decem.ber 1973, 
p. 4244 . 
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The function of the PMA v/ould be 'to explore for and 
develop petroleum and mineral resources and to assist in 
implementing the Government's policy of promoting Australian 
ownership and control of natural resources and resource 
industries'. A crucial aspect of its work would be to help 
implement the governm.ent's energy policies, and consequently 
much of its effort would be concentrated on petroleum and 
natural gas, but its activities would extend to non-fuel 
minerals. In particular, it vrauld have the task of encouraging 
increased Australian ownership and control in this latter 
area. VJhere Australian ventures had discovered promising 
mineral deposits but were unable to finance further exploration 
and development, the PMA would provide assistance. Mr Connor 
pointed out that existing Australian mining concerns had a 
limited capacity to take on new ventures, and that local 
exploration companies found themselves turning to foreign 
investors to provide finance; as a result, the latter secured 
an interest in Australia's mineral resources.^^ The P:4A would 
remove the need for foreign capital by providing equity, loans, 
or guarantees, financing its activities from funds saved by 
the Treasury by abolishing tax concessions previously granted 
to individuals and companies contributing to private exploration 
programmes (see below, p.313 Mr Connor stated the PtlA 
would not take over foreign equity in existing mining ventures. 
^^  ibid, p.4248 
^^  ibid, Vol.88, 8 April 1974, p.1155. 
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but only assist local concerns in developing new discoveries.^^ 
In pursuit of its functions the PflA could 'undertake 
activities appropriate to a petroleum and mining business.... 
employing its own personnel and equipment in search, letting 
out contracts for search, acting in partnership with companies, 
....[and] taking up shares in companies^^ The Authority 
would initiate exploration on its own behalf by publishing a 
notice in the government Gazette to the effect that a particular 
area had been declared an exploration area for the purposes of 
the establishing Act. It would not enter land until the 
written permission of the occupier had been received, but if 
this was not forthcoming a Justice of the Peace could issue a 
warrant permitting entry. 
The opposition rejected the proposed legislation vehemently. 
It claimed the PMA v;ould be another vehicle for the government's 
plans to 'socialise' Australian industry, that the powers of 
entry conferred on the Authority would allow it to usurp 
promising exploration areas held by private concerns, take over 
mineral deposits discovered by other prospectors, and even 
nationalise existing m.ining operations.^^ Undesirable in itself, 
this prospect would also have serious side effects. It would 
destroy the traditional power of the states to allocate mineral 
^^ ibid, Vol.87, 4 December 1973, pp.4245-6. 
^^ ibid, pp.4247-8. 
^^ ibid, 12 December 1973, p.4602. 
^^ ibid, pp.4598, 4602, 4630-2. The opposition also claimed_ 
that the legislation failed to provide for adequate compensation 
if confiscation did occur. 
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59 rights. The threat of nationalisation would have a disastrous 
effect on mineral exploration. Foreign companies would be 
unwilling to invest risk capital knov/ing that any discoveries 
might be confiscated,^*^ while the uncertainty created by the PMA's 
existence would make it difficult for local concerns to raise 
finance. ^ ^ It was claimed the legislation v/ould have this 
effect regardless of the government's actual intentions, since 
the threat of confiscation would constantly be looming over the 
6 2 
industry. The opposition also pointed out that the Treasury 
would save only about $50 million by abolishing the tax 
concessions, a sum which could not possible make up for the 
predicted decline in private exploration.^^ 
The opposition also rejected the legislation on other grounds. 
It was opposed in principle to the use of taxpayers money in 
high-risk activity,^"* particularly in the area of non-fuel 
minerals v/here, it claimied, plentiful reserves were already 
available for mining.^^ Opposition spokesmen also objected to 
what they saw as the Authority's favoured position in relation 
to the private concerns with which it would be competing; in 
their view, the establishing legislation would exempt the 
PMA from state royalties and give it access to unlimited interest-
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
ibid, pp.4609, 4630. 
ibid, p.4628. 
ibid, Vol.88, 8 April 1974, p.1165. 
ibid, Vol.87, 12 December 1973, p.4628. 
ibid, p.4601. 
ibid, pp.4601, 4608. 
ibid, pp.4602, 4606. 
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free capital appropriated from taxpayers' funds.^^ 
Opposition leaders made it clear the government had in 
their opinion exceeded its legal authority in proposing to 
establish the PMA, and that the relevant legislation would be 
challenged in the Courts on constitutional grounds. 
In reply, government spokesmen claim>ed the PMA's exploration 
activity v;ould be concentrated on off-shore and petroleum and 
natural gas search, and that its principal task in relation to 
6 8 
non-fuel minerals would be to assist private Australian concerns. 
They argued there was a need for direct government participation 
in the minerals and energy sector if decision-making was to be 
based on the 'community good', and not just on the motivation 
of private shareholders or multinational corporations. More 
generally, they claimed it was necessary to increase Australian 
ownership of resources (by public and private concerns) if 69 
Australia was not to be 'ripped and raped' by foreign companies. 
In particular, concern was expressed that Australian mineral 
exports would be underpriced while such companies were in control. 
The Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill was passed by 
the House of Representatives on two occasions in 1973-4, but was 
rejected on both by the opposition-dominated Senate. Along 
v/ith a number of other bills it was the basis for a double 
6 6 
ibid, pp.4609, 4616-7. 
ibid, Vol.88, 8 April 1974, p.1161. 
^^  ibid, pp.1154-5; Vol.87, 12 December 1973, pp.4607, 4612. 
^^  ibid, Vol.88, 8 April 1974, p.1156; Vol.87, 12 December 1973, 
pp.4611, 4620. 
ibid, Vol.87, 12 December 1973, p.4626. 
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dissolution of Parliament in April 1974, and when the Labor 
Party was returned to office it pushed the measure through in 
a joint sitting of both Houses. The Act was already under 
challenge in the High Court on technical grounds, but the 
Authority was constituted in any case, in August 1974. The 
High Court found the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act 
invalid in June 1975. The government announced plans to re-
introduce it, and in the meantime to establish a corporation 
which would perform the Authority's functions, but it proved 
legally impossible to transfer funds voted by Parliament to 
this corporation. A considerably modified version of the Act 
72 
was introduced in October 1975, but the Labor Party's 
electoral defeat in December prevented further action. 
During the short period for which it was operational, the 
PMA had available neither the time nor the resources to organise 
an exploration programjne on its own behalf, but it did become 
involved in a number of existing mining ventures. For example 
in October 1974 it acquired a 49 per cent shareholding in the 
Wambo Mining Corporation, a New South VJales coal producer which 
was then suffering from cash shortages. Wambo unsuccessfully 
The challenge v/as based on the fact that the required three 
months had not elapsed between the Bill's rejection in the Senate 
and its re-introduction in the House. 
The amended version of the Act modified those of the 
Authority's powers which had been most vehem.ently rejected by 
the opposition, for example those relating to acquisition of 
mining interests and to the Authority's right to enter land 
under warrant of a Justice of the Peace. 
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sought help from a number of Australian companies, after which 
it considered admitting the Anglo American Corporation of 
South Africa Limited as a shareholder under an arrangement 
which would have raised its level of foreign ownership from 17 
to 53 per cent. Wambo approached the PMA, which agreed to pay 
$3.7 million for 49 per cent of the company and provide credit 
facilities. The Authority assisted a number of other Australian 
companies in this v^ay, but its largest single venture was 
motivated by a desire to increase Australian ownership in a 
foreign firm. This involved the acquisition of shareholding in 
Dehli International Oil Corporation, a wholly U.S.-owned 
company which controlled oil and natural gas deposits in South 
74 
Australia. 
Another vehicle for direct government participation was 
the Australian Atomic Energy Comjnission (AAEC). In mid-1974 
the AAEC agreed to underwrite a share issue by the CRA subsidiary, 
Mary Kathleen Uranium (MKU), when it became apparent that the 
level of foreign ownership in MKU would otherwise increase; as 
a result, the AJ^ EC obtained a 46 per cent holding in the company. 
'Wambo Shares Purchased: Media Statement, R. Connor, 
23 October 1974 ' . 
74 The PMA paid $12.7 million for a 50 per cent interest in 
Dehli's Copper Basin reserves and a 25 per cent interest in 
its exploration ventures outside the Basin. Its purchase 
raised Australian ownership in the Basin's reserves from 37 
to 53 per cent. 'Authority to Acquire Oil and Gas Interest: 
Media Statement, R. Connor, 2 February 1975'. 
'Reopening of Mary Kathleen Uranium Mine: Media Statement, 
R- Connor, 14 August 1974'. 
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The government undertook a much more substantial commitment by 
involving the AAEC in the Northern Territory Ranger uranium 
project, controlled by two predominantly Australian-owned 
companies, EZ Industries and Peko-Wallsend. In October 1973 
the government concluded an agreement with these companies 
whereby it would provide 72.5 per cent of the project costs 
(then estimated at $100 million) in return for 50 per cent 
of the uranium concentrates produced. According to later 
reports, EZ Industries and Peko-Wallsend v/ere far from happy 
with the government's involvement, which they regarded as 
'effective expropriation', and only agreed to the arrangement 
in the belief that to do otherwise would be to risk losing their 
entire investment. 
What prompted the government to becom.e involved in an 
Austvalian mining enterprise? Its concern to exercise control 
over energy sources was clearly important; in addition, it may 
have felt that the Ranger partners' need for finance might 
force them to involve foreign investors in the project. Perhaps 
most importantly, two of the other large Northern Territory 
uranium deposits, which would be developed later, were foreign 
7 8 owned (Jabiluka and Koongara). The government had decided to 
7 9 acquire a 50 per cent holding in these ventures, and may 
By 1979 the estimated cost of this project had risen to 
$300 million. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 January 1980. 
Jabiluka was controlled by the U.S.-based Pancontinental 
Mines Ltd, Koongara by the Canadian Noranda Mines Ltd. 
'Northern Territory Uranium Program Outlined: Media 
Statement, R. Connor, 31 October 1974'. 
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consequently have felt that it had to set a precedent with the 
first major development. 
Ownership guidelines for the mining industry 
The third category of initiatives involved the formulation 
of ownership guidelines for future mining projects. At an 
early stage the government made it clear that in future there 
would be 'at least majority Australian control over both equity 
and policy in resource development'.^^ In October 1973 the 
Prime Minister, Mr Whitlam, issued a major policy statement on 
foreign investment, and this explained the government's position 
in greater detail. Its general aim would be 'to achieve the 
highest possible level of Australian ownership', by v/hich v/as 
meant 'the highest Australian equity that can be achieved in 
negotiations, project by project, that are fair and reasonable 
to both parties and are within the capacity of our own savings 
... 81 to support'. 
Thus Mr Whitlam. indicated his government's belief that 
continued foreign investment might be required, and he went on 
to say: 
I want to make it clear that there is no prescription 
of foreign equity participation in mining. In some 
circumstances it may be acceptable for foreign investors 
to participate significantly in decision-making in a 
project. The size of the project, the amounts involved, 
and the type of mineral are all factors to be taken into 
account. In pursuing our objectives we shall be 
CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.83, 12 April 1973, p.1411 80 
^^ 'Foreign Investment in Australia: Speech by_the Prime 
Minister, Mr Whitlam, at the Australia-Japan Ministerial 
Committee Meeting, Tokyo, 30 August 1973'. 
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flexible and guided by the particular needs of 
particular cases.^^ 
However this flexible approach would not apply to fuel minerals, 
particularly uranium. Grov/ing world energy shortages and 
'other factors' dictated that full Australian ownership and 
8 3 
control would be sought in this area. Nevertheless the 
government recognised that in this case also Australia's 
resources of capital and technology might be inadequate, and 
that it would consequently 'need to call upon overseas expertise, 
technology and capital...'. However overseas participation 
would be sought 'through access to technology, loans and 
especially long-term contracts', rather than through equity 
84 ties. 
Exploration for uranium would also be carried out exclusively 
by Australian concerns, but in regard to exploration for other 
minerals Mr Whitlam stated: 
In order to maintain a desirable level of exploration 
activity, we would, if necessary, accept a lower^ 
level of Australian ownership in exploration. Given 
the limited Australian capital resources available 
and the higher risks usually involved in exploration, 
there is m.uch to be said for concentrating equity at 
the production stage.^^ 
This policy was based on a num.ber of important assumptions. 
The first was that foreign investors would be willing to supply 
capital and technology without obtaining equity. The second was 
82 ibid. 
^^ ibid. Full Australian ownership and control was regarded 
as an 'objective' in uranium projects and as 'a desirable 
objective' in oil, natural gas and coal projects. 
ibid. 
^^ -Northern Territory Uranium Program Outlined: Media 
Statement, R. Connor, 31 October 1974'. 
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that Australia could generate sufficient capital to maintain or 
increase exploration for fuel minerals, and to provide a 
high proportion of development finance for fuel and non-fuel 
mineral discoveries. The third was that foreign mining concerns 
v/ould be willing to finance the bulk of expenditure on 
exploration for non-fuel minerals in the knowledge that, if 
successful, they would be expected to offer an unknown proportion 
of their equity to Australian concerns. The validity of the 
first two assumptions is analysed in detail below; as regards 
exploration, time alone would tell whether foreign companies 
would be prepared to operate under these conditions,^^ but the 
view of overseas companies then operating in Australia was that 
they definitely would not.^"^ One point was clear - the guidelines 
relating to exploration and development of non-fuel minerals 
left considerable uncertainty as to what level of foreign 
participation would be acceptable, and this in itself was 
likely to have an adverse effect on exploration. 
When Mr VJhitlam issued his next policy statem.ent on equity 
guidelines in November 1974, the em.phasis had shifted somewhat. 
The government's aim was to achieve 'maximum Australian ownership 
compatible with Australia's long-term capital requirements and 
its needs for access to markets, advanced technology and know-how' 
^^ In real terms, expenditure on mineral exploration fell 
substantially between 1972 and 1975, but it is not apparent 
whether this was due to the equity guidelines ' . . , . ^^ ^ 
uncertainty created by the Labor government s other initiatives, 
or to other factors. 
'No equity for foreign investment'. Age, 11 August 1973. 
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Mr Whitlam added: 
The Government recognises however, that many of the 
important existing enterprises engaged in the 
development of Australian resources are under 
foreign equity control. For this reason, the 
promotion of Australian equity in and control of 
our resources and industries must be viewed as a 
longer-term objective. 
The statement repeated the government's recognition of the 
need for foreign investment, particularly in exploration, and 
again stressed that Australian equity would be concentrated at 
the production stage. There was still no indication as to 
precisely what level of foreign participation would be acceptable. 
Though stressing the need for foreign investment in 
exploration, the government did insist that Australian concerns 
be invited to participate in all new exploration ventures. 
Over the period to March 1975, it refused some 30 foreign 
companies permission to import funds for exploration until this 
90 requirement had been satisfied. 
More definite equity guidelines were not laid down until 
September 1975. The requirement to seek Australian participation 
at the exploration stage was removed,^^ and Mr Whitlam announced 
that: 
89 
p p 
'Foreign Equity in Mining: Media Statement, E.G. Whitlam, 
3 November 1974 ' . 
ibid. 
9 0 'Share or no funds: Canberra', kge, 1 March 1975. 
^^  'Policy on Foreign Investment: Statement by the Prime 
Minister, Mr Gough Whitlam, 24 September 1975'. However, foreign 
companies would be required to report to the Treasurer when 
the proving-up stage was reached and in any case every two years 
on the efforts they were making to attract Australian participation 
in their exploration activities. 
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the Government will expect proposals for all new mineral 
development projects (other than those relating to 
uranium) to have no more than 50 per cent foreign owner-
ship and with the foreign participants having no more 
than 50 per cent of the voting strength on the board of 
the development company. The Government will not insist 
on the Australian participants necessarily being the 
technical operators and supervisors of the project, but 
will expect Australian nationals to have a significant 
role to play in the management, technical operation and 
control....In considering proposals for foreign equity 
participation... account will be taken of the expected 
main source of demand for the output of the development.^^ 
However it was stressed that all foreign investment proposals 
would be examined on a case by case basis to ensure maximum 
93 
benefit to Australia. 
The reference to the source of demand for mineral output 
reflected the government's recognition that availability of 
secure markets v/as frequently dependent on the potential 
customer being permitted to take a major shareholding at the 
mining stage. This represented a fundamental departure from the 
previous position, which was based on the assumption that 
customers would be willing to forgo ownership in return for 
security of supply, and v/hich ignored the fact that many 
consumers equated security of supply with a measure of ownership 
and control. 
Mr Whitlam's announcement was greeted with approval by 
mining industry spokesmen, who felt that the stipulation of 
minimum Australian equity removed much of the uncertainty 
created by the previous ad hoc approach, allowing foreign 94 companies to plan accordingly. 
ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
-Whitlam's new guidelines demand 50% Australian ownership', 
^ge, 25 September 1975. 
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Export controls 
Another means of implementing policies v/as provided by the 
Commonv/ealth' s control over mineral exports, derived from the 
federal parliament's jurisdiction over international trade. 
Mineral exports had been subject to federal control on a number 
of occasions prior to 1972, mainly for purposes of conservation 
(iron ore from 1938 to 1960) or on grounds of national security 
(uranium). In the decade to 1972 , controls v/ere generally 
relaxed, though the government did intervene to insist on 
price increases for iron ore shipments to Japan in 1966, and 
95 
to set floor prices for zircon exports in 1971. All of 
these actions were taken on an ad hoc basis in response to 
specific problems, and generally involved only one mineral 
at a time. 
When the Labor Party cam.e to office, it announced that all 
minerals would be subject to control on a continuous basis. 
Beginning in March 1973, applications for export licences would 
have to be cleared by the Department of Minerals and Energy. 
In order to obtain clearance, exporters would have to supply 
the Department with copies of existing sales contracts and 
other relevant documents affecting quantities, price and 
conditions of export, and to consult with it prior to finalising 
96 new export contracts. 
G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australvan Federat^sm, 
Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations Research 
Monograph No.17, (Australian National University, Canberra, 1976), 
pp.48, 52. The government maintained a limited supervision of 
iron ore exports over the period 1966-72; it set minimum prices, 
which in practice were rarely exceeded, and read the export 
contracts, which it almost invariably approved. 
^^ 'Mineral Exports Controlled: Press Statement, R. Connor, 
Canberra, 23 February 1973'. 
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The government had at least three distinct reasons for 
applying export controls. The first was to obtain information. 
Mr Connor complained that his predecessors had kept no records 
regarding export prices obtained, the degree to which these 
corresponded to 'world parity' prices, the periods over which 
contracts applied, or the currencies in v/hich they were denominated. 
Because of constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction 
over mineral rights, export controls represented the only 
means by which the government could obtain this and other data 
. . 97 
on v/hich to base its policy decisions. 
Secondly, the government feared that mineral exports might 
be undervalued, for tv;o reasons. First, transfer pricing might 
occur between subsidiaries of vertically-integrated multinational 
mining companies, especially in the aluminium industry. Secondly, 
closely co-ordinated buyers might hold a bargaining advantage 
over Australian suppliers who were fragmented and frequently 
competing among themselves for export markets. Of particular 
concern in this latter regard were sales of iron ore and coal 
to Japanese companies, who operated through a single buying 
agency. The fact that a num.ber of Japanese customers were 
shareholders in the Australian companies with which they held 
contracts, and that close ties existed between those customers 
and the Japanese government, provided additional grounds for 
anxiety that Australia might not be receiving the full value of q o Its exports. 
97 
CVD, House of Representatives, Vol.83, 3 April 1973, p.969. 
9 8 G. Stevenson, op.cit., p.48. 
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Thirdly, export controls could provide the government 
with a power of veto over the development of new mines, allowing 
it to ensure that its guidelines on issues such as foreign 
99 equity participation or environmental protection were adhered to. 
In 1973-4, the government utilised its export controls to 
impose a more co-ordinated approach on mineral exporters, 
particularly on Western Australian iron ore producers. Price 
guidelines were agreed upon at meetings with these producers 
prior to each set of negotiations with the Japanese, a strategy 
which apparently had some success. In May 1973 the iron ore 
companies won substantial price increases from the Japanese to 
compensate them for devaluation of the Australian dollar (their 
contracts were denominated in U.S. dollars).^^^ In August 1974 
Mr Connor instructed the producers to re-negotiate increases in 
iron ore prices, with the result that prices increased by 28 
rather than 24 per cent.^^^ Subsequently, the depressed 
state of world iron ore markets restricted the government's 
ability to act in this way, and no further increases were 
obtained until April 1976. 
Prices for coal exports also increased substantially after 
the controls were introduced, but this was apparently due to 
the impact of world energy shortages rather than to the 
government's intervention.^^^ 
99 . ibid, p.49. 
'A coup for "the strangler"', The Australian, 31 May 1973. 
'Iron Ore Export Contracts: Media Statement, R. Connor, 
29 August 1974 ' 
102 ^ G. Stevenson, op.cit., p.52. 
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Mining industry taxation 
Under provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act implemented 
in 1968 and prior years, mining companies and certain of their 
shareholders were permitted to reduce and/or postpone their 
liability to taxation by means not available to other taxpayers. 
These special provisions fell into four categories. Sections 
77 and 78 allowed individuals subscribing to shares in exploration 
or mining companies to deduct part or all of the amount subscribed 
in calculating their taxable incom.e.^'^^ Section 23 exempted 
certain types of mining income from taxation; its most 
significant provision exempted 20 per cent of net income 
earned from mining prescribed minerals, including bauxite, 
copper, nickel, mineral sands and tin. The remaining concessions, 
involving deduction of capital expenditure in assessing taxable 
income, were covered by Division 10 of the Act. 'Category A' 
concessions permitted deductions in respect of items not 
allowable for other taxpayers, for example preliminary site 
preparation and construction of housing and community facilities. 
'Category B' concessions allowed mining companies to apply 
generally available allowances at an accelerated rate. 
The effect of these concessions was that, especially 
during periods of major capital expenditure such as occurred 
in the mid and late 1960s, mining companies paid rates of tax 
considerably lower than those applied to all corporations, as 
Table 14 illustrates. 
Section 77C and 78(1)(b) allowed subscribers to mining 
companies to deduct one third of the amount subscribed ^^ 
calculating their taxable income. Section 77D permitted deduction 
of sums subscribed to exploration companies, providing tnat tne 
company involved waived its right to claim ensuing expenditure 
against any income it might earn. 
TABLE 14 
YEAR 
Tax Rates, Mining Companies and All Companies, 1967/8-1973/4 
1967/8 1968/9 1969/70 1970/71 1971/2 1972/3 1973/4 TOTAL 
All Companies 
company Income ($m)* 2,219 2,586 2,972 2,862 2,996 3,709 4,206 21,550 
Income Tax ($m) 
Tax Rate (%)** 
Mining Companies 
Company Income ($m)* 
Income Tax ($m) 
Tax Rate (%) 
Source: Bureau of Minere 
Review, various issues; xiiuus uj. xcs ^as , --- ^ 
Industries, 28 May 1976 , CGovernment Printer, Canberra, 1976), Table 1, p.53. 
Notes- * Excludes tax payable by private companies. ^ , . ^  ^ • ^ ** Tax ratios vary from the company tax rate because the income on which tax is assessed 
by the taxation authorities differs from company income calculated for National 
Accounts purposes. 
938 1,070 1, 337 1,367 1,448 1, 885 2 ,408 10,453 
42 42 45 48 48 51 57 49 
106 132 358 345 471 484 555 2 ,451 
29 49 78 36 46 99 187 524 
27 37 22 10 10 20 34 21 
Resources, Geology and Geophysics, Australian Minerat Indu stry Annual 
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The concessions to individual taxpayers granted by 
Sections 77 and 78 were apparently inefficient in promoting 
mineral exploration. According to one estimate, only 27 per 
cent of the amounts claimed was actually spent on exploration 
or development, while the concessions v/ere employed by some 
104 
subscribers in tax avoidance schemes. In May 1973 the Labor 
government announced their termination, claiming that exploration 
could be promoted more efficiently by channeling the funds 
saved by the Treasury through a government mining corporation. 
Some months later the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Mr Connor, 
commissioned a consultant, T.M. Fitzgerald, to examine the 
whole question of income tax for the mining industry. Kis 
report. The Contribution of the Mineral Industry to Australian 
Welfare, was published in April 1974.^*^^ 
Fitzgerald concluded that the application of the Income 
Tax Assessment Act represented a substantial subsidisation of 
the mining industry from public funds. He rejected industry 
R.B. McKern, 'Foreign Direct Investment in the Financing 
of the Australian Minerals Industry', paper presented to the 
101st annual meeting of the A.I.M.E., San Francisco, 1972. 
Mining industry spokesmen refuted McKern's claim, arguing 
that the concessions were valuable in promoting mineral_exploration 
However in evidence to an Industries Assistance Comjnission 
Inquiry the Australian Taxation Office described them as 'costly 
and inefficient' and claimed that they 'opened up avenues for 
tax avoidance by persons who contributed little, if at all, 
towards mining development in Australia'. Industries Assistance 
Commission, Report, Petroleum and Mining Industries, 28 May 1976, 
(Government Printer, Canberra 1976), p.47._ (Hereafter referred 
to as Report, Petroleum and Mining Industries). 
^^^ CPD, House of Representatives, Vol.83, 8 May 1973, p.1750. 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1974. (Hereafter referred 
to as 'Fitzgerald Report') 
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claims that the concessions relating to capital expenditure 
simply postponed liability to taxation, pointing out that 
Category A deductions were not available to other companies 
and that their application exempted permanently from 
taxation a proportion of income which v/ould have been taxable 
in the hands of such companies. He also pointed out 
that, where capital expenditure was maintained at high levels 
over an extended period of time, application of Category A 
and 3 concessions would postpone liability to taxation long 
after expenditures associated with the initial development 
had been allowed for. By way of illustration, he quoted the 
example of Mount Isa Mines, v/hich was then still paying less 
than 10 per cent of its net income in tax, twenty years 
after the initial development of its copper deposits was 
108 completed. In fact, Fitzgerald argued, 
a mutually reinforcing relationship existed between 
the tax concessions and growth of productive capacity 
in the mining industry: growth created tax 
concessions, and the tax concessions helped to finance 
greater growth while also providing incentives for 
growth.109 
Fitzgerald opposed the concessional treatment afforded 
the mining sector on a number of grounds. First, he claimed 
it might encourage inefficient allocation of resources, by 
subsidising investment in export generating activity which 
was surplus to Australia's foreign exchange requirements. Ke 
argued that the priority attached by policy-makers to earning 
107 'Fitzgerald Report', p.14. 
108 . Ibid, pp.32-7, Table 18, p.90. 
105 Ibid, pp.24-5. 
I l l 
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foreign exchange in the 1960s v/as no longer appropriate, since 
Australia's balance of trade was in surplus and her foreign 
reserves substantial . In his view , 'opportunities for 
obtaining additional foreign exchange (were) a g i f t horse 
to be looked in the m o u t h T h e principal consideration 
in allocating resources should be the impact of alternative 
uses on national income and i ts d i s t r i b u t i o n ; since foreign 
ownership was high in the mineral industry , concentration 
of resources in that sector would result in a growing drain 
on national incomie, and was consequently not to be encouraged. 
Fitzgerald also feared that the economies of capital cost 
which the taxation system allowed an expansive and heavily 
borrowing mining company might mean that it would benefit 
from increased production even where this resulted in lower 
prices. I f this occurred, Australia might be denied part of 
the value of its resources , to the benef it of (predominantly 
112 
foreign) buyers of the minerals concerned. 
His second pr inc ipal objection was based on the contention 
that a high proportion of the value of the mineral industry 's 
output derived from the intr ins ic worth of non-renev/able 
resources belonging to the Australian people. It was 
consequently essent ial that Australia should reap substantial 
financial benef it from exploitation of its minerals . 
According to F i t z g e r a l d ' s ca lculat ions , the granting of 
tax concessions combined with the federal government's provision 
1 1 0 . 
Ibid , p . 7 1 . 
111 -u. 
Ibid , p p . 3 , 69 , 71 , 74 
112 
Ibid , p . 6 4 . 
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of services to the mining industry (for example through the 
BMR) resulted in a net financial loss to the Commonwealth 
in its relations with the industry, am.ounting to $55 million 
over the years 1967/8-1972/3.^^^ In com.parison, foreign 
direct shareholders of the principal mining companies earned 
$1,024 million in profits, net of current taxation, during this 
• ^ 114 period. 
Mining industry and other critics attacked the 'Fitzgerald 
Report' on a number of grounds, both methodological and 
conceptual. It was claimed that the sample companies on which 
it was based were atypical of the industry as a whole, being 
without exception large, profitable enterprises, and that 
conseguently its assessmcent of the industry's ability to bear 
additional taxation was invalid.^^^ The companies chosen 
by Fitzgerald for detailed analysis were certainly amongst 
the most profitable in the industry, and he failed to substantiate 
his claim that mining v/as Australia's 'most profitable sector'.^^^ 
In fact, over the period 1967/8-1973/4, profitability of 
Australia's 27 largest mining companies (measured by the 
average rate of return to funds employed before tax but 
after deduction of royalties) was only slightly higher than 
in the manufacturing sector (16.4 as against 12.6 per cent).^^"^ 
^^^ ibid, pp. 3, 74, Table 1, p.6. 
114 . ibid. Table 1, p.6. 
^^^ S. Eambrick, The Changing Relationship: The Australian 
Government and the Mining Industry, (Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia, Melbourne, May 1975), p.29. 
^^^ 'Fitzgerald Report', p.8. 
^^^ Industries Assistance Commission, Report, Petroleum and 
Mining Industries, Table A3.11, p.A32. 
318 
Hov;ever, this average figure hid very large disparities 
between individual concerns: some made losses, while others 
118 earned annual returns of up to 50 per cent on funds employed. 
While any assessment of mining industry taxation should 
certainly have taken the existence of loss-making or marginal 
operations into account, it does not necessarily follow that 
average profitability should determine the rate of tax to be 
applied to all companies. Government might wish to charge 
substantial rates on highly profitable operations while leaving 
others free from tax or subject to lower taxes, especially 
since a proportion of above-average profits might derive 
from the relative richness or accessibility of the deposits 
involved, indicating the existence of economic rents. 
A second criticism related to the time period chosen 
for the study. It was pointed out that taxation patterns in 
the mining industry over the period 1967/8-1972/3 were 
affected by high capital expenditures associated with a rate 
119 
of expansion which was very unlikely to continue. The 
'Fitzgerald Report' it was claimed, misrepresented the real 
impact of the Division 10 allowances by failing to adopt a 120 longer-term perspective. 
ibid, p.8. 
This was principally because the rate at which new discoveries 
were made was likely to decline as the more accessible deposits 
v/ere found, and because export markets in the industrialised 
countries were unlikely to maintain the growth rates which 
characterised the 1960s. 
Australian Mining Industry Council, Mining Taxation and 
Australian VJelfare, (Canberra, June 1974), p.6. 
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Vlhile it was true that the six year period examined by 
Fitzgerald was unlikely to be typical, this criticism was not 
entirely justified, since he was able to demonstrate that a 
company investing only enough capital to maintain production 
or expand at a modest rate could substantially reduce its 
121 
tax liability over an extended period of time. Liability 
to taxation was of course only being postponed, but where a 
company was in possession of extensive ore reserves, the 
postponement might be counted in decades rather than years. 
Since government would presumably apply a discount rate to 
future tax receipts, the present value of the sums involved 
might in many cases be minimal. 
The 'Fitzgerald Report's claim that Category A allowances 
(those not available to non-mining companies) represented a 
concession to the mining industry also came under attack. 
The industry argued that these allowances related to essential 
capital assets which were either not used by non-mining 
companies (for example shafts, tunnels), or which would have 
no residual value in the remote regions where mining usually 
took place but would retain or even increase their value in 
urban areas where most non-mining companies operated. 
Consequently, it was claimed, the only concession offered by 
Division 10 derived from the fact that mining companies could 122 write off assets more quickly than could other concerns. 
Mining industry spokesmen recognised the value of this 
121 'Fitzgerald Report', pp.33-7. 
^^^ Australian Mining Industry Council, Mining Taxation and 
Australian Welfare, pp.6-7. 
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123 concession, but argued that the industry operated under 
unique disabilit ies and that soine recompense was necessary if 
it was not to be disadvantaged relative to other sectors, 
particularly since the latter received assistance through 
mechanisms which conferred little benefit on mining, for 
example the tariff (manufacturing industry) and direct and 
indirect price subsidies (rural industry). Among these 
perceived disabilities were the necessity to undertake expensive 
124 
exploration programmes, liability to royalty payments, 
the need to provide infrastructure usually supplied by public 
authorities, and a high level of dependence on export markets 
characterised by severe price fluctuations. In addition, the 
higher cost structure imposed by remoteness meant that 
operations had to be on a m_assive scale to be viable, facing 
the industry v/ith special problems in raising huge blocks of 
development capital. This in itself, it was contended, 
necessitated application of accelerated depreciation allowances,-
since loan funds would be difficult to obtain without the 125 
assurance of large early cash flow. 
Some of these arguments were certainly valid; the mining 
industry did display distinctive features, and it was appropriate 
that these should be recognised in income tax legislation. 
123 ibxd, p.6. 
The industry denied that its expenditures on exploration 
could be equated with those of manufacturing concerns on 
research and development, because of the much greater urgency 
of exploration and because of its much higher cost in relation 
to industry turnover. Australian Mining Industry Council, 
Mining Taxation: A Review, (Canberra, June 1974), p.18. 
125 ibid, pp.17-22. 
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However, while the 'Fitzgerald Report' may have exaggerated 
the extent of the concessions available to the industry, this 
did not preclude the possibility that unnecessarily generous 
concessions were being offered by government in its attempts 
to encourage mineral development. 
The 'Fitzgerald Report' was also criticised for its claim 
that the level of foreign ownership was higher in mining 
126 
than in any other industry. This was an important point. 
Low rates of taxation in an Australian-owned industry might 
not be cause for concern, since the incomes involved might be 
taxed at some other point or reinvested in productive activity 
elsewhere in the economy. As mining spokesmen pointed out, 
foreign ownership was in fact higher in a number of other major 
1 ? 7 
industries. However, while the accuracy of Fitzgerald's 
information left something to be desired, the general trend 
of his argument was valid. As he demonstrated, 56 per cent 
of profits generated by Australia's major mining concerns over 
the period 1967/8-1972/3, or $1,024 million, was payable to 
direct foreign investors; if portfolio investment and shares 
held by nominee companies were taken into account, the 12 8 
figure would be significantly higher. Clearly it would be 
disturbing from Australia's point of view if this flow of 
profits was being undertaxed. 
Another criticism of the 'Fitzgerald Report' was that it 
adopted too narrow a perspective in assessing the mining 
12 6 'Fitzgerald Report', p.3. 
Australian Mining Industry Council, Mining Taxation and 
Australian Welfare, p.11. 
12 8 'Fitzgerald Report', pp.4-5. 
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industry's contribution to Australian welfare in that it 
ignored, for example, the industry's role in providing export 
receipts, employment, and infrastructure, and in furthering 
decentralisation and industrialisation (the latter via mineral 
129 
processing and fabrication). It was also claimed that the 
narrowness of his approach led Fitzgerald to misrepresent the 
nature of the industry's financial relationship with government, 
to ignore certain items on the positive side, for example 
additional employee taxation resulting from higher wage 
payments to mineworkers, and savings on community infrastructure 
which public authorities would otherwise have had to provide.^^^ 
The 'Fitzgerald Report' did not in fact ignore the mining 
industry's direct economic impact, but rather took the view 
that its significance had been exaggerated. It claimed, for 
example, that mineral development in remote areas such as 
the Pilbarra had failed to bring about significant decentralisation, 
and that at least certain types of mineral processing (for 
example toll refining of bauxite at Gladstone) had very little 
positive economic im.pact on Australia. In general, Fitzgerald 
espoused the view that 
if Australia is to gain much short-term benefit from 
foreign exploitation of her mineral wealth, it will 
have to be mainly through the taxes and_royalties 
imposed on overseas-ov/ned mining companies. 
12 9 • ^ Australian Mining Industry Council, Mining Taxatton and 
Australian Welfare, pp.3-4, 12. 
130 . ibid, pp.7-10. 
^^^ 'Fitzgerald Report', pp.45-6, 75, 83. 
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The significance of the mining industry's direct economic 
impact is examined in the next Chapter, but at this stage one 
general commient can be made. Regardless of how significant 
that impact was, it was still pertinent to ask whether tax 
revenue was being sacrificed unnecessarily, in other words, 
v;ould the mineral developments of the 1950s and 1960s have 
proceeded without the tax incentives, or with less generous 
incentives? 
Clearly this question cannot be answered conclusively. 
Some relevant evidence was collected by the Industries 
Assistance Commission Inquiry into the mining and petroleum 
industries, held over the period 1974-6. The Inquiry heard 
evidence from most major mining companies operating in 
Australia. No company could provide evidence of any project 
that would not have been undertaken had the concessions not 
applied, and the Commission concluded 
that the major part of the development which occurred 
over the period 1967/8-1972/3 would have taken place 
in the absence of the concessions... (though) the rate 
at which many of these projects were developed would 
have been s l o w e r . 1 3 2 
However, this conclusion raises two important issues, 
the first of which involves the perspective of policy-makers 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Policy-makers were apparently not 
fully aware of the various factors which favoured Australia 
in seeking development of her mineral resources (see pp. 281-2 
above), and felt that tax concessions were essential if 
^^^ Industries Assistance Commission, Report, Petroleum and 
Mining Industries, p.2. 
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development was to proceed.^^^ There seemed little to loose 
and much to gain in terms of direct economic impacts, which 
were expected to be substantial, by offering the concessions. 
Even had there been a greater awareness of Australia's inherent 
advantages, Australian governments anxious to expand export 
receipts quickly vjould probably have been prepared to sacrifice 
134 
revenue in order to ensure a more rapid pace of development, 
though they could hardly have foreseen what the extent of the 
sacrifice would be. In the event, the tax liability of mining 
companies was reduced by an estimated $1,100 million over the 
period 1967/8-1972/3 a l o n e , f i g u r e s are not available for 
earlier years, but a number of major projects became operational 
prior to 1967/8, and the total loss was probably well in 
excess of this sum. 
Secondly, it must be remembered that four quite distinct 
types of provisions accounted for the reduction in tax liability, 
and that their significance varied. Exemptions of mining 
income, which had in fact been introduced during earlier 
phases of mining activity in response to particular situations, 
accounted for $117 million.^^^ It is unlikely that these 
^^^ See, for example, H.G. Raggatt, Mountains of Ore, (Lansdowne 
Press, Melbourne, 1968), p. 6; D.F. Livingstone, 'Mineral 
Policy', in J.A. Sinden, op.cit., p.205. 
^ ^ H.G. Raggatt, for instance, believed that one of the most 
important effects of the concessions was that they prevented 
delays in the development of Australia's minerals. H.G. Raggatt, 
op.cit., p.52 . 
^^^ Industries Assistance Commission, Report, Petroleum and 
Mining Industries, p.2. 
^^^ This and figures relating to other concessions were derived 
from Industries Assistance Commission, Report, Petroleum ana 
Mining Industries, Table 2, p.54. 
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exemptions exercised a significant influence in the post war 
period; they did not even apply to two of the principal 
minerals developed at this stage (iron ore and coal), and 
generally benefitted long-established concerns such as Mount 
Isa M i n e s . A l l o w a n c e of share payments against tax liability 
cost some $240 million. It is improbable that large developments 
would have been delayed in the absence of this concession, since 
only a fraction of the amounts involved were actually spent on 
exploration or development and since most of the major companies 
obtained the bulk of their funds overseas. 
Category A allowances accounted for $300 million. Absence 
of these provisions would have placed a substantial additional 
burden on mining companies, and might well have led to a slower 
pace of development and possibly to abandonment of some marginal 
projects. The remaining $445 million represented deferred 
tax liabilities resulting from instant asset write-off, with 
governm.ent' s loss represented by the (considerable) notional 
interest on this amount. It is particularly difficult to 
reach definite conclusions regarding this concession. Somewhat 
less generous provisions would have reduced the loss to 
government and might not have retarded development, but lack 
of any concession would probably have done so. 
We may therefore conclude that the Australian government 
need not have sacrificed revenue to the extent it did to 
achieve its objectives, and that the cost of its generosity 
was somewhere in excess of $350 million over the period 
13 V 
The provisions did exempt 20 per cent of income gained from 
mining of bauxite and mineral sands, but it seems certain that 
major developments in both sectors would have proceeded in 
their absence. 
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1967/8-1972/3 alone. 
The Labor government accepted the 'Fitzgerald Report' 
conclusions; it withdrew the exemptions of mining income from 
taxation (with the exception of gold mining), and terminated 
the accelerated depreciation provisions. Amendments to the 
Income Tax Assessment Act introduced in 1974 provided that, in 
general, capital expenditure would be deducted on a declining 
balance basis over the shorter of mine life and twenty-five 
years. Exceptions related to expenditures on exploration, 
which could be deducted immediately, on mining and treatment 
plant, deductible over the estimated economic life of such 
plant, and on facilities for transporting minerals, deductible 
over twenty years (previously ten). 
Conclusion 
Labor party policies were based on the assumption that 
foreign ownership in the mining industry was creating certain 
costs for Australia, and in particular that foreign companies 
were engaging in pricing and marketing practices inimical to 
Australia's interests, were failing to develop viable opportunities 
for mineral processing in Australia, and were responsible for 
substantial outflows of income from Australia. In addition, 
it was felt that Australia's perceived lack of control over the 
operations of foreign concerns denied it the opportunity 
to fully utilise the potential diplomatic power conferred on 
it by its possession of valuable mineral resources. 
Further, it was assumed that Australia could not re-establish 
control or avoid the costs of foreign investment unless direct 
Australian participation in the mining industry, public and 
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private, was very much increased. The Labor Party believed 
that this could be achieved without significant decline in 
the scale or efficiency of mining operations or in overall 
levels of capital investment, for the following reasons: 
a) Additional dom.estic capital could be mobilised by the AIDC 
and the National Investment Fund. b) The AIDC and the PMA could 
strengthen Australian mining companies which could then apply 
that capital efficiently. c) The PMA, the AAEC and the National 
Interest Fund of the AIDC could implement a major programme of 
direct government participation in mineral development, 
d) Substantial amounts of foreign capital would flow into 
mining projects through the AIDC. e) Technical and marketing 
expertise could be obtained from abroad without direct foreign 
investment. f) Foreign mining concerns would be willing to 
explore for minerals in Australia in the knowledge that 
ownership of mining projects would later be shared with 
Australians. 
The last three points rested substantially on another 
assumption, that Australia's possession of substantial mineral 
resources in a world facing resource scarcities would place her 
in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis foreign investors, 
allowing it to obtain theiv resources without sacrificing 
. 138 ownership and control of its minerals. 
Labor also believed that mineral development would continue 
^^^ See, for example, 'International Affairs: Ministerial 
Statement by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr Whitlam', CPD, Vol.84, 24 May 1973, pp.2643-bz. 
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under s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s g e n e r o u s t a x a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s . 
I m p o s i t i o n o f m o r e s t r i n g e n t p r o v i s o n s w a s e s s e n t i a l if p r o f i t 
o u t f l o w s w e r e t o b e c u r t a i l e d in t h e s h o r t t e r m , a n d s i n c e t h e 
direct e c o n o m i c im.pact o f m i n i n g p r o j e c t s w a s u n l i k e l y t o b e 
s u b s t a n t i a l . ^ ^ ^ 
In g e n e r a l , L i b e r a l / C o u n t r y P a r t y g o v e r n m e n t s o p e r a t e d o n 
d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d a s s u m p t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d , 
There w a s l i t t l e t o f e a r f r o m f o r e i g n m i n i n g i n v e s t m e n t a n d 
any d a n g e r s c o u l d b e d e a l t w i t h t h r o u g h t h e n o r m a l e x e r c i s e of 
g o v e r n m e n t p o w e r s . In a n y c a s e A u s t r a l i a d i d n o t p o s s e s s t h e 
r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y t o d e v e l o p h e r m i n e r a l s , a n d t a x a t i o n 
i n c e n t i v e s w e r e r e q u i r e d if f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s w e r e to b e 
p e r s u a d e d t o d o s o . T h e d i r e c t e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s c r e a t e d b y 
m i n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t r e c o m p e n s e to A u s t r a l i a 
for p e r m i t t i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n o f h e r m i n e r a l s . 
A n a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t o r y v i e w p o i n t s r e q u i r e s 
an e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e i m p a c t o f f o r e i g n - f i n a n c e d m i n i n g 
p r o j e c t s , a n d t h i s is a t t e m p t e d in t h e n e x t C h a p t e r . 
T h e r e w a s o f c o u r s e a n u n r e s o l v e d c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n 
the L a b o r P a r t y ' s p e s s i m i s m a s r e g a r d s t h e d i r e c t i m p a c t of 
m i n i n g p r o j e c t s a n d i t s e n t h u s i a s m f o r m i n e r a l p r o c e s s i n g . 
329 
Chapter Seven 
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN-FINANCED 
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
It is particularly difficult to examine the impact of 
foreign-financed mineral development in the Australian case as 
official and other statistics usually cover all projects, 
regardless of ownership. This must be borne in mind when 
considering the impact of mining on, for example, employment, 
government revenue and export earnings. However, in considering 
the economic and other issues raised by mineral development, the 
discussion can usually be made specific to foreign mining 
investment. 
Generation of government revenue 
Table 15 gives details of royalties and income taxes paid 
by the mining industry over the period 1965-1977. The absolute 
level of both rose substantially during these years, with much 
of the increase coming after 1974, reflecting rising royalty 
rates, changes to income tax legislation introduced in 1973/4, 
and the non-availability of depreciation allowances claimed 
at an accelerated rate in earlier years. The Commonwealth also 
raises revenue through the coal export levy, introduced by the 
Labor government and now being phased out ($90 million in 1977), 
and through withholding taxes on interest and dividend payments 
made abroad ($10 million in 1977).^ 
^ Australian Mining Industry Council, 'Minerals Industry 
Survey 1977 and 1978', (Canberra, 1979), Table 4.5, p.37. 
T a b l e 15 
R o y a l t i e s and Income Taxes Paid by the A u s t r a l i a n Mining I n d u s t r y , 
S e l e c t e d Years 1965 -1971 and 1972-1977 
1965 1967 1969 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
* 
R o y a l t i e s 
- To S t a t e s 22,994 23,689 24,960 60,528 59,109 62,082 78,062 141,714 146,326 186,734 
- To Commonwealth - 10 11 5,024 7,567 7,895 10,769 12,155 13,440 13,805 
T o t a l 22,994 23,699 24,971 65,552 66,676 69,977 88,831 153,869 159,766 200,539 
Income Tax 18,776 26,854 48,473 35,659 45,632 98,683 162,771 310,470 409,474 n .a . 
Source: Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology, and Geophysics (BMR), Australian Mineral Industry 
Annual Review, various issues. 
Notes: *From 1970 onwards, these figures include royalties received under the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1 9 6 7 - 6 8 , 
Oo UJ o 
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Direct taxation from mining has accounted for a small but 
increasing proportion of the Commonwealth government's total 
tax revenue, 0.5 per cent in 1966, 2.3 per cent in 1977.^ The 
contribution of royalty payments to total state taxation has been 
similarly modest;^ in 1977, only in Western Australia did they 
account for more than 10 per cent of total taxation."^ 
Perhaps the most persistently expressed fear of I,abor Partv 
spokesmen was that foreign mining companies would undervalue mineral 
exports and so reduce profits generated within Australia, whether by 
transfer pricing or by failing to exercise their full bargaining 
powers in their dealings with customers. Opportunities for 
transfer pricing have certainly existed, as some mining operations, 
particularly in the aluminium industry, were conducted by 
subsidiaries of fully-integrated multinational mining corporations. 
In fact on a number of occasions the Taxation Commissioner has 
imputed prices to mineral exports for tax assessment purposes 
different to those actually received by the Australian subsidiary.^ 
The Commissioner's power to act in this way might be thought to 
indicate that there is little danger of revenue loss, but in 
practice he has encountered serious difficulties in establishing 
2 
Table 15 and Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Public 
Authority Finance, Federal Authorities, various issues. 
^ It was 7.0 per cent in 1966, 5 per cent in 1977. ABS, 
Public Authority Finance, State and Local Authorities, various 
issues. 
4 ibid. 
^ Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia, 
p. 53; B.L. Johns, 'Private Overseas Investment in Australia: 
Profitability and Motivation', Economic Record, Vol. 43 (June 
1967), p.236. 
332 
'arms length' prices for mineral coinmodities which are not 
freely traded on a large scale (for instance bauxite, alumina).^ 
Foreign mining companies, especially iron ore and coal 
exporters, have apparently sometimes suffered from failing to 
adopt a more unified approach in dealing with customers, but it 
is difficult to differentiate in specific cases between the 
effect of disunity and that of prevailing market conditions for 
the commodity involved. This difficulty is illustrated by price 
negotiations between iron ore producers and the Japanese steel 
industry in 1978. The Japanese adopted a tactic of concentrating 
their negotiating effort on one producer. They persuaded the 
Mount Newman Mining Company to accept a significant drop in 
prices on the contracts being re-negotiated by offering to 
re-negotiate an older contract, which was not yet due for renewal, 
in its favour; this effectively gave the Company a $14 million 
'kickback' which balanced the lost revenue from the newer contracts 
According to press reports. Mount Newman's acceptance of the 
lower prices undermined the bargaining position of the other 
producers, forcing them to follow suit and accept those prices, 
with none of the benefits afforded Mount Newman."^ However, the 
willingness of the other companies to accept a drop in prices 
reflected the current depressed state of international iron ore 
markets and the consequent absence of alternative market outlets. 
Thus Mount Newman's 'defection* was only partly responsible for 
the failure to obtain higher prices. 
^ Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia, 
p.53. 
^ Mining Journal, 8 September 1978, p.177. 
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Generation of employment and wage payments 
The mining industry is highly capital-intensive, and 
consequently the numbers employed are small in relation to 
output. In 1973, capital intensity in mining (measured as 
the book value of fixed tangible assets per person employed) 
was five times higher than the average for the manufacturing g 
sector. Table 16 gives details of direct mining employment 
(as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics) in selected 
years over the period 1966-1978; in 1978, such employment 
9 
occupied 1.4 per cent of the civilian workforce in Australia. 
However, this figure underestimates the impact of mineral 
development on employment, for three reasons. 
Table 16 
Direct Employment in the Australian Mining Industry,* 
Selected Years, 1966-1978 
1966 48,589 
1969 55,225 
1972 63,179 
1975 69,122 
1978 66,074 
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Mining Establishments, 
details of Operations, various issues. 
Notes: *Includes petroleum and natural gas, excludes 
employment in smelting and refining. 
First it represents a narrow interpretation of mining 
employment, referring only to those engaged in extracting minerals, 
Industries Assistance Commission, Annual Report, 1973/4, 
Table 4.1.1. 
^ Total civilian employment in 1978 averaged 4.7 million. 
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and excludes employment in mineral processing. Second, Australia 
produces a high proportion of the goods and services consumed by 
the mining industry, and consequently indirect employment is 
substantial. According to the Australian Mining Industry Council 
the multiplier effect is about 2.75, indicating that between 
150,000 and 200,000 Australians, or around 3.5 per cent of the 
workforce, depend directly or to a large extent on mining (as 
defined by the Bureau of Statistics) for their jobs.^^ Third, 
where mining occurs in remote areas almost the entire workforce 
usually depends on mining and related activity for employment. 
For example, the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations estimated in November 1976 that 87 per cent of the 
workforce in the Queenstown area of Tasmania were dependent 
on the Mount Lyell copper mine through direct wages, contracts, 
purchases, or expenditures of mineworkers' wages.^^ 
It is difficult to assess the economic significance of 
mining employment since general economic conditions in Australia 
have changed substantially over the period under review, and 
since significant variations in such conditions occur on a regional 
basis. In the 1960s Australia experienced virtual full employment 
and the mining industry cannot therefore be regarded as having 
generated- employment from a national point of view, since the labour 
it absorbed could have been utilised elsewhere. In this situation 
the principal impact of mining employment would probably have been on the 
incomes of the existing workforce, since the additional demand for labour 
^^  Australian Mining Industry Council, Mining Review,Uovemher-
December 1977, p.2. 
^^ Industries Assistance Commission, Interim Report, Copper 
Ores and Concentrates, 30 September 1977, (Government Printer, 
Canberra, 1977) , p.21. 
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could be expected to have pushed up wages. Two other aspects 
of this question should be mentioned. First, by 1970 gross product 
per person employed in mining was higher than in any other sector 
and twice as high as in manufacturing,^^ indicating that labour 
employed in mining was utilised more productively than it would 
have been in most alternative uses. Second, wages in the mining 
industry have been substantially higher than the national average, 
by between 18 and 38 per cent over the period 1966-78,^^ allowing 
the individuals involved to earn more and adding to the multiplier 
effects created by expenditure of their incomes. 
Since the early 1970s unemployment in Australia has 
increased steadily, and currently stands at between 5 and 6 per 
cent of the workf orce. Mining activity could consequently be 
seen as generating employment from a national perspective, but 
this would only hold true if labour was geographically mobile. 
This is apparently not entirely the case, and labour shortages 
still exist in certain remote areas in which mining occurs. 
Thus the economic significance of mining employment cannot be 
assessed in general terms; it might be quite different, for 
example, in the case of the Woodlawn lead/zinc mine, which 
operates near population centres in New South Wales, than for 
the Agnew nickel project, situated in a remote part of 
Western Australia, 
^^ W.D. Scott and Co. Pty. Ltd., The Contrihut^on of the 
Minerals Industry to Australian Welfare: Report to Conzvnc 
Riotinto of Australia Ltd., (Unpublished, Sydney, July 1974), 
p.2/13. In 1970-72, the relevant figures were tor 
mining and $6,810 for manufacturing. 
^^ The unemployment rate grew from 4.1 per cent in May 1976 to 
5.1 per cent in May 1977 to 6.2 per cent in May 1978. ABS, 
Employment and Unemployment, various issues. 
^^ Derived from ABS, Average Weekly Earnings, v a r i o u s issues, and 
Mining Establishments: Details of Operations, various issues. 
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Mine closures in regions dependent on mining employment 
can cause severe economic problems, particularly if mining has 
been carried on for a substantial period of time. Where this 
is the case, large investments have usually been made in public 
and private facilities and businesses, and these assets are 
often immobile, at least in the short term. Where the communities 
involved do not serve other economic functions (for example as 
centres for rural industry), cessation of mining may result in 
wastage of public and private capital and to severe social and 
economic location dislocation. 
A classic example of this situation is offered by the 
Tasmanian community of Queenstown which, as mentioned above, 
is almost entirely dependent on copper mining. Mining operations 
have been carried on since the late 1890s, and over the decades 
substantial public investments have been made in providing rail, 
road and air transport and educational and medical facilities. 
In addition, a high proportion of local residents own their own 
homes,^^ while substantial private investments have been made 
in businesses providing consumer services to the mine and the 
townspeople.^^ 
By 1975 financial difficulties, resulting from poor copper 
prices, falling ore grades and more difficult mining conditions 
threatened the Mount Lyell copper mine with closure. Very little 
^^ At June 1976, 1,005 of the 1,381 dwellings in Queenstown, or 
about 70 per cent, were under private ownership or purchase. 
^^ For details of the businesses involved, see Industries 
Assistance Commission, Inquiry Regarding Copper Ores and 
Concentrates: Official Transcript of Proceedings, Queenstown, 
1 and 5 September 1977, Sydney, 7 December 1977. 
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alternative employment was available, and townspeople faced 
the prospect of leaving an area in which many of their families 
had lived for three generations and of abandoning investments 
in houses and businesses. There would also have been a wastage 
of public capital as sufficient demand would not have been 
available to maintain public facilities. 
Assistance provided by the state and federal governments 
averted closure, but this can only be a stop gap measure. As 
of June 1977, ore reserve estimates indicated that mining 
operations could be supported only until 1986 ,^ "^  at which time 
Queenstown's existence as a viable community will again be in 
jeopardy. 
Creation of additional economic activity through linkage 
development 
Backward linkages: Australia has supplied a substantial 
and growing proportion of the goods and services utilised by 
the mining industry. As in the Irish case, an initial lag in 
linkage development apparently occurred, and a significant 
proportion of the capital expenditure associated with mineral 
developments in the late 1950s and early 1960s was expended 
abroad, particularly on transport, electrical, and mining 
equipment.^^ However domestic manufacturing capacity was 
already well developed and as Australian firms became aware 
of the mining industry's needs they were well placed to take 
^^  ibid., Canberra, 1 September 1977 , p. 82. 
^^  For example in implementing its expansion programme ^^^^ 
the period 1958-68 Mount Isa Mines purchased electricity generating, 
ventilation, milling, and transport equipment in the US, tne u^, 
and West Germany. 
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a d v a n t a g e o f t h e a v a i l a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h e 
large s i z e o f A u s t r a l i a ' s m i n i n g i n d u s t r y a l l o w e d t h e m s i g n i f i c a n t 
e c o n o m i e s o f s c a l e . F o r e x a m p l e , in t h e 1 9 6 0 s d u m p t r u c k s u s e d 
in iron o r e a n d b a u x i t e m i n i n g w e r e i m p o r t e d , b u t b y t h e m i d 
1970s r e p l a c e m e n t v e h i c l e s w e r e b e i n g p r o d u c e d in A u s t r a l i a . I t 
is a l s o a p p a r e n t t h a t in l a t e r y e a r s a t l e a s t s o m e f o r e i g n 
mining c o m p a n i e s a d o p t e d a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y of f a v o u r i n g 
19 
d o m e s t i c p r o d u c e r s . 
B y t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , s o m e 85 p e r c e n t of c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t 
20 
by m i n i n g c o m p a n i e s w a s b e i n g e x p e n d e d in A u s t r a l i a , t h o u g h 
as w a g e s a n d s a l a r i e s a c c o u n t e d f o r s o m e o f t h i s a m o u n t t h e 
p r o p o r t i o n o f g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s p u r c h a s e d l o c a l l y w a s c e r t a i n l y 
l o w e r . S p e c i a l i s e d t r a n s p o r t a n d m i n i n g e q u i p m e n t w a s (and is) 
still b e i n g i m p o r t e d , ^ ^ a n d t h i s w i l l a p p a r e n t l y c o n t i n u e 
b e c a u s e o f e c o n o m i e s o f s c a l e in t h e p r o d u c i n g i n d u s t r i e s , t h o u g h 
some c o m m e n t a t o r s b e l i e v e t h a t A u s t r a l i a c o u l d e s t a b l i s h e x p o r t 2 2 
m a r k e t s a n d t h u s r e n d e r l o c a l p r o d u c t i o n f e a s i b l e . C u r r e n t l y , 
m i n i n g f i r m s o b t a i n a n e s t i m a t e d 88 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l 
23 
s u p p l i e s a n d s e r v i c e s w i t h i n A u s t r a l i a . 
^^ S e e t h e s u b m i s s i o n s o f M I M H o l d i n g s L i m i t e d a n d Q u e e n s l a n d 
A l u m i n a L i m i t e d t o t h e S e n a t e S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n O w n e r s h i p 
and C o n t r o l , Official Hansard Report, 20 J u l y 1 9 7 2 , p . 6 5 9 , 
7 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 2 , p . 1 3 0 6 . 
T h i s f i g u r e w a s q u o t e d b y C R A in i t s s u b m i s s i o n to t h e S e n a t e 
S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n O w n e r s h i p a n d C o n t r o l , a n d a c c o r d s 
with o t h e r p u b l i s h e d e s t i m a t e s . 
^^ F o r i n s t a n c e d r a g l i n e s f o r u s e in o p e n p i t c o a l m i n i n g a r e 
still i m p o r t e d f r o m t h e U S . 
^^ S e e t h e c o m m e n t s b y R . L . W h i t m o r e , Queensland Government 
Mining Journal, O c t o b e r 1 9 7 9 , p . 5 1 4 . 
^^ A u s t r a l i a n M i n i n g I n d u s t r y C o u n c i l , Minerals Industry Survey 
1977 and 1978, p . 5 2 . 
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While a high proportion of the inputs used in mining are 
supplied locally, total linkage from the industry is comparatively 
weak. Over the period 1972/3 - 1975/6, for example, each dollar 
of output required expenditure of only 30 cents on materials, 
electricity, fuels, payments to mining contractors, repair and 
24 
maintenance and freight charges; the equivalent figure for 
the manufacturing sector was 64 cents.^^ 
Forward linkages: The degree to which mineral processing 2 6 
occurs in Australia varies from commodity to commodity. In 
nearly all cases, production for the domestic market is fully 
integrated with smelting, refining, and manufacturing of semi-
fabricated and fabricated goods taking place locally; however a 
high proportion of Australia's mineral exports are in 
unprocessed form, particularly exports of iron ore, mineral sands 
27 
and, to a lesser extent, bauxite. The attention of policy-
makers and of the public has focused on the issue of whether 
Australia's minerals can or should be subject to a greater 
degree of processing prior to export, and it is on this question 
that attention is concentrated here. 
The desirability of increasing the proportion of processed 
metals in Australia's mineral exports has caused less controversy 
than almost any other aspect of mineral policy, at least until 
Derived from ABS, Mining Establishments, Details of Operations, 
1975/6, Tables 4 and 6. 
^^ Derived from ABS, Manufacturing Establishments, Details of 
Operations by Industry Class, various issues. Tables 5 and 7. 
^^ For a comparison of the degree to which processing of various 
minerals occurs in Australia, see BMR, Australian Mtneral Industry 
Review 1977, Table 12 , p.13 , 'Production and Export Processing 
Indexes'. 
27 ibid. 
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very recently. Federal and state governments of all political 
hues, official inquiries into Australia's economic circumstances, 
trade union spokesmen and many academic and other commentators 
have lauded the likely benefits of following this course of 
action. State governments have attempted to encourage 
processing by making the granting of mineral rights conditional 
on the lessee's willingness to construct smelters or refineries 
within their states, and by offering financial incentives. For 
example, in 1957 the Queensland government granted a lease to 
Comalco Limited to mine bauxite deposits at Weipa on condition 
that the Company would construct a plant in Queensland to convert 
2 9 
its output to alumina, while Western Australian iron ore 
agreements negotiated during the 1960s provided for the termination 
of mining rights if processing was not undertaken within a 
specified period of time.^^ The Queensland and federal 
governments offered financial incentives by applying a lower 
royalty rate to bauxite which was to be processed locally,^^ 
while the Western Australian government encouraged the Western 
Mining Corporation Limited to smelt and refine its output of 
nickel ore in Western Australia by providing for a lower royalty 
at the mining stage if processing was undertaken, by offering to 
^^ See, for example, the statements by the Federal Prime Minister, 
Mr Whitlam, Age, 20 March 1973; the Federal Minister for Natural 
Resources, Mr Anthony, Mining Journal, 9 December 1977, p.4/H; ana 
Queensland's Minister for Mines, Mr Camm, Queensland Government 
Mining Journal, July 1974, p.233-4. 
^^ Queensland, Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Pty. Limited 
Agreement Aat, 1957, Eliz. 2, No.29, Clause 7. 
See for example Western Australia, Iron ore (Mount Goldsworthy) 
Agreement Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, No.97, Clause 13 (4). 
^^ Northern Territory of Australia, Mining 
Nabalco Agreement) Ordinance 1968, No.15 of 1968, First Schedule, 
3, (b). 
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ship the Company's nickel products at concessional rates on the 
State railway system, and by undertaking to provide some of the 
32 
infrastructure for the project. 
Enthusiasm for mineral processing reflects a belief that it 
greatly increases value added and so government and export revenue, 
generates additional employment, creates technical 'spin-offs', 
generally increases the level of industrialisation, and creates 
opportunities for decentralisation of economic activity and 
population. ^ ^ This belief results in part from the fact that 
processing activities have in the past led to development or 
expansion of other economic activities. For example, smelting 
of lead and zinc concentrates mined at Broken Hill resulted in 
the production of sulphuric acid at Broken Hill itself and in 
Tasmania, with the acid in turn being used in the production 
of fertilisers at Newcastle. By-product copper, silver, gold, 
cadmium and antimony was also produced; some of these metals 
were used in other industrial processes, others were exported. 
Another by-product was zinc dust, which was utilised in gold 
metallurgy and paint production.^^ Each of these activities 
created demands for goods and services, and there can be little 
doubt that, overall, significant additional employment, incomes. 
Western Australia, nickel Refinery (Western Mining Corporatton 
Limited) Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No.24, Clause 3 (1) and (2), 
Clause 5 (a) and (b), Clause 9 (1). 
^^  J.J. Craig, 'The Outlook for Iron Ore Processing in the 
Pilbara', in S. Bambrick (ed.). Mineral Processing ^n Austraiva, 
Conference Papers and Report, Centre for Continuing Education, 
Australian National University, (Canberra 1973), p.l. 
34 . ^ H.G. Raggart, op.cit. pp.171-7. 
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and government revenues were generated as a result of processing 
activity, a fact of particular significance to state governments 
in pursuit of 'development'. 
The second principal basis on which processing has been 
sought is that it would substantially enhance the value of 
Australia's mineral exports. A comparison frequently quoted 
is that one dollar's worth of bauxite can be converted into 
$100 dollars' worth of aluminium.^^ Though an extreme case,^^ 
this example does illustrate the potential impact of large-scale 
processing on Australia's export income, and comparisons of this 
kind have played a major part in fostering the belief that 
Australia has become a 'quarry' for consuming contries and is 
consequently deprived of much of the value of her minerals. 
A number of important points should be made in relation to 
these perceived benefits. First, resources utilised in 
processing have alternative uses, in some of which they might 
exercise an even greater impact. For example, creation of 
employment is currently a major concern of state and federal 
governments. Mineral processing is extremely capital intensive; 
in 1973, capital intensity in smelting and refining of bauxite, 
alumina, copper and nickel was eleven times that in the 
See, for example, A. Fitzgibbons, The Economic Contrvbutxon 
of the Mineral Sector in Australia, Resource Policy Series No. 4, 
Economics Department, Australian National University, (Canberra, 
1972), p. 2; and 'Is the aluminium worth the energy?', NatvonaL 
Times, 16 December 1978. 
So, for example, one dollars worth of iron ore could be 
converted into about seven dollars worth of steel billets a^t: ly/J 
prices). j.j. Craig, 'The Outlook for Iron Ore Processing in tne 
Pilbara', in S. Bambrick, op-cit., p.2. 
^^ See, for example, Report of the Committee of Economic Inquiry^ 
May 1965, p.195. 
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3 8 
manufacturing sector as a whole. Recent investments in 
processing and current investment proposals have been concentrated 
in this group (especially bauxite/alumina and nickel), and it 
should be noted that capital intensity in treatment of these 
commodities is five times that in processing of the 'older' metals 3 9 
(lead, zinc, and silver). It is therefore clear that, in 
seeking to maximise employment, resources might be more usefully 
employed elsewhere. 
It could of course be argued that the capital employed in 
processing is primarily supplied by specialised mining corporations 
who would be unwilling to invest it in alternative uses, but as 
against this two points can be made. First, where state 
governments sacrifice royalties at the mining stage and/or supply 
infrastructure or services at concessional rates, substantial 
commitments of public capital can be involved. Second, 
significant amounts of capital have been raised by processing 
concerns from general banking and finance sources in Australia, 
and this capital presumably would be available for alternative 
uses. For example in 1971 the Queensland alumina producer, 
Queensland Alumina Limited, had invested $35.5 million provided 
40 by Australian institutional lenders. 
Mineral processing absorbs other resources, of course, 
particularly energy resources, usually provided in Australia 
^^ Industries Assistance Commission, Annual Report, 1973-74, 
Table 4.1.2, p.81. 
ibid. 
Queensland Alumina Limited, Submission to the Senate Select 
Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control, Off^c^al Hansard 
Report, 1 September 1972, p.1307. 
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by state authorities in the form of electricity. There is a 
danger that their desire to encourage mineral processing may 
lead state governments to undervalue fuel minerals used as 
feedstock in generating electricity, an issue raised by current 
plans to expand Australia's alumina smelting capacity by some 
41 600,000 tonnes. 
Australia's competitiveness as an energy supplier has 
obviously been a major influence in attracting investment in 
this area,^^ but in their attempts to capture projects for theiv 
states, state governments may reduce energy costs below the 
level required to maintain Australia's competitive position. 
To date, they have apparently kept electricity prices at levels 
which have not been increased to take account of inflation or 
of the general escalation in energy costs.^^ Particularly 
if fixed price contracts are agreed for electricity or fuels 
and if world energy costs continue to rise, the states may be 
deprived of a significant part of the value of their energy 
resources, wi th the predominantly foreign-owned smelting companies 
reaping the benefit.^^ If this occurs, it will not of course be 
the result of any innate characteristic of the mineral processing 
industry, but rather of essentially political factors, and 
44 
Mining Journal, 27 April 1979, p.319; 24 August, p.139. 
-IS aluminium worth the energy?'. National Times, 16 December 
1978 . 
43 ibid, 
^^  Currently, all bauxite/alumina processing facilities have 
in excess of 50 per cent foreign ownership, as apparently will 
most of the projects now planned or under consideration. 
^^ This assumes that the cost of energy to A-^tralian P^odu^ers 
would not significantly affect international prices for alumina/ 
aluminium. 
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especially of Australia's federal system of government. 
Mineral processing is one of the most energy-intensive 
industrial activities carried on in Australia. Table 17 shows 
the value of fuels and electricity consumed per dollar of 
output by the principal forms of mineral processing and by the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, and indicates that usage of 
fuels and electricity in processing bauxite/alumina and iron 
ore is seven times that in manufacturing as a whole; 
it should also be noted that it is four times greater per dollar 
of output than in processing of the 'older' metals, copper, 
lead and zinc.^^ Consequently if the energy charges imposed 
by the states do not fully reflect the value of feedstock 
minerals, the loss to government will be on a very substantial 
scale. 
Thus the resources absorbed by mineral processing may have 
alternative and possibly more efficient uses. It should also 
be noted that in their alternative uses these resources might 
still make a significant contribution to Australia's balance 
of payments, by allowing production of goods for export or by 
permitting import substitution. On the other hand, mineral 
processing can certainly bring important economic benefits, 
though the differences which have been noted between processing 
of 'new' and 'old' minerals indicate that Australia's past 
experience in this regard may not be an accurate guide to the 
future. In sum, proposals for mineral processing require 
careful assessment in the light of available alternatives. 
in fact processing of copper, lead and ^inc is probably 
less energy-intensive than the figures in Table 17 suggest, as 
they are grouped with nickel, processing of which is higniy 
energy-intensive. 
Table 17 
Output, and Value of Fuels and Electricity Consumed, 
Mineral Processing and Total Manufacturing, Australia, 1975-1976 
Output Value of Fuels 
and Electricity 
Consumed 
$000•s 
Expenditure on Fuels 
and Electricity per 
Unit of Output 
Cents 
Smelting and Refining 
of Copper, Lead, Zinc 
and Nickel++ 
Iron Ore Pelletising 
and Metallising 
Alumina and 
Aluminium 
Total Manufacturing 
940 ,794 
186,267 
594,146 
39,474,405 
60,095 
41,353 
143,027 
1,037,545 
22 
24 
3 
Source: ABS, Manufaaturing Establishments, Details of Operations by Industry Class, 1975/6, 
Tables 5 and 8. 
Notes: + Includes electricity, coal, petroleum and gas. 
++ The statistician does not publish separate figures for lead, zinc or nickel. 
u> 
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especially if they are going to be subsidised by the provision of 
public resources at less than their full value. The current 
attitudes of state and federal governments show little evidence 
that this requirement is being fulfilled. 
Whatever the justification for investing in mineral 
processing on grounds of economic efficiency, the fact remains 
that Australian governments would prefer a higher proportion of 
mineral exports to be in processed form, and the question arises 
as to whether the foreign nature of mining investment has 
prevented this from happening. 
It is evident that a number of 'objective' economic 
factors have militated against development of forward linkages 
in Australia. First, some mineral developments were financed 
by loans raised on the security of long term contracts with 
consumers of ores and concentrates; such contracts could not 
have been secured for finished metal, and it is doubtful if 
the loans could have been obtained without them. Second, 
Australia, like other mineral exporters, faces substantial 
tariff barriers when attempting'to sell finished metal in 
the industrialised countries. A number of foreign-owned 
Australian producers have been forced to purchase or build 
47 
processing facilities abroad to overcome this problem. 
Third, substantial infrastructural costs can be incurred if 
processing is to occur at the mine site, costs which 
competitors in the industrialised countries would not have 
CRA and its associates, for example, have acquired zinc 
smelters in Britain and Holland, and constructed an alumina 
refinery in Sardinia. 
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to meet. On the other hand, substantial internal transport 
costs may be incurred if processing facilities are located 
near urban areas; for instance, the cost of moving bauxite 
from Weipa to Gladstone is almost equivalent to the cost from 
4 9 
Weipa to Europe and Japan. Fourth, market outlets for 
certain metals, for example aluminium, are cartelised by the 
existing producers, creating barriers to entry for new producers. 
Nevertheless, it has certainly been the case that some 
foreign mining companies have invested in Australia specifically 
with the intention of securing sources of ores and concentrates 
for existing processing facilities abroad. This was the case, 
for example, with Alsuisse's development of the Gove bauxite 
deposits, and other investments in the aluminium industry have 
been similarly motivated.^® In these instances, foreign 
companies would clearly be reluctant to undertake processing 
in Australia if the outcome was to render existing plant 
redundant. However, horizontal diversification rather than 
the search for captive sources of supply has apparently 
motivated most investments outside the aluminium industry 
and, given that foreign investors have attached little political 
risk to investment in Australia, it is consequently likely that 
For example, it was estimated in 1971 that it cost about 
$1 billion to develop infrastructure for an - t - ^ - f / ^ ^ ^ S v ^ L e n t ' , 
steel industry in the Pilbara. C.W. Court, The KOie ol 
in D. Douglas, (ed.). Minerals Investment and Austr>aL^an 
Development, Department of Adult Education, University ot 
Sydney, 1971, p.34. 
^^ CRA, Submission to the Industries Assistance Commission 
Inquiry on Petroleum and Mining Industrzes, Unpublisnea, may 
1975 , p.413. 
R.B. McKern, op.cit., pp.154-5. 
^^  ibid, p.12-14. 
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e c o n o m i c factors of the type discussed above governed most 
decisions on whether or not to undertake processing locally. 
Impact on the balance of payments 
Mineral exports have made a major and growing contribution 
to Australia's export income over recent years. At constant 
prices, the value of mineral exports in 1977 was over seven 
times that in 1965, while the proportion of export income 
accounted for by minerals increased from 12 per cent in 1965 
to 42 per cent in 1977.^^ This growth has been supported by 
higher sales of nearly all minerals produced in Australia, but 
it has been accompanied by a major decline in the relative 
significance of the 'older' metals, copper, lead and zinc, 
and an increase in that of alumina/aluminium, black coal, iron 
ore and nickel.^^ It is of course in exploitation of the 
latter that foreign investment has been concentrated over the 
54 last twenty years. 
It is impossible to calculate the net balance of payments 
effect of foreign-owned mining projects as the available 
information is incomplete, and in any case relates to the 
mining industry as a whole. Aggregate data indicates that 
in 1976/7-1977/8,77 per cent of foreign currency inflows 
(export receipts, equity and loan capital) remained after 
" Derived from BMR, Australian Mineral Industry Annual Review, 
various issues. 
^^ In 1965, the former accounted for 53 per cent of mineral 
exports, the latter for 23 per cent; in 1977, 
figures were 11 per cent and 70 per cent. Derived from BMR, 
Australian Mineral Industry Annual Revvew, various issues. 
^^ Growth in mineral production has also influenced the balance 
of payments by increasing Australia's self-sufficiency in a 
number of minerals, for example alumina/aluminium, asbestos, 
tin and nickel. 
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deduction of dividends, interest and debt repayments payable 
abroad, and direct imports.^^ This figure omits imports 
purchased through Australian agents and the import content 
of domestic purchases. It also overestimates the contribution 
of foreign-owned companies, as the total flow of dividends 
abroad should be deducted from their share of export income, 
and it is evident that the impact of individual foreign-
financed projects has been considerably lower than the 
aggregate figure would suggest. For example, over the period 
1961-71 the Queensland bauxite producer, Comalco, received 
total overseas funds equivalent to $ 7 5 8 million, of which $403 
million was paid abroad on direct imports, loan repayments, 
interest and dividends, indicating a net positive contribution 
. ^ 56 
equivalent to 47 per cent of foreign exchange receipts. 
Of the identified foreign currency outflows during 1 9 7 6 / 7 -
1977/8, debt repayment accounted for 26 per cent, interest 
payments for 16 per cent, dividends for 22 per cent, and 
direct imports for 30 per cent.^^ Government revenue 
accounted for only 23 per cent of the foreign currency retained 
in Australia, with wage payments (30 per cent) and purchases 58 of goods and services (47 per cent) accounting for the balance. 
'' Australian Mining Industry Council, ^'^^/"f^'^Ls 
1977 and 1978, Table 6 . 1 , p.53 . The survey on ^^xch t h e s e figures 
are based did not cover all mineral exporters, but did include 
nearly all of the major companies involved. 
Derived from Comalco Limited, S u b m i s s i o n t o t h e Senate Select 
Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control, Offtczal Hansard 
Report, 20 July 1 9 7 2 , Appendix 1 1 , p. 7 8 1 . 
" Australian Mining Industry Council, Minerals Industry Survey 
2977 and 1978, Table 6 . 1 , p.5 3 . 
^^ Derived from ibid.. Table 4 . 5 , p . 3 7 , Table 6 . 1 , p . 5 3 . 
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This is in contrast to the situation in Zambia, where the 
59 
relative significance of the two categories is reversed. 
The growth in mineral exports has exercised a major impact 
on Australia's balance of payments. It has helped to turn the 
trade deficits which characterised the early and mid 1960s 
into surpluses, while the investments which permitted 
expansion of mining activity were accompanied by substantial 
capital inflows. Over the period 1969/70-1972/3 both these 
developments, combined with inflows of non-mining capital, 
resulted in substantial surpluses on the balance of payments; 
however, import demand did not expand quickly enough to absorb 
those surpluses, which were accumulated as foreign reserves. 
The appropriate policy response would have been to revalue 
the Australian dollar progressively through 1971, but 
revaluation was delayed until December 1972, by which time 
speculative capital inflow had exacerbated the situation and 
Australia was firmly on the path to external readjustment 
through rapid i n f l a t i o n . T h e Labor government responded 
to the balance of payments problem with successive 
revaluations of the Australian dollar and stringent controls 
on capital imports,®^ measures which in turn created other 
difficulties. Export industries (including mining) faced 
serious problems in maintaining their competitiveness, while 
59 See p. 236 above. 
B. smith, -Australia's Minerals Production and 
Study of a Resource-Rich Developed Country', m L.B. Krause ana 
H. Patrick, op.cit., pp.259-60. 
These were based on a requirement that a 
raised abroad be deposited, free of interest, with the Reserve 
Bank. 
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companies found it substantially more expensive to raise 
development capital abroad. It should however be noted that 
the accumulation of reserves which the Fitzgerald Report 
interpreted as indicating that Australia possessed sufficient 
export capacity did not continue after 1973, and since then 
foreign reserves have been drawn upon to meet rapidly-
escalating deficits on invisibles. 
Revaluation would have faced the Australian economy with 
problems of structural readjustment regardless of when it 
6 2 
occurred. Thus while the growth of the mining industry 
has helped to ensure that scarcity of foreign exchange does 
not impose a constraint on the Australian economy, it has 
also, in combination with other factors, created other 
economic problems for Australia. 
Provision of scarce capital resources through the investment 
process 
Over the last three decades, foreign investors have 
played a crucial role in providing the enormous amounts of 
capital required to finance the discovery and exploitation of 
Australia's minerals. Comprehensive figures are difficult 
to obtain, but over the period 1964-1970 alone total investment 
by foreign mining concerns was well in excess of 
62 
For a discussion of this point, see R. Gregory, 'Some 
Implications of Growth in the Minerals Sector', Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, For some 
comments on Gregory's approach, see B. Smith, 'Australia's 
Mineral Production and Trade: Case Study of a Resource-
Rich Developed Country', in L.B. Krause and H. Patrick, 
op.cit., p.260-2, and N.R. Norman, Mining and the Economy: 
An Appraisal of the Gregory Thesis, Mimeo, Australian 
Mining Industry Council, September 1977. 
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$3 billion.^^ In contrast to the situation in other case 
study countries, such concerns have mobilized significant 
64 
amounts of domestic capital in Australia. 
As mentioned above. Labor politicians generally believed 
that Australia could have supplied the capital required for 
mineral development without the assistance of foreign companies, 
claiming that sufficient domestic resources were available and 
that what was lacking were appropriate mechanisms through which 
to mobilise those resources, a viewpoint which exercised a 
major influence on their whole approach to mineral policy. A 
number of factors appeared to give that viewpoint credence. 
First, during the 1950s and 1960s savings generated within 
Australia were sufficient to finance a very high proportion 
of fixed capital formation; over the period 1957/8-1970/1, 
this proportion ranged between 82 and one hundred per cent.^^ 
Second, a substantial part of Australian savings were in 
contractual form, for example in life assurance and pension 
funds, and therefore apparently presented a suitable basis on 
which to finance medium and long term investments of the kind 66 required for mineral development. 
Foreign companies surveyed by McKern had invested $3,290 
million over this period, and his survey covered only an 
estimated 84 per cent of total funds invested. R.B. McKern, 
op.cit.. Table 8.2, p.162. 
64 See below, p. 366. 
^^  Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia, 
Table 26, p.39. 
^^  P.J. Rose, 'Financing the Mineral Industry in Australia', 
in H.W. Arndt and A.H. Boxer (eds), The Australian Economy: 
A Second Volume of Readings, (Melbourne, 1972),p.137 8. 
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Third, a high proportion of the capital supplied by 
foreign companies was obtained either from Australian 
investors or from foreign banks. It has been estimated 
that, over the period 1964-70, 72 per cent of total investment 
by foreign mining concerns was financed from these sources, 
and the question arose as to whether this capital could not 
. 6 8 
be mobilised by Austvalx-an companies. 
Though the absolute amount of savings generated in Australia 
was almost sufficient to finance total capital formation, this 
did not necessarily mean that sufficient capital of the type 
required to finance mineral development was available. In fact 
a number of powerful influences operated to reduce the availability 
of domestic capital to mining concerns. First, government 
regulations restricted the ability of banks and other financial 
institutions to allocate their funds freely. For example, life 
assurance companies, pension funds and savings banks were 
effectively compelled to invest part of their capital in 
government securities or in specific activities (for instance 
house building). Trading banks had to lodge a portion of their 
assets with the Reserve Bank, maintain a further portion in 
liquid funds, and their deposit term was restricted; these 
constraints were eased somewhat in 1967 when the trading 
banks established the Australian Resources Development Bank 
(ARDB), which was excluded from the general provisions, but 
Derived from R.B. McKern, op.cit., Table 8.2, p.162. 
^^  J. Carter, The New Frontier: Australia's -^^sin^^ 
Northwest, (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1971), p.74 b. 
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the ARDB's operations were on a relatively modest scale.^^ 
Second, institutional investors displayed a strong reluctance 
to undertake what were perceived as high risk investments in 
the mining sector, particularly in exploration. So, for 
example, Comalco unsuccessfully attempted to raise funds for 
expansion of its Weipa bauxite operations from a number of 
major lending institutions in 1964.^*^ This hostility towards 
mining investment lessened as the mineral industry became 
more established, and during the 1970s a number of institutional 
investors committed large amounts of capital to individual 
projectshowever, investment in exploration continued 
to be shunned. 
These two factors meant that, especially during the 1950s 
and 1960s, private investors would have had to provide a 
substantial proportion of mining capital, mainly through the 
stock exchanges. However, funds from this source were limited; 
for example, over the period 19 67-70, total new capital 
raisings by all firms on Australian stock exchanges were only 
7 9 
$2.5 billion, a significant proportion of which would have 
been subscribed by institutional investors. In addition, 
private investors also attached significant disadvantages 
Over the period 19 67-71, the ARDB made total investments of^ 
$400 million. ARDB, Submission to the Select Committee on Foreign 
Ownership and Control, Official Hansard Report, 29 June 1972, 
p.180. 
Comalco Limited, Submission to the Senate Select Committee on 
Foreign Ownership and Control, Official Hansard Report, 20 July 
1972, p.775. 
For instance, Australian Mutual Provident (ATIP) invested 
$100 million in the coal mining operations of Central Queensland 
Coal Associates in 1977. 
72 A. Fitzgibbons, op.cit., p.3. 
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to mining investments. In general, they displayed a preference 
for investments with short maturity periods, and few 'grass 
roots' mining projects qualified in this regard. For instance, 
Alcoa of Australia commenced operations in 1961, but it was 
1969 before it paid its first dividend. Investors in 
exploration ventures would of course have to wait even longer 
for a (more uncertain) return. 
Some private investors did subscribe to mining stocks 
during boom periods, but generally their aim was to obtain a 
X. 73 
quick return rather than undertake a long-term commitment. 
Some were also prepared to invest in large, established mining 
concerns which were better able to bear the risks of 
exploration, but of course this was of little use to small 
Australian companies attempting to develop mineral discoveries, 
while the larger companies were predominantly foreign-owned. 
Neither would domestic mining concerns necessarily share 
the access of foreign companies to overseas borrowings. In 
many cases, the ability of Australian subsidiaries to raise 
loans abroad depended on the connections of their parent 
companies with international financial institutions, 
connections which domestic firms might not possess. So, for 
example, Alcoa of Australia attempted unsuccessfully in 1966 
to raise overseas loans, but with the assistance of its 
parent, loans were obtained 'from companies and institutions 
73 • n c-7 Tr^  the booms which R.B. McKern, op.ext., p.167. In any case, . 
attracted investors were usually short lived, ^ ^ 
capital into mining stocks fluctuated substantially, whereas a 
sustained level of investment was required to fund exploration 
and development programmes. 
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which had contact with Alcoa U.S.' Once their operations 
a c h i e v e d profitability, the subsidiaries themselves were 
frequently able to raise foreign loans, though their ability 
to do so still depended to a significant degree on the 
r e p u t a t i o n s of the parent companies. In other cases, 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of foreign loans resulted from the ability of 
parent companies to themselves supply assured outlets for 
minerals produced or to negotiate long term contracts with 
third p a r t i e s . I n general Australian companies did not in 
fact enjoy access to foreign funds on an equal basis with their 
foreign counterparts. Once again, the formation of the ARDB 
(and, later, of the AIDC) improved the situation somewhat, as 
both organisations were able to raise loans abroad and channel 
them to Australian firms. However, in this case also the scale 
of operations was relatively modest; in 1971, the ARDB and AIDC 78 had total combined overseas borrowings of $126 million. 
A number of points arise from the above discussion. First, 
the availability of domestic capital increased significantly 
as the projects involved reached maturity, but by this stage 
^^  Alcoa of Australia, Submission to the Senate Select^Committee 
on Foreign Ownership and Control, Off%czaL Hansai t^ 
July 1972, p.647. 
ibid.; R.B. McKern, op.cit., p.171. 
^^  This was the case, for instance in r e l a t i o ^ ^ ^ 
obtained by Queensland Alumina Limited to finance con 
the Gladstone alumina refinery. 
" ARDB, Submission to the Senate Select Co^ittee on Foreign 
Ownership and Control, 29 June 1972, p.i/y-
Qon^t-p Select Committee ibid., p.174; AIDC, Submission to the Senate Sele 
Foreign Ownership and Control, 13 July 1972, p.41/. 
78 
on 
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ownership was usually firmly in foreign hands. In the absence 
of Australian investment in exploration, valuable mineral 
deposits came into the possession of foreign companies; where 
equity was subsequently issued to Australians, it was usually 
79 
in small lots and at a substantial premium. In other words, 
ownership of minerals was alienated because few Australian 
companies were willing or able to act as risk takers, and the 
fact that domestic capital was available at a later stage 
had little impact. 
This raises a broader question. Even had sufficient 
domestic capital been available at each stage of the development 
process, there was a need for appropriate vehicles to mobilise 
capital and other resources, for a substantial number of 
companies which could raise risk capital and, where exploration 
was successful, marshall the financial, technical and marketing 
skills required to bring major mineral deposits into 
production. Some such companies did exist in Australia, but 8 0 
were few in number. There were even fewer concerns which 
were large enough to undertake massive investments in the 
large scale mining and handling facilities and supporting 
infrastructure required to exploit bulk commodities with low 
unit values (iron ore, coal, bauxite). The Alcoa venture 
was illustrative in this regard. It involved three of 
Australia's largest mining companies, North Broken Hill, 
Comalco, Hamersley, Utah and Consolidated Gold Fields were 
among the companies which issued shares in this manner. 
^^ They included the Broken Hill companies. Western Mining 
Corporation, and Colonial Sugar Refineries Limited (CSR). 
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Broken Hill South and Western Mining Corporation, yet the funds 
required for initial development represented 150 per cent of 
their combined market value in 1961. In contrast, they represented 
81 
7 per cent of the market value of Alcoa US in the same year. 
The scarcity of suitable domestic vehicles for mining 
investment had an important side-effect. Those foreign companies 
which were willing to admit Australian partners at an early 
stage frequently encountered difficulties in finding suitable 
candidates. This was apparently the case both in the 1950s and 
8 2 1960s and after the Labor government introduced ownership 
8 3 
guidelines for the mining industry in 1973. 
Thus if Australian minerals were to be developed without 
foreign help or through joint ventures between Australian 
and foreign companies it was essential to devise mechanisms 
through which domestic capital could be mobilised and to 
establish vehicles capable of utilising that capital 
efficiently in exploration and development. The Labor 
government recognised this fact, as indicated by its plans 
to expand the role of the AIDC, establish the National 
Investment Fund and the PMA, and generally increase direct 
government participation in mineral development. The question 
p"] 
Alcoa of Australia, Submission to the Senate Select Committee 
on Foreign Ownership and Control, Official Hansard Report, 
20 July 1972, p.647. 
Q 9 
H.G. Raggatt, who served as Director of the BMR for many years, 
has stated that substantial numbers of foreign firms displayed 
a willingness to involve Australian companies in exploration 
and development, but that rarely could a candidate be found who 
was willing and able to participate. H.G. Raggatt, op.cit., 
p.55-6. 
8 3 
Industries Assistance Commission, Report, Petroleum and 
Mining Industries, p.70. 
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remains as to whether these initiatives could be effective 
in practice; this issue is dealt with below, but one general 
point should be made at this stage. Australia's savings were 
certainly not greater than her capital requirements; savings 
84 
ratios were already very high and were unlikely to increase, 
and thus if domestic capital was mobilised for mineral 
development it would very probably have to be withdrawn from 
other uses, as the opposition claimed. 
Foreign investors have played an important role in 
providing technology and technical expertise, though the 
significance of their contribution has varied from sector 
to sector of the industry. Australia has a long history of 
technical innovation in mining and metallurgy, particularly n J 85 
in association with working of lead, zinc, copper, and gold, 
but the expertise required to exploit the 'new' minerals 
discovered after 1945, particularly aluminium and nickel, p r 
was not available locally. For example, major bauxite 
deposits were discovered in Western Australia and Queensland 
by two Australian-based companies. Western Mining Corporation 
and the Zinc Corporation, in the 1950s. Though proficient in 
The government could of course attempt to enforce a higher 
level of savings by increasing taxation, but any such action would 
probably be counteracted by a decline in voluntary savings. 
For an account of some of those innovations, see MIM Holdings 
Limited, Submission to the Senate Select Committee on Foreign 
Ownership and Control, Official Hansard Report, 20 July 1972, 
pp.664-6; and Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, Submission to_the 
Senate Select Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control, ibid., 
pp.750-1. 
^^ The contribution of foreign investors has not however been 
limited to the exploitation of 'new' minerals; for example, ASARCO 
made significant contributions to the development of lead, zinc 
and copper deposits at Mount Isa. 
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raining skills, these companies lacked access to the technology 
and expertise required to design, construct and bring into 
8 7 
operation facilities for producing alumina and aluminium. 
WMC and the Zinc Corporation formed joint ventures with Alcoa 
and Kaiser Aluminium respectively, two US companies which had 
for many years played a major role in the world aluminium 
industry. The latter used their research facilities and their 
extensive experience to design processing facilities appropriate 
to the individual bauxite deposits, and supplied skilled 
expatriate personnel to supervise construction and operation 8 8 of those facilities. 
In both cases, expatriate staff numbers declined as 
Australian personnel were trained in relevant skills. However, 
specialised expatriate staff continued to be seconded to 
Australia, partly to facilitate the transfer of newly-acquired 
expertise from the parent company to the subsidiary or associate, 
89 
while Australian staff visited the US for the same reason. 
^^ The basic process for extracting alumina from bauxite was well 
known, but variations in the chemical form of the alumina and in 
the levels of impurities present in individual bauxite deposits 
required refinements to the process, which were usually held as 
proprietary technology by the major producers; in addition, 
application of certain of these refinements required experience 
gained in an operating plant. The technology of the aluminium 
process was licenced to only a small number of companies, most of 
whom were large established producers. R.B. McKern, op.cit., 
p.178-9. 
^^ Comalco Limited, Submission to the Senate Select Cormittee 
on Foreign Ownership and Control, Official Hansard Report 20 
July 1972, p.764-5; Alcoa of Australia, Submission to the Senate 
S e l L t Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control, Off^c^al Hansard 
Report, 20 July 1972, p.647-8. 
ibid., p.647, 649. 
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It should be noted that in these cases investment in 
mineral development came about partly as a result of the foreign 
90 
companies' possession of relevant technology. Alcoa US, for 
instance, refused to make its technology and expertise available 
to WMC unless it v/as offered a 51 per cent shareholding in the 91 Australian operation. Similarly, Kaiser Aluminium obtained a 
92 50 per cent interest in the Weipa development. 
This background did not augur well for the Labor government's 
hopes that foreign technology and expertise could be obtained 
without direct foreign investment. Those hopes were in fact 
dealt a severe blow at the Australia-Japan Ministerial meeting 
at which they were first expressed officially. The Japanese 
Ministers refused to study the feasibility of establishing a 
uranium enrichment plant utilising Japanese technology in 
Australia so long as the Australian government precluded 
93 
Japanese equity participation in the project. If the 
government of a country utterly dependent on imported fuels 
took this attitude towards an energy-oriented development, 
it was very unlikely that other potential suppliers of 
technology would accept the Australian proposals. 
The issue of the appropriateness of technology employed 
by foreign investors is enormously complex, because of the 
It also resulted from their access to sources of finance and 
to market outlets for the output of Australian bauxite and 
alumina. ibid., p.645. 
91 ibid., p.645. 
92 Kaiser's share in V7eipa has since declined to 41 per cent. 
^^ 'Japanese say "no" to uranium plant'. Age, 31 October 1973. 
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variety of mineral and ore types worked in Australia. However, 
the outstanding feature of most recent developments has been 
the use of capital-intensive highly-mechanised mining methods, 
and in most cases use of such methods was unavoidable if bulk 
commodities with a low unit value were to be exploited 
efficiently. Labour scarcity and the remote location of many 
of deposits reinforced this requirement. 
Creation of external economies 
Because of the very specialised nature of many of, the 
processes involved, it is unlikely that non-mining firms have 
benefitted significantly from technology or expertise imported 
by foreign mining companies. In the aluminium and nickel 
industries, ownership of the (sometimes secret) techniques 
is closely guarded, and consequently little 'spill over' 
to other mining companies occurs; each new venture makes its 
own arrangements with foreign suppliers of the technology 
involved. In areas where access to technology is more widely 
dispersed, the situation has been somewhat different. For 
instance, techniques for mining and processing of copper, lead, 
and zinc developed by or supplied to Mount Isa Mines and CRA 
94 
have been licensed and made available to other firms. 
However, as B.L. Johns has pointed out, the high degree of 
foreign ownership in the mining industry means that relatively 
few Australian companies exist which might benefit from any 
CRA, Submission to the Senate Select Committee on Foreign 
Ownership and Control, Official Hansard Report, 20 July 1972, 
p.750. 
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95 such transfer of technology. 
Many recent mineral developments have been located in 
remote and sparsely-populated regions, and have consequently 
been accompanied by major infrastructural investments. For 
example, Hamersley's development of its Western Australian 
iron ore deposits required construction of roads, railways, 
and port and shore facilities, provision of power and water 
96 
supplies, and the establishment of four townships. However, 
much recent infrastructural development has been particular 
to mining operations, reflecting the general absence of other 
forms of economic activity in remote regions. For instance in the 
Pilbara ports and railways are used almost exclusively for 
shipment of minerals, while townships and community facilities 
mainly serve mining company employees. In Queensland, railways 
associated with some mining projects (for example Mount Isa 
Mines, Utah's coal developments) pass through established 
pastoral areas, and have facilitated graziers' access to 
markets and lowered their transport costs. 
Mining company spokesmen and state and federal politicians 
and civil servants frequently express confidence that mine 
infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of new 
^^ B.L. Johns, 'Foreign Investment in Australia's Natural 
Resources', in J.A. Sinden, op.cit., p.297. 
^^ Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, Submission to the Senate 
Select Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control, Off^c^al 
Hansard Report, 2 0 July 1 9 7 2 , p. 7 4 7 . 
^^ Queensland Government Mining Journal, 2 1 December 1 9 6 4 . 
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9 8 
industries in Australia. To date, little evidence has emerged 
which might justify this confidence. Many of the projects 
involved have not of course been operational for very long, 
but the experience of well-established mining centres such as 
Mount Isa and Broken Hill, both of which have failed to establish 
significant industries autonomous of mining, is not encouraging. 
Once again, comparisons with earlier periods of mining activity 
99 • • may have created false impressions. Much of thxs activity 
was located in regions which were endov/ed with additional 
resources and could consequently support agricultural and 
manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s ; m a n y of the areas v;here recent 
developments have occurred are not so fortunate. 
Creation of external diseconomies 
Foreign mining companies have absorbed significant amounts 
of Australian resources, particularly labour, capital, and of 
course minerals. The labour utilised in mining would until 
recently have had alternative uses, and this is still the case 
in certain regions; however, as mentioned above, labour was 
probably employed more productively in mining than it would 
have been in its alternative uses. 
See, for example, Freeport of Australia, Submission to the 
select senate Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control Off^c^a^ 
Hansard Report, 20 July 1972, p.792; H.G. Raggatt, op cit p.75, 
C.W. Court, 'The Role of Government', in D. Douglas, op.cit., 
p.33-6. 
^^ Such comparisons have been drawn, for example, by S. Bambrick, 
T/z. Australia's Mineral ^^ 
Series No.3, Faculty of Economics, Australian National 
University, (Canberra, 1972), p.19. 
For instance, much of the gold mined in the nineteenth 
century was won in Victoria and New South Wales. 
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Absorpt ion of domestic capital raisss mors complex issues. 
The sums involved have certainly been substantial; over the 
period 1964-72 alone, foreign mining concerns raised over 
$620 million in loans and $670 million in equity from Australian 
sources.^^^ Could this capital have been more profitably 
employed elsewhere? 
As regards loan capital, foreign mining companies had to 
compete with other potential borrowers, and presumably their 
success in raising funds reflected their ability to pay 
interest at rates as high or higher than alternative users. 
However, two points should be made here. First, where 
Australian lenders attached a lower element of risk to investing 
in a subsidiary of a multinational corporation, Australian 
borrowers might be denied loan finance despite their 
willingness to pay competitive rates of interest. If the 
lenders' risk assessment was in fact mistaken, a failure to 
maximise returns on capital would result. 
As regards equity capital, a distinction should be drawn 
between equity subscribed at an early stage of the development 
process and that subscribed to established mining operations. 
As mentioned above, there is evidence that returns on 
Australian equity subscribed to established foreign-owned 
mining projects have been low, and to date most major equity 
subscriptions have fallen into this category. As an extreme 
example, it has been estimated that the AIDC would have earned 
an after-tax return of about 2 per cent if it had taken up 
102 CRA's share subscription offer (see above, p. 292). 
Derived from R.B. McKern, op.cit.. Tables 8.2, 8.3, p.162. 
'The High Cost of Nationalism', Age, 14 April 1973. 
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The willingness of Australian investors to subscribe equity 
in this manner can be explained by their expectations of 
receiving rates of return similar to those enjoyed by the 
original investors. The case of Hamersley Holdings Limited 
illustrates how mistaken such expectations can be; as of 
February 1975, Australian shareholders in Hamersley had paid 
on average 3.67 times as much for each share held as had the 
principal original shareholder, CRA.^^^ In sum, it is apparent 
that much of the domestic equity capital absorbed by foreign 
mining concerns might have been employed more profitably 
elsewhere. 
Foreign investors have also used large quantities of 
non-renewable mineral resources. The issue here is whether 
mineral development should have proceeded at a slower pace, 
allowing Australian investors an opportunity to develop the 
capacity to exploit those resources. How long it would have 
taken them to develop that capacity is a matter for conjecture, 
but policy-makers in the 1950s and 1960s had few doubts as to 
the answer - large-scale domestically-financed exploration 
and development seemed very far away, while a high value was 
placed on immediate returns from mineral exploitation, 
particularly in terms of foreign exchange earnings. 
The possibility that foreign mining concerns might pre-empt 
domestic investment by buying up or pushing out domestic 
mining companies is certainly real, and in this Australia 
differs from the other case study countries. Foreign investors 
might be able to act in this manner for a number of reasons. 
^^^ Derived from CPD, House of Representatives, Vol. 93, 
19 February 1975, p.508, Table II. 
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First, their greater size and the more diversified nature of 
their activities might place such concerns in a better 
position to bear the risks of exploration, giving them a 
competitive edge in the search for mineral deposits. Second, 
foreign companies might be able to outbid domestic rivals for 
resources discovered by third parties, for example because 
differences in taxation provisions between the foreign 
investor's home country and Australia affect after-tax 
returns, ^ "^"^because of the global strategy of the foreign company 
confers additional value on the resource, or because its 
superior technical abilities raise the expected rate of return. 
Third, domestic companies might lack access to the capital 
required to develop mineral discoveries, and have to sell out 
to foreign firms which enjoy such access. 
There is evidence that foreign mining companies operating 
in Australia have in fact enjoyed advantages of this type. It 
is generally recognised that their size and the diversity of 
their operations have assisted such companies in sustaining 
exploration a c t i v i t y , t h o u g h this advantage has probably 
been counteracted to some extent by the greater local knowledge 
enjoyed by domestic concerns.^^^ Foreign companies have 
certainly been in a position to outbid local investors for 
° For example the ability of US firms to claim tax deductions 
for depreciation of buildings and depletion of mineral resources 
is thought to have favoured them in bidding against Australian 
companies. 
See, for example, R.H. Harding, Participation in Mining ^  
Development of the Multi-interest corporation, the Mult%nat%onal 
Consortium and the Multinational Corporation, Resource Policy 
Series, No.l, Faculty of Economics, Australian National 
University, (Canberra, 1972), p.23. 
A number of Australian companies have certainly demonstrated 
an impressive ability to discover major mineral deposits. 
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mineral resources or the companies which possess them. In 
1970/1, for example, the assets of a major exploration company, 
Minsec, were offered for sale. The AIDC, in association with 
a number of potential Australian investors, carried out a 
detailed assessment of their value,but even their most 
generous estimate fell far short of the figure offered by 
107 
foreign competitors. it is also evident that Australian 
companies lacked access to overseas funds for reasons unrelated 
to their technical competence; both the ARDB and the AIDC 108 
identified a number of such concerns. 
It is extremely difficult to determine whether or not 
advantages of the type discussed above reflect real strengths 
which increase the capacity of the foreign companies concerned 
to exploit minerals efficiently, a point illustrated by their 
ability to outbid domestic concerns for mineral resources. 
For instance, the Canadian-based Noranda Mines Limited 
successfully bid against Australian concerns for Minsec's 
uranian interests. Noranda v/as evidently attempting to 
establish a strong position in the international uranium 
industry at that time, as it also purchased uranium interests 
and undertook uranium exploration in many other parts of the 
world, including Alaska, Ireland, Canada and Zambia. Its 
presence in Zambia, a country which, as mentioned above, was 
unlikely to attract exploration companies basing their 
investment decisions on 'normal' investment criteria indicates 
AIDC, Submission to the Senate Select Committee on Foreign 
Ownership and Control, Offioial Hansard Report, 13 July 1972, 
p. 418. 
ibid., p. 404; ARDB, 'Submission to the Senate Select 
Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control', ibid, p. 29, 
June 1972, p. 179. 
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that Noranda may have been prepared to pay in excess of a 
'normal commercial price' for uranium reserves, presumably in 
the hope of sharing in monopoly rents at a later date. Thus 
its willingness to outbid Australian companies might have 
little connection with any superior technical expertise. On 
the other hand, Noranda may possess specialised skills which 
would allow it to mine Australian uranium more efficiently 
109 
than a domestic concern. 
Thus it is certainly possible that domestic investment 
has been pre-empted by foreign mining concerns, and that 
national income has consequently been lower than it otherwise 
would have been. The Labor government certainly believed this 
to be the case, and in particular that Australian mining 
companies required assistance to overcome their relative 
disadvantage in terms of access to capital. The government 
intended to provide that assistance through the AIDC and the 
PMA, but the ability of Australia's Senate to block the 
relevant legislation prevented it from doing so. 
Two points can be made in relation to the impact of foreign 
mining investment on domestic income distribution. First, 
such investment probably exercised some upward impact on 
general wage levels, by creating additional demand for labour 
in a situation of full employment. However, the numbers 
employed in mining were relatively small (less than 2 per cent 
of the workforce) , and consequently the direct impact is 
unlikely to have been substantial. For the same reason and 
However this seems unlikely. Mining and initial processing 
of uranium is a straightforward operation, and could probably 
be carried out efficiently by most Australian mining companies. 
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because of the remoteness of the projects involved it is also 
unlikely that a significant 'demonstration effect' occurred. 
Second, Australian investors may have been denied 
opportunities to earn higher returns on capital by investing 
in lucrative mineral developments. Thus to the extent that 
income distribution has been affected, the result has been to 
narrow income differentials between Australian workers and 
Australian investors. 
This analysis permits some conclusions regarding the 
fears and assumptions underlying Labor policies. Certain 
foreign mining companies did engage in pricing and marketing 
practices likely to result in loss of Australian government 
revenue, and some (though probably few) may have failed to 
develop opportunities for viable mineral processing projects. 
Overseas investment in mining certainly did lead to a 
substantial outflow of incomes in the form of dividends and 
interest payments. But was it necessary to increase direct 
Australian participation in the mining industry to avoid these 
costs? 
As regards transfer pricing, the essential problem arose 
from the difficulty of establishing 'arms length' prices for 
the commodities being exported. It is not obvious that greater 
Australian participation could solve this problem at a cost 
commensurate with the potential gains. If Australian 
participation were limited to the mining stage, difficulties 
would probably arise in disposing of mineral products previously 
traded within vertically-integrated multinational corporations. 
On the other hand, attempts to refine those products into 
finished metal in Australia might frequently prove to be 
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uneconomic, for reasons outlined above; since private 
Australian concerns would certainly be unwilling to subsidise 
such operations, the Commonwealth would have to do so. 
Consequently it seems that little could be done other than to 
apply the Taxation Commissioner's existing powers as rigorously 
as possible. 
There apparently was a need for government involvement in 
certain cases to ensure that fragmentation and/or competition 
among mineral producers did not contribute towards under-pricing 
of mineral exports. This is not to suggest that the Australian 
government should have or could have cartelised producers and 
thus obtained monopolistic prices, or that intervention was 
required in relation to all minerals at all times, but rather 
that selective initiatives might be needed to ensure that 
producers obtained full current market prices for their exports. 
Was it necessary to increase direct Australian 
participation in mineral development in order to prevent under-
pricing, or did the application of export controls offer 
sufficient protection? Foreign firms might be less willing to 
voluntarily co-operate in negotiating with customers than would 
Australian companies, either because of relevant home country 
legislation (for instance US anti-trust laws) or because of 
equity ties with the customers involved. However, there is no 
evidence that foreign companies have been able to avoid 
The Australian government could have attempted to relate 
export prices directly to the value of finished metal. Attempts 
by the Jamaican government to adopt this approach in relation 
to bauxite exports led the companies to reduce output in Jamaica, 
compensating with increases elsewhere; thus a united front 
would have to be formed among mineral producing countries before 
such an approach could succeed. 
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government-imposed discipline. Thus increased Australian 
participation might reduce the need for government to intervene, 
but would hardly enhance its ability to prevent under-pricing. 
In those instances where failure to process minerals was 
due to the requirement of overseas companies for guaranteed 
sources of raw materials, increased domestic participation 
might result in greater local processing. However, a similar 
result could possibly be achieved by favouring foreign companies 
without such a requirement in the granting of mining leases, 
leaving domestic resources free for alternative uses. 
Greater Australian participation in mineral development 
clearly was essential if the flow of incomes to overseas 
'suppliers of capital was to cease. The important question in 
this instance is whether the Labor government was justified 
in its assumption that such participation could be achieved 
without significant decline in the efficiency or scale of 
mining operations or in overall levels of investment. It is 
evident that its expectations regarding the willingness of 
foreign mining companies to supply their resources (technology 
and technical expertise, entrepreneurship and risk capital) 
without being offered equity participation were largely mistaken. 
This misperception resulted from two factors. First, the 'oil 
crisis' of 1973/4 and the commodity boom which accompanied it 
distorted perceptions as to the true long-term demand/supply 
situation for energy minerals other than petroleum/natural gas 
and for non-fuel minerals, hiding the fact that alternative 
sources of supply would be available for most of these minerals 
for the foreseeable future, and that foreign investors would 
consequently not be prepared to pay a high premium for access to 
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guaranteed supplies from Australia. Second, foreign investors 
in fact generally equated 'security of supply' with the 
ownership and control conferred by direct equity participation, 
a point recognised by the Labor government towards the end of 
its term in office (see above, p. 308), 
Thus additional domestic resources would have to be 
mobilised if Australian participation was to increase. As 
mentioned already, domestic capital mobilised for mining 
investment would probably have been withdrawn from other uses. 
If investment levels were not to decline, Australia would have 
to finance resource development with capital borrowed overseas, 
which would mean that interest payments would continue to flow 
abroad. In fact, this was the course the Labor government 
apparently intended to take. It is ironic that its attempts to 
do so brought about a constitutional crisis, its removal from 
office, and the abandonment of its schemes to increase Australian 
participation in mineral development.^^^ 
There was also a need for Australian corporate vehicles 
which could act as risk-takers, apply mining capital efficiently, 
and marshall the other resources required for mineral development. 
Because of the shortness of Labor's term in office and of the 
legislative delays caused by the Senate and by legal challenges, 
it is a matter for conjecture whether the necessary entre-
preneurial and other skills could have been provided by a 
combination of private Australian firms (assisted by the AIDC 
and the PMA) and government mining corporations. It seems likely 
^^^ For a description of the Labor government's attempts to raise 
loans overseas for this purpose, and of the political aftermath, 
see 'Rex Connor: A last testament on the Loans Affair', Natzonal 
Times, 29 August - 3 September 1977. 
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that a substantial period of time would have elapsed before 
these concerns could develop the technical expertise and the 
financial strength to undertake large-scale developments alone, 
and consequently foreign investors would probably have 
continued to play a major role. In addition, alienation of 
mineral ownership had already occurred to a considerable degree. 
For both these reasons, the level of foreign ownership in the 
mineral industry was likely to remain high for some time to come. 
It was consequently important that taxation provisions 
applying to the industry should appropriate a substantial 
112 
proportion of any economic rents arising from mining. This 
was so for another reason. The analysis in this Chapter 
indicates that the Labor Party was justified in its pessimism 
regarding the likelihood of substantial direct economic benefits 
arising from mining projects. Mining was highly capital-
intensive and so had little employment-generating potential, 
backward linkage was comparatively weak, mineral processing 
was unlikely to create substantial benefits relative to the 
alternative uses of the resources involved, it was unlikely 
that mining infrastructure would give rise to significant 
additional non-mining activity, and there was little 'spill-
over' of technology from the industry. Thus taxation of mining 
profits would constitute an important element in any benefits 
which Australia would receive from exploitation of its minerals. 
In theory, separate taxation provisions might be applied to 
foreign and domestic companies, but considerations of equity and 
of administrative feasibility would dictate a unified approach. 
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Mining taxation and Australian federali sm 
Australia is unique among the case study countries in that 
taxes are imposed on mining operations by two levels of 
government: the Commonwealth imposes income taxes, while state 
governments charge royalties on minerals worked within their 
borders. (The Commonwealth collects royalties in the 
Territories). The Australian Constitution vests ownership of 
minerals in the Crown, as represented by the state governments, 
and royalties constitute compensation for use of the Crown's 
property. 
Until very recently, royalty rates were generally low;^^^ 
in 1968, for example, they amounted to $22 million, or only 
2.5 per cent of the ex-mine value of mineral output in that 
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year. A number of factors accounted for the failure of 
state governments to demand a higher return from exploitation 
of their mineral resources, perhaps the most significant being 
their concern to maximise the direct economic impact of mineral 
development. They were consequently reluctant to impose taxes 
which might render projects unviable or reduce 'the scale on 
which they proceeded and, lacking experience in dealing with 
large scale mineral developments, tended to err on the side of 
caution in assessing appropriate levels of taxation. Interstate 
competition also had some effect; while the fact that reserves 
of individual minerals were concentrated in one state (for 
A significant exception were the royalties charged by New 
South Wales on the Broken Hill mines, which were profit based 
and steeply progressive. 
^^^ BMR, Australian Mineral Industry Annual Review, 1968, Table 4, 
p. 4; Table 15. 
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example iron ore in Western Australia) might be expected to 
have diminished competition, state governments were anxious 
to ensure that their states did not generally appear less 
attractive to investors than their neighbours, and this 
concern exerciseda depressive effect on royalty levels. In 
addition, most royalties had been set in earlier years at 
fixed sums which became increasingly less onerous as the money 
value of minerals rose.^^^ 
By the mid 19 70s some increase in royalty rates had 
occurred; in 1976/7, they amounted to 4 per cent of the ex-mine 
116 value of mineral output. 
Three distinct types of royalties are applied in Australia: 
fixed charges on each unit of production (unit royalties), 
charges calculated as a percentage of the value of output (ad 
volorem royalties) and royalties calculated as a percentage of 
net profits. Frequently, two or even all three types will be 
employed in a single state; the effective rate of royalty 
can vary from one mineral to another within each state, and 
, 118 
from state to state in regards to the same mineral. 
Reluctance to impose higher royalties apparently did not 
result from any likelihood that the states' entitlement to 
grants from the Commonwealth would be reduced if income from 
mining increased. Under the procedures adopted by the Grants 
commission, royalty rates in the standard states (New South Wales 
and Victoria) affected the size of recommended grants, but rates 
in the claimant statesdid not. G. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 61. 
^^^Royalties were $201 million, the ex-mine value of mineral 
output $4,810 million. BMR, Australian Mineral Industry Annual 
Review, 1977, Table 4, p. 4; Table 15. 
so, for example. New South Wales applies profit-based 
royalties to the Broken Hill mines, unit royalties to coal, ana 
ad valorem royalties to other minerals. 
^^^ For example, Queensland charges a unit royalty of 5C per 
ton on coal, New South Wales charges SOC per ton. 
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Some states, notably Queensland, also confiscate part 
of raining revenues by imposing inflated rail charges and by 
requiring the mine operator to finance construction of government-
119 
owned infrastructure. It is impossible to calculate 
accurately how much revenue is raised in this manner. However, 
information supplied by Mount Isa Mines to the Industries 
Assistance Commission in relation to Queensland indicates that 
profit generated by those lines which mainly carry mining 120 traffic amounted to $30 million in 1973/4; by comparison, 
121 
mineral royalties yielded $4.3 million in that year. 
The impact of royalties on mining operations varies, of 
course, with the type and level of royalty involved. Unit and 
ad valorem royalties are similar in that they represent a 
charge on production which takes no account of costs; their 
effect is to hasten the point at which marginal costs equal 
price, thereby reducing the total quantity of ore mined. In 122 
other words, they raise cut-off grades. Depending on 
relative movements in costs and prices, the impact of unit and 
ad valorem royalties can increase over time though the rates 
at which they are charged remain unchanged. So, for example, 
^^^ Western Australia and South Australia also apparently obtain 
revenue in this manner, though to a lesser extent than Queensland 
Derived from Industries Assistance Commission, Report, 
Petroleum and Mining Industries, Table A5, p. A60. 
^^^ BMR, Australian Mineral Industry Annual Review, 1977, 
Table 33, p. 42. 
^^^ in theory, they might also serve to reduce the rate of 
extraction and so prolong mine life, a consideration which might 
be of considerable social significance in regions heavily 
dependent on mining. However in practice royalties have 
apparently exercised little impact on extraction rates in_ 
Australia. Industries Assistance Commission, Report, Mtmng and 
Petroleum Industries, p. 49. 
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the Western Australian iron ore producer, Hamersley, was 
subject to an ad valorem royalty of 7l/2 per cent over the 
entire period 19 67/8-197 4/5, but because its costs rose much 
more steeply than prices over these years, the proportion of 
gross profits accounted for by royalty payments increased 
123 
from 16.3 per cent in 1967/8 to 40.0 per cent in 1973/4. 
Where this occurs, the impact of royalties on production 
decisions is of course increased. 
Unit royalties have an additional disadvantage in that 
their real value can decline considerably over time and, as 
a result, they are usually subject to periodic readjustment, 
adding to the degree of uncertainty faced by investors in the 
industry. So, for example, Queensland imposed a unit 
royalty of 10c a tonne on bauxite exported from VJeipa when 
development commenced in 1957; by 1974, this charge seemed 
almost irrelevant, and it was increased tenfold to $1 per 
tonne. 
It should be noted that freight charges have an equivalent 
affect to unit royalties where they are used to generate 
revenue, as they represent a fixed payment on each tonne of ore 
produced. Their hidden nature may create additional costs in 
that it can disguise inefficiencies in the allocation of 
resources, a point which also applies when state governments 
collect quasi-royalties by obtaining undertakings to develop 
uneconomic mineral processing facilities. 
Profit-based royalties largely avoid the disadvantages 
discussed above, as they adjust in response to changes in both 
IP Q 
ibid., Table A5.2, p. A64. 
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costs and prices. However they also will affect cut-off 
grades if their application reduces the expected rate of return 
on mining of certain ores below that required by the investor; 
in the same way they may render some mineral prospects sub-
marginal . 
This point also applies, of course, to income tax as it 
was charged on mining operations in Australia. While effective 
income tax rates were low, the practical impact was unlikely 
to be great, but a high proportion of economic rents 
would escape taxation. As effective tax rates increased, that 
proportion would decline, but the likelihood of mining 
• . 124 operations being rendered sub-marginal would grow. 
It is unlikely that application of royalties directly 
prevented development of any specific mineral prospect in 
Australia. As mentioned above, their generally low level 
reflected a determination on the part of state governments that 
they should not do so, a determination which still exists 
despite recent increases in royalty rates. The states have 
been careful to retain an element of flexibility in their 
royalty systems, and would very probably reduce royalties in 
individual cases if it could be demonstrated that developments 
would not otherwise proceed. So, for example, Queensland's 
Minister for Mines, Mr Camm, has stated that royalties imposed 
by his state will not result in the abandonment of any mineral 
^ Thus the Industries Assistance Commission inquiry into 
mining taxation concluded that the Labor government s amendments 
to the Income Tax Assessment Act might deter future mineral 
developments. Industries Assistance Commission, Report, 
Petroleum and Mining Industries, p. 47. 
381 
125 prospect. The corollary of this situation is, of course, 
that royalty charges are unlikely to capture a significant 
proportion of economic rents. 
While royalty rates were low, it is also unlikely that 
they exercised a significant impact on production decisions. 
However the recent increases, especially where accompanied by 
unfavourable cost and price movements, may well alter this 
situation. Quite apart from changes in the industry's general 
cost structure, costs within individual mines tend to increase 
as ore grades decline and as mining occurs at deeper levels 
or requires stripping of additional overburden. As the mineral 
discoveries of the 1950s and 1960s move into later phases of 
their development, the impact of royalties may be expected to 
increase. 
Thus the existing taxation system has important 
12 6 
disadvantages, a fact widely recognised in Australia. Why 
then does it persist? 
First, the royalty issue must be placed in a broader 
context. A strong belief exists in the principal mineral 
producing states (especially Queensland and Western Australia) 
that mineral policies formulated in Canberra reflect the 
consumer-oriented views of the Eastern industrialised states, 
combined with a strong element of economic nationalism, and that 
they consequently give scant recognition to their own interests 
Queensland Government Mining Journal, February 1977, p. 479. 
^^^ See, for instance A. Henderson, op.cit., pp. '' , . . 
industries Assistance Commission, Report, Petroleum and Mvmng 
Industries, p.40. 
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127 as mineral producers or to their need for development. 
As a result, there is a strong determination not to brook 
outside interference in the exercise of the prerogatives 
conferred on the states by their ownership of minerals, one 
of the most significant of which is the right to charge 
royalties. In other words, any initiative towards a more 
efficient taxation system would have little hope of success 
unless it originated with the states; for a number of reasons, 
this is very unlikely to occur. 
First, a more efficient tax system would require a degree 
of centralised administration, because it would have to be 
applied universally or at least uniformly by each state. The 
mineral producing states fear that their interests would not 
be protected under a centrally administered tax system, for 
two reasons. They believe that its introduction would be 
accompanied by increases in the level of taxation which, in 
their opinion, would inhibit mineral development. In 
addition, they are convinced that Canberra would use the 
opportunity provided by its introduction to increase its 
128 
relative share of mining taxation. The net result would 
be that their development would be inhibited while they would 
receive little or no compensation in the form of additional 
revenue. 
These perceptions have been strengthened by the fact that 
proposals by the federal government to alter the tax system 
^^^ For a detailed discussion of the manner in which the mineral 
producing states have perceived mineral policy initiatives by 
Canberra over recent years, see G. Stevenson, op.cit., 
especially Chapters IV, VI and VII. 
G- Stevenson, op.cit., pp. 27-8. 
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have in practice amounted to proposals that it impose 
additional taxes. So, for example, when the Liberal/National 
Country Party government envisaged in its 1977 Budget that a 
resource tax would be applied to profits above a certain rate 
of return, there was no question that the tax might be applied 
generally in place of existing provision and a portion of 
revenue receipts dispersed to the states, but only that the 
Commonwealth apply it to 'windfall' profits expected to accrue 
to oil and uranium producers. Introduction of the tax was 
129 
bitterly opposed by Queensland and Western Australia, and 
their opposition played an important part in the decision 
V, ^ 130 to abandon it. 
This approach probably reflected the Liberal/Country Party 
government's belief that opposition from the states would make 
it impossible to implement a more basic reform of the system, 
and tnat it should consequently act to obtain a part of the 
economic rents which would otherwise go untaxed. While it 
might have withstood pressure from Queensland and Western 
Australia in relation to the 'windfall profits tax', it is 
unlikely that a Labor government would be any more willing to 
attempt a fundamental restructuring of mining taxation. 
A second major reason for the states' opposition to change 
results from the advantages their governments can obtain by 
retaining flexibility in the manner in which, and the level at 
which, royalties and quasi-royalties are set. Perhaps the 
129 
See for example the statement by Queensland's Minister for 
Mines, Mr Camm, Queensland Government Mining Journal, February 
1977, p. 479. 
'Resources Tax Chopped', Australian Financial Review, 3 July 
1978 . 
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clearest example of the first is provided by the Queensland 
government's railway freight charges. By charging royalties 
in this way the government can subsidise freight rates to 
politically influential groups (urban commuters, rural 
dwellers) without appearing to grant direct subsidies which 
might be difficult to justify in economic terms.^^^ 
Flexibility in the level of royalties can, for example, allow 
a state to encourage investment in mineral processing, in a 
particular mineral or region, and to establish a competitive 
edge over its neighbours in attempting to attract mining 
investment, should it feel the necessity to do so. 
It could be argued that the states could retain much of 
this flexibility and avoid many of the disadvantages associated 
with the existing system by switching to a profit-based royalty. 
It has been suggested by not a few federal politicians and 
civil servants (especially during Labor's period in office) 
that their failure to recognise the benefits of doing so 
reflects the inability of their bureaucracies to grasp the 
full implications of using various types of taxation measures, 
a viewpoint often associated with a general belief that state 
civil servants and politicians lack information and expertise, 
have no aptitude for or interest in long-term planning, and 
132 ^ 
think only of the immediate impact of their actions. i am 
not in a position to assess the validity of these views, but it 
is clear that state governments have at least one very concrete 
This can occur because revenues from carriage of minerals 
are included by the Queensland railways in a consolidated 
account which does not differentiate between either revenues or 
costs by origin. 
13 2 G. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 30. 
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and well-defi nsd irsason f.ox pirsfsiriring unit a.nd ad valorsin 
to profit-based royalties — incomes from the former are more 
stable and secure. Incomes tend to fluctuate less widely 
than under profit-based royalties, they accrue more quickly 
from new projects as profitability does not first have to 
be achieved, and perhaps most importantly the state is 
guaranteed a return regardless of whether a project achieves 
profitability or not. The belief that royalties should be 
charged regardless of profitability has little justification 
in economic theory, as the inherent value of the resource 
is thought to be defined by its ability to generate economic 
rents. However, there is a strong belief in most countries, 
including Australia, that mineral resources belong to the 
community, which should receive payments for their use, 
and from this perspective a fundamental weakness of profit-
based royalties is that they fail to ensure that it will do 
so. 
In sum, application of royalties and quasi-royalties 
is likely to create distortions in production decisions and 
in resource allocation, while the existence of the royalty 
system, and of the federal structures which underlie it, 
militate against the introduction of a more efficient taxation 
system by the Commonwealth. 
Conclusion 
The fears which underlay Labor Party policies were 
certainly not unjustified, though the extent to which practices 
inimical to Australia's interests actually occurred were 
sometimes exaggerated. It is less certain that the policies 
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adopted by the Labor governments of 1972-5 were appropriate 
in the Australian context. I n the case of pricing and 
marketing practices and of mineral processing, much could 
have been done without diverting resources from other 
uses in order to increase direct Australian participation 
in mining. In addition, Labor leaders underestimated the 
obstacles they would face in attempting to achieve increased 
participation. On the other hand, some Australian investors 
apparently were well placed to take advantage of opportunities 
in the mining field, and a relatively small amount of 
government assistance might have allowed them to counteract 
the comparative advantages enjoyed by foreign concerns. 
Labor's attempts to provide that assistance, and to remove 
the obstacles to increased domestic participation which it 
did recognise, were frustrated by the powers exercised by 
the Senate within Australia's federal parliamentary system. 
Certain of tne assumptions which underlay Liberal/Country 
Party and state governments towards foreign-financed mineral 
development were also unfounded; in particular, their 
confidence that such development would generate substantial 
direct economic benefits was largely misplaced, and their 
relative disinterest in taxing the profits of foreign mining 
companies consequently inappropriate. Indeed federal and 
state governments of all political hues have failed to 
formulate an efficient taxation system; at the heart of this 
failure lies the state royalty system and the federal structures 
which underlie it. 
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Chapter Eight 
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: 
THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1964-1972 
Papua New Guinea consists of the eastern portion of 
the island of New Guinea and some 600 smaller islands, a 
total land area of 463,000 square kilometres. Its 
topography is rugged; much of the country is covered by 
steep mountains, while some 70 per cent of its land area 
is forested. Many of its rivers are unnavigable, there are 
no railways, and the capital. Port Moresby, is not connected 
to any other major urban centre by road.^ Because of its 
formidable geography, the country is culturally fragmented; 
over 700 local languages have been identified, while a wide 
variety of social structures exist, though most share two 
characteristics - a social security system through which 
members of kinship groups assist and support one another, 
and a system of land tenure in which ownership is a 
community right granted to individuals or families by 
agreement among owning groups. 
Permanent contact with Europeans was not established 
until after 1870, when missionary, labour-recruiting, trading 
and plantation activities commenced. In 1884 Britain and 
Germany divided the area which now constitutes Papua New 
Guinea, Britain taking control of the southern mainland and 
the southern islands (Papua), Germany taking the northern 
^ Air transport is used for much of Papua New Guinea's 
internal shipping and most of its passenger traffice. 
mainland and its neighbouring islands (New Guinea). 
After the First World War, both areas were administered by 
Australia, separately until the Second World War and 
jointly from Port Moresby (as the Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea) thereafter. 
Until the early 1960s Australian policy-makers 
assumed that Australia would administer the Territory for 
a long time to come, and little was done to encourage 
political participation by indigenous people. However, 
political development proceeded very rapidly from 1970 
onwards. In 1973 Papua New Guinea was granted self-
government and in 1975 it became independent. A Westminster-
style parliamentary system was established, and this has 
since been modified by the creation of a system of 
provincial governments. 
Papua New Guinea's economy is predominantly 
agricultural; subsistence agriculture (increasingly 
augmented by cultivation of export crops) engages from 
60 to 70 per cent of its 2.9 million inhabitants, while over 
50 per cent of its 350,000 wage earners are engaged in 
primary industry. Only 7.2 per cent are occupied in 
industrial activity.^ Until very recently, Papua New 
Guinea's external transactions have been balanced by, and 
much of its public expenditure financed by, Australian 
government grants and expenditures. This situation has 
changed to some extent over the last seven years, primarily 
because of the development of a handful of foreign-financed 
^ Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1979 Yearbook, 
(Hong Kong, 1979), p.277. 
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export-oriented natural resource projects, the most 
important of which is the copper/gold mine on 
Bougainville Island. 
In this Chapter and the next the development of the 
Bougainville mine is described, its impact on the economy, 
society and politics of Papua New Guinea is analysed, and 
issues arising from that analysis are discussed within the 
framework developed in Chapter One. The analysis is divided 
into two parts. Chapter 8 deals with the period of 
exploration and construction (1964-1972), a period 
dominated by issues relating to the impact of mining 
activity on the indigenous population. Chapter 9 deals 
with the operational phase (1972-1979), a period during 
which the distribution of profits between government and 
the foreign investor has been the central issue. 
Historical introduction. 
In 1929, two Australian prospectors discovered small 
amounts of gold in the Kupei area of Bougainville Island. 
In subsquent years other finds were made nearby, at Moroni, 
south of Kupei, and in a small valley east of Kupei called 
Panguna. Mining was carried on intermittently from 1940 
until 1952, but Bougainville's 'gold rush' was of modest 
proportions. The deposits were located at a height of 3,500 
feet in dense tropical forest, there were no stories of 
instant wealth to fire the imaginations of prospective 
explorers, and the gold was difficult to extract from the 
copper-bearing host rocks. When the gold miners abandoned 
Bougainville in the early 1950s, they left little trace of 
themselves, other than rusting pieces of equipment which soon 
disappeared under the encroaching forest. 
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Within a decade, foreign prospectors again came to 
Bougainville, attracted by the copper which had caused 
difficulties for their predecessors. In this instance, 
prospecting and mining activity was to have a profound 
impact on Bougainville, and on Papua New Guinea as a whole. 
In 1961 a government geologist, J. E. Thompson, had 
compiled a report which concluded that the Panguna gold-
copper prospect warranted investigation.^ At that time 
the London-based Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (RTZ), through 
its subsidiary Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), was 
prospecting for low grade copper deposits in Eastern 
Australia. A company geologist. Ken Phillips, persuaded 
CRA that New Guinea offered a more favourable geological 
climate in which to search for such orebodies. Encouraged 
by Thompson's report, CRA decided to investigate the Kupei 
prospect, and in December 1963 it obtained a Special 
Prospecting Authority for the area. 
Bougainville is the principal island of the northern 
group of the Solomon Islands, and is about 120 miles long 
by 30 miles wide. The steep Crown Prince mountain range 
dominates the Island; flat land is scarce, though 
Bougainville's volcanic soil is extremely fertile. 
The Island's political status was determined in 1898 
when Britain gave Bougainville to Germany in exchange for 
the rest of the Solomon Islands, whose inhabitants shared 
strong racial and cultural links with the Bougainvillians, 
and for the Tongan group. In 1914 Australia took over 
^ Thompson's report was published by the Australian Bureau 
of Mineral Resources in 1962. 
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4 Bougainville from Germany; Australian rule was characterised 
by an attitude of laissez-faive , if not by outright 
neglect, though individual officials tried hard to assist 
the local people. Complaints of Administration neglect 
emanated from every province in the Territory during the 
1960s, but Bougainville apparently received scant attention 
even in relative terms. ^  The Administration may have felt 
that the Island was comparatively well-endowed in natural 
resources and also in terms of social services (provided 
mainly by missionary groups), and consequently should 
yield priority to less fortunate regions. However, this 
circumstance did not detract from the sense of neglect felt 
by Bougainvillians. The Islanders also apparently suffered 
at the hands of individual Europeans, enduring 'specific 
acts of discrimination including occasional physical 
violence'.^ 
Little accurate information exists regarding the 
economic or social character of Bougainville in the decades 
Australia governed the Island under military rule 
(1914-1921), as part of the Mandated Territory of New 
Guinea (1921-1942), and as part of the Trust Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea (1945 onwards). Bougaxnville fell 
under Japanese military rule from 1942 to 1945. 
^ For instance, a full-time agricultural officer was not 
appointed until 1958, despite Bougainville's considerable 
agricultural potential, and an Administration school was 
not built until 1961. For a more detailed discussion ot_ 
this point, see J. Momis and E. Ogan, 'A View from Bougain-
ville', in M. W. Ward (ed.), Change and Development ^n Rural 
Melanesia, (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 
1972), pp. 107-8; andW. Fingleton, 'Bougainville: A 
Chronicle of Just Grievances', /1/ew Gmnea, Vol.5, No.z, 
(June-July 1970), pp. 13-20. 
^ J. Momis and E. Ogan, op.cit., p.108. 
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prior to 1963."^ Commercial agriculture had commenced in 
the 1880s, when Australian and European interests 
established coconut plantations in coastal areas. 
Relatively few Bougainvillians accepted the wage employment 
offered by the planters, preferring to rely on subsistence 
g 
production, and plantation labour was drawn from Highland 
and other districts, particularly in the post-war period. 
By the early 1960s, about 75 per cent of Bougainville's 
72,000 indigenous inhabitants were still engaged in 
agriculture. Output of cocoa and copra was substantial by Q 
this stage- Large-scale production was dominated by 
expatriates, but many local people were producing cash 
crops to supplement subsistence income. It has, however, 
been estimated that 41 per cent of the indigenous workforce 
were still entirely engaged in subsistence production in 
1966.^° Aggregate figures distort the picture somewhat; 
it is likely that villages located away from flat, fertile 
coastal areas were considerably more dependent on 
subsistence farming. 
What information does exist is summarised by_ 
M. L. Treadgold, The Regional Economy of Bougainville: 
Growth and Structural Change', Development Studies Centre, 
Occasional Paper No.10, (Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1978), pp. 2-16 (hereafter referredto as The 
Regional Economy of Bougainville); and D. Oliver, 
Bougainville: "A Personal History, (Melbourne University 
Press, 1973) . 
® Treadgold has estimated that only about 20 per cent of 
males of working age were in wage-employment in the late 
1930s. Derived from M. L. Treadgold, The Regional Economy 
of Bougainville, p.5. 
^ In the late 1960s, Bougainville accounted for one sixth 
of PNG's copra production and one quarter of its cocoa 
production. 
TPNG, Office of the Economic Adviser, Bougainville 
Draft Development Programme, Port Moresby,(September 1969), 
p. 4. 
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In 1964, Bougainville was an island whose people 
harboured a sense of resentment, developed over many 
decades, against the Australian Administration and against 
Europeans in general. The Bougainvillians were also a 
people whose whole mode of existence depended on access 
to and use of agricultural land. 
The early exploration period, 1964-1966. 
In January 1964, Phillips travelled to Kieta to prepare 
for a geological survey of the Kupei prospect.^^ He 
sought the assistance of Max Denehy, the Assistant District 
Commissioner, in dealing with the local people, but 
Denehy was very short staffed and unable to help. In 
mid April 1964 Phillips set out for Kupei with three 
assistants; none of the four had extensive experience of 
working in areas populated by non-Europeans. 
Initially, no objections were made to their presence. 
In early May a group of local people visited the site to 
find out what the geologists were doing. A lengthy 
discussion ensued during which the villagers questioned 
CRA's right to prospect on their land, but as far as 
Phillips was concerned they approved the presence of the 
Use is made of Phillips' own account of events in 
this section: see K. Phillips, 'Notes on Contact with 
Bougainvilleans in the Early Exploration Phase', reproduced 
in R. Bedford and A. Mamak, Compensating for Development: _ 
The Bougainville Case, (hereafter referred to as Compensatvng 
for Development), Bougainville Special Publications No.2, 
(Christchurch, 1977), pp. 151-60. Phillios' account was 
verified where possible in interviews held with Severius 
(Sev) Ampoai, a local schoolteacher who was closely 
involved in events during this period, at Panguna on 
19 June 1978. 
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12 exploration team. Whatever the case, one group of local 
people, the Guavas, soon expressed opposition to CRA's 
activities, and demanded that the geologists leave. 
Subsequently, Denehy pointed out to Phillips that CRA was 
not employing any Guavas; he called village leaders to 
Kieta and explained CRA's plans in detail, and Phillips 
undertook to employ Guavas at the Panguna site. This 
apparently placated the Guavas, as exploration work was not 
interrupted for several months thereafter. By September 
1964, Phillips was convinced that a major copper deposit 
existed at Panguna. 
In the meantime, CRA sought exclusive prospecting 
licences for the Panguna area, and a Warden's Court was 
held in Kieta in January 1965 to consider its application. 
The Guava people objected to the granting of the licences, 
and questioned the Court's right to issue them. The Mining 
Warden explained that existing legislation vested ownership 
of all minerals in the Administration and thus conferred 
that right on the Court, but the Guavas denied the validity 
of the Administration's claim. Despite their objections, 
CRA's application was successful. 
Phillips apparently gained this impression largely 
from the attitude of one individual, a Nasioi named Oni. 
Later commentators have claimed that Oni was an outspoken 
individual who had no right to commit the larger community 
to co-operation with CRA, and that the Company's failure to 
realise this gave rise to conflict at a later date. (J.Momis 
and E. Ogan, op.cit., p.110.) The CRA team was certainly 
ill-equipped to analyse the sociological intricacies of 
village society, but Phillips claims that Oni, though he 
later lost influence, was a major force in the whole area 
in 1964, and not just an outspoken Nasioi. It is possible, 
however, that Oni caused dissatisfaction among local people 
by failing to pass on information provided by Phillips and 
by not distributing cash and food payments given to him as 
leader of his clan (K. Phillips, op.cit., p.160). 
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In January CRA also received its first really 
favourable drilling results; CRA and the Administration's 
Mines Division now knew that there was a strong" 
probability of a mine eventuating in time.^^ 
From January 1965 onwards, Phillips spent much of his 
time trying to convince local people that the Panguna 
development would be in their interests, a difficult task 
since he was unable to say what financial benefits 
development might bring. The Mining Ordinance then in force 
did not provide for payment to landowners of occupation 
fees or of compensation for minerals removed. Phillips and 
Denehy were concerned with the implications of this 
situation; they were facing more and more questions as to 
what local people would gain from CRA's activities, and 
many villagers were now openly expressing dissatisfaction 
with the Company's presence. 
In mid 1965 Phillips and Denehy submitted a document 
on the matter to the Administration in Port Moresby. This 
discussed the problems of the Company and of the local 
people, offered advice as to how conflict between the two 
could be avoided, and emphasised the need to promise monetary 
compensation to local people for minerals removed from their 
land. 
The unusual step of submitting such a document was 
taken because, as Phillips explained, 'we were quite sure 
that [Port] Moresby had no real appreciation of the 
situation and Denehy was entirely frustrated in trying to 
^^ K. Phillips, op.cit., p.156. 
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get anything through normal c h a n n e l s M o r e iiramediately, 
it was prompted by a number of incidents involving CRA 
personnel and local people. In July 1965 Phillips was 
absent from Bougainville. His replacement, a senior 
exploration man from Melbourne, pushed the exploration effort 
ahead vigorously despite warnings from Denehy and Phillips, 
and sent a party into Mainoki village without consulting 
the villagers. The party was expelled and the villagers 
refused to permit CRA personnel back on to their land, an 
attitude they maintain to this day. 
The most serious incident apparently resulted from a 
misunderstanding. The Company wished to prospect in an area 
between Panguna and Kupei, and it consulted the Kupei and 
Guava people who, it believed, held customary rights in the 
area. As far as CRA understood, there was no objection. A 
hunting party from Musinau, a village which, unknown to 
CRA, held hunting rights in the area, came upon the 
exploration camp and pulled it down. Police were called in 
and a number of Musinau men were imprisoned. Following 
this incident, a substantial body of policemen were brought 
into the prospecting area. The majority were soon withdrawn 
but this type of exercise was precisely what Phillips and 
Denehy had been working to avoid. 
Relations between local people and the authorities 
deteriorated rapidly from this time onwards, and in Phillips' 
view the visit of the Minister for External Territories to 
Bougainville in mid 1966 was 'the major milestone' in this 
process. Mr Barnes was briefed for about half an hour on 
14 ibid, p.157. 
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his arrival at Port Moresby by the Assistant Administrator, 
Henderson. He flew to Kieta and without consulting Denehy 
or other individuals on the spot spoke to meetings of local 
people. In effect, Barnes told these people that there 
was nothing in the Panguna development specifically for 
them, but rather that the project would benefit Papua New 
Guinea as a whole. Phillips and Denehy were thunderstruck; 
a new Mining Ordinance was then being prepared and they had 
conveyed their optimism regarding its likely provisions to 
the local people. 
In the wake of the Minister's visit, more and more 
local people refused CRA employees access to their land. 
The Administration responded by adopting a 'hard line' 
policy. Denehy, who was convinced of the need for patience 
and compromise, was transferred from Bougainville. Additional 
police were drafted in and a patrol post established at 
Panguna. By the following year the situation was, 
according to Phillips, 'appalling'. 
In June 1966, amendments to the Mining Ordinance were 
introduced in the House of Assembly, a legislative body made 
up of elected representatives and of 'official' members 
appointed by the Administration. The amendments reasserted 
the principle of Administration ownership of minerals,^^ a 
principle which Administration spokesmen defended on the 
basis that mineral exploitation should benefit all Papua 
New Guineans, not merely those fortunate enough to own 
land rich in minerals. They pointed to the actions of other 
^^ This principle had been applied to New Guinea by 
legislation enacted in 1928; the amendments extended its 
application to Papua. 
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national governments in legislating for state ownership as 
evidence of the concept's validity,and stressed that every 
dollar of mineral revenue would be needed by Port Moresby 
to finance the economic development of the Territory as a 
u -1 16 
whole. 
The Acts provided for payment of a minimum occupation 
fee of $1 per annum to landowners affected by prospecting 
or mining activity.^^ Persons wishing to enter and prospect 
on private land would have to obtain a permit from an open 
Warden's Court, thus allowing 'full opportunity for public 18 
interest and private interest to be represented'. 
The member for South Bougainville, Paul Lapun, was 
entirely dissatisfied with these provisions. The Acts 
provided for the imposition of royalties on mineral 
production, and Lapun tabled an amendment providing that 
20 per cent of those royalties would be paid to the 
landowners involved. He pointed out that, according to 
local custom, mineral rights belonged to the landowner. 
Mining would deprive local people of their livelihood as it 
would -permanently damage their land, and substantial 
compensation was therefore required. Lapun warned 'if the 
^^ TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 8 June 1966. 
The annual fee would amount to 5 per cent of the 
unimproved capital value of the land or $1, whichever was 
the highest. The minimum annual payment was later raised 
to $2 for land included in mining tenements. 
^^ If a landowner was dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Warden's Court he could appeal the verdict to the Supreme 
Court. This provision was unlikely to have any practical 
effect since subsistence farmers would hardly possess the 
resources to undertake such litigation. In fact no 
Bougainvillian was to employ this provision though many 
were certainly dissatisfied with the verdicts handed down 
by VJarden's Courts. 
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people in Kieta are dissatisfied...trouble could arise.... 
If the landowners receive a share of the potential 
19 
benefits then they will welcome the company'. 
Lapun's amendment was strongly opposed by the 
Administration, which argued that the concept of state 
ownership would be undermined by payment of royalties to 
landowners. In any case, it v/as stated, payment of 
compensation and occupation fees would ensure that landowners 
were not disadvantaged, while islanders would benefit 20 
directly from developments associated with the mine. 
Lapun reduced his demands to 5 per cent of royalties but the 
Administration stood firm and his amendment was defeated. 
Lapun re-introduced it in November 1966, by which time 
trouble had indeed arisen on Bougainville. The Administration 
again opposed the amendment, but a number of members were 
now convinced that some initiative should be taken. Lapun 
assured the House the prospect of obtaining a share of 
royalties would satisfy his constituents, and the amendment 
21 was passed. 
But Lapun was mistaken - his efforts did little to 
improve the situation on Bougainville, where conflict 
between the local people and CRA continued. In fact many 
villagers refused to accept the payments due to them lest 
acceptance be interpreted as indicating their willingness 
to alienate their land. 
^^ TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 14 June 1966. 
20 ibid. 
^^ TPNG House of Assembly debates, 24 June 1966. 
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In the following years, the hostility of local people 
would wax and wane; most have now fully accepted the 
benefits resulting from mineral development, though many 
still resent the presence of the Company and its employees. 
Certain villages have consistently refused to have anything 
to do with the mining project. The events of 1964-1967 
were crucial in determining the attitude of local people 
to the Panguna development. What caused the confrontation 
and conflict which characterised CRA's early involvement? 
Could that confrontation have been avoided or mitigated? 
The causes of conflict. 
A certain degree of conflict was probably inevitable, 
given the nature of CRA's activities and of Bougainville's 
economy and society. The variety of languages spoken on 
the Island combined with the very different cultural 
backgrounds of the individuals involved certainly made it 
likely that misunderstandings would arise and that 
mistakes would be made.^^ Nevertheless, conflict need not 
have been as serious nor as extensive as it was. 
First, some of CRA's mistakes could have been avoided 
if the advice of officials 'on the ground' had been heeded. 
CRA has not denied that it made mistakes. As a senior 
executive stated in 1972, 'With the convenient benefit of 
hindsight I freely acknowledge that my company made 
mistakes. We lacked knowledge (and so did some of those 
whose advice was recommended as reliable) and we lacked 
experience of a project of this size in a remote location 
in a developing country'. See F. F. Espie,_'Bougainville 
Copper: difficult development decisions', in R. J. May (ed.). 
Priorities in Melanesian Development, (Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1973), p.337. However, as I 
point out in the text, some of the mistakes could have been 
avoided if CRA had paid more attention to the good advice 
which was available. 
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The action of a senior company official in sending 
geologists into Mainoki village (see above) is a case in 
point. Secondly, and more importantly, CRA and the 
Administration could have done considerably more to try and 
understand the character of the local people, and to act in 
a way designed to minimise their resentment and allay their 
fears. This section outlines and seeks to explain the 
failure of the Company and the Australian authorities in 
this regard. 
It is apparent that, at least over the period 1964-1967, 
neither CRA nor the Administration made any deliberate attempt 
to familiarise themselves with the social, cultural, economic 
or political circumstances of the people with v^ hom they 
were dealing, though both knew from January 1965 onwards 
23 
that a mine might well eventuate on Bougainville. 
Individuals like Phillips and Denehy learned much from 
personal experience, but their superiors made little use of 
this knowledge, a fact especially evident in relation to 
the whole issue of land and land use. 
It is difficult for any outsider to grasp fully the 
meaning of land to a Bougainvillian villager, but the 
following passage offers some insight: 
Land is our life. Land is our physical life -
food and sustenance. Land is our social life; 
it is marriage; it is our only world. When 
you [the Administration] take our land, you cut 
away the very heart of our existence. We have 
little or no experience of social survival 
This has been confirmed by Sev Ampaoi, who during these 
years was closely involved in community affairs (as a 
schoolteacher and as chairman of the Local Government 
Council), and who would certainly have known of any such 
attempt. Interview, Panguna, 19 June 1978. 
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detached from the land. For us to be 
completely landless is a nightmare which 
no dollar in the pocket or dollar in the 
bank will allay; we are a threatened 
people. 
In general, officials showed little appreciation of 
the importance of land, as indicated by the Administration's 
failure to offer villagers more than a small yearly cash 
payment in return for land which, if mined, would be 
permanently lost to them.^^ In addition, they failed to 
take into account the nature of land ownership and usage 
on Bougainville.^^ 
Because of the system of ownership and inheritance 
practised by villagers, numerous individuals other than the 
current occupier might hold an interest (or potential 
interest) in any one piece of land. A cash payment might 
satisfy the occupier, but it offered nothing to other 
interested individuals. An important point as regards land 
usage was that its various aspects might be treated quite 
separately. Land could be built on, planted, hunted on, 
walked through, or used as a food collecting area, but 
rights to carry out certain of these activities might belong 
^ Quoted in J. Dorve, T. Miriung, M. Togolo, 'Mining 
Bitterness', in P. G. Sack (ed.). Problems of Choice: Land 
in Papua New Guinea's Future, (Australian National University 
Press, 1974,) p.182. 
^^ Administration claims that the land would eventually be 
returned to its owners, and was therefore merely being 
leased, were facile and were treated as such by the villagers, 
The whole question of land ownership and land usage 
is a very complex one, and is only touched on briefly here. 
For a fuller discussion of the issues involved, see 
G. M. Denning, 'Traditional Concepts of Land Ownership on 
Bougainville', in Papua New Guinea Society of Victoria, 
Background to Bougainville - a Factual Analysis, Melbourne, 
1969), pp. 31-5; J. Nash, Matrilinity and Modernisation: 
The Nagovisi of South Bougainville, New Guinea Research 
Bulletin No.55, (Australian National University, 1974); 
D. L. Oliver, op.cit., Ch.8; P. G. Sack, op.cit. 
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to individuals or groups other than the occupier or 
occupiers. Failure to realise this led directly to 
conflict (for example in the case of the Musinau hunting 
party), and also generated resentment among those who did 
not receive occupation fees as compensation for their loss 
of rights. 
Administration officials also showed little awareness 
of the political feelings of Bougainvillians. They 
constantly appealed to the islanders for co-operation on 
patriotic grounds, and resisted Bougainvillian demands for 
a share of royalties by claiming that mining revenue should 
2 7 
benefit Papua New Guinea as a whole. The concern of 
Australian officials with nation-building is understandable, 
but in calling on a patriotic sentiment they entirely 
ignored the political realities: such a sentiment simply 
did not exist. The focus of loyalty for most Bougainvillians 
did not extend beyond their clan or district. They certainly 
had no loyalty to 'Papua New Guinea', and felt that revenue 
generated by their cocoa and copra industries was already 
being used for the benefit of other Papua New Guineans, 
while they themselves received little or nothing from Port 
Moresby. Bougainvillians simply could not understand why 
they should make sacrifices so that others might reap the 
benefits. 
Neither did the Islanders automatically accept that the 
'benefits' which the Administration did promise (towns, 
roads, bridges, etc.) would be to their advantage, another 
See, for example, TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 
14 June, 23, 24 November 1966. 
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fact which Australian officials failed to realise. Many 
villagers could not comprehend the implications of such 
developments, and in a society where giving imposes 
obligations the prospect of largesse on such a scale caused 
considerable anxiety.^^ 
This lack of understanding on the part of Administration 
officials explains why they were so frequently at cross 
purposes with Bougainvillians, and why they often became 
frustrated in their attempts to explain and justify their 
actions. As one official commented: 
No amount of talking and reasoning on any 
subject whatsoever, will alter their 
thinking and therein lies the basic 
problem. Once a decision is made by 
the people nothing no matter how sound, 
sane, and logical will be listened to, and 
unsound, insane and illogical reasoning on 
their part will be used to defend their 
decision. [Emphasis in original. 
Australian Administrators failed to understand that their 
actions might be sound, sane and logical within their own 
frame of reference, but might appear unsound, insane and 
illogical within the autonomous cultural, social and 
political structures employed by Bougainvillians to assess 
As Peter Hastings has explained: 
giving...is a method of imposing obligations on 
others. Where the gift given to a person is 
reasonably commensurate with his capacity to 
repay, in goods or services, a state of 
reasonable equilibrium is created between giver 
and recipient. Huge or culturally immeasurable 
largesse, however welcome, may impose a_ 
repayment obligation which it is impossible to 
meet, arousing deep anxiety and consequently 
even deeper hostility in the recipient. 
NexJ Guinea: Problems and Prospects, (Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1973), p.1962. 
^^ Quoted in R. Bedford and A. Mamak, Compensating for 
development, p.21. 
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initiatives taken by outsiders. The Administration need 
not have allowed its decisions to be dictated by the 
islanders, but it should have accepted their reactions to 
its policies as legitimate expressions of anger, self-
defence or fear and, where possihle, amended those policies 
accordingly. To some extent what was involved was a 
question of attitude. Had the Administration's attitude been 
different, CRA's activities would have generated considerably 
less resentment. 
Nevertheless, the crunch would have come. Some local 
people simply wanted CRA to 'wrap up its things and go home', 
while the Administration was determined not to allow a small 
group of villagers to obstruct a major mineral development. 
However, though Bougainvillians would inevitably have had to 
face the fact that mining would occur, and that their lives 
would be radically changed, the trauma of facing such change 
could have been mitigated. This is well illustrated by the 
issue of compensation and royalty payments. 
Throughout the House of Assembly debates on the royalty 
issue. Administration spokesmen claimed that Bougainville 
people were simply anti-mining, that they wanted CRA to 
leave, and that offering them a share of royalties would have 
no effect on their a t t i t u d e s . Y e t Phillips and Denehy, 
the two individuals who had the most direct contact with 
local people over the preceding years, believed that it was 
vitally important to offer concrete financial incentives to 
the villagers. Clearly they felt that though a 'dollar in 
See, for example, the statements by Grove and by Newman, 
TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 23 and 24 November 1966. 
406 
the bank' might not compensate a villager for his land, it 
would make his loss more acceptable. 
Apart from the royalty question, the Administration's 
general approach was unsuitable to circumstances on 
Bougainville. Denehy and Phillips were in favour of 
compromise, of patient endeavour designed to fully inform 
people of developments and hopefully to win their approval. 
They opposed the use of force in response to hostile 
reaction by local people.^^ The Administration rejected this 
approach and pushed for vigorous action, meeting resistance 
with coercion, a strategy implemented under Denehy's 
32 successor. Bill Brown. 
It is obvious that the Administration was unwilling 
rather than unable to develop a policy suitable to the 
situation on Bougainville. For example, officials in Port 
Moresby must have been aware of the sensitivity of the land 
issue. After all, the Administration had been dealing with 
indigenous systems of land ownership for fifty years. It 
received ample advice from Denehy and Phillips on the royalty 
issue and generally on its dealings with local people, but 
that advice was ignored. 
31 K. Phillips, op.cit., p.151 
^^ It is illustrative of the Administration's attitude 
that while Brown was later awarded an OBE in recognition of 
his services, Denehy received no such reward for his years of 
patient work on behalf of the Bougainville people. (J. Ryan, 
The Hot Land: Focus on New Guinea, Macmillan, 1969, p.33J.) 
Given this attitude, individuals like Denehy were powerless. 
As Sev Ampaoi commented, 'there was little the people up 
front" could do - if they were not fighting hard enough for 
the Administration, it would replace them'. (Interview, 
Panguna, 19 June 1978.) 
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\Vhat explains the /'idministration' s behaviour? To 
provide an ansv/er, it is necessary to understand the 
broader context v/ithin v/hich policy tov;ards the 
Bougainville project v/as formulated. In 1962, a visiting 
United Nations Mission had criticised the Administration for 
failing to formulate plans for the economic development of 
the Territory, a criticism later repeated in a number of 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions. The I-lission 
also stated there v;as an urgent need to rapidly increase 
expenditure on education for Papua Nev/ Guineans.^"* In 1963 
the Australian government invited the V/orld Bank to draw up 
an economic development plan for the Territory. The Bank 
recommended a policy aimed at achieving rapid grov/th in the 
monetary sector of the economy, and argued that substantial 
increases in Australian financial support v/ould be required 
if this policy were to succeed. Again, the urgent need for 
1 34 increased educational expenditure was stressed. 
Thus by 1964 the Administration was anxiously searching 
for ways in which to stimulate growth in the monetary sector 
of the economy, and for sources of internal revenue which 
would allow public expenditures to be maintained, and 
Australian subsidisation to decline, with the advent of 
independence. Given Papua New Guinea's economic circumstances, 
large-scale mineral development offered perhaps the best 
prospect of achieving both. The discovery of the Panguna 
to 
pp. 24-26. ^^ Rppovi of thp. 1002 United Nations Visiting Mission 
ihe Trust Tarribory of New Guinea, (New York, 1962), pp. 
Tntcrnational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
The Kconomin Development of the Territory of Papua 
Guinea, (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965), PP- -^ i 
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prospect was consequently a heartening development for 
the Administration. 
CRA, on its part, was anxious that prospecting be 
concluded quickly, and it apparently exerted pressure on 
the Administration to ensure that prospecting teams were not 
withdrawn when faced with local opposition, lest they be 
prevented from re-entering the area.^^ CRA's need for haste 
continued after detailed exploration and project evaluation 
commenced. It regarded the Panguna prospect as a marginal 
one whose viability might depend on 'catching' a predicted 
boom in copper prices. The Administration accepted CRA's 
viewpoint and believed that if delays occurred it might lose 
. 36 
a development which it very much wanted to proceed. 
The approach advocated by Phillips and Denehy would 
take time, as indeed would any detailed analysis of the 
situation on Bougainville. As CRA had convinced the 
Administration that time was precisely what it did not have, 
a different strategy was required. 
In pushing for a more forceful approach, CRA was of 
course attempting to further its shareholders' interests. 
At least in theory, the Administration's duty was to protect 
its subjects' interests and thus fulfil its trusteeship. 
Officials in Port Moresby would doubtless have contended 
that this duty applied to all Papua New Guineans and that 
they could not therefore delay a development which would 
benefit the whole Territory. 
^^ Interview with Sev Ampoai, Panguna, 19 June 1 9 7 8 . 
This attitude was expressed by a number of officials 
during the debates on the royalty issue. See TP/VG House 
of Assembly Debates, 14 June, 24 November 1 9 6 6 . 
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The royalty issue was a different matter. The question 
of time was not involved, and indeed a concession in this 
area might well have saved time as local opposition to CRA 
might have been mitigated. As mentioned above, the 
Administration claimed to be defending the principle of 
state ownership of minerals. If that principle was breached, 
it argued, individual landowners could obstruct development 
3 8 
and claim part of mineral revenues. But by 1966 it was 
apparent that individuals could cause obstruction without 
possessing mineral rights, and it was clear to officials on 
Bougainville that financial incentives would have to be 
offered if local opposition was to be overcome. 
This raises the broader question of whether legal 
concepts considered appropriate in other countries were 
suitable to local circumstances. Bougainvillians simply 
could not understand why minerals under their land should 
belong to the Administration, and given the enormous importance 
they attached to land it would seem reasonable that 
Bougainvillian landowners should be entitled to more generous 
compensation than their counterparts in Western 
societies. 
But the Administration, anxiously seeking sources of 
revenue, was determined to retain all royalty payments for 
its own purposes, and it was the question of who would 
receive royalties, rather than any consideration of principle. 
^^ As far as CRA was concerned, it mattered little who 
received the royalties, and if payments to local villagers 
made the Company more acceptable, all the better from its 
point of view. 
TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 14 June 1966, 
23, 24 November 1976. 
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which was the real issue. In fact a proportion of 
royalties could have been paid to villagers without 
recognising their claims to mineral ownership, by 
calculating occupation fees as a percentage of the value of 
mineral production. 
The Administration's economic policies are analysed 
below, but whatever the economic rationales for its actions, 
they were interpreted by Bougainvillians as indicating its 
determination to protect its own interests or those of CRA. 
When the Company v;anted an exploration licence, it was 
3 9 
granted. If local people expelled CRA personnel from 
their land, police v;ere brought in to ensure that prospecting 
continued. If villagers acted to protect their traditional 
rights, they were imprisoned. Bougainvillians felt that the 
Administration was deliberately sacrificing their 
interests. It was this feeling of being abandoned, at a 
time when powerful and only partly understood forces were 
radically changing their lives, which lay behind much of the 
resentment and anger felt by local people. The 
Administration could certainly have done much to allay that 
feeling without sacrificing the Panguna project. Its 
failure to do so was to have a long and sometimes bitter 
legacy. 
By 1967, both CRA and the Administration were showing 
greater awareness of the need to win local endorsement for 
^^ All applications for licences were considered before a 
public Warden's Court, but in fact not one of CRA's 
applications was rejected. 
This feeling was further enhanced when the Administration 
purchased a 20 per cent shareholding in CRA's Panguna 
operation. See below, p.416. 
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the Company's activities. CRA undertook projects designed 
to demonstrate the beneficial effects of its presence. It 
built a road on Bougainville's West Coast to facilitate 
transport of export crops, and provided free medical 
treatment to local people. It also initiated a training 
programme for indigenous employees. The Administration 
increased its staff on Bougainville, and a number of officials 
were given the duty of informing local people of CRA's plans 
and of explaining developments. 
Despite these efforts, opposition to CRA's activities 
41 
persisted. The attitude of local people brought 
criticism from many House of Assembly members, who felt that 
Bougainvillians should be satisfied now that they were 
guaranteed a share of royalties and were benefiting from 
infrastructural developments. On 9 March 1967 the House 
passed a motion stating that it fully supported CRA's . . . 42 prospecting and mining activities. 
The background to the Bougainville Copper Agreement. 
By late 1966, exploration work at Panguna had reached 
an advanced stage. Eventually, ore reserves of 900 million 
tons would be established, grading on average 0.48 per cent 
copper and 0.36 dwt. per ton gold, and also containing 
Administration officials c l a i m e d _ t h a t the persistence of 
local opposition vindicated their belief that the promise of 
royalty"payments would have no impact. This view was hardly 
justified since, as yet, local People had no indication of 
precisely what financial benefits they might receive, and 
indeed were unsure whether a mine (and consequently their 
share of royalties) would materialise at all. In any case, 
the suspicion and resentment generated during the early 
exploration period would not be easily dispelled. 
TPNG House of Assembly debates, 9 March 1967. 
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silver in recoverable quantities. As its initial exploration 
programme neared completion, CRA faced the prospect of 
investing substantial sums in project evaluation and possibly 
project development. The Company was therefore anxious to 
negotiate a contract with the Administration which would 
spell out the terms under which any development would take 
place. As the position stood in 1965, CRA would automatically 
be entitled to a mining lease if and when its deposit was 
proved commercially viable, but the Mining Ordinance did not 
specify the terms on which a lease would be granted. 
In June 1966, the Mining Ordinance was amended to allow 
the granting of Special Mining Leases which would specify 
conditions governing individual mineral developments. 
Negotiations on the terms of a Special Mining Lease for the 
Panguna prospect were in fact already under way and in 
June 1967 an agreement was concluded between CRA and the 
Administration. Before its terms are outlined, the policy 
aims and priorities of the two parties will be discussed 
u • 43 briefly. 
The Administration had two principal concerns, to 
guarantee a major source of internally-generated public 
revenue for the future, and to secure an immediate source of 
export income and of stimulation to the monetary sector of 
the economy. Administration officials did not believe that 
internally-generated revenue was needed urgently, since 
^^ The most comprehensive published discussion of these 
aims and priorities is contained in G. 0. Guttman, 
•ObjectivL, Strategy and Tactics in Negotiations for Mining 
Enterprises', in J. G. Zorn and P. Bayne eds.), Foreyn 
Investment, International Law and Nattonal Development: 
Papers presented at the Seventh Waigani Sem^nar, Sydney, 
1975), pp. 93-105. 
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Australian subsidisation was guaranteed in the short term 
and since the Papua New Guinea economy could not in their 
view efficiently absorb additional large-scale public 
expenditures. However, as Papua New Guinea approached 
political independence (a prospect not likely to eventuate 
before 1980, it was then felt), and as the economy expanded 
and became capable of absorbing resources at a greater rate, 
the need for domestic sources of revenue would increase. 
The Administration was anxious to secure a major 
source of export income as quickly as possible, since the 
Territory's external balance of trade was permanently and 
substantially in d e f i c i t . I t also hoped that the 
establishment of a major mineral project would act as a 
catalyst to further private investment both directly, by 
providing a demand for goods and services, and indirectly, 
by generating interest and confidence in Papua New Guinea as 
a location for private foreign investment. 
The Administration was therefore prepared to forego 
revenue in the short term in order to ensure that the Panguna 
development would proceed and thus contribute to the 
implementation of its broader economic and financial strategy. 
CRA wished, of course, to operate as profitably as 
possible at Panguna, and more particularly to achieve a high 
level of profits during the early years of mine life. The 
Company's preference in this regard reflected, in part, the 
application of a discount rate to future earnings, but it 
also reflected CRA's capital requirements. Substantial loan 
The Administration failed to realise that its decision 
to forego mineral revenues would itself reduce the Panguna 
mine's impact on the balance of payments. 
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finance would be needed to help fund a development at 
Panguna. The prospective lenders would attach a high risk 
factor to investment in the project, partly because of the 
political uncertainty they would associate with investment 
in a developing country, partly because of economic and 
technical factors associated with exploitation of the Panguna 
orebody.^^ CRA would have to persuade these lenders that its 
cash flow would be sufficiently large to allow rapid 
repayment of its borrowings, thus ensuring that their funds 
would be at risk for the shortest time possible. The 
Company would therefore be prepared to accept high taxation 
rates at a later date in return for concessional rates 
during the early years of production. 
CRA would also wish to minimise uncertainty as to 
future operating conditions, both to protect its own 
interests and to allay its creditors' fears of political 
instability. It would therefore attempt to have its rights 
and obligations clearly specified, and to obtain assurances 
that the agreement would not be altered to the Company's 
detriment.^^ 
The Bougainville Copper Agreement, 1967. 
The terms of the arrangement between the Administration 
and Bougainville Copper Pty. Limited (BCPL) (a CRA subsidiary 
The most important of these related to the low grade of 
the Panguna ore, to the scale of operations which would be 
required to exploit that ore profitably, and to the price 
instability which characterises world copper markets. 
^^ Any such assurances might of course later be abrogated, 
but at least while the Australian Administration remained 
in control they might be expected to offer a measure of 
security. 
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incorporated in Papua New Guinea), were contained in the 
liininq (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance 1967.'^'^ 
BCPL would be granted a Special Mining Lease for an initial 
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period of 42 years, the principal financial terms of which 
would be as follows. 
The Company (BCPL) would pay royalties at the rate of 
per cent of the f.o.b. sales value of minerals produced 
(Clause 5(h)). BCPL would be exempt from income tax during 
the first three years of commercial production (Clause 7(a)). 
Under general taxation provisions, the Company could allow 
for depreciation and amortisation and for financing costs 
in calculating its taxable income. Clause 7(a) and (b) 
provided that these allowances would not be claimed during 
the three year tax exemption, but would be accumulated and 
set against revenue in calculating taxable income from the 
fourth year onwards. This provision was necessary if income 
earned during the initial three years was to be permanently 
exempted from taxation; the accumulated allowances would 
be deductible immediately, and thus BCPL's liability to 
taxation would be postponed for some years after the end of 
the tax free period.^^ Clause 7(e) exempted 20 per cent 
of BCPL's net income from taxation, a concession then 
generally available to mining companies in Australia and 
Territorij o^ Papua and New Guinea, Ordinance No.70 
of 1967, Government Printer, Port Moresby, January 1968. 
BCPL was granted successive rights of renewal for 
further terms of 21 years, if required. 
^^ The exact duration of the postponement would depend on 
the scale of relevant capital expenditures and on the 
Company's profitability. 
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Papua New Guinea and which the Company would continue to 
enjoy even if the general exemption were revoked. 
When BCPL's net income did become liable to taxation, 
the applicable rate would rise from 25 per cent^^ to 
50 per cent over four years (Clause 7 (k)). After the 
twenty-fifth year of production the tax rate would rise by 
one per cent each year to a maximum of 66 per cent 
(Clause 7(p)). BCPL also undertook to offer the 
Administration 20 per cent of its equity at par value.^^ 
The Agreement also set out the rights and obligations 
of the two parties. The Company agreed to carry out a 
detailed feasibility study of the Panguna prospect as 
quickly as possible and, if the outcome was favourable, to 
construct within five years facilities for mining and 
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transporting ore in commercial quantities. (Clause 6(a)). 
In meeting its construction obligations, the Company would 
use supplies, machinery and equipment manufactured or 
produced in the Territory so far as was 'reasonably and 
economically practicable' (Clause 9(a)). The question of 
further processing of mineral output was left at the Company's 
discretion (Clause 16). BCPL also undertook that, so far as 
was 'reasonably and economically practicable', it would 
This was the standard rate in the Territory at the time. 
^^ The Administration could later transfer this share-
holding to local individuals or groups if it wished, and the 
holders of a majority of the Administration shares would 
have the right to appoint a director to BCPL's Board 
(Clause 8). 
^^ The Company also agreed to construct a hospital to 
serve its employees and any town servicing the mine, but the 
Administration would later reimburse BCPL for the cost of 
this work. 
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use and train in new skills labour 
available in the Territory and... 
continue and expand its training 
progreunme...with a view to the early 
employment by it in technical and 
staff positions of suitably qualified 
inhabitants of the Territory. 
(Clause 10 (a)) . 
The rights of the Company were also spelt out in 
detail. It would of course receive Leases for mining and 
ancillary purposes (Clause 5(a)). It would have the right 
to import any items it needed (Clause 9(b)), and would be 
free to recruit abroad personnel required for construction 
or mining activity (Clause 10(b)). It could construct a 
port and roads on Bougainville Island. The Company would 
exercise administrative control over these facilities, but 
public access would be permitted, except where BCPL felt 
that such access would interfere with safety or with mine 
efficiency (Clauses 11, 14).^^ The Company was also granted 
the right to construct a hydro-electric power station and to 
generate, transmit and sell electric power, and it could 
take and use water for this and other purposes. 
The Administration agreed to provide and maintain 
'education, police, postal, telecommunication and medical 
facilities'. In general terms, its other obligations 
corresponded to the rights of the Company, while its 
principal rights were to levy the taxes and other charges 
outlined above and to obtain a 20 per cent equity shareholding 
in the operating company. 
" In such cases BCPL could 'prohibit, restrict or 
regulate the use of and traffic on all Company roads and 
close any Company road...' Individuals who disobeyed the 
Company's instructions in this regard would be liable to 
arrest and fine or imprisonment (Clause 14, Preamble). 
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Another purpose of the Agreement was to guarantee 
BCPL against financial or other impositions beyond those 
specifically laid down in the Ordinance. It would not be 
disadvantaged by any alterations to the Territory's general 
tax legislation and would not be subject to any taxes or 
tariffs which were discriminatory in law or in practice 
(Clause 7). One effect of this provision was that import 
duties and a range of other taxes were frozen at the low 
levels which then applied. 
The Company would be free to choose its employees at all 
levels, its contractors, suppliers and customers, and to 
declare, credit and pay dividends. The Administration 
undertook not to 'expropriate or permit the resumption of 
any asset...of the Company'; the term 'expropriation' did 
not simply imply confiscation of property but would also 
include 'any substantial interference with the rights of the 
owner to control or carry on...[his] business...' (Clause 17), 
Both the Administration and CRA wished to obtain House 
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of Assembly ratification for the Agreement and the relevant 
Ordinance was discussed in the House on 29 and 30 August 
1967. Little detailed comment was made on its terms, and 
very few Papua New Guinean members spoke.^^ This was hardly 
surprising; many of the provisions were extremely complex. 
^^ In fact the Agreement would not come into effect until 
that ratification was obtained. The approval of the House 
was sought by both parties because of the conflict on 
Bougainville, and because of the realisation that Papua New 
Guinea would achieve self-government or independence in the 
not-too-distant future. 
^^ TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 29 and 30 August 1967. 
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as was the language in which they were couched.^^ Those 
members who did speak, including Paul Lapun, expressed 
general approval of the Agreement. 
Assessing the Agreement: the Administration's 
negotiating effort. 
It is difficult to develop a standard against which to 
assess the Agreement. A number of authors have attempted to 
use similar agreements negotiated elsewhere at about the same 
5 8 
time as a standard, but this approach raises two major 
problems. 
First, it does not allov; conclusions regarding the 
Agreement as a whole, since each arrangement contains a 
different mix of provisions relating to taxation, 
depreciation, government shareholdings and provision of 
infrastructure. For example, the arrangement concluded 
between Indonesia and Freeport Minerals Limited in 1967 for 
the development of the Ertsburg copper deposit provided for 
a lower nominal tax rate than did the Agreement, but did not 
permit immediate write-off of capital expenditure. The 
Indonesian government was not offered a shareholding in the 
operating company, but on the other hand did not undertake 
The provisions of the Agreement have been very much 
simplified in the account above. For an example of the 
complexity of the original, see Clause 7(a) regarding the 
carrying forward of losses. 
Lapun's only criticism was that indigenous people, rather 
than the Administration, should be offered the 20 per cent 
shareholding in BCPL. TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 
29, 30 August 1967. 
^^ See, for examnle, G. 0. Guttm.an, op.cit., pp. 102-5; 
R. B. McKern , op.cit. , pp. 90-1. 
420 
to provide and maintain a part of mine infrastructure.^' 
The full financial ramifications of the t^o agreements could 
not therefore be compared until mining had been carried on 
under each for a substantial period of time. 
Even if such a comparison was available it would not 
offer a basis on which to assess the Australian 
Administration's negotiating effort, for two reasons. 
First, the potential bargaining power of other host 
countries might have been different. For example, Indonesia 
in 1967 had recently experienced great political unrest 
(associated with the overthrow of Sukarno), and might 
consequently have found it impossible to attract foreign 
investors without offering special concessions. Secondly, 
other host country governments might have failed to exercise 
the potential bargaining power which they did possess. 
A comparison between the Agreement and the minimum 
concessions required to attract CRA's investment would allow 
a judgement as to whether the Administration fully utilised 
its bargaining power, but it is difficult to establish what 
those minimum concessions were. CRA has not published any 
relevant information, while the absence of large-scale 
mineral developments prior to 1967 deprives us of what might 
have been a useful yardstick. 
The report of an international mission which studied 
development strategies for Papua New Guinea in 1972 (the 
^^ For details of the Ertsburg Agreement, see G. 0. Guttman, 
op.cit., p.104; R. B. McKern, op.cit., p.90. 
In the Irish case, for example, it was possible to point 
to mineral developments which had previously taken place 
under less generous provisions in claiming that the granting 
of a twenty year tax exemption was unnecessary. 
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Faber Report) claimed that the Agreement offered the 
original shareholders (CRA and related companies) a return 
far in excess of that required to attract the necessary 
investment. In support of this viewpoint it quoted a 
feasibility study carried out in 1969 which estimated that 
these shareholders would receive an annual return on capital 
of 34 per cent (at conservative metal price forecasts.) The 
Report concluded that the Administration's over-generosity 
resulted in part from its lack of relevant expertise.^^ 
The Report's emphasis on the feasibility study's profit 
forecast marks a very important point - the study was carried 
out in 1969. It could not have been compiled in 1967, 
because the basic operational characteristics of the 
6 2 
prospective mine were unknown. Consequently, the Australian 
negotiators could not gauge its likely profitability even in 
very general terms; the only guide they had was CRA's 
claim that the project would be marginal. 
Its lack of information placed the Administration at a 
serious disadvantage, and it could have done one of two 
things to strengthen its position. It could have negotiated 
a flexible agreement which would take account of the 
possibility that its bargaining position would improve as 
additional information became available, or it could have 
^^ Overseas Develooment Group, University of EastAnglia, 
A Report on Development Strategies for Papua New Gmnea, 
(Port Moresby, 1973), p.69. 
As a senior Administration official later stated, 'at 
the time of negotiations there was no certainty that the 
project would proceed, or on what basis or size it would 
proceed'. D. Mentz, 'Administrative Aspects of the 
Bougainville Development', in Papua and New Guinea Society 
of Victoria, op.cit., p.12. 
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taken steps to immediately increase the level of 
information it possessed. It did neither, negotiating 
financial terms which were largely inflexible, and failing 
to obtain an independent assessment of the likely 
character of any development at Panguna. Thus its failure 
was not in neglecting to utilise its available bargaining 
power, but rather in neglecting to provide for, or to 
bring about, increases in that pov/er. 
It is important to note that the Administration 
could have negotiated a considerably more flexible 
arrangement while giving BCPL many of the assurances it 
sought regarding operating conditions. For example, 
renegotiation of the Agreement could have been provided for 
if (and only if) the project proceeded on a scale 
considerably in excess of that anticipated, or a sliding 
scale of royalties could have been negotiated, the upper 
range of which would only apply if the project was unexpectedly 
profitable. And while it lacked the technical competence to 
assess the prospects for Panguna itself,^^ the Administration 
could have employed independent consultants to do so. But 
it chose to accept CRA's projections at their face value, 
and thus displayed considerable naivete, since it was 
The Mines Section of the Department of Lands, Surveys 
and Mines only had sufficient resources to deal with the 
administrative aspects of exploration and mining leases and 
to render some technical assistance to small-scale gold 
miners. 
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extremely unlikely that the Company v/ould describe its 
deposit as anything but marginal.^^ 
Was the Administration engaged in complicity v/ith 
CRA? The explanation for its failure to negotiate more 
flexible financial terms apparently lies more in its lov; 
position on the relevant 'learning curve'. The /administration 
did not, in fact, lack expert advice per se, as it was 
assisted by staff employed by Australia's Federal Government 
in its Treasury Department, its Attorney General's Office 
and its Bureau of Mineral Resources.^^ However, the 
Administration's claim that these officials 'were experienced 
in making similar agreements in Australia'^^was probably 
incorrect. The Australian Federal Government did not then 
negotiate terms for the development of particular projects, 
but rather applied a general tax regime to all mining 
64 . . . 
As a United Nations official with wide experience ot 
assisting host governments in negotiating mining agreements 
has stated, '...I have never been in a negotiation where the 
project has been described by the mining company other than 
as a marginal deposit'. C. J. Lipton, 'Government 
Negotiating Techniques and Strategies', in United Nations, 
NerjotiaLion and Drafting of Mining Development Agreements, 
(Mining Journal Books, London, 1976), p.107. 
It is not clear whether BCPL deliberately played down 
the potential value of the Panguna deposit or whether it was 
as uncertain as to its likely profitability as was the 
Administration. The important point is, of course, tnat 
Administration officials accepted BCPL's projections 
without (juestion. 
^^ see the statement by Mr Henderson, TPIW House of 
Assembly Debates, 30 August 1967. 
66 .. . ^ ibid . 
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operations.^^ Their professional background may have led 
the Administration's advisers to ignore the importance of, 
and the need to provide for, shifts in the relative 
bargaining powers of the host country and the foreign 
investor in velation to specific projects. 
The Administration's acceptance of CRA's profit 
forecasts is a different matter. Its uncritical approach may 
have reflected a failure on its part to distance itself 
sufficiently from the fellow Australians who ran CRA. It is 
evident from the statements of its spokesmen in the House of 
Assembly and from the policies it implemented on Bougainville 
that the Administration perceived a considerable degree of 
affinity between its interests and those of CRA, a perception 
which can only have been enhanced when it obtained a 20 per 
cent holding in the Company. This feeling of affinity may 
have dulled the Administration's awareness that its interests 
differed from CRA's in important ways, and that the Company 
might have a strong incentive for being less than frank with 
it. On the other hand, the Administration may have simply 
been overawed by and unwilling to challenge CRA's obvious 
superiority in the field of mining expertise, a feeling it 
would certainly have shared with authorities in many other 
6 8 host countries. 
State governments negotiated items specific to 
individual developments such as royalty rates and terms 
for provision of infrastructure. 
^^ See the account on p.77-8 below of the attitude of 
Irish authorities in this regard in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Assessing the Agreement: a broader perspective. 
The Agreement can also be assessed within the framework 
of national social and economic policies. The policies 
being pursued by the Administration in 1967 substantially 
followed the recommendations of the 1963 World Bank report^^ 
which recommended monetary sector expansion based largely on 
production of agricultural and forestry goods for export. 
The Bank advocated that 'expenditures and manpower be 
concentrated in areas and on activities where the prospective 
return is h i g h e s t ' . R e s o u r c e s should be channelled into 
'areas of good land which are readily accessible and where 
development is relatively easy'; once the economy had grown, 
allocation of resources to more difficult areas could be 
considered. 
The World Bank urged the Administration to 'concentrate 
72 
its efforts on the advancement of the native people, but 
did not question whether its economic policies were 
appropriate in the light of this recommendation. 
In 1968 the Administration published a document 
entitled Programmes and Policies for the Economic Development 
of Papua New Guinea, setting out its economic policies for 
the next five years.^^ No basic change in the development 
strategy was envisaged, though a more broadly-based aporoach 
would be adopted. The document called for 'considerable 
^^ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
op.cit. 
ibid, p.35. 
ibid, pp. 35-6. 
ibid, p.34. 
^^ Government Printer, Port Moresby, September 1968. 
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expansion in the agricultural, pastoral, forestry, mining 
and manufacturing industries, requiring heavy private 
74 
investment and expatriate involvement'. Private 
investment would come substantially from expatriate 
businessmen and foreign companies who alone would possess 
the necessary financial and technical resources. The aim 
of this development strategy was to achieve 'the maximum 
participation of the indigenous people as a means of 
progress towards economic self-reliance and social 
advancement' . 
In this instance, it was very apparent that 
discrepancies might exist between stated policy aims and the 
measures advocated for their achievement. Since expatriates 
and foreigners would provide the main impetus for growth, 
they would presumably also reap the direct benefits of 
economic expansion. This raised the question of precisely 
what kind of participation indigenous people would enjoy and 
to what extent real social advancement would occur. The 
Administration's position was based on two important 
assumptions, first that if aggregate income grew quickly the 
benefits would automatically 'trickle down' to all Papua New 
Guineans, and secondly that indigenous people would be 
better off 'with a small share of a large cake because at 
ibid, p.104. 
^^ ibid. 
^^ It also raised the question of what was meant by economic self-reliance' since dependence on foreign capital and skills 
would clearly continue if not increase. It is apparent tnat 
'fiscal self-reliance' would have better described what 
the Administration hoped to achieve. 
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I n d e p e n d e n c e or some time thereafter it is the size of the 
77 
cake that counts, not who owns what share'. 
The Administration's position was criticised by a 
number of Australian economists. One of these, Rod Crocombe, 
attacked the absence of concrete measures to enable 
indigenous people to overcome the disadvantages they would 
face in attempting to benefit from economic expansion. 
Without such measures, Crocombe argued, the type of 
development advocated by the Administration would offer 
Papua New Guineans participation 'mainly as labourers for 
expatriate industry... [or] as peasant producers for 
expatriate industry to buy produce from and supply goods 
^ . 78 to' . 
Crocombe also argued that the question of who owned 
what 'share of the cake' was of considerable immediate 
significance. He pointed out that poverty and wealth are 
relative concepts, and that social and political problems 
would arise if the indigenous population became relatively 
poorer and foreigners relatively richer, regardless of 
79 
whether indigenous living standards rose in absolute terms. 
How does the Agveement relate to these policy issues? 
Its implementation would obviously accord with the 
Administration's strategy, since it would involve a commitment 
of resources to an export-oriented project from which the 
prospective returns were high and which would contribute 
ibid, p.104. 
78 
No.4, (December 1968-January 1969), p.70 
79 
R. Crocombe, 'That Five Year Plan', New Guinea, Vol.3, 
(December 
ibid, p.60. 
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substantially to monetary sector growth. But its operation 
would certainly raise the questions of indigenous 
participation, 'trickle down' effects, and income 
distribution. 
Indigenous participation could occur in various ways. 
Employment opportunities would be created, at least 
initially at unskilled and semi-skilled levels only. The 
Agreement required the Company to train nationals for 
technical and staff positions, but there was no timetable 
attached to this requirement and the inclusion of the 
phrase 'as far as is reasonably and economically 
practicable' would grant considerable flexibility to BCPL. 
This is not to suggest that the Company would not in fact 
undertake an effective training programme, but only to point 
out that the Agreement did little to ensure that it would do 
so. Indigenous participation in the management of the 
project would be slight because of the almost total absence 
of suitably-qualified personnel. In terms of ownership, 
participation would be negligible, unless the Administration's 
shareholding was distributed to the public. In any case, 
ownership would remain predominantly foreign. Participation 
by nationals in the financial benefits generated by the mine 
would be small, at least initially. Such benefits would flow 
mainly to CRA, to the lending banks, and to highly-paid 
expatriate workers, and as a result Papua New Guineans would 
receive a smaller relative share of national income. 
There was little indication that 'trickle down' effects 
from the mine would be substantial. Wage payments to 
nationals would be modest as the numbers employed would be 
small and their skill levels low, and expenditure of wages 
429 
would not therefore generate very much additional economic 
activity. It was unlikely that significant linkage effects 
would materialise, since the domestic economy could not 
provide the necessary goods and services. Purchases of 
foodstuffs and provision of infrastructure might have an 
important effect on Bougainville's economy, though public 
use of infrastructure would be at the Company's discretion. 
In sum, Papua New Guinea possessed neither the human 
nor physical resources to play a substantial part in providing 
skilled labour, capital, goods or services to the Panguna 
mine, a point which applied generally to the type of economic 
development sought by the Administration. Consequently, the 
Bougainville project would contribute significantly to 
increased indigenous participation in economic activity only 
if it helped finance economic development programmes which 
would utilise domestic resources. The financial arrangements 
negotiated by the Administration meant that substantial 
government revenues would not be obtained for some time. 
BCPL's decision to mine the high-grade sections of the 
orebody first (see next page) also meant that the richest 
parts of the deposit would have been exploited before full 
tax rates applied. 
Thus it is apparent that the Bougainville Copper 
Agreement was appropriate in the light of the economic 
measures being taken by the Administration, but that neither 
those measures, nor the Agveement, were likely to substantially 
assist in achieving the Administration's stated policy aim 
of maximising indigenous participation in economic activity. 
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preparations for mine development. 
Having concluded an agreement with the Administration, 
BCPL carried out a detailed feasibility study of the Panguna 
prospect, undertaking complex and exhaustive research 
designed to indicate the combination of production levels, 
grading policy and other mining practices which would 
8 0 maximise the present value of operating cash flows. It 
was concluded that an open pit operation on as large a scale 
as possible was required and that mining should initially be 
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concentrated on the high-grade sections of the orebody. 
Physical, financial and marketing constraints indicated that 
approximately 90,000 tons of ore per day should be mined, 
inferring annual metal production (in concentrates) of about 
165,000 tons copper, 500,000 ounces gold and 1 million ounces 
silver. Production would therefore be far in excess of that 
anticipated by the Administration when it negotiated the 82 
Agreement (70,000 tons copper, 200,000-300,000 ounces gold). 
Market outlets and loan finance would have to be secured 
before development could proceed. It had been decided to 
dispose of Panguna's output in concentrate form; the 
Company's product would be of a high quality, rich in by-
product metals and low in impurities, and BCPL successfully 
For a description of the studies involved and the 
methodology employed, see M. R. L. Blackwell, Some Aspects 
of the Evaluation and Planning of the Bougainville Mine , m 
H. H. Stephenson, Bougainville... The "" 
Copper MiL, (Construction, Mining, Engineering Publications, 
Melbourne, n.d.), pp. 66-75. 
The Panguna deposit was characterised by significant 
variations in ore grades. While the cut-off trade "as set 
at 0.2 per cent copper, two ore zones grading in excess of 
0.6 per cent copper were identified. 
See the statement by the Director of Lands, Surveys and 
Mines, TPNG House of Assembly debates, 8 June 1966. 
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negotiated long-term contracts with smelters in Japan, 
Germany and Spain providing for sales of concentrates with 
a total copper content of 1,992,500 tons over fifteen years. 
BCPL would be paid for the metal content of its concentrates 
at prices based on prevailing London Metal Exchange 
quotations for copper and silver and London Gold Market 
8 3 quotations for gold. A base price of 30<:;/lb would apply 
to copper sales. 
BCPL required an estimated US$250 million in loan 
capital to help finance the planned development at Panguna, 
and in early 1969 CRA and RTZ set about raising this amount. 
A consortium of 27 banks from 8 countries was assembled, 
and in July 1969 a Credit Agreement was signed between it and 
84 
BCPL. Two separate loans were negotiated. The first, 
known as the Intermediate Loan, was for a maximum of 
US$154 million, a sum which would be made available directly 
to BCPL. The second, or Long Term loan of US$92 million 
would be provided to the Commonwealth Trading Bank of 
Australia (CTBA), which would then pass on an equivalent 
amount in Australian dollars to BCPL. 
The loans were guaranteed by a pledge of BCPL's shares, 
which effectively meant that CRA was the principal guarantor. 
8 3 
Different methods of calculating the relevant quotations 
were to be employed by the Japanese and European smelters. 
Japanese purchases would be based on average LME prices in 
the month following each sale, while the European smelters 
could 'back-price' or make payment at prices prevailing on a 
day of their choice during a defined period. (Limits existed 
on the tonnages which could be priced at any one day's 
quotation.) Interview with BCL's Treasurer, Panguna, 
14 June 1978. 
8 4 
I am grateful to BCL for making a copy of the Credit 
Agreement available to me. 
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RTZ was not a guarantor, but it undertook to maintain a 
controlling interest in BCPL at least until repayment was 
o c; 
complete. RTZ played a crucial role in raising finance 
for BCPL. It utilised its extensive links in the 
international banking community to assemble the Consortium, 
while the Consortium's willingness to provide finance 
depended to an important degree on RTZ's assurance that its 
technical and financial expertise v/ould be available to CRA 
and BCPL. 
The necessary financial and marketing arrangements 
were completed by July 1969 , and construction was soon under 
way on Bougainville. 
Renewal of conflict and the emergence of 
secessionism on Bougainville. 
As CRA's activities expanded and its presence took on 
an air of permanence, some Bougainvillians began to consider 
more radical political action, particularly the possibility 
of secession. Secessionist sentiment existed on 
Bougainville before the Company's arrival.®^ The blue-black 
Bougainvillians felt little affinity with their lighter-
skinned Papuan and New Guinean countrymen, having more in 
common racially and culturally with the inhabitants of the 
Western Solomon Islands. This feeling of separateness was 
matched by a sense of insularity which was enhanced by 
Bougainville's distance from the mainland, and by the 
^^ Credit Agreement, Appendix f. 
^^ J. Ryan, op.cit., pp. 335-6. 
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conviction that the islanders had been neglected by Port 
Moresby and mistreated by Europeans. 
But it was only after CRA's arrival that secessionist 
sentiment was articulated by politically influential 
individuals, or was widely reflected in public opinion. 
Many local people believed that the Administration was 
deliberately sacrificing their interests in pursuit of its 
own and CRA's objectives, and that the House of Assembly, 
dominated by the 'redskins' they distrusted, was determined 
that Bougainvillians should bear the costs of mineral 
development while other Papua New Guineans enjoyed the 
benefits. To people who felt threatened and abandoned, 
secession seemed an attractive alternative, and the prospect 
of substantial copper revenues appeared to make it a 
financially viable one. Self-government or independence 
could give local people increased control over CRA's 
actions, and would certainly allow them to obtain a greater 
share of the benefits generated by mineral development. The 
issues of control and of financial gain were quite separate, 
and it is apparent that Bougainvillians differed in the 
88 
priority they attached to one or the other. 
On 1 September 1968, 25 prominent Bougainvillians met 
in Port Moresby to discuss their island's political future. 
Evidence for this belief was found in the House's 
initial rejection of Lapun's royalty legislation, m its 
criticism of Bougainvillians for their stand on the land 
issue, and in its passing of a motion which expressed approval 
of CRA's activities (see above, p.411 )• 
^^ This point has been made by Raymond Mikesell: Foreign 
Investment in Copper Mining in Papua New Guinea: Current 
Developements and Prospects, paper prepared for the Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 
(Washington, September 1973), p.7. 
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They called for a referendum in 1970, which would ask 
Bougainvillians whether they wanted to remain within Papua 
and New Guinea, join the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate, or become a self-governing and eventually 
independent republic. Not surprisingly, the Administration's 
response was critical: secession would undermine its entire 
strategy in relation to the Panguna development. Many Papua 
New Guinean leaders joined in the criticism, and the twenty 
five were accused of attempting to selfishly monopolise the 
benefits of mining on Bougainville for the islanders 
themselves.^^ 
By mid-1968 the Administration and CRA were looking for 
land near Kieta on which to construct a town and other 
9 0 
facilities. A number of clashes occurred between local 
people and Company surveyors, one of which led to the arrest 
and imprisonment of villagers from Pakia. The renewal of 
conflict was one reason for the meeting of Bougainvillians 
in Port Moresby. 
The Administration examined a number of potential town 
sites, and chose an area at Arawa comprising a 1,000-acre 
expatriate-owned plantation and 650 acres owned by the Arawa 
people. 14 5 acres of the Rorovana people's land was earmarked 
as a location for a construction camp and other facilities; 
this land would be leased by CRA, while that at Arawa would 
be alienated permanently. 
89 J. Ryan, op.cit., p.326. 
Very little land was available in Panguna and the 
adjoining valleys, and consequently a large proportion of 
employee housing and mine services would be located on the 
coast. 
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The Administration's decision was criticised by local 
people, who pointed out that a fertile and highly-developed 
plantation would be destroyed, and argued that village 
land should be used and the villagers given the plantation, 
91 
or that swamp land should be reclaimed. The Administration 
pointed out that resumption of village land would cause 
much greater disruption than that of a plantation owned by 92 
a small group of expatriates. In its view development of 
swamp land was unacceptable, because of the time this would 93 
take. On these grounds it rejected a number of alternative 
sites proposed by the villagers and by CRA. 
The Administration initiated negotiations for purchase 
of the land; the plantation's owners accepted its terms 
after a long struggle (in which they were supported by the 
local people) and under threat of compulsory acquisition. 
The Arawa people rejected them, as did some Rorovanas, and 
the Administration obtained a compulsory leasing order on 
the Rorovana land. The villagers ignored the order, and in 
August 1969 riot police employed physical force (including 
use of tear gas) to remove them. 
The Administration's action received wide publicity, 
much of it critical, in Australia. The Australian Prime 
Minister, Mr Gorton, intervened in the dispute, and 
instructed the Administration to depart from its principle 
of not allowing direct negotiations between local people and 
^^ TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 20 June 1969. 
^^ TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 23 June 1969. 
^^ As mentioned above, both CRA and the Administration were 
determined that development of the Panguna deposit should not 
be delayed. 
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CRA. This principle reflected the Administration's 
determination that land sales on Bougainville should be 
at prices applicable in the Territory as a whole, so as to 
avoid setting a precedent which might be applied to 
purchases of land needed for development elsewhere. It 
believed, correctly, that CRA would pay prices well in 
9 4 
excess of the norm in order to avoid costly delays. 
CRA soon negotiated a 42 year lease with the Rorovanas 
on terms considerably more favourable than the 95 
Administration had offered, and a similar arrangement was 
subsequently concluded between the Administration, BCPL 
and the Arawa people.^^ Having been granted a much more 
generous settlement, the coastal people accepted the Company's 
presence and there was no further violence. But the threats 
of compulsory acquisition and the use of force at Rorovana 
lost the Administration whatever credibility it retained 
with local people, and served to strengthen secessionist 
sentiment on the Island. 
The Administration had attempted to implement two 
policies which v/ere in practice irreconcilable. It tried to 
ensure a rapid pace of development, while refusing to grant 
In a letter to a Melbourne legal firm dated 14 August 
1969, CRA's legal officer pointed out that each day's stoppage 
could cost the Company up to $30,000, and that it was 
therefore in its interests to be generous with the villagers. 
Quoted in R. Bedford and A. Mamak, Compensating for 
Development^ p.94, n.31. 
^^ The Administration had offered the villagers $15,000 
($105 per acre), an annual rental of $725 ($5 per acre), and 
an equivalent amount of land elsewhere. CRA offered $30,000, 
an annual rental of $7,000 ($48 per acre), and gave the 
villagers an option on 7,000 BCPL shares. 
For the terms of this agreement, see R. Bedford and 
A. Mamak, Compensating for Development, p. 26. 
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villagers compensation above the agricultural value of 
their land. But if development was to proceed rapidly, 
concessions had to be made on the issue of compensation. 
The alternative was conflict. 
In June 1969 the Director of District Administration, 
Mr Ellis, outlined to the House of Assembly the actions 
which the Administration had taken over the previous three 
years to improve communication with Bougainvillians. He 
detailed the work undertaken by officials in informing local 
people of CRA's plans, in explaining the Company's rights 
and the villagers' entitlement to compensation and other 
payments, and in accompanying prospecting teams into 
villages. It is apparent from the information supplied by 
Ellis that the Administration invested considerable time and 
effort in this work.^"^ But it clearly failed to understand 
that one action such as the use of riot police at Rorovana 
could counteract the years of painstaking effort. 
By early 19 70 the main phase of devf.lopment was under 
way at Panguna. The construction of the mine and ancillary 
facilities involved an enormous commitment of human and 
physical resources.^® By early 1972, preparation of the 
Panguna deposit was complete, processing facilities were 
installed, and sites prepared for the disposal of waste rock 
and mine tailings. Town sites complete with recreational, 
commercial and educational facilities had been constructed 
at Panguna and Arawa, a two-lane highway connected Panguna 
TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 19 June 1969. 
^^ For a detailed account, see H. H. Stephenson,^op.cit., 
particularly L. F. Hutchinson, 'Project Management , 
pp. 101-6. 
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to the coast, and port, power generation and fuel storage 
facilities were established at Loloho (near Arawa). The 
Administration had upgraded the Aropa air strip, 
constructed a road from Kieta to Arawa and Loloho, 
installed a telecommunication system and constructed 
schools, houses and other facilities at Arawa. 
Total project costs plus working capital exceeded 
US$490 million. BCPL obtained US$177.4 million under 
the Credit Agreement, US$53 million from Japanese lenders, 
and equipment loans of US$89 million from the US Export-
Import Bank and Australian suppliers. The Commonwealth 
Savings Bank of Australia provided a housing loan of 
A$12.5 million {US$14.8 million). Total loan capital was 
therefore US$334 or A$282 million. BCPL's shareholders 
99 
provided a total of A$133 million or US$151 millxon, 
giving total investment of A$415 million or US$491 million 
and a debtrequity ratio of 2.1:1.0.^^*^ 
BCPL commenced commercial production on 1 April 1972. 
Conclusion. 
This Chapter has described the discovery and development 
of a copper-gold deposit by a foreign investor operating in 
a colonial setting. Attention was focused on two aspects 
of mineral development - its impact on local people, and the 
financial and other terms under which development proceeded. 
^^ It should be noted that the public shareholders 
contributed a disproportionate amount of this A$133 million, 
since they paid $1.50 per share as against CRA's 50C per share 
Exchange rates used to derive these figures are those 
which prevailed in 1972. 
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In both cases, policies adopted by the colonial Administration 
played a crucial role in shaping events. 
Regardless of how it was conducted, mineral exploration 
and development would have imposed some costs on indigenous 
people. The foreign nature of the mining enterprise was 
partly responsible for increasing those costs, because its 
personnel were unfamiliar with local conditions, but the 
Company's determination to proceed with development rapidly 
(a determination which any private enterprise pursuing its 
shareholders' interests would have displayed) was a much more 
important factor. It was the Administration's duty to 
ensure that private interests were pursued at minimum cost 
(and maximum benefit) to the indigenous population, and in 
this it failed. 
That failure did not occur because the Administration 
acted as the Company's agent, as some commentators have 
c l a i m e d ; w h i l e the Administration certainly did much to 
facilitate CRA's activities, it had its own reasons for doing 
so and some of its policies ran contrary to CRA's interests. 
Rather the failure resulted from policies adopted in pursuit 
of Australia's interests and Papua New Guinea's perceived 
interests. 
Concern with Australian interests was most apparent in 
the drive for the fiscal self-reliance which would remove 
102 
the need for subsidisation from Canberra. This drive 
see R. west, of Tears: ^^e Rise of the Rio TM^ 
Zinc Corporation Ltd., (Earth Island Limited, London 1972), p.117 
AS mentioned below, the Administration failed to m^imise 
the contribution of the Bougainville mine to fiscal seit 
reliance, and thus did not serve its own interests as well 
as it might have. 
440 
influenced general economic policy, and was partly 
responsible for the emphasis on aggregate growth, 
regardless of its distributional effects, or of its 
implications for indigenous participation in the economy. 
'Regardless' is perhaps too strong a v/ord. It is important 
to remember the broader context within which economic 
policies were formulated - in the mid 1960s there was still 
considerable optimism that aggregate economic growth would 
automatically generate broadly-based economic development 
in LDCs, while the implications of the distributional 
effects of particular growth patterns were not fully 
realised. There was a neat coincidence between what 
accepted economic doctrine seemed to recommend, and what was 
in Australia's interests. 
In implementing its fiscal and economic policies, the 
Administration increased the costs, and reduced the benefits, 
of mineral development to indigenous people. It supported 
CRA's push for rapid development, and suppressed indigenous 
resistance with coercion and, occasionally, violence. It 
rejected the demands of Bougainville landowners for a share 
of copper revenues. It refused to allow landowners the 
opportunity to benefit financially from CRA's demand for 
land. In negotiating the Bougainville Copper Agreement it 
did little to ensure that indigenous participation in 
economic activity would be maximised. 
For a discussion of changes in perception which occurred 
during the late 196Qs and early 1970s regarding the 
relationship between aggregate economic growth, income ^ 
distribution and the prospects for broadly-based economic 
development, see J. P. Grant, 'Development: The ^nd of 
Trickle Down?', Foreign Policy, No. 12, (Fall 19/J), 
pp. 43-65. 
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The Administration did not simply abandon the 
indigenous population to its fate; for many years its 
officials worked hard to protect the interests of 
villagers in the vicinity of the mine. But when the crunch 
came, its own interests and Papua New Guinea's perceived 
interests were paramount, and the contradiction inherent 
in its position became apparent on those occasions when 
years of hard work were destroyed in a matter of days, as 
happened at Rorovana. 
In negotiating financial terms for development of the 
Panguna deposit, the Administration served neither its own 
interests nor those of Papua New Guinea; its failure to 
remedy, or take account of, its lack of information left it 
in a weak bargaining position. This failure was partly due 
to the level and type of expertise available to it, while 
the affinity of interests it felt with the foreign investor 
may also have played a part. 
The impact of mineral development over the period 
1964-1972 was primarily determined by the nature of Papua 
New Guinea's government rather than by the foreign character 
of mining investment. 
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Chapter Nine 
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 1972-1978 
Political developments 1969-1972 
By April 1972 important political changes had occurred 
in Papua New Guinea. Throughout the 1960s it was generally 
assumed in Port Moresby and Canberra that Australia would not 
take the initiative in granting self-government or independence 
until requested to do so by Papua New Guinea's political 
leaders. However during these years indigenous politicians 
displayed little impatience to take up the reins of government. 
In 1969 the leader of the Australian federal opposition, 
Mr Whitlam, made a number of statements which represented an 
important departure from the previously bipatisan policy. He 
stated that his Labor Party would grant immediate self-
government if it won power in the 197 2 elections^ and would 
offer independence by 1976. Whitlam's commitment exerted 
considerable influence on Australian government policy,^ and 
in April 1971 the Minister for External Territories announced 
that a 'leadership group' would be chosen by the next House of 
Assembly. This group would exercise powers already delegated 
to Papua New Guinea and would negotiate self-government with 
Canberra. 
The new House of Assembly was elected in March 1972. Its 
members were younger and better educated than their predecessors. 
R. Cooksey,'Gough Whitlam: His V^orld View and His Foreign 
Policy', Paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies 
Association, Hobart, August 1979, pp. 23-4. 
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who had usually shown deference to the Administration and 
accepted that Australian officials knew what was best for 
2 
Papua New Guinea. The new House would be more critical of 
Administration policy, and this attitude would certainly 
extend to the Agreement. The coming to power in December 1972 
of a Labor Party government in Australia meant that the House 
would soon be in a position to act as well as criticise. 
It had been expected that the conservative United Party 
would win a majority in the House, but in fact the more 
radical Pangu Pati joined with a number of smaller groupings 
to form a coalition government in April 1972. Its Chief 
Minister was Mr Michael Somare and its Minister for Mines, 
Mr Paul Lapun. 
Among the newly-elected members was a Bougainvillean 
priest, Fr John Momis, who was strongly critical of BCPL's 
activities and of the Agreement . On 27 September 1972 Momis 
introduced a motion which proposed that government policy 
towards foreign mining investment be based on certain principles 
These dealt, among other things, with government equity 
participation in mining ventures, employment and training, 
generation of linkages, and taxation of mining company profits.^ 
But the principle of greatest immediate significance was that 
mining agreements 'should make provision for [their] re-
negotiation in the light of changing circumstances and the 4 acquisition of knowledge'. 
^ See, for example, the statements by Kaibelt Diria and Dirona 
Abe, TPNG House of Assembly Debates, 14 June 1966. 
^ For the full text of the motion see PNG House of Assembly 
Debates, 16 November 1972. 
4 ibid . 
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The motion generated the first comprehensive House of 
Assembly debate on mineral policy per se. Speakers dealt 
with each principle in detail, but it was on the possibility 
of renegotiation that debate centred. 
The government's official position on this issue remained 
unclear- While Mr Somare stated that 'we are not questioning 
previous agreements with the Administration', Paul Lapun's 
view was that 'if at a later date the Government sees that 
the company is making colossal profits I think the Government 
should be able to renegotiate The United Party 
opposition criticised suggestions of a renegotiation, arguing 
that the Agreement should be honoured regardless of whether it 
was a good one or not. An 'officially and legally signed 
contract' existed, and breach of that contract would destroy 
Papua New Guinea's 'good name' and its standing with the 
international financial community, deterring foreign investment 
in mining and other industries.^ 
Despite these reservations the opposition gave its 
general support to the motion, which the House passed on 23 
November 1972. 
Development strategies and the Bougainville Copper Agreement 
These political developments were accompanied by changes 
in the climate of opinion as to what constituted appropriate 
development strategies for Papua New Guinea, An important 
^ ibid. 
^ See the statements by Ward, Neville and Mathias To Liman, 
PNG House of Assembly Debates, 16 November 1972. 
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milestone in this regard was the 1972 Faber Report. This 
rejected the basic assumption of the Administration's economic 
policies, i.e. that rapid monetary sector growth would 
automatically enhance the economic and social well-being of 
Papua New Guineans. 
The evidence available in 1972 indicated that the economic 
situation of nationals was worsening in relative terms. While 
monetary sector product grew at an annual rate of 15.6 per cent 
over the period 1966-70, the share of monetary sector income 
accruing to the indigenous workforce fell from 36.0 per cent 
to 32.0 per cent.^ Increased reliance on foreign investment 
was partly responsible for this trend; the proportion of 
national income accruing to foreign companies increased from 
g 
5 per cent in 1967-68 to 16 per cent in 1971-72. Dependence 
on expatriate labour also played a part; the proportion of 
household income accruing to nationals fell from 79.5 per cent 9 
in the early 1960s to 63.4 per cent in 1970. Papua New 
Guineans were,of course,receiving a smaller slice of a 
substantially larger cake, but as the Faber Report pointed out 
any relative decline in indigenous incomes was likely to cause 
political and economic problems.^^ 
R.T. Shand, 'Emerging Policy Issues in the Development of 
Papua New Guinea', in R.T. Shand and M.L. Treadgold, The Economy 
of Papua New Guinea: Projections and Policy Issues^ Department 
of Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 
National University, (Canberra, 1971), pp.54, 71. 
® M.L. Treadgold, Economic Growth and Inequality in Papua New 
Guinea, (The University of New England, 1976), p. 10. 
ibid. 
Faber Report, p. 6. 
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Administration policy had other weaknesses. Concentration 
of resources in the most productive sectors of the economy 
offered no solution to, and probably accentuated, inequalities 
in regional income distribution.^^ The rapid growth of the 
monetary economy was not matched in the subsistence sector; 
a rapidly-growing imbalance was emerging between the two 
sectors, an imbalance associated with substantial migration 
from rural to urban areas. Employment opportunities in the 
towns did not match the inflow of labour. According to one 
estimate, such opportunities grew at an annual rate of 9.6 
per cent over the years 1966-71, while the urban population 
12 
increased by 16.9 per cent per annum during the same period. 
Clearly, economic growth per se did not guarantee a 
solution to Papua New Guinea's problem and might well add to 
them. The Faber Report set out to identify social, political, 
and economic priorities and to seek the type of investment and 
growth patterns most likely to facilitate their implementation. 
The priorities it identified were to increase indigenous 
control of the economy, expand opportunities for income-
generating self-employment for indigenous people, increase 
income to nationals while avoiding large disparities in 
local income distribution, reduce dependence on foreign aid 
and enhance prospects for rural development.^^ Regional 
It has been estimated, for example, that in 1970/1 the Island 
districts with 12.5 per cent of the population received 31.7 per 
cent of indigenous incomes, while the Highlands with 39.3 per 
cent of the population earned 26.7 per cent of such incomes, 
R.J. Moreland, Papua New Guinea: Politics, the Economy, Trade, 
Investment Opportunities, Economic Research Pty. Ltd., (Sydney, 
1974), p. 69. 
1 9 
M.L. Treadgold, Economic Growth and Inequality in Papua New 
Guinea, p.12. 
^^ Faber Report, p. 4. 
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development and rural revitalisation were seen as indispensable 
if other policy aims were to be achieved. The urban cash 
economy could not grow quickly enough to supply sufficient 
employment for Papua New Guinea's expanding workforce, and so 
employment opportunities in rural areas would have to be 
enhanced. Rural development could be expected to increase 
indigenous incomes while reducing dependence on foreign aid 
and investment in the longer term, thereby increasing indigenous 
control of the economy. 
The principal role of enclave projects would be to provide 
revenue which government would use to help poorer regions 
catch up on lost ground and generally to facilitate and 
14 
encourage indigenous economic activity. Public expenditure 
would have to be increased rapidly for political as well as 
economic reasons. The newly-formed national government would 
have to display its ability to bring material benefits to its 
constituents if political stability was to be maintained and 
secessionist movements stemmed.^^ Given this general approach, 
it was hardly surprising that the Faber Report should state 
that 'earlier and substantially greater contributions to public , 16 
revenue should be obtained from the Bougainville project . 
Policies of the type advocated by the Faber Report were 
very much more attractive to the Papua New Guineans who were 
14 Faber Report, p. 27. 
^^ Thus the Report advised that 'a high degree of preference 
should be assigned to benefits that will be experienced before 
mid 1978 ' (p. 15) . 
^^ Faber Report, p. 101. 
448 
taking over power than a strategy which seemed to promise 
many of the rewards of economic development to foreigners 
while failing to deal with increasingly apparent economic and 
social problems. When Mr Somare's Cabinet outlined its policy 
priorities in December 1972, the emphasis was similar to the 
Faber Report's: increased indigenous control of the economy, 
a more equal distribution of economic benefits, concentration 
on rural development, a more self-reliant economy, and an 
increased capacity to meet government expenditure from locally-
raised revenue. 
By 1972 two of the major assumptions which underlay the 
Australian Administration's negotiation of the Agreement were 
no longer valid. First, continued Australian subsidisation 
could not be guaranteed now that independence was at hand, 
and in any case the national government was anxious to avoid 
dependence on Australian aid. Secondly, it was felt that 
enclave projects would not directly create significant benefits 
for Papua New Guineans, and should therefore generate 
substantial government revenues at an early date. 
The background to renegotiation 
Throughout 1973 a number of politicians, particularly John 
Momis and Paul Lapun, continued to press for a critical 
reappraisal of the Agreement. Meanwhile support for such a move 
was growing among the staff which the Somare government had 
The Cabinet's priorities were summarised in the Eight Point 
Improvement Plan, reproduced in National Investment and 
Development Authority, Framework for Industrial Development in 
Papua New Guinea, (Port Moresby, September, 1975), p. iii. For 
a more detailed discussion of those priorities, see Cabinet 
Committee on Planning, Papua New Guinea's Improvement Plan for 
2973-74, (Port Moresby, 1973). 
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recruited to replace Australian Administration officials, 
though a wide spectrum of opinion existed as to how, or to 
what extent, the Agreement should be altered. The two main 
strands of opinion consisted of those who wished to pressure 
18 Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) into providing more revenue 
immediately without substantially changing the Agreement, and 
19 
those who wanted a full-scale renegotiation of its terms. 
In May 1973 the Finance Minister, Julius Chan, requested 
one of his staff, Ross Garnaut, to suggest a tax system that 
would 'take as much money as possible from (BCL) consistent 
with similar arrangements being applied to new mineral OA . , 
investments'. Garnaut prepared a proposal in conjunction 
with a University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) economist, Anthony 
Clunies Ross.^^ Their basic assumption was that host countries 
should obtain as high a proportion as possible of mining company 
profits after deduction of the company income which would 
correspond to the minimum return necessary to attract investment 
into new projects. In designing a tax system for this 
purpose, two considerations would be particularly important. 
First, most host countries would not possess the information on 
In a corporate re-organisation effected in 1971, Bougainville 
Copper Pty. Limited (BCPL) became Bougainville Copper Ltd. (BCL). 
^^ Interview with former Secretary to the PNG Cabinet, Port 
Moresby, 11 June 1978. 
R Garnaut, 'The Framework of Economic Policy-Making Under the 
First Somare Government 1972-77', to be published in J Ballard 
(ed.) Policy-!-:aking in a New State: Papua New Guvnea 1 972-7 7 
Queensland University Press, 1980), draft copy, p.45 [hereafter 
referred to as The Framework of Economta Polvoy Makvng ...J. 
^^ Their proposal was later published: R. Garnaut and A. Clunies 
Ross, -uncertainty. Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural 
Resource Projects', Economic Journal, Vol.85 (June 1975), pp.272-87 
^^ In theory, the host country could confiscate 100 per cent of 
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production costs and product prices needed to permit an accurate 
forecast of project profitability. Thus a single appropriate 
tax rate could not be fixed in advance. Second, host 
country authorities would wish to ensure that investment in 
marginal deposits was not deterged while making certain that 
profitable projects would generate substantial government 
revenue. 
Garnaut and Clunies Ross recommended use of a Resource 
Rent Tax (RRT), that is 'a profits tax that begins to be 
collected when a certain threshold rate of return on funds 
invested ... has been r e a l i s e d R R T would be collected 
at progressively higher rates as higher rates of return were 
realised. Under such a system, a company contemplating 
investment in what appeared to be a marginal project would 
know that little or no tax would be incurred until it had 
earned an 'appropriate' return. If the project was unexpectedly 
profitable, RRT would apply, ensuring that the government 
captured a large proportion of windfall profits. 
Such a system would minimise the cost to government of its 
lack of information, since a single tax rate would not have to 
be set in advance. Neither would absence of such a tax create 
uncertainty for investors, since they could calculate precisely 
what tax levels would apply given various assumptions concerning 
costs and prices. 
This discussion raises a number of important questions, 
particularly regarding the concept of an 'appropriate' return on 
•surplus profits' without affecting mineral development but in 
practice L c h action would remove the incentive 
companies to operate efficiently, as after tax profits would 
remain unchanged for a very wide range of production costs. 
23 R. Garnaut and A. Clunies Ross, op.cit., p.277. 
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investment, and these are dealt with below (see p.467-73) . Of 
immediate interest is that application of RRT would necessitate 
a substantial renegotiation of the Agreement. 
An alternative approach was advocated by Louis T. Wells, 
at the Harvard Business School, whom the government invited to 
examine the Agreement and recommend any changes he considered 
desirable. Wells advised a cautious approach. In his view, 
mining agreements in Papua New Guinea's immediate geographical 
area were less stringent than in other parts of the world, and 
so it would have to be careful not to price itself out of the 
market. Wells suggested that additional revenue could be 
obtained immediately by abolishing the tax exemption on 20 per 
cent of BCL's income and by beginning write-offs of capital 
expenditure during the first year of the tax holiday rather 
than at its completion.^^ He opposed imposition on a profit-
26 
based tax in addition to standard corporation tax. 
Throughout late 1973 political momentum in favour of 
renegotiation gathered force while the debate among proponents 
of the various strategies continued. BCL itself helped to 
decide the issue in early 1974 by announcing net profits for 
1973 of A$158.4 million. The government would receive about 
A$29 million of this amount, mostly as dividends on the equity 
it had purchased, and from dividend withholding tax (introduced 
in the 1972 budget at a rate of 15 per cent) on dividends paid 
interview with Department of Finance official. Port Moresby, 
8 June 1978. 
R.B. McKern, op.cit., p.93. 
R. Garnaut, The Framework of Economic Policy-Making 
p. 45. 
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27 to non-nationals. it found this situation completely 
unacceptable, and decided to proceed with a full-scale 
renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement. 
BCL's public reaction to this decision was moderate. Its 
officials claimed that the terms of the Agreement were not 
inappropriate when they were negotiated, that similar terms 
would still have to be offered to attract capital into new 
mining projects, and that the Agreement was comparable to 
other agreements governing copper mines on the Western rim of 
the Pacific. They also argued that BCL should enjoy an adequate 
return for the considerable risk it had taken in developing 
2 8 
Panguna. Nevertheless BCL agreed to negotiate. It had 
little choice. As its directors later explained, the Company 
only had two alternatives — to negotiate and obtain the best 
possible result, or to refuse to negotiate and take the risk 29 that the government would unilaterally amend the Agreement. 
Preparing for the renegotiation 
The government devoted considerable effort to the task of 
preparing for negotiations. It already employed competent 
advisers on general economic and legal matters, and it now 
recruited specialised staff (usually on a short-term basis) in 
The government would receive A$16 million in dividends, 
A$9.5 million in dividend withholding tax, and about A$3.9 
million in royalties, 
^^ Bougainville Copper Limited, Annual Report, 1973, p.4. [Unless 
otherwise stated, all references to Annual Reports in this 
Chapter are to those of Bougainville Copper Ltd.]; Rio Tinto 
Zinc Corporation, Press Release, 9 April 1973. 
^^ Bougainville Copper Limited, Letter to Shareholders, 29 
November 1974. 
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those areas where it lacked expertise. Assistance was received 
from the Cominonwealth Secretariat and the Intergovernmental 
Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). Few of the 
individuals involved were to remain in Port Moresby throughout 
the negotiating process, but their presence was of considerable 
help to the government in formulating its negotiating position. 
Another important step was the establishment and maintenance 
of liaison between senior politicians and advisory staff. 
Mr Somare had earlier formed a ministerial committee to consider 
the whole question of renegotiation; staff members now reported 
to this committee regularly, and care was taken to keep it 
fully informed of all relevant developments. In addition, the 
renegotiation was periodically discussed by Cabinet, and the 
basic principles being applied were reaffirmed,^^ 
The government was anxious that Bougainvillians should 
feel that they had been represented at the renegotiation, and 
that its position should not be weakened by conflict with the 
islanders. It therefore included John Momis and Leo Hannett 
(a prominent political figure on Bougainville and a founder-
member of the secessionist movement) in the team which would 
handle the renegotiation. 
But perhaps the most important preparatory work was 
carried on as part of the general process of policy formulation 
undertaken between 1972 and 1974. The politicians and civil 
servants involved rejected many of the Administration's 
R. Garnaut, The Framework of Economic Policy-Making .... 
p. 46. 
^^ interview with former Secretary to the PNG Cabinet, Port 
Moresby, 11 June 197 8. 
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assumptions, and in doing so articulated the fundamental 
principles which would underlie their own approach. As part 
of this process, agreed priorities were established concerning 
the role which mining projects would be expected to play. 
Consequently the government knew exactly what it wanted (and 
was united in its commitment to obtain it) when negotiations 
commenced. 
The broad policy aims of Mr Somare's government have 
been mentioned above. They dictated that 'the government 
should be in the business of rural development, not of mining', 
32 • • as one official expressed it. Consequently, its priority 
would be to maximise mineral revenues which could then be used 
to finance rural development; it would not demand increased 
ownership of BCL nor, with some expections, would it seek 
increased control over the Company's operations. 
The government did not wish to increase its shareholding 
in BCL for a number of reasons. First, it believed that its 
limited administrative capacity should be used to foster rural 
development rather than to oversee a mining concern. Second, 
a substantial commitment of funds would be required,^^ and it 
believed that investment in an already-operating mine would 
^^ Interview with Department of Finance official. Port Moresby, 
7 June 1 9 7 8 . The discussion of government policy is based on 
this interview and on interviews with the following: Assistant 
Secretary, Office of Minerals and Energy, Port Moresby, 27 June 
1978; Assistant Director, Central Planning Office, Port Moresby, 
27 June 1978; former Secretary to the PNG Cabinet, Port Moresby, 
11 June 1978; former Political Adviser to the Minister for 
Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1 9 7 8 . 
^^ Nationalisation without compensation was not considered, 
partly because the government did not believe that it possessea 
the administrative or technical skills to run a major mining 
concern, partly because of the adverse effects such action was 
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represent an inefficient use of Papua New Guinea's limited 
financial resources. In addition, it was felt that CRA and 
RTZ would have little incentive to commit their technical and 
financial resources to the Panguna project if the state 
substantially increased its shareholding. Increased state 
ownership was not seen as a prerequisite for capturing a higher 
share of BCL's profits; an efficient tax system would do this 
without involving the state in the expense (and the risk) of 
further equity investment. 
The government believed that Papua New Guinea would not 
be disadvantaged if BCL retained complete control of many 
aspects of mining operations. For example, there was little 
concern with the Company's marketing practices, since it did 
not sell concentrates to affiliates and could therefore be 
expected to market its products at the highest available price. 
Neither was there any desire to influence corporate decisions 
affecting the labour intensity of mining operations. The 
government was not concerned with creating additional employment 
on Bougainville, since this could only lead to further 
immigration and increased social and political tensions. Nor 
did it wish to influence BCL's purchasing policies. It felt 
that the domestic economy was not in a position to supply the 
goods and services required, and that it was not part of its 
development strategy to help establish industries which would 
34 
probably be uncompetitive in any case. 
likely to have on the flow of investment and ^^^ to Papua New 
Guinea. Interview with Department of Finance official. Port 
Moresby, 7 June 1978. 
^^ Any increase in BCL's costs would of course reduce profits 
and government revenues. 
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Underlying this relative disinterest in the direct 
economic impacts of mining (employment, linkages) was the 
belief that their effects would be geographically concentrated 
and that the type of development they would represent might 
frequently be undesirable,^^ Mineral revenues, on the other 
hand, could be expended for the benefit of all Papua New 
Guineans and so as to foster the desired type of development. 
In addition to the question of revenue generation, tv/o 
other issues would receive attention. The governinent would 
wish to ensure that BCL's training and localisation policies 
would maximise indigenous participation in the Company's 
activities, and that the adverse environmental effects of tiie 
Panguna mine on surrounding rural areas be minimised. 
Thus v;hen negotiations commenced the government had 
identified a well-defined and limited range of issues on which 
its negotiators would concentrate their attention. 
The conduct of negotiations 
Negotiations took place over the period May to September 
1974. BCL rejected the government's first proposal out of hand 
The basic elements of this proposal were to be contained in the 
final settlement, and BCL's attitude at this stage apparently 
36 
reflected its desire to test the government's determination. 
It was also felt that commitment of resources to development 
of linkage industries would further increase Papua New Guinea's 
dependence on the mining sector, thus increasing the adverse 
effects of fluctuating metal prices. Interview with Assistant 
Secretary, Office of Minerals and Energy, Port Moresby, 27 June 
1978 . 
^^ Tiiis was certainly how its attitude was interpreted by the 
government. Interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October 
1979 . 
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In June a second proposal was submitted to the Company, and it 
met this with a counterproposal which was discussed at a short 
meeting in Port Moresby. BCL's terms were rejected by government 
negotiators, who felt that the changes proposed were cosmetic in 
nature and were intended to present the Company as willing to 
compromise while leaving the division of profits essentially 
37 
unchanged. The government was angered at what it saw as BCL s 
refusal to enter into serious negotiations, and it informed the 
Company that the Agreement would be amended by legislation if a 
satisfactory arrangement was not negotiated. Just before the 
Port Moresby meeting broke up, BCL submitted another proposal 
for consideration, and its terms made it clear that the Company 38 was now ready to negotiate. 
In August 1974 the main phase of negotiations began, and 
agreement was soon reached on a number of non-financial matters. 
The government was anxious to compile an environmental impact 
study of the Panguna project, and BCL agreed to assist in this 
work.^^ The Company undertook to commission a pilot study which 
would examine the economic feasibility of smelting or refining 
copper concentrates in Papua New G u i n e a . B C L ' s localisation 
^^ interview with Assistant Secretary, General Economic Policy 
Division, Department of Finance, Port Moresby, 6 June ly/a. 
^^ interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October 1979. 
^^ The amendments to the 1967 Agreement are contained in the 
Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) {Amendment) Act 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, January 1975), The relevant 
clause is 16A. 
ibid.. Clause 16. If the results were ^ ' ^ 
the government would discuss the question of whether a full 
feasability study was warranted. 
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and training policies were also discussed, and the government 
accepted that progress was generally satisfactory- The parties 
agreed to keep in close consultation on the matter and the 
government concluded that this, combined with its powers under 
generally applicable legislation, would allow it to exercise 
• - 41 
its influence wnenever necessary. 
Agreement v/as not so easily achieved on financial matters. 
The government's demands v^ ere as follows: abolition of the 
tax exemption on 20 per cent of BLC's incorae; termination of 
the three-year tax exemption from 1 January 197 4; witndrawal 
of accelerated depreciation allowances; and imposition on 
BCL's profits of corporation tax at the standard rate (then 
33^ per cent) and of an Additional Profits Tax (APT) which 
would yield a total tax rate of 7 0 per cent on tliat portion 
of profits above a sum which would represent a return to BCL 
of 15 per cent on funds invested-
Financial terms were finally agreed upon in September after 
two protracted negotiating sessions. Previously much of the 
actual bargaining had been between advisory staff and executives 
of CRA and BCL, but by this stage the raost senior personnel on 
both sides were involved. The Company team was led by Sir Val 
Duncan, the RTZ Chairman, and CRA's Chairman, Rod Carnegie. 
The Papua Hew Guinea team included Paul Lapun, Julius Chan 
(Minister for Finance), and Maori Kiki (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs), and was headed by Mr Somare during the second session. 
An the first meeting, Duncan suggested that the government's 
proposals might be acceptable if it agreed to buy a further 
^^ interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October 1979. 
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50 per cent of BCL' s equity (at a substantial premium above the 
narket price), a proposal which the Papua New Guineans 
42 rejected. They saw it as a diversionary device whereby RTZ 
could take back with one hand what it had just conceded with 
43 
the other. 
The government team proceeded to negotiate on the basis 
of its own proposals, applying 'a carefully orchestrated 
approach', as one witness expressed it, v/ith each member 
playing a particular role. Mr Somare explained what he saw 
as the political realities and stated that his government's 
position would be undermined if it did not obtain a more 
favourable agreement. Mr Chan outlined Papua New Guinea's 
financial situation and claimed that the country simply had to 
obtain additional revenue. Paul Lapun spoke in Pidgin of the 
costs which the mine had imposed on his people. Kiki took a 
very hard line throughout, demanding that all the government's 
requests be met and rejecting any compromise; thus he 
constantly reminded the Company of what it stood to lose if it 44 refused to compromise. 
This 'orchestrated approach' was apparently not planned; 
rather the roles of individual ministers emerged from the 
Duncan had already canvassed this idea in Canberra and 
suggested that the Australian government might provide a loan to 
Papua New Guinea with which to purchase the shares. He apparently 
attempted to persuade Mr Whitlam to exert pressure in Port Moresby 
on behalf of his plans. Whitlam refused on the grounds that the 
matter involved Papua New Guinea's internal affairs, and ne 
simply informed Mr Somare of the nature of RTZ's suggestion. 
Interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October ly/y. 
43 ., . , ibid. 
^^ interview with former Secretary to the PNG Cabinet, Port 
Moresby, 11 June 197 8. 
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interaction and discussion which occurred in numerous meetings 
of the ministerial committee and of C a b i n e t . I t was certainly 
effective. Gradually the Company conceded on the major issues, 
abandoning its 'non-negotiable principles' one by one.^^ It 
accepted the principle of APT, but Duncan fought long and hard 
to have BCL' s 197 4 earnings exempted from tax. Much was at 
stake here- BCL's first half operating profit amounted to 
$118 million, and under the proposed tax system the government 
47 
would receive some $66 million of this. Finally, it was 
agreed that BCL's 1974 income would be liable to taxation, but 
an element of compromise was included in that first half profits 48 
would be taxed at a rate of only 44 per cent. 
A number of additional points were also agreed upon. BCL 
could claim an increase in the return allowed on its funds 
before APT applied if 'abnormal conditions of inflation' 
occurred or if it was substantially disadvantaged by alignments 
^^ Interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October 1978. 
company negotiators had claimed there were certain 'principles' 
on which it could not compromise, for example non-retrospectivity 
of tax liability. 
^^ BCL would have been allowed to receive A$58 million net of 
corporation tax at the rate of 33^ per cent before APT was 
charged. The figure of $66 million assumes that half of this 
amount would have been claimed in tne first six months of 1974. 
^^ Tax would be applied at the higner of two rates, either 33^ 
per cent or a rate expressed as 1 ^ 7 n . _ 1 , 
5 2 f^fo ' 2-p' " 3 J 
when n was equal to 32 million and p ^ 
was 118 million and the applicable tax rate ^^ ^ 
operating income is considered here). M^n^ng (Bouga^nv^lle Copper 
Agreement (Amendment) Act, Schedule, Part 11. 
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in currency conversion rates.^^ it undertook to pay 50 cents 
per tonne of copper sold into a Non-Renewable Resources Fund 
which would be expended for the benefit of Bougainvillians. 
Finally, the two parties agreed to meet in 1981 and every 
seven years thereafter to review the operation of the 
^ 51 Agreement. 
The renegotiation in itself had little effect on the 
status of Bougainvillians in relation to BCL's operations, 
though they would receive some additional financial benefit 
from the Non-Renewable Resources Fund, while the involvement 
of Momis and Hannett in the negotiating team was a recognition 
of their special interest in the outcome. However, during tne 
following two years the situation was to change quite 
dramatically. In December 1974 the national government agreed 
that all mineral royalties from Panguna should flow to 
52 
Bougainville. In 1974-76 a provisional government v/as 
established on the Island and this very much increased 
Bougainvillian participation in decisions affecting the mine. 
The provincial government is consulted both by BCL and by Port 
Moresby regarding all major relevant policy initiatives, and it 
v.'ill effectively have a power of veto over any new mineral 
developments on Bougainville.^^ 
49 
ibid.. Clause 7i and 7j. 
^^ ibid., Clause 16B. 
^^ ibid., Clause 26A. 
^^  The landowners involved would continue to receive 5 per cent 
of royalties, while the provincial government would receive the 
remainder. 
5 3 
Interview with provincial government official, Arawa, 20 June 
1978; interview with Assistant Secretary, Office of Minerals 
and Energy, Port Moresby, 27 June 1978. 
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Assessing the 1974 Agreement 
The 1974 Agreement embodied nearly all the government's 
objectives; the only substantial concession it made was to 
modify its demands concerning BCL's tax liability for 1974, 
by about A$14 million. What accounts for its success? 
The manner in which the government prepared for 
negotiations was clearly very important, particularly in that 
it identified limited and specific objectives. This placed it 
in a strong bargaining position as it could immediately reject 
any proposal which did not accord with its aims, and its own 
54 
proposals would again become the basis for negotiations. 
Tnis was illustrated, for example, when the Company suggested 
that Papua New Guinea buy a majority shareholding in BCL. The 
government had already excluded this alternative, and could 
therefore swing negotiations back to the question of tax 
revenue. 
The liaison which existed between advisory staff and 
senior politicians was also of considerable importance. Over 
a period of time, these politicians were 'educated' as to the 
issues involved by their advisers, and a feeling of trust and 
mutual confidence developed between the two groups. When the 
important final negotiating sessions occurred, the politicians 
were well informed and working closely with the advisory staff, 
and so could throw all their weight behind the negotiating 
^^ C.J. Lipton has pointed out the advantage which can accrue 
to a negotiating team if it can make its proposals the basis 
of discussion. 'Government Negotiating Techniques and 
Strategies', in United Nations, op.cit., p.104. 
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effort.^^ 
The personal qualities of the individuals concerned also 
contributed to a successful outcome. The Advisory staff were 
technically competent in their particular fields and also 
displayed a keen tactical sense,^^ a quality apparently scarce 
among many groups of this kind.^^ 
The quality of political leadership was also high. Unity 
was maintained throughout, and no ambiguity existed as to the 
commitment of any minister to the pursuit of Papua New Guinea's 
interests- The politicians most directly involved were, as 
^^ The closeness of this liaison resulted from a number of 
factors. Realising the importance of renegotiation, Mr Somare 
chose advisers who were already regarded as politically trust-
worthy. There was an overlap of personnel between the two groups 
in that certain of the advisory staff (Fr John Momis, John 
Kaputin) were also politicians- In addition, the civil servants 
among the advisory staff reported directly to the ministerial 
committee, rather than through normal bureaucratic channels. 
The newness of the bureaucracy in Port Moresby facilitated this 
arrangement since rigid reporting procedures had not yet 
developed. 
^^ Their treatment of Sir Val Duncan, the RTZ Chairman, is 
illustrative in this regard. Duncan made a practice of dealing 
with the countries in which RTZ operated at the prime ministerial 
level only, and on his arrival in Port Moresby he asked to see 
Mr Somare, a request the Prime Minister refused. Duncan per-
sisted, but officials and ministers ensured that there was always 
some obstacle to a meeting, and the two men did not come face to 
face until the final negotiating session. This action apparently 
dealt a considerable blow to Duncan's confidence, and also 
informed him in no uncertain terms that the PNG government could 
not be treated lightly. 
This is the view of at least one person with wide experience 
of negotiating situations. Interview with Anthony Martin, former 
East African Correspondent for the Financtal Tzmes, Port 
Moresby, 9 June 1978. 
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5 8 
a number of their advisers have attested, open-minded, 
willing to listen to advice and rational argument, and ready 
to try alternatives which did not correspond to the 
conventional wisdom on relevant issues-
Many of the factors discussed above could not have 
applied had the general context of policy-making in Port 
Moresby not been characterised by a high degree of rationality. 
A wide range of alternatives was usually considered in each 
policy area, their implications were discussed and analysed, 
and choices were then made on the basis of Papua New Guinea's 
perceived interests. It was this climate which allowed the 
government team to make its preparations and which ensured 
that it enjoyed enthusiastic political support for its 
negotiating effort. 
A number of factors underlay this climate of decision-
making. The politicians involved felt that their actions 
would have a major impact on Papua New Guinea's history, and 
that a rigorous standard of decision-making should therefore 
be applied. Political development in Papua New Guinea was not 
far advanced, and consequently few organised pressure groups 
were attempting to influence decision-makers. In this context, 
a point of particular relevance was the absence of domestic 59 groups with a vested interest in protecting BCL's profitability. 
Interview with former Secretary to the PNG Cabinet, Port 
Moresby, 11 June 1978; interview with former Political Adviser 
to the Minister for Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978. 
^^ Initially it was feared that the Papua New Guineans who 
became shareholders in BCL when it issued one million shares to 
Territory residents in 1971 might mobilise political oppostion 
to renegotiation, but this fear proved to be groundless. 
Interview with former Political Adviser to the Minister for 
Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978. 
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Since the bureaucracy in Port Moresby was new, neitner had 
vested bureaucratic interests emerged. Unlike many colonial 
regimes, Australia did not create a bitter legacy of racial 
antagonism, and foreign companies could be objectively 
assessed in the light of their contribution to Papua New Guinea 
rather than condemned out of hand as agents of continued racial 
exploitation. 
The attitude and actions of BCL/CRA/RTZ also played an 
important role in determining the outcome of events. It is 
difficult to discuss the negotiations from their perspective 
because company officials are very reluctant to discuss the 
subject. What is certain is that BCL did not attempt to 
undermine the government's political position (as Tara Mines 
Limited did in Ireland, for example), or to mobilise external 
forces in support of its own position.^^ If BCL had acted 
otherwise, it might of course have placed a A$500 million 
investment in jeopardy, and this may partly explain its 
cautious approach-
Because of this approach, BCL would exercise whatever 
bargaining powers it possessed in the negotiating room and not 
outside it. Those powers were limited by a number of important 
constraints. First, the government possessed an ultimate 
sanction: if necessary, it could simply legislate to obtain 
The only exception was Sir Val Duncan's unsuccessful attempt 
to enlist Mr Whitlam's help. In other instances, mining 
companies have obtained the support of international lending 
and other agencies in their relations with host country govern-
ments. See T.H. Moran, 'Transnational Strategies of Protection 
and Defense by Multinational Corporations', International 
Organisation, Vol. 27, No.2, (Spring 1973), pp. 273-87. 
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the desired outcome.^^ Second, BCL could not credibly 
threaten to abandon a A$500 million investment while the 
government allowed it to receive a reasonable return on that 
investment. BCL could only argue for as generous an 
interpretation as possible of the term 'reasonable'. 
VJhile it is clear that the government obtained most of 
what it sought, the question remains as to whether its demands 
corresponded to what it would have achieved through exercise 
of its full bargaining potential. It is important to remember 
that the terms negotiated with BCL had to be 'consistent with 
similar arrangements being applied to new mineral investments'. 
The government was concerned not only to obtain higher returns 
from Panguna, but also to ensure that other known deposits 
(particularly the Ok Tedi and Frieda River copper/gold 
prospects) would be developed, and that exploration would not 
be discouraged. In theory, it could have imposed stringent 
conditions on BCL and offered more generous terms to new mines. 
However, prospective investors would expect to have conditions 
similar to those negotiated with BCL applied to themselves when 
and if their mines became profitable, and would evaluate 
investment opportunities accordingly. Thus the 1974 Agreement 
must be assessed within the context of Papua New Guinea's 
mineral taxation system as a whole. 
The basic principle of that system is that when 'returns 
ro investment arc well in excess of the reasonable return that 
is necessary to induce a decision to invest, a high proportion 
of the additional profits will be passed to the people ... 
^^ Papua New Guinea did not then have a written constitution, 
and was governed by ordinances and orders-in-council which 
could be amended by Parliament. 
4 6 7 
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through taxation'. Though this principle seems appropriate, 
two practical questions arise. How is the concept of a 
'reasonable' rate of return defined, and what are the 
implications of applying a single rate of return to all 
projects or prospective projects? 
To date, the government has applied the concept of a 
'reasonable' or 'appropriate' rate of return to the 
Bougainville mine, and to the Ok Tedi copper/gold prospect. 
In BCL's case, a great deal was known about the scale of 
investment, production and other costs, and profitability. 
This knowledge allowed the government to designate a rate of 
return which ensures that the tax burden is light when profits 
are low, and that tax payments are substantial when profits are 
high. Over the period 1975-78, when BCL's markets were 
depressed, the effective corporate tax rate averaged 31 per 
cent.^^ In 1979, large increases in gold prices boosted 64 
profits, and the effective rate rose to 48 per cent. 
The Ok Tedi deposit, situated in the V/estern Province, 
was discovered by the US-based Kennecott corporation in 1967. 
Kennecott carried out preliminary exploration work over the 
next five years, but it was 1975 before serious negotiations 
were undertaken regarding terms for further exploration and 
development. The Company asked that a very high rate of return 
be allowed in calculating its liabilitv to APT, making it 
^^ Papua New Guinea, Financial Policies Relating to Mining 
and Mining Taxation: Statement of Intent, (Port Moresby, 
June 1977) , p. 4. 
^^ Derived from Table 19 below. 
^^ Derived from Annual Report, 1979, p. 20. 
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unlikely that it would ever pay the tax.^^ Kennecott was in 
fact reluctant to invest in Papua New Guinea for reasons of 
corporate strategy,^^ and the government concluded that Ok Tedi 
would attract investment from other companies under less 
generous conditions. Thus when Kennecott turned down its terms 
the government refused to renew the Company's prospecting 
authority. It established a state concern, the Ok Tedi 
Development Corporation, to take over the work at Ok Tedi; a 
firm of geological consultants was employed to carry out a 
drilling programme, and by mid 1975 ore reserves had been added 
to substantially. 
The government in the meantime discussed its proposals for 
development of the deposit with six separate groups, which 
included many of the world's largest base metal mining 
companies, and this, combined with the technical information 
obtained through its direct involvement in Ok Tedi, allowed it 
to form a clear idea of the level at which it could pitch its 
demands.^^ 
In 1976 a consortium of Australian, American and German 
companies undertook to conduct a feasibility study of the 
project. Terms were concluded for any subsequent development, 
Kennecott asked for a return of 20 per cent on funds employed 
in veal terms; government officials believed that very few mining 
projects were currently earning a return of this size. 
Interview with Assistant Secretary, General Policy Division, 
Department of Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978. 
^^ Kennecott had recently been expropriated in Chile, and was 
reluctant to make a substantial investment in a developing 
country. In addition, it had decided that in future it would 
expand its operations by taking over existing mining concerns 
rather than by devgloping 'grass roots' projects-
^^ Interview with Assistant Secretary, General Policy Division, 
Department of Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978. 
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though the consortium could withdraw within a given time 
period. (In the event, it decided to proceed). The relevant 
provisions were contained in the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) 
Act 1976. 
The State would be offered a 20 per cent shareholding 
in the project, at par. The government would reimburse 
Kennecott for its exploration expenditure (between Kl2 million 
and K15 million), but this amount would be credited towards its 
6 8 purchase of shares (Clause 11). 
The standard rate of corporation tax would be charged, 
tnough with an upper limit of 35 per cent during the Investment 
Recovery Period (that period between commencement of commercial 
production and the date at which the sum of post-tax profits 
plus depreciation allowances exceeds total investment at the 
commencement date) (Clause 23.1, 23.2). During the Investment 
Recovery Period, accelerated depreciation would be available 
in each year to the extent that would be necessary to allow 
Cash Flow (after-tax profits plus depreciation allowances) to 
equal 25 per cent of Initial Capital Expenditure (defined 
below),^^ or to reduce taxable income to zero, whichever limit 
^^ The value of Kennecott's compensation was nominal: it would 
receive bonds for the relevant amount, redeemable after 15 
years, or some 25 years after the exploration expenditure had 
actually been incurred. The consortium was anxious that some 
recognition be given to Kennecott's role in discovering the 
deposit, but was not over-concerned with its plight. Interview 
with Assistant Secretary, General Policy Division, Department 
of Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978. 
^^ initial capital expenditure is defined as 'Total Investment 
to the end of the Tax Year for which additional deductions are 
sought or to the end of the fourth year after Commencement of 
Commercial Production, whichever is the earlier, less 
Replacement Expenditure to the end of the Tax Year for which 
additional deductions are sought or to the end of the fourth 
year after Commencement of Commercial Production whichever is 
earlier'. (Clause 23.5). 
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would give rise to the lower amount of deductions (Clause 23.5). 
Royalties would be payable at the rate of per cent of 
the f.o.b. value of mineral sales (Clause 24), and dividend 
withholding tax would be applied at a rate of 15 per cent to 
dividends payable to non-nationals (Clause 23.9). 
Additional Profits Tax (APT) would be calculated in the 
following manner. Net Cash Receipts (defined b e l o w ) w o u l d 
be accumulated from the commencement of construction at a 
designated interest rate (either 20 per cent or 10 percentage 
points above prime corporate borrowing rates in the United 
States). APT would become payable when the accumulated value 
of Net Cash Receipts was positive, in other words when the 
initial investment with compound interest at the designated 
rate had been recovered. Positive accumulated value would be 
taxed only once: it would be set at zero following any year 
for which APT was payable. If Net Cash Receipts were negative 
in any year for which APT was payable, APT would not again be 
charged until the 'loss' had been recouped at the designated 
interest rate (Clause 23). 
APT would be calculated according to the formula 
APT = A X (70% - T) , 
where A equals accumulated value of Net Cash Receipts in the 
current tax year and T equals the standard income tax rate 
(currently 36^ per cent) (Clause 23) . 
'Net Cash Receipts' means the result (which may be negative) 
in any Tax Year of the sum of all income from mineral sales and 
other receipts (but excluding any interest which accrues to the 
company), less the sum of all capital and operating expenditures 
incurred in that Tax Year (excluding interest payments) and the 
amount of income tax paid by the company in that Tax Year 
(Clause 23.1). 
471 
It is not possible to predict what the rate of APT will 
be in particular situations- Application of the formula to 
BCL's operations in 1979 would have resulted in a rate equal 
to 24 per cent of pre-tax profits,^^ giving a total tax rate 
of 60^ per cent. 
These terms, which now form the basis of general tax 
legislation, appear to strike a reasonable balance between the 
need to attract investment, to ensure that government receives 
a substantial return from profitable projects, and to encourage 
efficient mineral exploitation. The effect of the arrangement 
is to lighten the tax burden until such time as initial 
investment and a return on it is recouped; this is particularly 
so as regards marginal mines, which would enjoy the benefit of 
accelerated depreciation allowances. It thus facilitates 
rapid recovery of the initial investment and, in combination 
with the provision permitting carry-forward of losses in 
assessment of APT, significantly reduces the risk that 
application of taxation will result in a mineral investment 
incurring loss. Both factors are of course very important from 
the perspective of a potential investor. 
Onthe other hand, the application of APT to all profits 
after the investment has been recovered, the charging of 
royalties and dividend withholding tax, and the absence of 
accelerated depreciation allowances for non-marginal mines 
means that profitable operations will quickly yield a 
Assessable receipts were K343,251,000, operating and capital 
expenditure X168,924,000, and corporation tax 
K56,698,000. Kll7,029,000 would have been liable to APT, 
yielding revenue of K39,205,000 or 24 per cent of ore-tax 
profits. Derived from BCL, Annual Report, 1979. 
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substantial return to government. Yet the marginal tax rate 
is not so high as to remove tne incentive for efficient 
mineral exploitation, while the low level of royalties laeans 
that their application is unlikely to significantly distort 
production decisions. 
While the taxation framework is general appropriate, the 
question arises as to whether a single rate of return should 
be applied to all mineral developments- The government will 
iiardly be as well informed about other projects as it was 
about Panguna and Ok Tedi. Its experience to date has 
supplied it with information as to general factors influencing 
the supply price of investment to large mineral resource 
projects in Papua Mew Guinea. But is it not possible tnat 
otner developments will be substantially different in character 
and will require application of a different rate of return if 
they are not to be rendered sub-marginal, or if economic rents 
are not to escape taxation? 
Superficially, negotiation of a separate rate of return 
for eacn project might allow government to avoid this danger, 
since the characteristics of individual deposits could tnen 
be taken into account. But tnis alternative would face the 
government with precisely the problem it is seeking to avoid, 
since it would probably lack information regarding tnose 
characteristics. It would be faced with demands for concessions 
without whicxi 'marginal' prospects could supposedly not be 
developed, as happened to tne Australian Administration in 1967. 
There are other objections to such an approach. It would impose 
a heavy burden on the country's limited administrative resources, 
and might deter mineral exploration as companies would not know 
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in advance the conditions under which any discoveries would 
be developed. 
Thus Papua New Guinea's taxation system is appropriate 
in terms both of general efficiency criteria and of the 
country's particular circumstances. 
It is also necessary to assess Papua New Guinea's 
broader mineral development strategy, based on tne concept 
of maximising mineral revenues for use in rural development. 
In the following sections the economic and other effects of 
the Bougainville mine are analysed, and this should provide 
evidence on which to base a judgement. At times use is made 
of financial data relating to BCL, and the relevant information 
is presented in Table 18. 
Generation of Government Revenue 
Table 19 gives details of the revenue generated oy BCL 
over the period 1972-79, broken down into its various 
components. Income taxes (corporate income tax, dividend 
withholding tax) represented by far the most significant source 
7 2 
of revenue, accounting for K254.8 million or 65 per cent of 
the total. Royalties (K22.1 million) and Group Tax (K25.8 
million over the period 1972-7 8) were also important. Dividend 
income should be treated separately, since it results from an 
investment by government of K25 million. It amounted to K72.1 
million, indicating a net return of K47.1 million.^^ 
^^ A new currency, tne Kina (K) was established in 1975; 
initially one Kina equalled one Australian dollar. 
This does not take account of interest payments on loans 
raised by the Administration to finance its purchase of equity 
Financial Statistics, 
Table 18 
Bougainville Copper Limited, 1972-197 8 (K'OOO •s) 
1972* 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Totals 
Net Sales Revenue 95,695 249,048 279,825 184,754 205,349 200,578 223,282 1,438,531 
Other Income 158 2,925 13,890 8,628 3,097 2,513 1,864 33,075 
Exchange Gains on Loan Repayments - 13,828 8,245 1,981 1,601 2,177 10,295** 38,127 
95,853 265,801 301,960 195,363 210,047 205,268 235,441 1,509,733 
Less 
Cost of Sales and Other Costs 39,010 61,949 75,770 93,440 103,636 112,656 116,118 602,579 
Interest Payments 13,443*** 17,493 13,205 11,469 11,060 11,661 6,093 84,424 
Depreciation and 7\mortization 14,520 24,831 28,453 29,591 31,103 36,203 40,425 205,126 
Royalties 1,202 3,118 3,487 2,309 2,578 2,490 2,790 17,974 
Taxable Income 27,678 158,410 181,045 58,554 61,670 42,258 70,015 599,630 
Current Taxation - - 63,159"^ 15,666 20,303 13,724 22,000 134,852 
Net Earnings 27,678 158,410 117,886+ 42,888+ 41,367 28,534 48,015 464,778 
Dividends Paid 11,000 81,400 73,528 26,738 26,738 21,390 40,106 280,900 
capital Expenditure 36,300++ 17,900 10,830 23,862 36,176 39,695 30,300 195,063 
Loan Repayments - 68,002 36,904 18,462 19,544 25,635 64,600 233,147 
Source 
Notes: 
Bougainville Copper Ltd., Annual Reports, 1973 - 1978; information supplied by BCL. 
* Production commenced on 1 April 1972. 
** Until 1977 BCL's Annual Reports stated exchange gains on loan repayments as a separate item while exchange gains/ 
losses on conversion of cash balances were included under the heading of Other Income. In 1978 a single heading. 
Net Exchange Gains/Losses, covered both items. 
*** Interest payments in 1972 totalled K22,562,000 but of this amount K9,119,000 was capitalised and will have been 
amortized over the following years. 
+ In its Accounts for 1974 BCL made an overprovision for taxation of K3,311,000, and this amount was added back to 
Net Earnings in the 1975 Accounts. These figures reflect the true tax situation. 
++ The figures for capital expenditure correspond to the item 'Expenditure on Fixed Assets' in BCL's Annual Reports. 
A part of expenditure in 1972 was associated with preproduction activity and was financed from initial loan 
capital. 
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Table 19 
Government Revenue Generated by BCL, 1970-1979"^ (K million) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Totals 
Corporate 
Income Tax - - _ _ 63.2 15.7 20.3 13.7 22.0 77.9 212.8 
Dividend With-
holding Tax - - 1.3 9.4 8.8 3.1 3.1 2.5 4.8 9.0 42.0 
Royalties++ - - 1.0 2.9 3.8 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.8 4.3 22.1 
Group Tax 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.9 2.4 3.7 5.3 5.4 5.5 n.a. n.a. 
Customs 
Duties - - 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.9 1.6 2.3 2.2 n.a. n.a. 
Dividends - - 2.2 16.3 14.7 5.3 5.3 4.3 8.0 16.0 72.1 
Totals 0.2 0.3 5.8 31.6 93.8 31.9 38.2 30.7 45.3 116.0 393.8 
Source: Information provided by BCL 
Notes: + Tax revenue is attributed to the year in which the relevant 
income was earned. 
Slight discrepancies exist between these figures and the 
royalty figures in Table 12, The latter describes provisions 
for royalty payments while those above reflect actual payments 
n.a. Information not available. 
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BCL's contribution to total government revenue is 
substantial, though its significance varies considerably over 
short-time periods, mainly as a result of fluctuating metal 
prices. In 1974/5, for example, total internal revenue was 
K180 million, while receipts from BCL were K94 million in 
1974; in 1975/6, revenue was K219 million, while receipts 
from BCL were only K32 million in 1975. In 1979/80, the 
Company will again make a very significant contribution to 
total revenue. Fluctuations in BCL's tax payments do not have 
an equivalent effect on funds available to government, because 
a portion of revenues is retained in a Mineral Resources 
Stabilization Fund in years of high profit, and utilised when 
74 
profits are low. 
Has BCL engaged in transfer pricing? The Company sells 
its output on an 'arms length' basis, and so any profit 
transfer would result from over-charging for goods or services 
provided by affiliates. 
CRA provides a number of services to BCL, some directly 
and some through a wholly-owned subsidiary, MINENCO. A range 
of managerial, technical, and informational services is 
provided by CRA itself, for which it receives management fees 
based on the volume of work undertaken (rather than on a 
percentage of sales, for example). These fees do not appear 
excessive given the depth of CRA's involvement: from 1974 to 
1978 , for instance, they averaged K680,000 per annum. 
For an account of how the Fund operates, see N.V. Lam, 
Fiscal responses to export instability in Papua New Guinea, 
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research Discussion 
Paper No. 19 (Port Moresby, April 1978), pp. 12-16. 
^^ Information supplied by BCL. 
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MINENCO carries out design and construction activities 
for BCL, on an 'arms length' basis according to BCL's 
m a n a g e m e n t b u t provincial government officials suspect 
that MINENCO is used to channel profits out of Papua New 
Guinea.^^ This is very unlikely. MINENCO's profits are 
modest, amounting to A$202,000 in 1976 and A$925,000 in 1977, 
7 R 
for example. Since MINENCO carries out work for other 
companies^^ and since it would earn 'legitimate' profits on 
arms length trading with BCL, any element of hidden profit 
transfer would be insignificant. It seems certain that 
BCL/CRA would not risk incurring government displeasure for 
such paltry returns. 
Generation of employment and wage payments 
Table 20 gives details of national and expatriate 
employment over the period 1972-79. Expatriate employment 
fell substantially in 1976/7 as certain skilled positions were 
taken over by nationals, but has since remained constant at 
around 8 50. 
BCL's operations have also created significant indirect 
employment on Bougainville. Employment in factory operations 
increased by over 900 between 1968/9 and 1974/5, while the 
public sector staff requirement specifically created by tne 
^^ Interview with BCL's Executive Manager- Commercial, Panguna, 
16 June 1978. 
Interview with provincial government official, Awa, 20 June 
1978 . 
Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Limited, Annual Report, 1977, 
p. 50 . 
^^ ibid., p.23. 
Table 20 
Direct Employment Generated by BCL, 1972-1979 
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1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Nationals 
2,590 
2,915 
3,238 
3,094 
2,989 
3,063 
3,243 
3,314 
Expatriates 
878 
929 
983 
942 
858 
853 
855 
851 
Total 
3,468 
3,844 
4,221 
4,036 
3,847 
3,916 
4,098 
4,165 
Source: Information supplied by BCL 
Table 21 
BCL's Expenditure on National and Expatriate Wages and 
Salaries, 1969/1972 - 1978. (k million) 
1969/1972* 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Totals 
Nationals(A) 19.0 5.4 6.7 11.1 12.9 13.6 14.1 82.8 
Expatriates (B) 61.0 10.7 13.3 14.1 16.4 17.3 16.9 149.7 
Total 80.0 16.1 20.0 25.2 29.3 30.9 31.0 232.5 
Ratio of Average 
Expatriate to 
Average National 
Wages n.a. 6.2 6.5 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.5 5.1 
Source: Information provided by BCL; Table 20. 
Notes: * Much of this expenditure was actually made by BCL's contractors, 
n.a. Not available. 
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O f) 
copper project was apparently in excess of 1,000. The 
majority of BCL's domestic purchases of goods and services 
are made on Bougainville, and it is consequently unlikely 
that significant indirect employment has been created outside 
the region. 
The labour employed by BCL has been withdrawn from other 81 
uses, usually from agricultural production, and thus some 
opportunity costs have been incurred. However, the willingness 
of the individuals involved to accept wage employment indicates 
that the change of occupation has enabled them to increase 
their net incomes. 
Table 21 provides details of wage and salary payments by 
BCL, which have totalled K232.5 million over the period 1969-78, 
A disproportionate share of these payments has accrued to 
expatriates who have filled the most highly-skilled (and highly 
paid) positions; in 1973, for example, the ratio of average 
expatriate to average national incomes was 6.2. This ratio 
declined to 4.4 in 1976 as localisation proceeded, but has 
since remained unchanged, reflecting the constant level of 
expatriate employment. 
Payment of occupation fees and compensation payments 
Occupation fees have been received by villagers whose 
land is used for mining or ancillary activities, while 
M.L. Treadgold, The Regional Economy of Bougainville, p.25, 
Table 5, p. 27. 
^^ Some labour was drawn from among the unemployed in Port 
Moresby, but their withdrawal from the job market apparently -
induced migration of an equivalent number of job seekers from 
rural areas to Port Moresby, as tne city's unemployment rate 
remained constant during the period under review. Interview 
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compensation payments have been made to individuals and 
villages in lieu of crop and other damage caused by such 
activities- Over the period 1968-74, some 1,500 individuals 
from 62 villages in South-Central Bougainville received a 
total of K1.8 million from these sources,^^ but only a small 
percentage of those people receive a regular income from 
8 3 BCL. From 1975 to 1978, BCL expended a further K3.3 
million on compensation, occupation fees, and village 
84 relocation. 
It is difficult to analyse the indirect economic impact 
of these incomes since little is known about how they are 
spent. Villagers who have lost garden land clearly purchase 
food, much of it imported, but substantially larger amounts 
8 5 
have apparently been spent on motor vehicles. Little of 
the m.oney has found its way into business ventures which might 
provide villagers and their children with an alternative 
source of future income. As far as could be established only 
one signficant venture (a taxi firm) has been funded from 
compensation payments. However a substantial proportion of 
with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 6 June 1980, 
8 2 
Individual payments varied greatly, but about 60 per cent 
were under KlOO while 10 per cent were above Kl,000. A. Mamak 
and R. Bedford, Compensating for Development, p. 58. 
^^ ibid., p. 63. 
O A 
Information supplied by BCL. Relocation work was largely 
completed by 1974 and so this item probably accounts for only 
a small proportion of the total. 
o c 
A. Mamak and R. Beford, Compensating for Development, p.86. 
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such payments have apparently been saved,^^ and if this 
venture is successful other enterprises may be established. 
Creation of additional economic activity through linkage 
development 
Backward Linkage: BCL purchases only a small proportion 
of its goods and services in Papua New Guinea, and consequently 
backward linkage has generally been weak. Local purchases of 
industrial goods are practically non-existent, for two 
reasons. First, Papua New Guinea does not produce many of the 
inputs used by BCL (for example mining equipment, fuel oil, 
tyres, chemicals). Second, local businesses which might 
supply BCL are usually structured to sell small quantities 
of goods at high profit margins on the domestic market. They 
can rarely match the extremely competitive prices which 
8 7 foreign producers offer BCL on large bulk orders. However 
BCL believes that individual domestic firms have the potential 
8 8 to compete successfully. The Company's expenditures do 
support some local service industries, for example motor 
8 9 
repairs, electrical equipment repairs, and trucking. 
BCL's purchases of agricultural goods have had a major 
impact on Bougainville. Particularly important are purchases 
ibid., p. 87. 
p 7 
Interview with BCL's Chief Purchasing Officer, Panguna, 
15 June 1978 . 
^^ Two specific areas mentioned were timber and wood products, 
and printing. Interview with BCL's Chief Purchasing Officer, 
Panguna, 15 June 1978. 
Service industries of this type account for much of the 
increase in factory employment noted above. 
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of fruit and vegetables, which averaged some K250,000 per 
annum in 1976-78; in addition, about K100,000 is spent 
annually on fish and p o u l t r y . I t has been estimated that 
vegetable farming provides villagers with incomes which are 
from 35 to 200 per cent above those from other cash crops, 
depending on the intensity of farming and the crop used as a 
• . 9 1 
basis of comparison. 
Considerable scope apparently exists for expanding 
domestic purchases of agricultural goods, for example fish, 
poultry, and particularly beef. BCL does buy beef from main-
land areas, but its demand far exceeds the available supply. 
Some fish is supplied by small-scale operators, but facilities 
to catch, store and transport fish in large quantities are 92 
not available locally. 
Clearly some opportunities exist for expanding backward 
linkage; the obstacles to their development do not arise 
from any reluctance on BCL's part to purchase locally, but 
rather from bottlenecks in supply. The Company has contributed 
substantially to the removal of supply bottlenecks on 
Bougainville. It set up Panguna Development Pty. Ltd. to 
assist in the establishment of large-scale enterprises, and 
formed a Business Advisory Service which has helped set up 93 small-scale trucking, sawmilling and fishing businesses. 
90 Information supplied by BCL. 
^^ W.D. Scott and Company Pty. Ltd, A Study of the Impact of 
the Bougainville Copper Project on the Economy and Society of 
Papua New Guinea, (Unpublished, Sydney, January 1973), 3/39. 
^^ Interview with BCL's Catering Manager, Panguna, 19 June 197: 
^^ W.D. Scott and Company Pty. Ltd., op.cit., 3/56, 3/59. 
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It also sponsors agricultural extension officers who advise 
villagers on animal husbandry and cash-crop farming.^^ Action 
is required on a national basis if opportunities for cattle-
raising and fishing are to be fully exploited, and it can only 
be taken as part of a broader government strategy aimed at 
enhancing Papua New Guinea's self-sufficiency in food 
9 5 production. 
Forward Linkage: Since BCL's exports are entirely in 
concentrate form, forward linkage is absent. The national 
government has not yet decided whether it wishes to have 
mineral processing conducted locally. It is concerned with 
the environmental impact, suspects that little additional 
government revenue would be generated, and realises that 
incomes accruing to nationals would not be substantial because 
of the high capital intensity of mineral processing and 
because much of the necessary capital, equipment, operational 
stores and skilled labour would be imported. It is currently 
96 gathering additional information on the matter. 
94 
Annual Report^ 1976, p. 21. 
95 
Food represents a major import item for PNG, amounting to 
20 per cent of total imports in 1975. The national government 
is engaged in a programme of import substitution in this area, 
and considerable emphasis has been placed on expansion of 
livestock production. 
^^ Interview with Assistant Secretary, General Economic Policy 
Division, Department of Finance, Port Moresby, 8 June 1978; 
interview with Assistant Secretary, Office of Minerals and Energy, 
Port Moresby, 27 June 1978. Also relevant are the prospects for 
hydro-electric power generation on the Purari river and for 
development of additional copper-mining capacity-
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In 1975 BCL fulfilled its commitment under the 1974 
Agreement, commissioning Bechtel Corporation to examine the 
feasibility of constructing a smelter. Bechtel concluded that 
the project would be uneconomic; its findings were updated in 
97 
1977, and the outcome was even more unfavourable. BCL does 
not want to construct a smelter for reasons not directly 
related to the financial viability of such an undertaking. 
It is reluctant to make an investment on the scale required 
in Papua New Guinea, partly because it perceives the political 
climate as uncertain, partly because CRA and RTZ have adopted a 
policy of spreading their investments over a wide range of 
projects, and are reluctant to commit additional funds to an 
operation associated with BCL. In addition, BCL now enjoys a 
competitive advantage in marketing its output because of the 
very high quality of its concentrates, an advantage which would 9 8 
be lost if it sold copper metal. It is therefore possible 
that the Company accepted very pessimistic cost estimates to 
make the project look unattractive. 
Until the national government adopts a position on the 
issue of local processing, it is not possible to assess the 
implications of BCL's attitude. 
Net foreign exchange receipts 
BCL has made a major contribution to Papua New Guinea's 
export income, accounting for 47 per cent of the value of total 
exports over the period 1972/3 -December 1977. Table 22 
^^ Interview with BCL's Planning Accountant, Panguna, 21 June 
1978 . 
interview with BCL's Treasurer, Panguna, 14 June 1978. 
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attempts to calculate the net foreign exchange inflow resulting 
from its operations. Positive effects result from net sales 
Q Q 
revenue and from imports of capital, negative effects from 
a variety of factors. Precise information is available 
concerning the most important of these (loan repayments, 
interest and dividend payments, imports of goods and services) , 
while others (expatriate employees' remittances, induced 
imports) have been estimated on a basis outlined in the notes 
to Table 22. Table 22 indicates that net foreign exchange 
inflow amounted to only 26.4 per cent of gross foreign exchange 
inflows over the period 1972-78. 
In addition, BCL exerted a major influence on the balance 
of payments during the construction period (1969 - April 
when foreign currency to the value of K3 56 million was expended. 
The domestic content of local purchases amounted to about 
K16 million, while Kl9 million was paid to indigenous employees. 
K61 million was paid to expatriate employees, indicating 
remittances of about K30 million and local expenditures of the 
q q 
Part of BCL's foreign exchange receipts does not enter Papua 
New Guinea since it is permitted to maintain external cash 
reserves to meet its short-term liabilities. For the sake of 
simplicity it is assumed that all foreign currency does enter 
the country, and all liabilities which are met in foreign 
currency are then assigned as currency inflows. 
It is not possible to entirely separate the construction 
and operational phases, since construction continued after 
production commenced. However care has been taken to ensure that 
items included in Table 22 are excluded when dealing with the 
construction period. 
^^^ These figures were obtained from R.F. Mikesell, Foreign 
Investment in Copper Miningp. 102. 
N e t F o r e i g n E x c h a n g e I n f l o w f r o m 
T a b l e 2 2 
t h e B o u g a i n v i l l e Mine, 1972 -1978 (K' 000's) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Totals 
Net Sales Revenue 9 9 , 6 9 5 2 4 9 , 0 4 8 2 7 9 , 8 2 5 1 8 4 , 7 5 4 2 0 5 , 3 4 9 2 0 0 , 5 7 8 2 2 3 , 2 8 2 1 , 4 3 8 , 5 3 1 
Capital Imports* 36 ,300 1 4 , 9 4 6 - - 1 3 , 1 2 0 1 3 , 1 2 0 1 5 , 8 0 0 1 0 8 , 2 6 6 
Total Inflow(A) 131 ,995 2 6 3 , 9 9 4 2 7 9 , 8 2 5 184 ,754 2 1 8 , 4 6 9 2 2 8 , 6 7 8 2 3 9 , 0 8 2 1 , 5 4 6 , 7 9 7 
Debt Repayment 6 8 , 0 0 2 3 6 , 9 0 4 1 8 , 4 6 2 1 9 , 5 4 4 2 5 , 6 3 5 6 4 , 6 0 0 2 3 3 , 1 4 7 
Interest Charges 2 2 , 5 6 2 1 7 , 4 9 3 1 3 , 2 0 5 11 ,469 1 1 , 0 6 0 1 1 , 6 6 1 6 , 0 9 3 9 3 , 5 4 3 
Dividends Paid Overseas - 5 4 , 4 5 3 4 9 , 1 8 7 1 7 , 8 8 7 1 7 , 8 8 7 1 4 , 3 0 9 2 6 , 8 2 9 1 8 0 , 5 5 2 
Expatriates' Remittances** 2 , 8 0 0 5 , 4 0 0 6 , 7 0 0 7 , 1 0 0 8 . 2 0 0 8 , 7 0 0 8 , 5 0 0 4 7 , 4 0 0 
Imported Goods and Services 6 0 , 4 0 0 5 2 , 7 0 0 5 6 , 3 0 0 8 1 , 6 0 0 9 8 , 6 0 0 1 0 3 , 6 0 0 1 0 4 , 6 0 0 5 5 7 , 8 0 0 
Import Content of Domestic 
Purchases of Goods and 
Services*** 400 4 , 0 0 0 3 , 8 0 0 3 , 4 0 0 4 , 1 0 0 6 , 2 0 0 3 , 4 0 0 2 5 , 3 0 0 
Total Outflow(B) 86 ,162 202 ,048 166 ,096 139 ,918 1 5 9 , 3 9 1 1 7 0 , 1 0 5 2 1 4 , 0 2 2 1 , 1 3 7 , 7 4 2 
Net Balance of Payments 
Effects = (A) - (B) 45 ,833 6 1 , 9 4 6 113 ,729 4 4 , 8 3 6 5 9 , 0 7 8 5 8 , 5 7 3 2 5 , 0 6 0 + 4 0 9 , 0 5 5 
- As % of (A) 3 4 . 7 2 3 . 5 4 0 . 6 24 . 3 2 7 . 0 2 5 . 6 1 0 . 5 + 2 6 . 4 
Source: Table 18; information supplied by BCL. 
Notes: * Capital imports are attributed to the year in which the relevant loans were drawn down. 
** It is not known precisely what proportion of expatriate wages and salaries are remitted. BCL estimates that 
salaried staff remit as much as 75 per cent of their incomes, while wage earners probably remit a somewhat lower 
proportion. It has been assumed that 50 per cent of all expatriate income is remitted, a figure which is very 
unlikely to overestimate the outflow. 
*** Expenditure on domestic goods and services was calculated by subtracting expenditure on imported goods and 
services, wage and salary payments, and customs duties from the sum of operating costs and capital expenditure. 
Import content of expenditure on domestic goods and services was taken to be 40 per cent, as calculated by W.D. 
Scott and Company Pty. Ltd., -4 Study of the Impact of the Bougainville Copper Project on the Economy and Society 
of Papua New Guinea, (unpublished, Sydney, January 1973), Appendix 5A - 10. 
+ The very low figures for 1978 reflect BCL's decision to make substantial loan repayments from accumulated 
reserves. 
00 
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102 same amount. Taxes amounted to K19 million during the 
main phase of construction (1970-71),^^^ indicating total net 
foreign exchange inflow of K84 million. 
Gross foreign exchange inflow in 1969-78 was therefore 
Kl,902,797 , 000, of which it is estimated that K493,055,000 or 
25.9 per cent represented net foreign exchange inflow. 
In conjunction with Table 19, these figures illustrate 
the central role of payments to government in generating 
positive balance of payments effects. Over the period 1969-78, 
government revenue was K296.3 million, equal to 60.0 per cent 
of net foreign exchange inflow. The remainder was accounted 
for by wage and salary payments (32 per cent) and purchases of 
104 domestic goods and services (8 per cent). 
Foreign exchange outflows were accounted for by direct 
imports (49 per cent) loan repayments (21 per cent), dividends 
(16 per cent), interest payments (8 per cent) expatriates' 
remittances (4 per cent), and induced imports (2 per cent).^°^ 
Provision of scarce capital resources 
In the context of the domestic economy, the capital 
requirements of the Panguna project have been enormous. This 
is illustrated by the fact that BCL's capital expenditure 
amounted to nearly twice the sum of those by all other private 106 
concerns and by government over the period 1969-72. Finance 
^^^ See the notes to Table 22. 
W.D. Scott and Company Pty. Ltd., op,cit., Appendix 5A-19. 
Derived from Tables 21 and 22. 
^^^ Derived from Tables 18 and 22. 
Over this period new capital expenditure by private concerns 
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had to be sought abroad, and as mentioned above RTZ's knowledge 
of and links with the international banking system played an 
important part in ensuring that it would be forthcoming. 
Provision of technology, and technical and other skills 
The technology utilised in exploiting low-grade copper 
deposits of the Panguna type was well established and could 
probably have been obtained without direct foreign investment. 
However, Papua New Guinea was almost totally lacking in the 
skills required to apply that technology in developing and 
operating a major mining project. It also lacked the 
entrepreneurial expertise to marshall the other resources 
needed for large-scale mineral development. 
BCL has filled its requirements for skilled personnel by 
recruiting expatriates and by establishing comprehensive 
training programme for its national employees. BCL's role in 
ensuring the availability of skilled expatriates is especially 
important at the senior technical and executive levels, since 
it will be some time before suitably-qualified nationals are 
available to fill these positions. It is difficult for 
companies operating in LDC's to attract and retain highly-
qualified expatriates, but the efficiency of BCL's operations 
has not been affected by this problem. The Company's position 
other than BCL totalled K103 million while that by government 
amounted to K96 million. BCL's totalled K360 million. Figures 
are derived from PNG Bureau of Statistics, Capital Expend^ture 
by Private Businessea, Port Moresby, various issues; and 
P. Hastings, op.cit.. Appendix, Table v. 
See the comments on p.221-3 concerning Zambia's difficulties 
in this regard. 
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as part of a large international mining organisation is 
probably important in this regard — prospective employees know 
that they would enjoy security of employment if operations 
ceased at Panguna or if they found conditions on Bougainville 
unacceptable, 
BCL's training programme is based on an apprenticeship 
scheme and on a scholarship programme which funds students 
attending UPNG and other colleges. The programme causes an 
impact beyond the Panguna project itself. Turnover among 
employees is high (trainees do not bond themselves to work for 
BCL), and the Company must train more workers than it will 
employ at any one time. Consequently the supply of skilled 
labour to the rest of the economy is enhanced. 
Over the period 1968-77, 79 BCL-sponsored university 
students graduated and of these 33 either did not join BCL or 
109 
have since terminated their employment. During the years 
1970-78, 130 skilled tradesmen (mainly mechanics, welders, 
heavy equipment fitters, plumbers and carpenters) left the 
C o m p a n y t o place this figure in perspective, Papua New 
Guinea's total annual output of skilled tradesmen was about 300 
in the early 1970s. Substantial numbers of other skilled and of 
in fact turnover among expatriate staff is high (about 25 
per cent in 1977/8, according to BCL). No breakdown of this 
figure is available, but my impression is that turnover is 
lower among senior technical and professional staff. In any 
case, BCL does not face difficulties in finding high-calibre 
replacement staff, and this is the important point. 
10 9 
Information supplied by BCL. 
Annual Report, 1978, p.15. 
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semi-skilled workers have also terminated their employment.^^^ 
Not all of those who leave BCL remain in the wage-earning 
workforce: a proportion return to their villages to open 
trade stores or develop family land, and some of these do not 
utilise the skills they have acquired. On the other hand 
certain trades (motor mechanic, carpenter, fitter) could be 
useful in the conduct of small businesses and in village 
development projects. Some skilled workers do remain in the 
wage-earning workface, as apparently do nearly all graduates, 
and since both categories are in short supply in Papua New 
Guinea, BCL's contribution is clearly a valuable one. 
BCL's training effort has generally attracted favourable 
comment,^^^ but the Company's Training Manager feels that it 
is unsatisfactory, particularly in the very important area of 
on-the-job training. In his view, expatriate staff lack any 
interest in passing on their skills since they would be 
'training themselves out of a job'. He claims that BCL is 
partly responsible for this situation because it fails to 
systematically monitor the progress of apprentices to ensure 
that skills are in fact being imparted, and he argues that 
113 
localisation will be slow until the problem is overcome. 
This argument seems to find support in the absence of any 
^^^ In 1974/5, for example, 449 skilled workers and 948 semi-
skilled workers left the Company. The figure for skilled 
workers would include the tradesmen who terminated during these 
years. Information supplied by BCL. 
^^^ See, for example, R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in 
Copper Mining, p. 118. 
^^^ interview with BCL's Training Manager, Panguna, 16 June 
1978 . 
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114 decline in expatriate employment over the last four years. 
Vigorous action by the Company might well cause dissatisfaction 
among expatriate staff, and BCL's lack of initiative may 
reflect its unwillingness to risk a confrontation. 
It is unlikely that its foreign nature is responsible for 
any such attitude on BCL's part. The Company's primary concern 
is to maintain efficiency, and at present efficiency depends 
on a high degree of commitment from expatriate workers. BCL 
thus faces a dilemma. While expatriates are needed, issue 
will not be taken with them on the question of training, but 
until training is improved expatriates will be needed. This 
dilemma faces other mining industries which depend on 
expatriate labour, and it is a dilemma which continued to face 
Zambia, for example, after foreign mining companies had been 
nationalised.^^^ Its basic cause lies in the character of 
the national workforce when mining commences. 
Provision of infrastructure 
The infrastructure provided by BCL has had significant 
'spin-off effects, particularly by facilitating movement of 
goods into and out of the region. By giving villagers in the 
vicinity of the mine and in Southwest Bougainville access to 
port of Kieta,^^^ the construction of the Panguna-Kieta road 
114 
See above, p.4 77. 
^^^ See p. 248. ^^^ BCL helped construct a road which links Southwest 
Bougainville with the Jaba-Panguna-Kieta road system. See M.W, 
Ward, Eoad and Development in Southwest Bouga%nv%lle, New 
Guinea Research Bulletin No.62, (The Australian National 
University, 1975), pp. 128-9. 
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has substantially lowered transport costs for export crops 
and for inwards shipment of general c a r g o e s . L o c a l people 
have increased their incomes, and will do so again at a later 
date since these improvements have encouraged additional 
118 
plantings of tree-crops. The new roads will also benefit 
the nascent cattle-breeding industry in Southwest Bougainville 
by facilitating stock movement. 
Part of mine infrastructure has been provided by the 
government. Detailed information is not available regarding 
the cost of providing services to BCL or the charges made for 
them, but the government apparently suffers a slight net loss 
^u • • • 119 from their provision. 
Absorption of domestic resources 
BCL's operations have absorbed significant amounts of 
agricultural land and of labour on Bougainville. Cash crop 
production and subsistence farming have been adversely affected 
by the resumption of the Arawa plantation and of other areas, 
and by withdrawal of labour.^^^ There is no agreement as to 
what the effects of labour withdrawal will be in the longer 
117 0-7 ibid., p. 37. 
^^^ Interview with Provisional Government official, Arawa, 20 
June 1978. 
^^^ Interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October 1979. 
Sales of cocoa and copra by the Arawa plantation alone were 
estimated at A$500,000 in 1969. 
^^^ For a detailed analysis of the impact of labour withdrawal 
on village occupations and cash cropping, see T.K. Moulik, 
Bougainville in Transition, Development Studies Centre Monograph 
No. 7, (The Australian National University, Canberra, 1977), 
pp. 36-8. 
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term. Some claim that a permanent loss of agricultural skills, 
122 
and so of production, will occur, but it is possible that 
areas now abandoned or under-utilised will again be fully 
exploited as Bougainville's population grows. 
Impact on consumption patterns 
BCL's presence has influenced consumption patterns on 
Bougainville in a number of ways. Villagers in the vicinity 
of the mine must now purchase much of their food requirements, 
previously met by subsistence farming. A substantial number 
of people have obtained large cash incomes from compensation 
payments or wages, enabling them to greatly extend the range 
of items consumed. Many Bougainvillians have been influenced 
by their experiences in company messes, canteens and super-
markets, and by the 'demonstration effect' exercised by 
expatriate workers and their families. They feel new and 
different needs and have changed their consumption patterns in 
satisfying them.^^^ 
But in what sense, if any, are the new patterns of 
consumption inappropriate? First, they add to Papua New 
Guinea's imports (for example of tinned and fresh food, motor 
vehicles, luxury goods), not a welcome development for a country 
12 4 
which emphasises the need for self-sufficiency. Second, 
^^^ Interview with Provincial Government Planner, Arawa, 20 
June 1978. 
^^^ A. Mamak and R. Bedford, Compensating for Development, p.86. 
One of the government's 'Eight Aims' is to achieve 'a more 
self-reliant economy, less dependent for its needs on imported 
goods and services ..." 
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consumption of certain items, particularly alcohol, is having 
12 5 
socially disruptive effects. Third, Bougainvillians may 
not be able to meet their newly-acquired needs in the future. 
As mentioned above, many of those who received cash payments 
from BCL will not enjoy a regular income, and there is a 
clear danger that these payments, made to allow replacement of 
income-generating assets (land, forest, rivers), will be 
frittered away on consumer goods. More broadly, the Kieta 
district has become highly dependent on the mine and, if and 
when mining ceases, a serious regional problem may emerge as 
few alternative sources of wage employment are likely to be 
available. This difficulty could be overcome if wage payments 
and other current cash receipts were invested in assets which 
could provide incomes in the future, but the impact of the 
mine on consumption patterns reduces the likelihood of this 
happening. In a detailed survey carried out in 1973-74, Moulik 
found that villagers in the Kieta area had substantially higher 
consumption levels and lower savings levels than those in the 12 6 
Buin district, farther removed from the mine. Ironically, 
the Buin people have not lost their income-generating assets, 
and consequently have less need to save. 
Impact on domestic income distribution 
BCL's demand for labour has created upward pressure on 
wage rates for plantation workers on Bougainville, and so has 
^^^ By 1974 this problem was causing considerable concern in 
areas surrounding the mine, being repeatedly mentioned in 
meetings of rural councils and similar forums. A. Mamak and 
R. Bedford, Compensating for Development, p.86. 
126 .K. Moulik, op.cit., pp.62-3, 166-7. 
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redistributed income from expatriate planters to their 
127 
indigenous employees, a desirable outcome given the Somare 
government's policy priorities. However in another way BCL's 
presence skewed income distribution in favour of non-
nationals, since it brought large numbers of highly-paid 
expatriates to the country. The Company's demand for labour 
has been less significant on the national level; it may have 
exercised some upward pressure on general wage levels,^^^ 
but it would not be possible to identify the distributional 
effects of any such trend. 
It is unlikely that payment of high wages to mineworkers 
has exercised a significant 'demonstration effect', since the 
numbers involved are small (less than 0.9 per cent of wage 
earners) and since BCL's operations are geographically isolated 
However the high profits generated by BCL in 1973/4 were 
apparently an important factor behind successful political 
pressure for large increases in minimum wages and public 129 service salaries in 1974. 
BCL's operations have had a marked effect on regional 
income distribution. In 1966/7, domestic factor incomes per 
capita on Bougainville exceeded the average for the rest of 
Papua New Guinea by an estimated 9 per cent; by 1971/2, this 
^^^ This effect was particularly noticeable during the 
construction phase when some 6,700 nationals were employed at 
Panguna, but BCL's presence has continued to exercise an 
influence as demand for labour is maintained because of high 
turnover among its employees. 
^^^ R.F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in Copper Mining, p. 102. 
^^^ Interview with Ross Garnaut, Canberra, 23 October 1979. 
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figure had risen to 185 per cent.^^^ Since a high proportion 
of Bougainvillians living in rural areas remained heavily 
dependent on subsistence farming during these years, income 
accruing within the region was apparently much more unevenly 
distributed at the end of this period than at the beginning. 
The political impact 
No evidence was found that Papua New Guinea's leadership 
engaged in complicity with BCL, or that BCL, its parent 
companies or their home governments attempted to subvert 
domestic political processes in order to produce policy 
outcomes favourable to themselves. 
The Panguna development's impact on the secessionist 
movement has had important political implications. In the 
early 1970s secessionist sentiment waxed and waned with 
changing circumstances, but the underlying demand for some 
measure of autonomy gradually strengthened. That demand led 
to the establishment of a provincial government on Bougainville 
in 1974, and eventually to a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Bougainvillian politicians for what they called 
the Republic of the North Solomons in September 197 5. Their 
action faced Papua New Guinea with its most serious political 
crisis to date, but a compromise was eventually agreed between 
the national and provincial governments whereby the latter was 
granted a substantial degree of autonomy in financial and 
Derived from M.L. Treadgold, 'The Regional Economy of 
Bougainville', Table 8, p.35; Table 11, P.41. 
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administrative terms.^^^ 
What was BCL's role in these events? Its presence gave 
the initial impetus to the secessionist movement and allowed 
its leaders to present secession as a financially viable 
alternative, but of course its influence in this regard was 
132 
passive: it could not help having these effects. The 
Company's operations are vulnerable to sabotage,^^^ while its 
expatriate workforce is also in a vulnerable position. In 
order to protect the interests of its shareholders (one of 
whom is the national government) and to safeguard its employees, 
BCL has been careful not to antagonise the separatists. On 
the other hand, the Company realises that it must live with 
the national government, and that any support for secessionism 
might bring retaliation from Port Moresby. Its response has 
been to refrain from any active involvement in island politics-
BCL is certainly not in favour of secession, contrary to 134 
what many Bougainvillians believe. These people feel that 
the Company's economic and political position would be stronger 
For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the 
unilateral declaration of independence and of its aftermath, 
see J. Ballard, 'Policy-Making as Trauma: The Provincial 
Government Issue', to be published in J. Ballard (ed.), Policij 
Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972-77, (Queensland 
University Press, 1980) . 
^^^ Except to the extent that it was responsible for confron-
tations with local people during the exploration stage. 
^^^ Destruction of the concentrate pipeline or damage to the 
power station or water supply would interrupt production, 
possibly for an extended period of time. Not only would repairs 
have to be carried out but employees who had dispersed would 
have to be re-hired or replaced. 
^^^ A number of local people assured me that BCL offered active 
support to the secessionists in 1975/6. 
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within an independent Bougainville, and conclude that BCL must 
therefore want secession. Whatever the validity of this 
belief, BCL's management has no guarantee that Panguna would 
survive secession intact or that a vengeful national government 
might not later regain control, and it would hardly risk a 
profitable $500 million investment on the off-chance of 
improving its position. 
Mineral policy — a broader perspective 
The strategy of maximising mineral revenues for use in 
rural development is basic to Papua New Guinea's general 
mineral policy. The analysis of the Bougainville mine's 
economic impact indicates that the assumptions which underlie 
this strategy are correct. The direct economic impact is 
slight; employment is modest, linkage industries practically 
non-existent (with the exception of food crop cultivation on 
Bougainville), and the spin-off effects of mine infrastructure 
are highly localised. The direct impact which occurs does have 
undesirable features, particularly in that it encourages 
inappropriate consumption patterns and adversely affects 
regional income distribution. On the other hand, the 
Bougainville mine has generated substantial economic rents, a 
significant proportion of which have been captured by the 
national government. Thus maximisation of mineral revenues does 
appear to provide the most logical response. 
A policy of applying mineral revenues to rural development 
is clearly appropriate for a country whose population is 
predominantly rural and will be so for the foreseeable future, 
and in which allocation of resources has previously been heavily 
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weighted in favour of the urban sector. However one important 
question does arise: can the government ensure that mineral 
revenues actually reach the rural sector? 
In the mid 1970s there were indications that a high 
proportion of such revenues might rather be absorbed by urban-
based civil servants and on urban-oriented services. Over the 
period 1971-75, for example, government expenditure on salaries 
and wages rose by 83 per cent, an increase due to expansion of 
the public service from 37,000 to 50,000 and a rise in average 
per capita public service earnings of 35 per cent.^^^ It is 
more difficult to trace developments in the allocation of 
expenditure on services between urban and rural areas, but over 
the years 1972-75 Departmental expenditure (much of which 
would be absorbed in maintaining the existing urban-oriented 
structure of services) increased by 212 per cent, while 
capital expenditure (which would include items crucial to rural 
development such as construction of roads, marketing and 
storage facilities, schools and hospitals) fell by 22 per 
^ 136 cent. 
Since 1976, the government has tried to come to grips with 
these problems. It is attempting to limit growth of the public 
^^^ Derived from World Bank, Papua New Guinea: Its Economic 
Situation and Prospects for Development, (Washington, 1978), 
Table 6.4, pp. 103, 104. 
Derived from ibid.. Table 6.4, p.103. These figures may be 
somewhat misleading, as the ran^. of current expenditure items 
financed by the PNG budget increased during these years (for 
example by the addition spending on defence and civil aviation 
was included). However the basic picture they present is 
correct. 
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137 service and has introduced an incomes policy designed to 
13 8 
prevent any real increase in public service incomes. It 
has also attempted to curb expenditure on existing services 
and infrastructure and has increased charges for government 
services, so that expenditure can be re-oriented towards 
capital investments in rural areas.^^^ 
Another important consideration relates to the existence 
of appropriate planning structures through which mineral 
revenues can be channelled into rural development projects. 
It has taken some time to establish such structures, but a 
Public Expenditure Plan is now in operation which identifies 
priority areas for resource allocation, and seeks to direct 140 
public expenditure accordingly. Mineral revenues will make 
a very substantial contribution towards financing that 
expenditure. 
The impact of public expenditures will depend to an 
important degree on the efficiency and honesty of national and 
provincial governments. If reasonably high standards can be 
^^^ It is planned that public service expansion should be limited 
to 1.4 per cent per year; expansion occurred at an annual 
average rate of 5.7 per cent in 1971-75. 
^^^ A wage freeze was in force from mid 1976 to March 1977; 
since then increases in public service incomes have been pegged 
to the inflation rate. 
^^^ In 1977, for example, expenditure on roads was double that 
of the previous year. However the government's critics point 
out that most of this expenditure was on highway construction 
rather than on the feeder roads so essential for rural 
development. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1977 Yearbook, 
(Hongkong, 1977), p. 272. 
PNG National Planning Office, The National Public 
Expenditure Plan 1979-82, (Port Moresby, 19 November 1978). 
Rural development projects which have been accorded priority are 
listed on pages 66-7 and 73 of the Plan. 
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reached and/or maintained, and if national government can 
contain the demands of the urban dwellers, expenditure of 
mineral revenues can play a significant role in fostering 
broadly-based economic and social development in rural areas. 
The analysis of the Bougainville mine's impact indicates that 
external diseconomies associated with mining (absorption of 
agricultural land and labour, effects on wage levels) are 
unlikely to adversely affect the chances of success; though 
significant on a regional basis, the impact of these 
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diseconomies is highly localised. 
Conclusion 
By the time operations commenced at Panguna, power was 
being transferred from the Australian Administration to Papua 
New Guineans. Their priorities dictated a change in approach 
to mineral development, and the very high profits enjoyed by 
BCL in 1973/4 provided the catalyst for rapid action. With 
the assistance of externally-recruited expertise, the Papua 
New Guinea government successfully renegotiated the Bougainville 
Copper Agreement. In doing so it obtained substantial 
immediate financial benefits, established a basis for an 
efficient mineral taxation system, and formulated soundly-
based general principles for future mineral development. 
Papua New Guinea's success in devising appropriate mineral 
policies reflects the influence of historical, political and 
Bougainville's island character has of course been important 
in this regard, but mineral prospects such as Ok Tedi, though 
situated on the mainland, are even more isolated than Panguna. 
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institutional factors which have shaped the policy-making 
process. In particular, the absence of strong racial 
antagonisms allowed a rational approach to the issues of 
foreign mining investment, and permitted the development of 
good working relationships between national politicians and 
expatriate advisers. The absence of domestic political or 
bureaucratic pressure groups with a vested interest in 
influencing the outcome also facilitated rational policy 
formulation. No evidence was found that complicity between 
local elites and foreign investors threatened the implementation 
of appropriate policies. 
Since 1972 the national government has acted to maximise 
the benefits of mineral development to Papua New Guinea and 
to Bougainville. Economic benefits have been substantially 
enhanced, and action has been taken to ensure that 
Bougainvillians enjoy financial benefits from the Panguna 
development and exercise greater control over mining activities 
which affect their island. This is in direct contrast to the 
situation which existed prior to 1972. In Papua New Guinea's 
case, the impact of mineral development has been determined 
primarily by the character of government rather than by the 
character of mining investment. 
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CONCLUSION 
What conclusions can be drawn from the case study 
material concerning the effects of foreign-financed mineral 
development and the nature of host country-foreign investor 
relations? I begin by summarising the empirical evidence 
yielded by the case studies, after which the implications 
of that evidence for the nature of the host country-foreign 
investor relationship are considered in the light of the 
discussion in Chapter One. 
Creation of national incomes. 
In all four cases, substantial profits were generated 
by foreign mining operations. The host countries differed 
considerably in the extent to which they captured those 
profits, and to which, they reconciled their need for revenue 
with the need for continued exploration and development. 
Ireland: Prior to 1973, Ireland sacrificed revenue 
unnecessarily in its attempts to attract foreign mining 
investment. Its failure to capture a higher proportion of 
economic rents occurred despite declining uncertainty as to 
geological and other conditions in Ireland and an increase 
in the expertise available to government. In attempting to 
overcome Ireland's general economic problems, Irish 
governments offered generous tax concessions to encourage 
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foreign investment. The attitude of Irish politicians 
towards foreign mining companies led them to accept claims 
that similar concessions were necessary to attract foreign 
mining investment. The companies involved apparently played 
some part in fostering those attitudes. 
The discovery of the Navan zinc/lead deposit in 1970 
substantially increased the Irish government's 'objective' 
bargaining power, and led to public pressure for 
termination of tax concessions to foreign mining companies. 
Those concessions were withdrawn, but bureaucratic 
decision-makers were able to negate substantially the 
effect of their withdrawal. Why the individuals involved 
acted in this way is uncertain; they apparently continued 
to hold the attitudes displayed by Irish governments in 
earlier years, while a determination to prevent what they 
saw as encroachment on their own powers may also have played 
a part. Their ability to act in this manner reflected 
divisions in the Irish government (caused by the continued 
adherence of some politicians to those same attitudes) and 
the secret nature of the bureaucratic processes involved. 
The Irish government's total 'take' from new mineral 
developments is also influenced by the level of its equity 
participation and by the level of royalties, both 
negotiated with the companies involved. In the negotiations 
with Tara Mines Limited, constitutional, political and 
bureaucratic constraints unrelated to the host country-
foreign investor relationship played a crucial role in 
weakening the government's bargaining position. 
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Zambia: In the mid and late 19 60s, the Zambian 
government captured a very high proportion of mining 
company profits, reducing the expected rate of return below 
that required to attract new investment. That rate was 
certainly high, reflecting the degree of risk attached by 
foreign mining companies to investment in Zambia. However, 
the government could have acted to reduce risk perceptions 
without sacrificing substantial amounts of revenue, 
particularly by changing the manner in which taxation was 
applied. This was done in 1970, but the new tax rate is 
substantially higher than the average over the period 19 6 4-7 0 
and, in conjunction with the requirement that the government 
have a 51 per cent 'carried' interest in all exploration 
ventures, its application will very probably deter 
exploration for, and development of, base metal deposits. 
Thus in attempting to meet its revenue requirements, 
Zambia has paid insufficient attention to the need for 
continued investment. To some extent, this failure 
reflected the urgency of those requirements and the absence 
of alternative ways of meeting them. It also reflected the 
influence of historical and political factors which militated 
against rational decision-making on issues involving foreign 
mining investment. 
Australia: During the period to 1972, Australian 
governments unnecessarily sacrificed revenue in their 
attempts to encourage foreign mining investment. This 
situation resulted from a number of factors. First, 
Australian authorities were not fully aware of the factors 
favouring Australia as a mineral investment location in 
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the post war period. This lack of awareness apparently 
reflected ignorance rather than any element of 'complicity': 
the factors involved were complex, varied, and occurred in 
different parts of the world, and consequently their 
implications for Australia were not grasped by policy-
makers. As a result, Australian authorities believed that 
mineral development would not occur if tax concessions 
were not granted. Second, Australian governments over-
estimated the likely extent of direct economic benefits 
from mineral development. The sacrifice of revenue 
consequently seemed worthwhile, and the direct benefits 
seemed sufficient reward for permitting exploitation of 
Australia's minerals. Another example of this general 
attitude has been the willingness to sacrifice revenue in 
order to encourage mineral processing in Australia. Third, 
competition between state governments for foreign mining 
investment apparently depressed royalty rates. 
The manner in which mining taxation is collected in 
Australia has significant drawbacks, resulting particularly 
from the application of unit and ad valorem royalties by 
state governments, but also from the charging of a flat 
rate of profits tax by the federal government. ^^ile the 
level of taxation was low, charging of such taxes was 
unlikely to have affected production or investment decisions 
significantly, but with increases in effective tax rates and 
as lower grade ores are exploited this situation may change, 
particularly if movements in costs and prices are 
unfavourable. The federal structures which underlie the 
state royalty system have played a crucial part in 
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militating against adoption of more efficient methods of 
taxation both by the States and the Commonwealth. 
Papua New Guinea: Papua New Guinea's colonial administrators 
failed to negotiate appropriate taxation arrangements for 
the Bougainville Copper project by omitting to provide for 
an unexpectedly favourable outcome. In this instance, lack 
of relevant expertise was an important factor, though it is 
possible that Australian administrators felt a community of 
interests with the foreign investors concerned, resulting 
in a failure to protect fully their own real interests and 
those of Papua New Guinea. 
Papua New Guinea's national governments have enjoyed 
considerable success in reconciling their revenue requirements 
with the need for continued investment and for efficient 
mineral exploitation. Substantial revenues were obtained as 
a result of the Bougainville renegotiation, while an 
efficient, generally applicable mineral taxation system has 
been designed which will obtain substantial revenues from 
profitable projects, but which is unlikely to deter mining 
investment or encourage inefficient working of minerals. 
Papua New Guinea's success in this regard resulted from the 
high degree of rationality which characterised decision-
making, itself reflecting historical and political factors, 
particularly the absence of strong racial antagonism and 
of domestic political or bureaucratic groups with an 
interest in influencing the outcome. 
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Generation of employment: In all cases, mining 
employrrient was small in relation to the value of output, 
reflecting the capital intensity of mining operations. No 
evidence was found that the mineral deposits involved 
could have been exploited in qualitatively different ways, 
and only in Zambia were economically-feasible mining methods 
sufficiently flexible to allow significant cross-
substitution between labour and capital. In this case it 
was argued that the profit-maximising factor combinations 
pursued by foreign mining companies were not necessarily 
inimical to Zambia's interests, but the Zambian government's 
failure to establish relevant policy priorities renders a 
more definite judgement difficult. 
In all four cases, wage payments to mineworkers were 
substantially above the national average, reflecting the 
high productivity of labour in a capital-intensive industry. 
In Papua New Guinea and Zambia very large wage differentials 
existed between expatriate and national mineworkers, and in 
the Zambian case those differentials exercised a major 
impact on wage levels in the monetary sector and on domestic 
income distribution (see below). 
Backward linkage: Substantial economies of scale are 
associated with production of many of the inputs utilised 
in modern mining operations. In addition, the total scale 
of backward linkage from mineral development is comparatively 
weak, as the Australian case illustrated. Consequently, 
mining operations can rarely of themselves provide the basis 
for establishment of new efficient manufacturing industries. 
Linkage usually occurs where the relevant industries are 
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already in existence, or where a high proportion of the 
fixed overhead costs associated with production of mining 
inputs can be met from established operations. In other 
words, the existing level of industrialisation in the host 
country is a crucial factor in determining the extent of 
linkage development. 
This is evidenced by the success of Australia (which 
also derived important economies of scale from the large 
size of its mining industry) and Ireland in taking advantage 
of the markets provided by mineral development. Papua New 
Guinea has been unable to do so, and while Zambia has 
established a wide range of supplying industries some have 
not achieved minimum economies of scale. It is not 
evident that the establishment of inefficient manufacturing 
industries will enhance the prospects for broadly-based 
economic development in Zambia. 
The foreign mining companies encountered in the case 
studies did display a tendency to purchase goods and services 
from suppliers of proven reliability, which frequently meant 
suppliers from their home countries. This led to conflict 
with host country authorities in Zambia, but for ideological 
and political rather than economic reasons: the Zambian 
government's aim of disengagement from Southern Africa was 
incompatible with continued reliance on suppliers in that 
area. In both Ireland and Australia, this tendency on the 
part of foreign mining companies was partly responsible for 
an initial lag in linkage development, which was, however, 
quickly overcome. Indeed at least some foreign companies 
operating in these countries have adopted a policy of 
favouring domestic producers. Their willingness to do so 
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reflects the ability of these producers to supply goods and 
services at competitive or near-competitive prices, but it 
should be noted that the Zambian companies also were 
generally willing to utilise domestic sources of goods and 
services where these were available, despite the cost 
disadvantages this sometimes entailed. 
It is important to remember that the companies 
encountered in this study generally did not themselves 
produce mining inputs. In addition, many of the 
subsidiaries were responsible for their own purchasing and 
did not utilise centralised purchasing agencies. 
Bougainville Copper Limited, for example, itself organises 
a comprehensive research programme aimed at identifying 
the most competitive source of the major inputs it utilises, 
and purchases goods and services accordingly.^ 
Forward Linkage: In each case study country situations 
were encountered in which foreign investors displayed a 
reluctance to undertake mineral processing. In Australia, 
Papua New Guinea and Zambia significant economic constraints 
militated against local processing and/or fabrication, but 
it is difficult to judge the extent to which their existence 
explained the reluctance to invest. In Zambia and Papua New 
Guinea perceptions of political risk and/or the corporate 
strategies of the investors concerned were certainly 
important. In neither case was clear evidence found that 
these factors resulted in failure to develop viable 
^ Interview with BCL's Chief Purchasing Officer, Panguna, 
15 June 1978. 
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opportunities for forward linkage, though the Zambian 
government had to act to ensure that an opportunity for 
domestic copper fabrication was grasped. 
In Ireland foreign smelting companies which supplied 
loan capital for mining projects acted to prevent construction 
of processing facilities in order to protect markets served 
by existing facilities. (The unwillingness of a number of 
aluminium companies to undertake processing in Australia was 
attributed to the same cause.) However, the foreign 
operator of one of the Irish mines was willing and indeed 
anxious to invest in processing. It should be noted that 
Ireland enjoyed considerable economio advantage as a 
location for processing, being close to major European 
markets and inside the EEC's tariff barriers. 
Provision of scarce resources through the investment 
process. 
Foreign investors have played a crucial role in 
supplying scarce risk capital in each of the case study 
countries. This continued to be the case in Zambia even 
after nationalisation? most of the capital involved was in 
loan form, but foreign equity capital has financed a high 
proportion of exploration expenditure since 1970, and it 
was argued that such capital will probably be used in future 
major base metal developments. 
In most cases the technology utilised in mineral 
development was widely available and could probably have 
been obtained without foreign direct investment; a notable 
exception involved technology associated with bauxite 
processing in Australia. However, in each case study country 
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foreign investors played a crucial role in providing the 
skills required to apply technology efficiently. In each 
case they also provided the entrepreneurial and 
organisational skills needed to assemble the other 
resources required for successful mineral development. 
In general little evidence was found that significant 
opportunities existed for varying the type of technology 
employed in mineral development. The only exception 
involved limited opportunities for varying the labour 
intensity of technology utilised in Zambia's copper mines, 
but as mentioned earlier the absence of clear policy 
priorities in this area makes it difficult to assess the 
appropriateness of the technology employed. 
Creation of external economies. 
The specialised nature of the processes involved, the 
secret nature of some of them and the general absence of 
domestic mining companies served to reduce the significance 
of technology 'spill-over' in the host countries. 
As regards diffusion of skills, the experience of the 
developing countries differed substantially from that of 
Ireland and Australia. In the latter diffusion occurred 
rapidly, with nationals replacing expatriates over a short 
period of time. Zambia and Papua New Guinea encountered major 
difficulties in the area of localisation, mainly because of 
a shortage of nationals with the education or training to 
receive skills and because of the unwillingness of some 
expatriate workers to pass on their expertise. 
As a result, Zambia and Papua New Guinea have had to 
attract and retain large numbers of expatriates over extended 
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periods of time. The links between foreign subsidiaries 
and their parent companies played an important role in 
allowing them to do this. Zambia has recently attempted to 
hire skilled personnel independently of the foreign 
companies, but has encountered serious difficulties in 
meeting its requirements, particularly at the middle and 
senior technical and managerial levels. Thus the difficulties 
encountered in localisation both reduce the contribution of 
the foreign investor to the host country's store of skilled 
personnel and prolong the foreign investor's role as a 
supplier of such personnel. 
In general, mine infrastructure did not facilitate 
emergence of new industries in the host countries. Thus 
its impact was largely determined by existing patterns of 
economic activity in mining areas, and its principal effect 
was to lower costs (particularly transport costs) or 
improve market access for established enterprises. The 
geographical location of mineral deposits in Australia, Papua 
New Guinea and Zambia meant that its impact in this regard 
was highly localised. 
Creation of external diseconomies. 
The operations of foreign mining companies and the 
presence of their expatriate staff affected consumption 
patterns in Papua New Guinea and Zambia in ways which imposed 
costs on those countries, or which threaten to do so. The 
remote situation of the Panguna mine has helped to localise 
its impact in this regard, but its effects on Bougainville 
itself have been substantial. In Zambia, the impact has 
been more widespread, reflecting the scale of mining activity, 
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its central geographical location, and the length of time 
over which it has occurred. 
Domestic resources were absorbed in each of the case 
study countries but the implications of resource 
absorption differed from case to case. In certain instances 
the resources had previously been idle (labour in 
Ireland). In others, resources were apparently used less 
efficiently in mining than they would have been in 
alternative uses (domestic equity capital mobilised by 
foreign mining companies in Australia). In Papua New Guinea 
and Zambia agricultural land and labour were absorbed, 
resulting in significant opportunity costs and to economic 
and social disruption on a local or regional basis. However 
the individuals involved were given an opportunity to 
enhance their incomes, while from a national perspective 
resources were probably used more productively by the 
foreign investors than they otherwise would have been. 
Foreign mining investment apparently did not exercise 
a significant effect on domestic income distribution in 
Australia or Ireland, It had a substantial impact on 
regional income distribution in Papua New Guinea, widening 
disparities in wealth between Bougainville and other parts 
of the country and within Bougainville itself. In Zambia, 
its effects were severe and deep-seated. For reasons 
explained in the case study, Zambian mineworkers received 
very large wage increases over the period 1964-1966. The 
direct effect of these increases was to redistribute income 
from foreign mining companies and the Zambian government to 
the mineworkers. Indirectly they reduced Zambia's capacity 
to expand urban employment, widened income disparities between 
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the rural and urban sectors, and lessened the government's 
ability to redistribute income in favour of the former. 
This in turn undermined the prospects for rural development. 
The situation was exacerbated by the Zambian government's 
failure to spell out and take account of the implications 
of its mineral policies for domestic income distribution. 
The political impact. 
Questions of government control over corporate 
decision-making played a central role in host country-foreign 
investor relations in the case study countries, with the 
exception of Papua New Guinea. It is possible to identify 
three distinct areas in which government sought to 
influence decisions or exercise control. The first involved 
what might be called 'strategic' decisions, relating, for 
example, to disposal of mine output, production levels, and 
investment policies. The second concerned operational 
decisions of a financial kind, and particularly pricing 
policies. A third area related to the actual conduct of 
mining operations, and involved issues such as grading and 
dilution policies. Issues relating to national economic 
management were generally not significant. Foreign-financed 
mineral development did create or help to create problems 
of economic management (for example through its impact on 
wage levels in Zambia and on the balance of payments in 
Australia), but these outcomes were not perceived by host 
country authorities as resulting from avoidable actions by 
the companies concerned. 
The question of control over production and investment 
decisions figured most prominently in Zambia, mainly because 
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of factors associated with, the structure of its mining 
industry. In Australia, Ireland and Papua New Guinea, many 
of the investment decisions taken during the 1950s and 
1960s were by companies contemplating investment in the 
country concerned for the first time. If the decision was 
negative, there was consequently little basis on which host 
country authorities could attempt to exercise influence. 
In Zambia, investment decisions were mainly being taken by 
operators of existing mines, which gave the Zambian 
government significant scope to exert influence. 
In addition, Australia, Ireland and Papua New Guinea 
followed a policy of enoouvaging favourable investment 
decisions, usually by granting tax concessions. Since there 
were then few profitable mines operating in these 
countries, little immediate sacrifice of revenue was 
involved and, since policy-makers generally believed that 
mineral development would not occur without the concessions, 
any future sacrifice was perceived as hypothetical. In 
Zambia, the companies concerned were generating substantial 
profits, and tax concessions would represent an immediate 
and real sacrifice of revenue. 
Finally, many of the companies operating in Australia, 
Ireland and Papua New Guinea were increasing their market 
shares or maintaining their shares of rapidly-expanding 
markets. Considerable expansion of capacity was 
consequently occurring, which seemed to justify the tax 
concessions, concessions which in turn encouraged further 
expansion (a point made in relation to Australia by the 
'Fitzgerald Report'). The companies in Zambia, on the other 
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hand, v;ere apparently content with their market shares 
2 
and indeed were willing to see those shares decline. 
It is not possible to state conclusively why AAC and 
RST were not attempting to expand output in Zambia. Changes 
in relative production costs and the desire to diversify 
the geographical spread of its investment may have motivated 
AAC, which did expand its copper interests in Botswana, 
Canada and Mauritania during the 1960s.^ RST did not follow 
4 
a similar course, but it was in a weaker position to do so, 
and it may be significant that the expansion of Zambian 
capacity which did occur over the period 1964-69 was entirely 
due to RST.^ Concern with over-supply in the copper market 
was certainly an important factor for both companies - they 
were earning a comfortable return at prevailing prices, and 
feared that increased production would lead to a decline in 
prices. Both also perceived Zambia's political situation 
as highly unstable. 
The Zambian experience seems to support Norman Girvan's 
contention that the investment and production decisions of 
the foreign investor will eventually come into conflict with 
the host country's interests. However, three points should 
^ Between 1964 and 1970 Zambia's share of world copper 
production fell from 13.0 per cent to 10.7 per cent. Zamb^a 
Mining Yearbook, 1972, p.19. 
^ AAC, Annual Report, 1976^ pp. 78-81. 
By the 1960s RST' s mining interests were almost exclusively 
confined to Zambia, and it was consequently less likely than 
the widely-diversified AAC to become aware of,or be in a 
position to grasp, favourable investment opportunities. 
^ See above, p. 179, n. 73. 
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be made here. First, it is not obvious that a strategy 
of restricting production in order to maintain prices was 
necessarily contrary to Zambia's interests. If its 
intention was to use mineral revenues to finance rural and 
other non-mining development, price maintenance might be a 
more important consideration than achieving increased 
production,and so higher employment and export receipts. 
It should also be remembered that the net foreign exchange 
inflow from mining operations was in any case highly 
sensitive to price fluctuations. 
Two factors explain the Zambian government's 
unwillingness to consider such a strategy. First, it was 
aware that it alone could not effectively maintain prices, 
and believed that other copper producers would expand 
regardless. While this belief was probably well-founded, 
it does not alter the fact that corporate and national 
interests may not have been in conflict. Secondly, it had 
not established clear priorities in relation to the role 
which mineral development was expected to play, and 
consequently had not decided whether its priority J^as price-
maintenance or expansion of production. Indeed, it had not 
even recognised that the two might be incompatible. 
A second point is that corporate behaviour was partly 
determined by the Zajnbian government's policies. Whatever 
the reason for the reluctance of AAC and RST to invest in 
new capacity, the actions of the Zambian government certainly 
^ Exports receipts would be higher where the impact of 
increase on the larger volume of exports was sufficient to 
outweigh that of the lower unit price. 
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reinforced it, as is evident from the fact that planned 
capacity expansions were abandoned after the failure to 
resolve the royalty issue.^ Thirdly, a host country need 
not forgo substantial amounts of revenue from profitable 
mining projects in devising taxation arrangements likely to 
encourage favourable investment decisions, as the Papua New 
Guinea case demonstrated. 
The Zambian government believed that production would 
not expand until it established control over the copper 
industry, which it attempted to do through the 19 6 9 Take-over 
This action added substantially to the reluctance of AAC and 
RST to invest in Zambia, while the arrangements it 
negotiated did not give the government the control it 
sought. This failure was due to the timing of the Take-over, 
which reflected short-term political considerations, and to 
historical and institutional factors which affected the 
quality of advice the government received and the quality of 
decision-making generally. It led to the redemption of the 
ZIMCO bonds in 1973, but this initiative did not give the 
government full control, because it failed to carry through 
the strategy for eliminating the minority shareholders' 
monopoly of technical expertise. Once again, the reasons 
for this failure involved political processes unrelated to 
the host country-foreign investor relationship. 
The attempts to gain control of the copper industry 
imposed substantial costs on Zambia, both in financial terms 
See above, p.173. 
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and as a result of the loss of technical and managerial 
skills which accompanied the partial withdrawal of foreign 
investment. 
Pricing policies were an important issue in Ireland, 
Australia and Zambia, though it was argued that, with the 
exception of a small number of companies in Australia, the 
activities of the foreign investors involved did not in 
fact warrant concern. The situation in Ireland was 
exceptional in that the government was concerned primarily 
with the pricing policies of multi-national oil companies, 
and felt it had to establish as a general principle its right 
of access to relevant corporate information. It was 
concluded that its negotiation of a minority shareholding 
in the enterprises involved, and of provisions relating to 
access to information, placed it in a strong position in this 
regard. 
Australia's Labor government over-estimated the degree 
to which pricing policies inimical to Australia's interests 
were being practised, though some aluminium companies 
certainly v;ere engaged in transfer pricing, and fragmentation 
among mineral exporters did sometimes exacerbate the impact 
of adverse market conditions on prices. It was argued that 
Australia could do little, acting alone, to prevent 
transfer pricing at a cost commensurate with the potential 
benefits, other than to apply relevant legislative controls 
as strictly as possible. As regards fragmentation among 
exporters, it is by no means evident that the foreign nature 
of the companies concerned v^ as the source of the problem. 
In general, these companies had no connections with their 
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customers, and themselves stood to lose by any failure to 
maximise prices. It is unlikely that Australian-owned 
companies would have been better able to resist the superior 
bargaining power of monopsonistic buyers. 
Concern with obtaining control over the technical 
aspects of mining operations was largely confined to 
Zambia. The Zambian government attempted to break the 
foreign investors' monopoly of technical expertise by 
establishing monitoring units designed to implement 
selective checks on mining operations and on 'technical' 
aspects of the decision-making process, but it followed 
this course only briefly. The reasons for its abandonment 
related primarily to political processes unconnected to the 
host country-foreign investor relationship. 
It should be noted that the need for host country 
control over mining operations is influenced by government 
policies. In particular, taxation structures can have an 
important bearing in that they can either encourage or 
discourage efficient mineral exploitation. Thus, for example, 
the application by the Zambian government of substantial 
unit royalties to copper production encouraged the high-
grading perceived as one factor which rendered government 
intervention necessary. 
In general, neither foreign mining companies nor their 
home countries attempted to subvert political processes in 
the host countries examined; only in Ireland was evidence 
found that foreign mining companies had influenced these 
processes so as to produce outcomes favourable to themselves. 
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II 
Three general points emerge from this summary. 
First, foreign-owned mining companies are not all alike, 
and the differences between them have very important 
implications for the way in which foreign mining investment 
affects a host country. The work of Moran and Girvan, for 
example, is based on a very specific model of corporate 
behaviour. In this model, the typical company is vertically 
integrated to a high degree, smelting and refining its mine 
output and using all or most of it in its own semi-
fabricating and fabricating plants. Mineral processing 
and/or fabrication is usually carried on in the home country 
to serve domestic markets. Functions such as purchasing 
are highly centralised, as is decision-making, and inputs 
utilised in mining are frequently obtained from within the 
multi-national organisation. It is a model based on largely 
North American copper and aluminium companies which exploit 
minerals in South America and the Caribbean, usually for 
consumption in their home countries. 
Some of the foreign mining companies encountered in this 
study displayed certain of these traits (particularly 
aluminium companies in Australia), but generally they have 
not corresponded to the model described above. They have 
typically not been vertically integrated beyond the refining 
stage, and have disposed of their output to independent 
smelters or fabricators. What processing they do carry out 
is usually performed in the host country. They exercise a 
substantial degree of autonomy in their purchasing policies. 
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and usually do not purchase significant quantities of 
mining inputs from associated companies. Reflecting these 
characteristics, they generally do not engage in transfer 
pricing, they base investment decisions, including those 
relating to m i n e r a l processing, on 'normal' investment 
criteria (which include perceptions of risk in the host 
country), and they are generally willing to utilise 
domestic sources of goods and services. 
The nature of the firms encountered reflected the 
motivation of parent companies in undertaking foreign 
investments and the industry structures within which they 
operated. ftost parent companies were motivated by a desire 
to apply capital and skills profitably in exploiting minerals 
for sale outside their home countries, a fact reflected in 
their organisational structures, which typically consisted 
of a number of self-contained units, each expected to 
generate a profit independently of the others. Outside North 
America, the international copper, lead and zinc industries 
within which many of the companies operated are characterised 
by a relatively low degree of concentration and of vertical 
integration. 
Second, 'objective' factors in the host country play a 
very important part in determining the impact of foreign 
mining investment. The existing level of industrialisation 
influences the prospects for backward linkage, proximity to 
markets for m e t a l goods and other factors of a similar kind 
influence the prospects for forward linkage, the nature of 
the national workforce determines the degree to which 
diffusion of skills can occur, and existing patterns of 
economic activity influence the impact of mine infrastructure, 
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Third, political processes affect the impact of foreign 
mining investment in a very wide variety of ways, many of 
which are not recognised even by authors such as Moran who 
accord a central role to political factors. This last 
point brings us to the question of host country-foreign 
investor relations. 
It is apparent from the case studies that shifts in 
bargaining power, declining uncertainty, progress along 
learning curves and elite complicity can explain certain 
aspects of host country-foreign investor relations in 
particular situations. The Papua New Guinea government's 
bargaining position in relation to the Bougainville project 
was stronger in 197 4 than the Australian Administration's had 
been in 1967; BCL had made a major investment from which it 
could not credibly threaten to withdraw as long as it was 
allowed a 'reasonable' return, while the profitability of the 
project had been amply demonstrated and the risks 
associated with the initial investment had largely faded 
from view. The discovery of the Tynagh and Tara lead/zinc 
deposits in Ireland in 1961 and 1970, respectively, 
represented important steps in a long-term decline in 
investor uncertainty as to conditions in the host country, 
a development which certainly improved the Irish government's 
bargaining position. The Papua New Guinea and Irish 
governments did move along relevant learning curves, and 
again this increased their potential bargaining powers. 
Irish and Australian authorities did fail to exercise their 
full bargaining powers, and in the Irish case this failure 
was associated with a 'pay-off to foreign investors. 
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However, the usefulness of these concepts in 
explaining the outcome of foreign mining investments and 
in analysing host country-foreign investor relations is 
limited, partly because they do not encompass certain 
aspects of host country behaviour. For example, they ignore 
the fact that ignorance (which does not involve any element 
of complicity) can exert a major influence, and that a host 
country which perceives its interests as being compatible 
with those of the foreign investor may feel no need to 
overcome its ignorance. The concept of host country 
progress along a learning curve ignores the fact that a 
host country does not have to rely on its own resources in 
dealing with foreign mining companies, but can obtain 
expertise from abroad and thus avoid what may be the very 
substantial costs of itself acquiring expertise (that is, 
moving along a learning curve). But their usefulness is also 
limited for more fundamental reasons. 
The case studies have shown that the political factors 
which influence the host country-foreign investor 
relationship are more complex than the concepts of 'pay-off 
or -complicity- can describe. In addition, those processes 
interact with the two other factors mentioned above (the 
nature of the foreign investor and -objective- factors in 
the host country) to determine the outcome of any particular 
investment. Thus the processes which result in a given 
outcome are much more complex than concepts such as 'shifts 
in bargaining power', 'decline in uncertainty', 'learning 
curve' or 'complicity' can encompass. 
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The case studies raised a number of points in 
relation to the political factors which influence the 
foreign investment process. First, factors unrelated to 
the host country-foreign investor relationship resulted 
in outcomes which favoured the foreign investor. In 
Ireland and Australia political norms, reflected in legal 
and constitutional constraints, limited the freedom of 
action of host country authorities. Political and 
bureaucratic actors unintentionally undermined the position 
of the agency responsible for monitoring the activities of 
foreign shareholders in Zambia, and created obstacles to 
the Irish government's acquisition of relevant expertise. 
Weaknesses in the general policy-making process lessened 
Zambia's ability effectively to exercise increases in 
bargaining power. 
This last point raises another issue. In general, the 
literature referred to in Chapter One is concerned with how 
and why changes in bargaining power occur and with whether 
or not they are exercised. Insufficient attention is paid 
to the manner in which favourable shifts in bargaining power 
are utilised, or to the fact that this can influence the 
host country-foreign investor relationship and the physical 
impact of foreign mining investment. For instance, both the 
Zambian and Papua New Guinea governments were in strong 
bargaining positions in the years after their countries 
received independence, and both exercised that power to 
increase revenue from foreign mining projects. Zambia did 
so without sufficient thought for the implications of 
collecting revenue tn a particular way. while the opposite 
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was the case in Papua New Guinea. The outcome had 
implications both for host country-foreign investor 
relations (conflictual in Zambia, consensual in Papua New 
Guinea), and for the efficiency of mining operations 
(wasteful use of mineral resources in Zambia by encouraging 
high-grading, efficient use of mineral resources in Papua 
New Guinea by lightening the tax burden on marginal 
operations). 
Political processes were crucial in determining the 
outcome in each case, but these had little to do with the 
host country-foreign investor relationship. Rather they 
reflected broader historical and political factors which 
affected the whole policy-making process. 
There is also the question of whether a host country 
correctly assesses the extent to which favourable shifts in 
bargaining power have actually occurred and to which it has 
acquired the ability to duplicate the functions of the foreign 
investor. The Zambian government apparently overestimated 
the extent of both in 1969, and Zambia incurred substantial 
costs as a result; once again, weaknesses in the general 
framework of policy-making were largely responsible. 
Australia's Labor government misinterpreted the significance 
of changes in the international supply/demand situation for 
minerals, and consequently overestimated Australia's ability 
to obtain foreign capital and expertise without permitting 
direct foreign investment. 
Political processes relate to the 'objective' factors 
discussed above in a number of ways. First, policy-makers 
may take account of their existence or may fail to do so, 
and this can modify the impact of such factors on the outcome 
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of foreign mining investment. For example, after 
Independence the Zambian government was faced with certain 
'objective' factors resulting from the wage structure of 
Zambia's economy. If these had been taken into account in 
formulating employment and localisation policies towards 
the mining industry, the adverse effect of foreign mining 
investment on domestic income distribution could have been 
mitigated. Second, 'objective' factors may themselves be 
modified by appropriate government action. For instance, 
the nature of the host country's workforce may be such that 
diffusion of skills cannot occur, but appropriate educational 
policies can favourably alter its character. The relevance 
of this possibility was very evident in the Zambian case. 
The policy-making process might relate to the character 
of foreign mining companies in two ways. First, host 
country authorities may identify the type of company most 
likely to act in a manner compatible with their interests, 
and discriminate in favour of such companies in granting 
prospecting and exploration rights. For example, a country 
anxious to develop forward linkages may favour companies 
which do not already possess processing facilities elsewhere; 
a country seeking to develop backward linkages might favour 
companies not affiliated with producers of mining inputs. 
Second, as mentioned above, governments can encourage 
foreign mining companies to display certain characteristics 
(favourable or unfavourable) , particularly by their taxation 
policies. 
Given the range of factors which determines the impact 
of foreign mining investraent and the extent of interaction 
between thera, it is evident that such investment may produce 
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a very wide variety of outcomes, each on balance favourable 
or unfavourable to the host country to varying degrees. 
Thus at least in theory any of the models described in 
Chapter One might accurately depict what occurs in 
individual cases. Indeed, variations on these models Csome 
of which are mentioned below) may be required to describe 
particular instances of foreign investment, and the 
relevance of one or another might vary over time as, for 
example, changes occurred in 'objective' conditions or in 
government policies. 
If the foreign investor provides capital and expertise 
which would not otherwise be available, if host country political 
processes are such as to allow a rational pursuit of 
policy aims, and if the foreign company involved displays 
characteristics consistent with achievement of these aims, 
either of the 'compatible' models might apply. If 
conditions governing mining operations were generally 
applicable and displayed sufficient flexibility, limited 
conflict of the type envisaged by Mikesell might be avoided. 
At the moment, Papua New Guinea approximates to this model. 
If the host country does possess the ability to 
duplicate the foreign investor's functions, if political 
processes are favourable to pursuit of host country 
interests, and if the characteristics of the foreign 
investor are inimical to those interests, foreign investors 
raay, as Moran suggests, be 'pushed out' without substantial 
cost to the host country. If political processes are not 
favourable, foreign investment may continue, and an 
exploitative situation persist over extended periods of 
time. The case studies provided substantial evidence to 
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support for the points made in Chapter One in relation to 
Moran's prediction that exploitation will necessarily be 
temporary. Bureaucratic decision-makers are sometimes in 
a position to grant concessions to foreign investors 
through processes which are secret, and political actions 
which result in concessions are sometimes not associated in 
the public mind with the granting of those concessions. 
For these reasons, public pressure for termination of 
complicity does not alv;ays emerge, while the concessions 
granted by host country political actors are sometimes very 
difficult to reverse (as in the case of MINDECO's 
disbandment in Zambia). 
If political processes are such that the ability of the 
host country to duplicate the functions of the foreign 
investor is not accurately assessed, he may be 'pushed out' 
and the host country may incur substantial costs as a result, 
as occurred in Zambia, 
It is also possible that foreign investors may play a 
vital role in providing capital and expertise and may behave 
in a manner compatible with host country interests, but that 
host country authorities may fail to reap their full share 
of the benefits from mineral development because of 
ignorance on their part or because political processes affect 
their ability to do so. This would seem to have been 
generally the case in Australia. 
A basic question remains. Is the nature of foreign 
mining companies, of 'objective' factors in the host 
country and of political processes which affect the impact 
of foreign mining investments such that, in a majority of 
cases, the impact of that investment will be favourable 
or unfavourable? The evidence provided by a limited 
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number of C3S6 studiss ca.nnot pirovide a. conclusivs 
answer, but it does allow a number of points to be made. 
First, in all the case study countries foreign 
investors played a crucial role in providing scarce risk 
capital and expertise; the Australian and Zambian studies 
indicate that it is difficult for a host country to obtain 
those resources without permitting direct foreign investment. 
Thus the economic opportunities created by mineral development 
would not have arisen or would have been substantially 
diminished if foreign investment had not occurred. Second, 
the extent to which host countries grasped those 
opportunities and acted to mitigate any adverse social and 
economic costs arising from mineral development depended 
almost entirely on their ability to acquire relevant 
information and to devise effective policy-making structures. 
Host country failure to optimise benefits and minimise costs 
was almost entirely due to historical, political and 
institutional factors which militated against effective 
policy-making, and which were generally unrelated to the 
host country-foreign investor relationship. Only in Ireland 
was evidence found that foreign investors had influenced 
the decision-making process so as to bring about outcomes 
favourable to themselves. Third, the companies encountered 
in this study generally displayed characteristics which were 
compatible with pursuit of host country interests, though a 
minority did display behaviour typical of the corporate 
model described by critics of foreign mining investment. 
Multi national and international mining companies may 
all be dead in the long run, but this study demonstrates 
that it will be in the interests of many host countries to 
keep at least some such companies alive for a very long time. 
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